|Table of Contents | Words: Alphabetical - Frequency - Inverse - Length - Statistics | Help | IntraText Library|
|Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira|
Unperceived Ideol. Transship. and Dial.
IntraText CT - Text
C. The Fear‑Sympathy Syndrome
In the very psychology of countless persons in the West there is an interplay of forces which we will call the fear‑sympathy syndrome. It arouses in influential, economic, political, intellectual, and even religious sectors of society a propensity to make an accommodation with communism.5
The considerations that we make in this chapter are important for the study of the true nature of the current estrangement between Russia and Communist China.
In view of the reasons we mentioned, communism logically must renovate its methods completely in order to begin this new stage of its struggle. With each new event of importance that occurs in the Communist world ‑ such as the split between Russia and China ‑ we must look beyond the proximate and visible causes to see how it fits into the new methods and ends of the latest communist strategy. A careful observer must then consider the Sino‑Soviet dissension in this light with the keenest critical sense.
Indeed, if it is true that there are natural differences between the national interests of Russia and China, and reasons for competition between the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties for the world leadership of the communist movement, it should be noted that the split between the two "greats" of Communism presents, from the propagandistic point of view, another aspect of a wide scope. In light of the fear‑sympathy syndrome it is apparent that to the free world communist China shows a somber and aggressive face which can work on the fears of the West, while Russia's proposals of peaceful coexistence and the symptoms of its having "softened up" cause vibrations in the fibers of soul sympathetic to communism on this side of the Iron Curtain. These two faces, Russian and Chinese, are two sides of the same coin and could well be, as it were, a device for exerting a double psychological pressure on the fear‑sympathy syndrome in the public opinion of the Free World, thus serving the highest interests of communist expansionism. To understand the plausibility of this hypothesis, one must keep in mind that these interests are ultimately common to all Marxists, whether Russian or Chinese.
Similar considerations should be made about the current tendency toward some kind of reestablishment of the free enterprise system in Russia.
On one hand, if Russia, for now desisting from a suicidal war, wants to compete with the United States in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence in the field of production, it must necessarily appeal for the reestablishment, although rudimentary, of free enterprise. The Soviet experiment has proven that progress in sectors where production is least sufficient is possible in no other way.
But won't this reestablishment be used propagandistically for other purposes?
For example, will it not neutralize minds in the Free World and prepare them for the illusion that Russia is heading for a merely semisocialist democratic regime, and that the dangerous contrast between the two worlds could be eliminated if the West, in the interest of peace, consented to heavily "socialize" itself while Russia concurrently "capitalized" itself a bit?
What retreats and capitulations could the action of this illusion over fear‑sympathy syndrome predispose the free nations to make!