Part, Chapter, Paragraph
1 I, 2. 2 | opportunities and offer incentives to improve competitiveness.
2 I, 2. 5 | market reforms have improved incentives to work but still more people
3 I, 2. 5 | retirement and strengthening incentives to work longer, provided
4 II, 5. 5. 2| companies offering positive incentives for a healthier lifestyle
5 II, 5. 9. 5| performance data, parallel incentives, and creating a sense of
6 II, 5. 14. 5| problems, such as providing incentives to dentists to serve people
7 II, 5. 15. 4| the EU and describes the incentives (e.g. 10-year market exclusivity,
8 II, 5. 15. 4| of these initiatives and incentives was published in January
9 II, 5. 15. 4| represents the status of such incentives as of the end of 2005.~ ~
10 III, 10. 3. 4| flooding or offered financial incentives for citizens to increase
11 IV, 11. 1. 3| waiting lists; a lack of incentives to increase efficiency;
12 IV, 11. 1. 3| focused more on introducing incentives that were expected to improve
13 IV, 11. 1. 5| these guidelines, financial incentives (or disincentives) coupled
14 IV, 11. 1. 5| care~ ~Direct financial incentives to improve quality of service
15 IV, 11. 1. 5| Linking sanctions or financial incentives to outcomes is highly complex.
16 IV, 11. 1. 5| unclear whether financial incentives are sufficient to motivate
17 IV, 11. 1. 5| between targeted financial incentives and the behaviour of individual
18 IV, 11. 1. 5| the effects of financial incentives on physician behaviour include
19 IV, 11. 1. 5| economic rewards of financial incentives, doctors are motivated by
20 IV, 11. 1. 5| longer motivated by financial incentives i.e. no linear relationship
21 IV, 11. 1. 5| linear relationship between incentives and impact (Rizzo and Blumenthal,
22 IV, 11. 1. 5| lessons regarding financial incentives that can be taken from the
23 IV, 11. 1. 6| providers create powerful incentives that affect provider behaviour
24 IV, 11. 1. 6| have different inherent incentives. Fee-for-service systems
25 IV, 11. 1. 6| poor. These theoretical incentives of different remuneration
26 IV, 11. 1. 6| moderate these negative incentives. Table 11.3 shows the physician
27 IV, 11. 1. 6| In consideration of the incentives for each method, some alternative
28 IV, 11. 1. 6| need to balance conflicting incentives falls within the scope of
29 IV, 11. 1. 6| Thus additional quality incentives have been developed alongside
30 IV, 11. 1. 6| DRG system depends on the incentives that are created, and whether
31 IV, 11. 1. 6| associated to several possible incentives, many of which have been
32 IV, 11. 1. 6| of the numerous perverse incentives, some countries make use
33 IV, 11. 3. 1| health issues. Financial incentives related to training, such
34 IV, 11. 3. 1| Austria and Germany. Financial incentives linked to the payment mechanism
35 IV, 11. 3. 2| medicines, and provide economic incentives for the industry to thrive.
36 IV, 11. 3. 2| currently do not provide incentives to reward the therapeutic
37 IV, 11. 3. 2| For example, financial incentives for pharmacists such as
38 IV, 11. 3. 2| Czech Republic) financial incentives are instead placed on patients
39 IV, 11. 3. 2| are given the appropriate incentives to prescribe generics when
40 IV, 11. 3. 2| initiatives focusing on incentives for physicians, such as
41 IV, 11. 3. 2| of this different type of incentives is not conclusive. Their
42 IV, 11. 6. 2| quality care, providing incentives for efficiency (WHO 2006).~ ~
43 IV, 11. 6. 2| not outweigh the strong incentives to select favourable risks.~ ~
44 IV, 11. 6. 2| mechanisms are used to limit the incentives for funds to cream skim
45 IV, 11. 6. 2| Bulgaria, and Slovenia - tax incentives to purchase PHI are in place,
46 IV, 11. 6. 2| al 2008).~ ~There are tax incentives to purchase PHI in some
47 IV, 11. 6. 2| to reduce or remove tax incentives in some countries as they
48 IV, 11. 6. 2| for PHI. There are no tax incentives for individuals to purchase
49 IV, 11. 6. 4| efficiency because it reduces incentives for risk selection (in social
50 IV, 11. 6. 4| still have strong financial incentives towards risk select, while
51 IV, 11. 6. 5| Effects of financial incentives on medical practice: results
52 IV, 11. 6. 5| more than money: financial incentives and internal motivation."
53 IV, 11. 6. 5| Merkur S et al. (2006): Incentives and Payment Systems in Austria.
54 IV, 11. 6. 5| et al. (2005): "Provider incentives and prescribing in Europe."
55 IV, 11. 6. 5| and Blending of Payment Incentives within Physician Organizations."
56 IV, 11. 6. 5| for quality: providers' incentives for quality improvement. ."
57 IV, 11. 6. 5| Sappington D (1991): "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships."
58 IV, 11. 6. 5| Mossialos E (2004): Financial incentives and prescribing. Regulating
59 IV, 12. 10 | Funds can grant (financial) incentives to their members for taking
60 IV, 12. 10 | merging, for which there are incentives, or by reforming municipal
61 IV, 13. 7. 2| investments and thus greater incentives for expanding private investment
62 IV, 13. 9 | Interplay of Health Policy, Incentives and Regulations in the Treatment
63 Key, Ap5. 0. 0| impotence~inactivity~incentive~incentives~incineration~incineration~
