Part, Chapter, Paragraph
1 II, 8. 2. 2| rehabilitation, welfare payments, lost taxation revenue and
2 IV, 11. 1. 3| clinical guidelines and linking payments to performance and quality
3 IV, 11. 1. 3| introduced activity-based payments to increase productivity (
4 IV, 11. 1. 6| Fee-for-service.~Salary, with bonus payments for performance.~Negotiable
5 IV, 11. 1. 6| selected services, target payments for immunization), 14% by
6 IV, 11. 1. 6| allowance, and additional payments for training and distance
7 IV, 11. 1. 6| payment (capitation and target~payments for preventive care).~100%
8 IV, 11. 1. 6| Slovenia~Salary and bonus payments.~Salary (with public contract);
9 IV, 11. 1. 6| increasingly case-based payments (often referred to as diagnosis
10 IV, 11. 1. 6| and expected activity: DRG payments are combined with risk-adjusted
11 IV, 11. 3. 2| higher margins or additional payments may provide an incentive
12 IV, 11. 6. 2| and direct out-of-pocket payments (though calculations of
13 IV, 11. 6. 2| cost sharing and direct payments) (see below).~ ~European
14 IV, 11. 6. 2| expenditure from out-of-pocket payments, compared to 66% in EU Member
15 IV, 11. 6. 2| predominant sources: out-of-pocket payments and private insurance. Out-of-pocket
16 IV, 11. 6. 2| insurance. Out-of-pocket payments constitute the large share
17 IV, 11. 6. 2| although out-of-pocket payments represent an important financing
18 IV, 11. 6. 2| PHI) and out-of-pocket payments, though in all countries
19 IV, 11. 6. 2| expenditure is from out-of-pocket payments (see below). The agents
20 IV, 11. 6. 2| widespread use of informal payments and the reluctance to pay
21 IV, 11. 6. 2| increases.~ ~ ~Out-of-pocket payments~ ~Out-of-pocket payments
22 IV, 11. 6. 2| payments~ ~Out-of-pocket payments can come in broadly three
23 IV, 11. 6. 2| broadly three forms: direct payments (‘pure private’ payments),
24 IV, 11. 6. 2| payments (‘pure private’ payments), cost sharing (individuals
25 IV, 11. 6. 2| care received) and informal payments (unofficial payments for
26 IV, 11. 6. 2| informal payments (unofficial payments for services that should
27 IV, 11. 6. 2| al 2008).~ ~Out-of-pocket payments comprise a substantial proportion
28 IV, 11. 6. 2| disaggregation of out-of-pocket payments into cost sharing, direct
29 IV, 11. 6. 2| into cost sharing, direct payments and, if recorded, informal
30 IV, 11. 6. 2| and, if recorded, informal payments. Since 1996 out-of-pocket
31 IV, 11. 6. 2| Since 1996 out-of-pocket payments have become an increasing
32 IV, 11. 6. 2| increase in out-of-pocket payments may be due to an increase
33 IV, 11. 6. 2| in direct and/or informal payments. On the contrary, Cyprus,
34 IV, 11. 6. 2| the share of out-of-pocket payments (WHO 2007, cited in Thomson,
35 IV, 11. 6. 2| Figure 11.19. Out-of-pocket payments (households) as a proportion
36 IV, 11. 6. 2| expenditure, 2004~ ~Informal payments~ ~In central and Eastern
37 IV, 11. 6. 2| increase in out-of-pocket payments in the 1990s (Preker et
38 IV, 11. 6. 2| By definition, informal payments are made without any record
39 IV, 11. 6. 2| studies indicate that informal payments have come to represent a
40 IV, 11. 6. 2| CIS countries. Informal payments constitute about 30% of
41 IV, 11. 6. 2| the prevalence of informal payments among service users highlight
42 IV, 11. 6. 2| across countries. Informal payments are mainly associated with
43 IV, 11. 6. 2| specialist visits involved payments in Slovakia (Vagac and Haulikova,
44 IV, 11. 6. 2| of patients made informal payments sometimes, while 5.7% made
45 IV, 11. 6. 2| sometimes, while 5.7% made payments on almost every visit (Vagac
46 IV, 11. 6. 2| In Bulgaria, informal payments are more common in Sofia,
47 IV, 11. 6. 2| 2002). In Romania, informal payments are prevalent and may account
48 IV, 11. 6. 2| Bulgaria, out-of-pocket payments (including both formal and
49 IV, 11. 6. 2| both formal and informal payments) increased from 9% of total
50 IV, 11. 6. 2| evidence on how informal payments affect utilization, patients
51 IV, 11. 6. 2| implications of informal payments is that they undermine governments’
52 IV, 11. 6. 3| distributed within the population. Payments are progressive if higher
53 IV, 11. 6. 3| for contribution rates; payments are progressive up to a
54 IV, 11. 6. 3| in the public system, the payments become regressive (De Graeve
55 IV, 11. 6. 3| arrangements towards out-of-pocket payments by individuals and households
56 IV, 11. 6. 3| the goal that healthcare payments should not be linked to
57 IV, 11. 6. 3| ability to pay and healthcare payments. Thus, a fair system of
58 IV, 11. 6. 3| households with catastrophic payments (defined as representing
59 IV, 11. 6. 3| households reporting catastrophic payments. Note that comparisons between
60 IV, 11. 6. 4| inadequate financing and informal payments have led to the exclusion
61 IV, 11. 6. 4| Sections on out-of-pocket payments and informal payments).
62 IV, 11. 6. 4| out-of-pocket payments and informal payments). Benefits packages or catalogues
63 IV, 11. 6. 5| Understanding informal payments for health care: the example
64 IV, 11. 6. 5| Hanvoravongchai P (2003): "Provider payments and patient charges as policy
