Part, Question
1 1, 5 | virtuous, the useful, and the ~pleasant?~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[1]
2 1, 5 | virtuous*, the useful and ~the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the
3 1, 5 | virtuous, ~the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided
4 1, 5 | virtuous, the ~useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament.
5 1, 5 | to divided against ~the pleasant and the virtuous.~Aquin.:
6 1, 5 | desired, is ~called the pleasant. ~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[5] A[
7 1, 5 | are desirable except the pleasant, being ~sometimes hurtful
8 1, 5 | the virtuous; then of the ~pleasant; and lastly of the useful.~
9 1, 19 | takes ~a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to
10 1, 77 | straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but ~because
11 1, 80 | sense or imagine something ~pleasant, which reason forbids, or
12 1, 81 | notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable
13 1, 101 | sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical ~
14 2, 1 | every taste the sweet is pleasant but to ~some, the sweetness
15 2, 1 | sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness
16 2, 1 | absolutely the best of ~all pleasant things, in which he who
17 2, 26 | goodness." But ~useful and pleasant friendship are not without
18 2, 26 | friendship of the useful or ~pleasant, in so far as it is connected
19 2, 27 | beautiful" is ~something pleasant to apprehend.~Aquin.: SMT
20 2, 29 | than on seeking what is ~pleasant: thus also irrational animals
21 2, 30 | craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold,
22 2, 31 | is for the sake of the ~pleasant is principally sight. But
23 2, 31 | which is for the sake of the pleasant: ~whereas the sight is a
24 2, 31 | 6) that some things ~are pleasant "not from nature but from
25 2, 32 | the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as ~possessed
26 2, 32 | Reply OBJ 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are ~
27 2, 32 | longer ~proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful
28 2, 32 | pertaining to repose, ~are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish
29 2, 32 | toilsome and fatiguing are not ~pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore
30 2, 32 | are accustomed to, are ~pleasant," as the Philosopher says (
31 2, 32 | these ~three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (
32 2, 32 | are concerned, change ~is pleasant to us because our nature
33 2, 32 | united to us, change is ~pleasant. Because the continued action
34 2, 32 | continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the ~measure
35 2, 32 | of that object ~becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge
36 2, 32 | itself (change becomes ~pleasant), because man desires to
37 2, 32 | change in ~such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass
38 2, 32 | What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes ~
39 2, 32 | custom and movement become pleasant.~~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[
40 2, 32 | apprehension of something ~pleasant.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[
41 2, 32 | are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far as
42 2, 32 | manner the recollection of pleasant things, ~by reason of these
43 2, 32 | OBJ 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from
44 2, 32 | pleasing to us: since it is pleasant to ~be benefited by another.
45 2, 32 | something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired
46 2, 32 | ii, 2) that "it is most ~pleasant to give presents or assistance
47 2, 32 | good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses ~
48 2, 32 | suffer for a ~friend is pleasant, because love is the principal
49 2, 32 | ill. For it is naturally ~pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as
50 2, 32 | as stated above. It is pleasant to ~an angry man to punish,
51 2, 32 | another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing ~evil to
52 2, 32 | evil to another is not pleasant, except in so far as it
53 2, 32 | good to others, which is pleasant.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[
54 2, 32 | i, 2. ~But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know,
55 2, 32 | acquired by custom, are pleasant. But "we ~wonder at what
56 2, 32 | 1/1~I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires,
57 2, 32 | even of those which are not pleasant in ~themselves, give rise
58 2, 32 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to
59 2, 32 | rare ~occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge,
60 2, 34 | virtuous, the ~useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous
61 2, 34 | without being ~good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with
62 2, 35 | more eagerly for something pleasant: thus ~a thirsty man seeks
63 2, 35 | Consequently, since love is pleasant, ~both pain and whatever
64 2, 35 | remind ~us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we
65 2, 35 | contemplate something suitable and pleasant. ~Consequently if the pleasure
66 2, 35 | fact that contemplation is pleasant in ~itself: for pleasure
67 2, 35 | apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these
68 2, 35 | the suitableness of ~the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow
69 2, 35 | it becomes in a manner pleasant and ~agreeable by way of
70 2, 36 | Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause
71 2, 36 | of pain. ~But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher
72 2, 36 | no separation would be ~pleasant: and this is clearly untrue
73 2, 36 | repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man
74 2, 36 | OBJ 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes ~
75 2, 38 | just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore
76 2, 38 | actual disposition, is always pleasant ~to him. Now tears and groans
77 2, 38 | consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as ~
78 2, 38 | cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; ~but the cause of
79 2, 38 | man's good and naturally pleasant to him.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
80 2, 46 | things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. ~for
81 2, 48 | that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell ~on the thought
82 2, 48 | imaginings of dreams are ~pleasant. Accordingly an angry man
83 2, 53 | nature; wherefore it is pleasant to act ~from habit. Now
84 2, 60 | two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming ~
85 2, 78 | and this, ~because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire,
86 2, 25 | present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods
87 2, 36 | instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter
88 2, 57 | that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. ~Accordingly, to
89 2, 104 | fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery." ~
90 2, 112 | Behold how good and how pleasant it is for ~brethren to dwell
91 2, 139 | of the other senses ~are pleasant on account of their becomingness,
92 2, 139 | savors, which make the food ~pleasant to eat, in so far as they
93 2, 139 | the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of ~
94 2, 139 | temperate man also desires other pleasant ~things," those namely that
95 2, 139 | temperate man makes use ~of pleasant things provided that not
96 2, 143 | with the useful and the pleasant;~(4) Whether honesty is
97 2, 143 | from the useful and the pleasant?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[
98 2, 143 | from the useful and ~the pleasant. For the honest is "what
99 2, 143 | does not ~differ from the pleasant.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[
100 2, 143 | with the useful ~and the pleasant, but it differs from them
101 2, 143 | honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in ~the one subject.~
102 2, 143 | referred to something else. The pleasant, however, ~extends to more
103 2, 143 | while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for ~its
104 2, 166 | and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy ~
105 2, 166 | are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are ~
106 Suppl, 49| virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous
107 Suppl, 72| fitting place for him and more pleasant to look upon. Now ~in order
108 Suppl, 83| Ethic. ix, 9), "Life ~is pleasant to all, for all desire to
109 Suppl, 83| just ~as life is simply pleasant, but not the life that is
110 Suppl, 87| that which is desirable or pleasant can have an ~admixture of
111 Suppl, 88| is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas excess of light ~
112 Suppl, 88| excess of light ~will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety,
113 Suppl, 94| Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as ~stated in Metaph.
|