Part,  Chapter, Paragraph

 1    I,     2.  2    |          opportunities and offer incentives to improve competitiveness.
 2    I,     2.  5    |     market reforms have improved incentives to work but still more people
 3    I,     2.  5    |     retirement and strengthening incentives to work longer, provided
 4   II,     5.  5.  2|      companies offering positive incentives for a healthier lifestyle
 5   II,     5.  9.  5|       performance data, parallel incentives, and creating a sense of
 6   II,     5. 14.  5|      problems, such as providing incentives to dentists to serve people
 7   II,     5. 15.  4|         the EU and describes the incentives (e.g. 10-year market exclusivity,
 8   II,     5. 15.  4|         of these initiatives and incentives was published in January
 9   II,     5. 15.  4|    represents the status of such incentives as of the end of 2005.~ ~
10  III,    10.  3.  4|    flooding or offered financial incentives for citizens to increase
11   IV,    11.  1.  3|         waiting lists; a lack of incentives to increase efficiency;
12   IV,    11.  1.  3|      focused more on introducing incentives that were expected to improve
13   IV,    11.  1.  5|      these guidelines, financial incentives (or disincentives) coupled
14   IV,    11.  1.  5|          care~ ~Direct financial incentives to improve quality of service
15   IV,    11.  1.  5|   Linking sanctions or financial incentives to outcomes is highly complex.
16   IV,    11.  1.  5|        unclear whether financial incentives are sufficient to motivate
17   IV,    11.  1.  5|       between targeted financial incentives and the behaviour of individual
18   IV,    11.  1.  5|         the effects of financial incentives on physician behaviour include
19   IV,    11.  1.  5|    economic rewards of financial incentives, doctors are motivated by
20   IV,    11.  1.  5|    longer motivated by financial incentives i.e. no linear relationship
21   IV,    11.  1.  5|      linear relationship between incentives and impact (Rizzo and Blumenthal,
22   IV,    11.  1.  5|      lessons regarding financial incentives that can be taken from the
23   IV,    11.  1.  6|        providers create powerful incentives that affect provider behaviour
24   IV,    11.  1.  6|          have different inherent incentives. Fee-for-service systems
25   IV,    11.  1.  6|          poor. These theoretical incentives of different remuneration
26   IV,    11.  1.  6|          moderate these negative incentives. Table 11.3 shows the physician
27   IV,    11.  1.  6|          In consideration of the incentives for each method, some alternative
28   IV,    11.  1.  6|      need to balance conflicting incentives falls within the scope of
29   IV,    11.  1.  6|          Thus additional quality incentives have been developed alongside
30   IV,    11.  1.  6|        DRG system depends on the incentives that are created, and whether
31   IV,    11.  1.  6|   associated to several possible incentives, many of which have been
32   IV,    11.  1.  6|         of the numerous perverse incentives, some countries make use
33   IV,    11.  3.  1|         health issues. Financial incentives related to training, such
34   IV,    11.  3.  1|   Austria and Germany. Financial incentives linked to the payment mechanism
35   IV,    11.  3.  2|  medicines, and provide economic incentives for the industry to thrive.
36   IV,    11.  3.  2|         currently do not provide incentives to reward the therapeutic
37   IV,    11.  3.  2|           For example, financial incentives for pharmacists such as
38   IV,    11.  3.  2|        Czech Republic) financial incentives are instead placed on patients
39   IV,    11.  3.  2|        are given the appropriate incentives to prescribe generics when
40   IV,    11.  3.  2|          initiatives focusing on incentives for physicians, such as
41   IV,    11.  3.  2|        of this different type of incentives is not conclusive. Their
42   IV,    11.  6.  2|          quality care, providing incentives for efficiency (WHO 2006).~ ~
43   IV,    11.  6.  2|          not outweigh the strong incentives to select favourable risks.~ ~
44   IV,    11.  6.  2| mechanisms are used to limit the incentives for funds to cream skim
45   IV,    11.  6.  2|     Bulgaria, and Slovenia - tax incentives to purchase PHI are in place,
46   IV,    11.  6.  2|        al 2008).~ ~There are tax incentives to purchase PHI in some
47   IV,    11.  6.  2|          to reduce or remove tax incentives in some countries as they
48   IV,    11.  6.  2|        for PHI. There are no tax incentives for individuals to purchase
49   IV,    11.  6.  4|    efficiency because it reduces incentives for risk selection (in social
50   IV,    11.  6.  4|      still have strong financial incentives towards risk select, while
51   IV,    11.  6.  5|             Effects of financial incentives on medical practice: results
52   IV,    11.  6.  5|       more than money: financial incentives and internal motivation."
53   IV,    11.  6.  5|          Merkur S et al. (2006): Incentives and Payment Systems in Austria.
54   IV,    11.  6.  5|         et al. (2005): "Provider incentives and prescribing in Europe."
55   IV,    11.  6.  5|          and Blending of Payment Incentives within Physician Organizations."
56   IV,    11.  6.  5|          for quality: providers' incentives for quality improvement. ."
57   IV,    11.  6.  5|            Sappington D (1991): "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships."
58   IV,    11.  6.  5|    Mossialos E (2004): Financial incentives and prescribing. Regulating
59   IV,    12. 10    |      Funds can grant (financial) incentives to their members for taking
60   IV,    12. 10    |     merging, for which there are incentives, or by reforming municipal
61   IV,    13.  7.  2|     investments and thus greater incentives for expanding private investment
62   IV,    13.  9    |      Interplay of Health Policy, Incentives and Regulations in the Treatment
63  Key,   Ap5.  0.  0|   impotence~inactivity~incentive~incentives~incineration~incineration~