Part, Question
1 1, 17 | affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from ~the
2 1, 17 | judge that we experience sensation. ~Since, however, sense
3 1, 17 | but not about the fact of ~sensation.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[17] A[
4 1, 18 | life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and ~understanding.
5 1, 18 | would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and ~the
6 1, 18 | have a nature capable ~of sensation or understanding. Thus,
7 1, 27 | and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be
8 1, 27 | actions; for ~the act of sensation is perfected by the action
9 1, 51 | 2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function.
10 1, 51 | fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this
11 1, 54 | object. But the act of ~sensation is relatively infinite,
12 1, 70 | of these operations, as sensation ~and nutrition, our body
13 1, 72 | desire of ~propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are
14 1, 75 | organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent operations
15 1, 75 | shown above (A[3]) that sensation is not the operation of ~
16 1, 75 | soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man,
17 1, 75 | through supposing that sensation was ~proper to the soul,
18 1, 76 | principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local ~movement; and
19 1, 77 | Somno et Vigilia i) that ~"sensation belongs neither to the soul,
20 1, 77 | Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper ~
21 1, 77 | body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed ~from the
22 1, 52 | 2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function.
23 1, 52 | fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this
24 1, 55 | object. But the act of ~sensation is relatively infinite,
25 1, 71 | of these operations, as sensation ~and nutrition, our body
26 1, 71 | desire of ~propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are
27 1, 74 | organ. On the other hand, sensation and the ~consequent operations
28 1, 74 | shown above (A[3]) that sensation is not the operation of ~
29 1, 74 | soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man,
30 1, 74 | through supposing that sensation was ~proper to the soul,
31 1, 75 | principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local ~movement; and
32 1, 76 | Somno et Vigilia i) that ~"sensation belongs neither to the soul,
33 1, 76 | Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper ~
34 1, 76 | body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed ~from the
35 1, 77 | only at the actual time of sensation, but ~also when it is absent.
36 1, 83 | his senses, to the act ~of sensation - by instruction or discovery,
37 1, 83 | produced in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that ~
38 1, 88 | soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet ~
39 1, 96 | man was passible. ~For "sensation is a kind of passion." But
40 1, 96 | Thus understanding and sensation are said ~to be passions.
41 1, 96 | first two objections; since ~sensation and sleep do not remove
42 2, 6 | reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious ~habit.~
43 2, 32 | is that which arises from sensation which requires the ~presence
44 2, 47 | incapable of sorrow and sensation; and ~this is chiefly what
45 2, 84 | other ~members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from
46 2, 42 | because our nourishment, sensation, and ~understanding ought
47 2, 171 | for objects of external sensation. Yet ~this abstraction from
48 2, 177 | the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the ~life
49 2, 177 | says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation and ~understanding are movements
50 3, 15 | suffer in this way through sensation and intelligence, as was ~
51 Suppl, 3 | world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some hurts
52 Suppl, 3 | sorrow is on account of the sensation of ~hurt, so interior sorrow
53 Suppl, 32| movement proceeding from sensation (De Anima ii). ~Hence the
54 Suppl, 79| impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?~Aquin.:
55 Suppl, 79| impassibility excludes actual sensation from ~glorified bodies.
56 Suppl, 79| Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11), ~"sensation is a kind of passion." But
57 Suppl, 79| they will not have actual sensation.~Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[
58 Suppl, 79| alteration which is requisite for sensation.~Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[
59 Suppl, 79| Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new perception, ~
60 Suppl, 79| there will be no actual sensation.~Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[
61 Suppl, 79| soul will have no actual sensation whatever.~Aquin.: SMT XP
62 Suppl, 79| Therefore there will be actual sensation.~Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[
63 Suppl, 79| distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement." Now there
64 Suppl, 79| there will also be actual sensation.~Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[
65 Suppl, 79| agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies ~of the blessed:
66 Suppl, 79| opinion as to the mode of sensation.~Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[
67 Suppl, 79| does not result in real sensation, because every ~passive
68 Suppl, 79| active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside ~
69 Suppl, 79| powers, there will be no true sensation. ~Hence we do not say that
70 Suppl, 79| must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies ~will
71 Suppl, 79| reception does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because ~
72 Suppl, 79| of itself causes actual ~sensation, without changing the nature
73 Suppl, 79| that takes place in ~actual sensation and is no other than the
74 Suppl, 79| species in the ~organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment
75 Suppl, 79| accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a ~
76 Suppl, 79| and the ~instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration,
77 Suppl, 81| bodies as ~perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither should
78 Suppl, 81| local movement but also for sensation, and for the ~execution
79 Suppl, 83| are in a manner patient to sensation, will ~nevertheless not
80 Appen1, 2| And, because all bodily sensation ~is from the soul, it follows
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