Part, Question
1 1, 1 | highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge
2 1, 5 | that it is in some way desirable. Hence the ~Philosopher
3 1, 5 | is ~clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is
4 1, 5 | signifies perfection which is ~desirable; and consequently of ultimate
5 1, 5 | goodness has the ~aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence
6 1, 5 | to some non-existence is desirable; for it ~is said of Judas: "
7 1, 5 | Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, ~and
8 1, 5 | since it has the ~aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
9 1, 5 | Reply OBJ 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only ~
10 1, 5 | removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil
11 1, 5 | removal of an evil cannot be ~desirable, except so far as this evil
12 1, 5 | being. ~Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being
13 1, 5 | wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as ~they are
14 1, 5 | goodness. Consequently, to be ~desirable is not its property, but
15 1, 5 | for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above AA[1],3).
16 1, 5 | is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of ~the movement
17 1, 5 | formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being ~
18 1, 5 | to ~such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired
19 1, 5 | predicated of such as are desirable in themselves. ~Aquin.:
20 1, 6 | hence the ~agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good.
21 1, 6 | the very thing ~which is desirable in it is the participation
22 1, 16 | good, is in the ~object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
23 1, 16 | goodness passes on from ~the desirable thing to the appetite, in
24 1, 16 | has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is ~related to
25 1, 16 | adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation
26 1, 16 | perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
27 1, 16 | Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, ~
28 1, 16 | in the order of things ~desirable; but not that it is prior
29 1, 26 | answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude,
30 1, 44 | because nothing is good and desirable except ~forasmuch as it
31 1, 45 | because nothing is good and desirable except ~forasmuch as it
32 1, 78 | otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, ~
33 1, 79 | desires some particular desirable thing - namely its ~own
34 1, 79 | this object which is the ~desirable in general, we should not
35 1, 80 | borne ~towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation
36 1, 86 | may say that health ~is desirable on account of life, and
37 1, 86 | and therefore life is more desirable ~still. But if we take things
38 1, 86 | follow ~that medicine is more desirable than health, for health
39 1, 95 | every man's proper good is desirable to himself, ~and consequently
40 1, 104 | unmoved. But such also is the desirable ~object when apprehended.
41 2, 2 | But ~nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since
42 2, 2 | since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary ~to that
43 2, 2 | motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, ~i.e.
44 2, 4 | reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet ~more desirable.
45 2, 4 | desirable, is yet ~more desirable. But operations are desired
46 2, 5 | of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they ~have the
47 2, 14 | not rank ~so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge
48 2, 29 | the light of something ~desirable, while being and true are
49 2, 29 | considered in itself, is a desirable thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
50 2, 35 | Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good
51 2, 84 | a universal good is more desirable than a particular good,
52 2, 108 | shows that an oath ~is not desirable as a good thing; and that
53 2, 32 | are ~effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore
54 2, 87 | act?~(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently
55 2, 87 | Para. 1/1~Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently
56 2, 87 | would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently ~
57 2, 87 | and consequently oaths are desirable as being good ~essentially.~
58 2, 87 | reverence and ~love of God are desirable as something good essentially.
59 2, 87 | assertion. ~Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.~Aquin.:
60 2, 87 | among those things that are desirable for ~their own sake, but
61 2, 87 | among those things ~that are desirable for their own sake, but
62 2, 87 | held as a good thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains
63 2, 116 | and so forth, which are ~desirable under another aspect. Wherefore
64 2, 116 | because when an ~end is very desirable, the result is that through
65 2, 116 | good or evil. Now the most desirable end ~is happiness or felicity,
66 2, 116 | conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the ~
67 2, 116 | directed to an end that is ~desirable principally, indeed it seems
68 2, 127 | they be little, are very desirable, as being ~necessary for
69 2, 130 | follows that it is most desirable. And since ~many vices arise
70 2, 134 | of the ~soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore
71 2, 139 | or to deem any of them desirable for ~its own sake, and commanding
72 2, 140 | of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither ~flesh
73 2, 143 | thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore ~
74 2, 143 | so far as the latter is desirable ~for the sake of something
75 2, 143 | the honest ~is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero,
76 2, 143 | For the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" ~[*Cicero,
77 2, 143 | honest is that ~which is desirable for its own sake: the useful
78 2, 146 | i.e. as having a most ~desirable end, other vices originate:
79 2, 146 | an end is rendered most ~desirable through having one of the
80 2, 146 | conditions of happiness which is ~desirable by its very nature: and
81 2, 146 | sustaining of life, is most desirable ~and whereas life cannot
82 2, 146 | follows that food ~too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the
83 2, 146 | sin which has the ~most desirable end surpasses the others
84 2, 146 | which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and ~consequently
85 2, 146 | that which is useful is ~desirable, not in itself, but as directed
86 2, 151 | vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire ~
87 2, 151 | Wherefore this pleasure is very ~desirable as regards the sensitive
88 2, 154 | things that are of themselves desirable.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[156] A[
89 2, 156 | capital vice to have a ~most desirable end, so that many sins are
90 2, 156 | aspect of good, has a ~more desirable end than hatred has, since
91 Suppl, 87| itself. Hence that which is desirable or pleasant can have an ~
92 Suppl, 95| not to be cannot be more ~desirable to the damned than "to be."~
93 Suppl, 95| unhappiness of this world, it is ~desirable to some to die, wherefore
94 Suppl, 95| therefore, is "not to be" desirable to the ~damned according
95 Suppl, 95| and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect
96 Suppl, 96| wishes that which is not desirable for its own ~sake, except
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