Part, Question
1 1, 6 | ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according ~
2 1, 11 | many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be ~communicated
3 1, 11 | communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes ~
4 1, 11 | as there cannot be many Socrates, so there ~could not in
5 1, 14 | matter. Hence he who knows Socrates ~because he is white, or
6 1, 14 | sight, as when ~I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another
7 1, 14 | saying is contingent, ~"Socrates is a white man." But this
8 1, 14 | an ass, as that I ~said Socrates runs, or God is: and the
9 1, 14 | says that this sentence, "Socrates ~sits," is true when he
10 1, 16 | But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the
11 1, 16 | mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the
12 1, 16 | the three propositions, ~"Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore
13 1, 16 | therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is ~true, as long
14 1, 16 | signifies a true opinion. When Socrates ~rises, the first truth
15 1, 16 | Reply OBJ 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the
16 1, 16 | truth of ~the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same
17 1, 16 | not the same meaning when Socrates ~sits, after he sits, and
18 1, 19 | it is not ~necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not
19 1, 25 | with ~the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible
20 1, 25 | impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be ~running is accidentally
21 1, 25 | could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he ~should not
22 1, 25 | contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not ~
23 1, 25 | instance, the ~running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past
24 1, 30 | determinate thing; ~as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and
25 1, 31 | is this man? we answer, ~Socrates, which is the name of the "
26 1, 31 | predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone writes," we do not
27 1, 31 | writes," we do not mean ~that Socrates is solitary, but that he
28 1, 31 | predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates" - that is, no ~one else - "
29 1, 31 | no ~one else - "runs: and Socrates runs only" - that is, he
30 1, 31 | cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."~Aquin.:
31 1, 31 | follow that if we say ~"Socrates alone is white," that therefore "
32 1, 39 | reason ~why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three
33 1, 39 | particular subject. ~For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else
34 1, 41 | begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So
35 1, 41 | otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither ~can paternity
36 1, 75 | though this particular man, Socrates, ~for instance, is not a
37 1, 76 | white. So ~when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it
38 1, 76 | therefore say either that ~Socrates understands by virtue of
39 1, 76 | intelligence is a part ~of Socrates. The first cannot stand,
40 1, 76 | that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of
41 1, 76 | understands is a part of Socrates, ~so that in some way it
42 1, 76 | is united to the body of Socrates.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[
43 1, 76 | intellect is the act of Socrates. ~This can be clearly seen
44 1, 76 | it does not follow that ~Socrates, in whom are the phantasms,
45 1, 76 | The reason therefore why ~Socrates understands is not because
46 1, 76 | Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a ~nature
47 1, 76 | the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing
48 1, 76 | cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is ~
49 1, 76 | understanding is attributed to ~Socrates, as the action of what moves
50 1, 76 | Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above ~
51 1, 76 | cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, ~however, Socrates
52 1, 76 | Socrates. If, ~however, Socrates be a whole composed of a
53 1, 76 | whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect
54 1, 76 | a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one ~absolutely,
55 1, 76 | For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and
56 1, 76 | The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no ~other
57 1, 76 | it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are ~otherwise
58 1, 76 | pentagonal - so neither is Socrates a man ~by one soul, and
59 1, 39 | reason ~why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three
60 1, 39 | particular subject. ~For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else
61 1, 41 | begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So
62 1, 41 | otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither ~can paternity
63 1, 74 | though this particular man, Socrates, ~for instance, is not a
64 1, 75 | white. So ~when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it
65 1, 75 | therefore say either that ~Socrates understands by virtue of
66 1, 75 | intelligence is a part ~of Socrates. The first cannot stand,
67 1, 75 | that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of
68 1, 75 | understands is a part of Socrates, ~so that in some way it
69 1, 75 | is united to the body of Socrates.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[
70 1, 75 | intellect is the act of Socrates. ~This can be clearly seen
71 1, 75 | it does not follow that ~Socrates, in whom are the phantasms,
72 1, 75 | The reason therefore why ~Socrates understands is not because
73 1, 75 | Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a ~nature
74 1, 75 | the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing
75 1, 75 | cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is ~
76 1, 75 | understanding is attributed to ~Socrates, as the action of what moves
77 1, 75 | Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above ~
78 1, 75 | cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, ~however, Socrates
79 1, 75 | Socrates. If, ~however, Socrates be a whole composed of a
80 1, 75 | whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect
81 1, 75 | a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one ~absolutely,
82 1, 75 | For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and
83 1, 75 | The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no ~other
84 1, 75 | it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are ~otherwise
85 1, 75 | pentagonal - so neither is Socrates a man ~by one soul, and
86 1, 83 | immovable; for ~instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet
87 1, 84 | man before it seen to ~be Socrates or Plato; and the same is
88 1, 84 | that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these
89 1, 85 | knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs
90 1, 85 | intellect knows this ~singular, Socrates.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[
91 1, 85 | forms the proposition "Socrates is a man." Wherefore the
92 1, 85 | necessary: for example, that ~Socrates runs, is in itself contingent;
93 1, 85 | for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. ~Now contingency
94 1, 86 | place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives ~that
95 2, 7 | said to be an ~accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is
96 2, 7 | and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, when ~such accidents
97 2, 14 | work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a ~necessary
98 2, 51 | nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato ~to be prone to
99 2, 58 | This was the opinion ~of Socrates, who said "every virtue
100 2, 58 | truth in the ~saying of Socrates that so long as a man is
101 2, 58 | be not right reason, as Socrates ~held, yet not only is it "
102 2, 77 | vii, 2), the opinion of ~Socrates was that knowledge can never
103 2, 47 | since it is necessary that Socrates sit, ~so long as he sits.~
104 2, 78 | speaks after the ~manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues
105 2, 81 | Dict. Memor. ~vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask
106 2, 93 | present, ~as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the
107 2, 97 | in another respect. Thus Socrates ~and Plato belong to the
108 3, 2 | thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of
109 3, 16 | and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence, ~since
110 3, 16 | was ~made God"; even as if Socrates, who was already a man,
111 3, 17 | be white is the being ~of Socrates, not as he is Socrates,
112 3, 17 | of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white.
113 3, 17 | person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct ~from
114 3, 17 | as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place ~one being inasmuch
115 3, 17 | to the personal being of Socrates. ~But being possessed of
116 3, 17 | pertain to the one person of Socrates, and hence there arises
117 3, 17 | these only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that
118 3, 17 | that after ~the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued
119 3, 17 | would be ~thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to
120 3, 24 | risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human nature,
121 3, 32 | imperfect ~sense: thus, because Socrates is said to be naturally
122 3, 42 | Gentiles, Pythagoras and Socrates, who were teachers of great ~
123 Suppl, 76| identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are two men and ~
124 Suppl, 89| sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of ~Diares; a friend
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