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St. Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologica

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  • Aquin.: SMT TP Prologue Para. 1/3 - THIRD PART (TP) OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (QQ[1]-90)
      • Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] Out. Para. 1/1 - OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
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Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] Out. Para. 1/1 - OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ?

(2) Whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is distinct
from the will of reason?

(3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ?

(4) Whether there was free-will in Christ?

(5) Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will
in the thing willed?

(6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there are two wills in Christ?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one Divine,
the other human. For the will is the first mover and first commander in
whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander was the
Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine
will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, viz. the
Divine.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

OBJ 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by the
will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the instrument of
His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own
will, but by the Divine will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

OBJ 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to the
nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for natural
things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity.
Therefore there is but one will in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

OBJ 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to will in
this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect," i.e.
our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will, since there
is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of its
species. Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there
was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt,
remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done." And
Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says: "As He
assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Lk. 22:42 he says: "His
will, He refers to the Man - the Father's, to the Godhead. For the will
of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to
have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not hold
an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place
of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since "the will is
in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9), it followed
that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was only one will
in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite nature in Christ
were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who maintained that
the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one
will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of
Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their followers,
held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ
there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that
Christ's human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch
as it was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of
Pope Agatho [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4].

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it was
decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the
following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us
concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the
Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him
and two natural operations." And this much it was necessary to say. For
it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was
shown above (Q[5]; Q[9], A[1]). Now the will pertains to the perfection
of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as the intellect,
as was stated in the FP, QQ[79],80. Hence we must say that the Son of God
assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption
of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to
His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the
FP, Q[19], A[1]. Hence it must be said that there are two wills in
Christ, i.e. one human, the other Divine.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the
bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there
was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of
other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh" in them "both to will
and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For although the will
cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by
God, as was said in the FP, Q[105], A[4]. And thus, too, Christ by His
human will followed the Divine will according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should
do Thy will, O my God, I have desired it." Hence Augustine says (Contra
Maxim. ii, 20): "Where the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but
what Thou willest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying
'He shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied
that man's will ought to be subject to God's will?"

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal
agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an
inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with
only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul
is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a horse by its rider; and an
instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the
command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like
an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic.
viii, 11). And hence it was in this manner that the human nature of
Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily follows
upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power - which is also
called will - is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with respect to
beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is neither necessary
nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the FS, Q[10],
AA[1],[2] [*Cf. FP, Q[82], A[2]]. And yet even reason itself, which is
the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence besides the Divine will
it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natural
power, or a natural movement, but even as a rational movement.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a
determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing of
which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature, "to
will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed considered
absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human will of
Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine
hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of
the Divine will.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of
reason?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of sensuality
besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
42) that "the will is in the reason, and in the sensitive appetite are
the irascible and concupiscible parts." Now sensuality signifies the
sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13) the
sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing
serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal
without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32).
Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

OBJ 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said (A[1]). But
in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ
there was only one human will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is the will which
He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow." From this we are
given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ. Now
sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the FS, Q[23], A[1];
FS, Q[25], A[1]. Therefore, seemingly, in Christ there is a will of
sensuality besides the will of reason.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

I answer that, As was said (Q[9], A[1]), the Son of God assumed human
nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human
nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the genus in
its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with the
human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which things is
the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality. Consequently it
must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appetite, or
sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual
appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be "rational
by participation," as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And
because "the will is in the reason," as stated above, it may equally be
said that the sensuality is "a will by participation."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially so called,
which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by participation can
be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent - not as regards
the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as regards the
corruption of the "fomes," which was not in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 3: "Where there is one thing on account of another, there
seems to be only one" (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface which is
visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because
the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the
rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as
there is but one human nature.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the
reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double
will in man, viz. the natural will which is called {thelesis}, and the
rational will which is called {boulesis}. Now Christ in His human nature
had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature. Hence both the
foregoing wills were in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

OBJ 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the
difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the
difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and
intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's
apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of
which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one
intellectual and the other rational.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

OBJ 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ.]
ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can only be on the part of
reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But the will
is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there
is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But
Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), the will is sometimes taken
for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken for
the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two species of acts of
the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said
in the FS, Q[8], AA[2],3, regards both the end and the means; and is
affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply
and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means
it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means
depends on something else. Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is
drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by
Damascene {thelesis} - i.e. simple will, and by the masters "will as
nature," is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything
that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and
this act of the will Damascene calls {boulesis} - i.e. counseling will,
and the masters, "will as reason." But this diversity of acts does not
diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the
object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of
the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human will, essentially
so called and not by participation; but if we are speaking of the will as
an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called
{thelesis}, and a will as reason, which is called {boulesis}.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the
act, as we have said.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as
was said in the FP, Q[79], A[8].

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct from the
will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another's evil,
absolutely considered.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there was free-will in Christ?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that {gnome}, i.e. opinion,
thinking or cogitation, and {proairesis}, i.e. choice, "cannot possibly
be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety." But in
the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore
there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which
choice is the act.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is "a
desire of something after taking counsel." Now counsel does not appear to
be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we
are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. Hence there was no
counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

OBJ 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ's will was
determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above (Q[15], AA[1]
,2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:15): "He shall eat butter and
honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good," which
is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

I answer that, As was said above (A[3]), there was a twofold act of the
will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in itself,
which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will was drawn
to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another - which
pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that will of itself regards the
end, while choice regards the means. And thus simple will is the same as
the "will as nature"; but choice is the same as the "will as reason," and
is the proper act of free-will, as was said in the FP, Q[83], A[3].
Hence, since "will as reason" is placed in Christ, we must also place
choice, and consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in
the FP, Q[83], A[3]; FS, Q[13], A[1].

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he
considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is
not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to choose,
according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the
world," although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to
choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of
whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only as
determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose, after
the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2,3). Hence if anything
is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding doubt or inquiry,
this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry
belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant
nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not
determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to
the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the Divine
will in the thing willed?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

OBJ 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything
except what God willed. For it is written (Ps. 39:9) in the person of
Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it." Now he
who desires to do another's will, wills what the other wills. Hence it
seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what was willed by His
Divine will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

OBJ 2: Further, Christ's soul had most perfect charity, which, indeed,
surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19,
"the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Now charity
makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4)
that one mark of friendship is "to will and choose the same." Therefore
the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was willed by His
Divine will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

OBJ 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints who are
comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they would
not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for
"blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will Christ wills
nothing else than does the Divine will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "When Christ
says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to have
willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been
by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His
Divine but into His human will."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

I answer that, As was said (AA[2],3), in Christ according to His human
nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality, which is
called will by participation, and the rational will, whether considered
after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason. Now it was
said above (Q[13], A[3], ad 1; Q[14], A[1], ad 2) that by a certain
dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His flesh to do
and suffer what belonged to it." And in like manner He allowed all the
powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear that the
will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt.
In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature and
what is evil in itself, as death and the like; yet the will as reason may
at time choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mere man the
sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink from burning, which,
nevertheless, the will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now
it was the will of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and
death, not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake
of man's salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and
in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did
not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God, which
appears from what He says (Mt. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt."
For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled
although He said that He willed something else by another will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be
fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does
not extend to the will of God - nor by His will considered as nature
which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the
Divine will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the
will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree,
inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to the will
of a friend.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch as
He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body. Hence things
repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite could happen
to Him in His passible flesh.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

OBJ 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in Christ. For
contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as contrariety of
movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is plain from the
Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His different wills
wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from
which He shrank in His human will, hence Athanasius says [*De Incarnat.
et Cont. Arianos, written against Apollinarius]: "When Christ says
'Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My
will, but Thine be done,' and again, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but
the flesh weak,' He denotes two wills - the human, which through the
weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion - and His Divine will eager
for the passion." Hence there was contrariety of wills in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Now when the
spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety of
wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the Holy
Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according to Is.
53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will," yet in His flesh He
shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 22:43) that "being in an agony, He
prayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle [*Greek,
{agonia}] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there
was contrariety of will in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third Council
of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess two natural wills,
not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His
human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather
being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] Body Para. 1/3

I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in
the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as regards
diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the
nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of contradiction, e.g. if
a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards
his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it is
necessary, first, that the diversity of wills should regard the same. For
if the will of one regards the doing of something with reference to some
universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same
with reference to some particular reason, there is not complete
contrariety of will, e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for
the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred wishes him
not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of
wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to
wish to hinder the public good for the private good - in that case the
opposition of wills would regard the same.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] Body Para. 2/3

Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in
the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational appetite,
and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there is no
contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change
or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case something
of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would reach the
rational will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] Body Para. 3/3

And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive
will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no
contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will nor
the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will and
the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion. For the
absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race, although
it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further;
but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend so far. Secondly,
because neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was
impeded or retarded by the natural will or the appetite of sensuality.
So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of
reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the movement of the natural
human will and the movement of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased
Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will of reason, that His natural
will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of
their nature. Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or
contrariety of wills.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something else than
did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose permission
the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15,18,19).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded by
the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in Christ
there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[18] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

Reply OBJ 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as far
as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives,
as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on
its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the
weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best
simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged
it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race
should be fulfilled by His passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in
Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of
coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18,23).





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