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      Part, Question1501   1, 107 |        principalities preside over the good ~spirits themselves."~Aquin.:
1502   1, 107 |            execution thereof; "for the good of ~a nation is more divine
1503   1, 107 |                is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2);
1504   1, 107 |              and the bad spirit by the good ~spirit." So the first order
1505   1, 107 |    Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the "Powers,"
1506   1, 107 |             from their "presiding over good spirits," which also agrees
1507   1, 107 |               1~OBJ 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good,
1508   1, 107 |             the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to ~what
1509   1, 108 |               to the precedence of the good angels?~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[
1510   1, 108 |          demons. For ~order belongs to good, as also mode, and species,
1511   1, 108 |              nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the
1512   1, 108 |               1 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Good can exist without evil;
1513   1, 108 |             evil cannot exist ~without good (Q[49], A[3]); so there
1514   1, 108 |               demons, as ~possessing a good nature.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[
1515   1, 108 |            Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the good angels have precedence over
1516   1, 108 |                 It would seem that the good angels have no precedence
1517   1, 108 |                not enlightened by ~the good angels. Therefore the good
1518   1, 108 |             good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over
1519   1, 108 |                they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence
1520   1, 108 |               is to be ~charged to the good angels; which cannot be
1521   1, 108 |            demons are superior to many good angels in the ~natural order.
1522   1, 108 |           natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence
1523   1, 108 |           deprived; and therefore ~the good angels have precedence over
1524   1, 108 |               or for the ~trial of the good; as in human affairs the
1525   1, 108 |               men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the
1526   1, 108 |              that follows; so also the good angels do ~not entirely
1527   1, 108 |            Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger
1528   1, 109 |               locally?~(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?~
1529   1, 109 |         miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice,
1530   1, 109 |           Therefore much ~more can the good angels.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[
1531   1, 109 |                in the city. ~Therefore good Christians, so far as they
1532   1, 110 |                in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle ~
1533   1, 110 |           angels introduce and kindle ~good thoughts. But this could
1534   1, 110 |               only in one way - by the good apprehended by the intellect.
1535   1, 110 |           apprehended as an ~appetible good, so far does he move the
1536   1, 110 |               accomplished within. But good ~thoughts are attributed
1537   1, 110 |           there is ~deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause
1538   1, 110 |                1~I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their
1539   1, 110 |              be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, ~sometimes
1540   1, 111 |         heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad ~angels can work
1541   1, 112 |                THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)~
1542   1, 112 |          guardianship exercised by the good angels; and ~their warfare
1543   1, 112 |       affection can vary and fail from good in ~many ways; and so it
1544   1, 112 |         regulate them and move them to good.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[
1545   1, 112 |             weak in affection ~towards good on account of the manifold
1546   1, 112 |          certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient
1547   1, 112 |              things are required for a good action; first, that the ~
1548   1, 112 |               affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us
1549   1, 112 |           methods ~to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (
1550   1, 112 |                the natural instinct of good by reason ~of a sinful passion,
1551   1, 112 |                the instigation of the ~good angels, which takes place
1552   1, 112 |               by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the "Principalities,"
1553   1, 112 |               life, encourage ~them to good works, and protect them
1554   1, 112 |           though at times they perform good works, do not perform ~them
1555   1, 112 |             deserving eternal life by ~good works, it does nevertheless
1556   1, 112 |             demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as
1557   1, 112 |             Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us.~Aquin.:
1558   1, 112 |               follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of
1559   1, 112 |               there is no strife among good angels.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[
1560   1, 112 |                Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others;
1561   1, 112 |               kingdom of ~Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship
1562   1, 113 |                evil by ~ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard
1563   1, 113 |          sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be
1564   1, 113 |              through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance,
1565   1, 113 |               to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the ~
1566   1, 113 |              to the ~suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine
1567   1, 113 |           angels take part in all ~our good works: whereas all our sins
1568   1, 113 |           matter does ~not obey either good or bad angels at their will,
1569   1, 117 |        adulterer, what is of nature is good; ~in this God concurs. But
1570   2, 1   |                will is the end and the good. Therefore all human ~actions
1571   2, 1   |                1/1~OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object
1572   2, 1   |                will is the end and the good in ~universal. Consequently
1573   2, 1   |        determinate to some ~particular good. Now it is clear that particular
1574   2, 1   |                who intends the common ~good, moves, by his command,
1575   2, 1   |              extends to the ~universal good, namely by the Divine will.~
1576   2, 1   |              object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it
1577   2, 1   |               proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive,
1578   2, 1   |               that which proceeds from good is ~itself good, the latter
1579   2, 1   |          proceeds from good is ~itself good, the latter must needs diffuse
1580   2, 1   |               needs diffuse some other good: so that the ~diffusion
1581   2, 1   |              so that the ~diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But
1582   2, 1   |              goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an ~end.
1583   2, 1   |                1/1~OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object
1584   2, 1   |       indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good is that ~
1585   2, 1   |              that it is good." But the good is that ~which has the nature
1586   2, 1   |              OBJ 1: The very nature of good is that something flows
1587   2, 1   |                else. Since, therefore, good has the ~nature of end,
1588   2, 1   |           nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument
1589   2, 1   |                the ~power of the First Good, which is infinite. But,
1590   2, 1   |         infinite. But, since the First Good ~diffuses itself according
1591   2, 1   |         certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good ~
1592   2, 1   |             good things from the First Good ~from Which all other goods
1593   2, 1   |              his perfect ~and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ.
1594   2, 1   |                speaking of ~the end of good we mean now, not that it
1595   2, 1   |           though each were its perfect good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5]
1596   2, 1   |             considered as one perfect ~good resulting therefrom, by
1597   2, 1   |         contrary to a thing's perfect ~good, that anything besides be
1598   2, 1   |                That is the end ~of our good, for the sake of which we
1599   2, 1   |         desires it under the aspect of good. And ~if he desire it, not
1600   2, 1   |          desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end,
1601   2, 1   |              as tending to the perfect good, because the ~beginning
1602   2, 1   |                 end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far
1603   2, 1   |       relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.~Aquin.:
1604   2, 1   |            desired ~as the scientist's good, included in complete and
1605   2, 1   |                in complete and perfect good, which is ~the ultimate
1606   2, 1   |              all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end
1607   2, 1   |             away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all
1608   2, 1   |             riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; ~others,
1609   2, 1   |          pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the
1610   2, 1   |              the will is the universal good, which is the end of all.
1611   2, 1   |           which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition ~
1612   2, 2   |              power?~(5) Whether in any good of the body?~(6) Whether
1613   2, 2   |           pleasure?~(7) Whether in any good of the soul?~(8) Whether
1614   2, 2   |                 Whether in any created good?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1]
1615   2, 2   |                by the aggregate of all good things." Now ~money seems
1616   2, 2   |               desire for the sovereign good never fails, it ~seems to
1617   2, 2   |               1~On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness
1618   2, 2   |            whose ~sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether
1619   2, 2   |              desire for the ~sovereign good. For the more perfectly
1620   2, 2   |                perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, ~the more
1621   2, 2   |           imperfect, and the sovereign good ~does not consist therein.~
1622   2, 2   |        happiness, which is the perfect good. ~But that is honor, as
1623   2, 2   |                 which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. ~
1624   2, 2   |              Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself,
1625   2, 2   |               Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the
1626   2, 2   |         happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to ~be fame
1627   2, 2   |                Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame ~
1628   2, 2   |                the perfection of human good, which ~is called happiness,
1629   2, 2   |              On the other hand, man's ~good depends on God's knowledge
1630   2, 2   |               1/1~Reply OBJ 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory,
1631   2, 2   |            must needs be derived from ~good existing in the man himself:
1632   2, 2   |               with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who
1633   2, 2   |               happiness is the perfect good. But the highest ~perfection
1634   2, 2   |               Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most ~imperfect.
1635   2, 2   |          because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness ~
1636   2, 2   |               man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness
1637   2, 2   |        happiness might consist ~in the good use of power, which is by
1638   2, 2   |            happiness ~is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with
1639   2, 2   |         foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly,
1640   2, 2   |                cannot lack any needful good. ~But after acquiring any
1641   2, 2   |               happiness is the perfect good, no evil ~can accrue to
1642   2, 2   |                2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make
1643   2, 2   |                thing for a man to make good use ~of power in ruling
1644   2, 2   |               is that power is towards good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1645   2, 2   |        Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: ~therefore
1646   2, 2   |             not because man's supreme ~good consists in power.~Aquin.:
1647   2, 2   |       happiness consists in any bodily good?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5]
1648   2, 2   |             happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health of
1649   2, 2   |                man is not ~the supreme good. Therefore the last end
1650   2, 2   |                the end of man is ~some good of the body. For man's being
1651   2, 2   |               is with ~reason that the good of the body is preferred
1652   2, 2   |               by "riches," just as the good of the soul is preferred
1653   2, 2   |           Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all
1654   2, 2   |        happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.~Aquin.:
1655   2, 2   |               that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or ~
1656   2, 2   |               in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the ~perfect
1657   2, 2   |              indeed it be the ~perfect good, is precisely man's happiness:
1658   2, 2   |              results from the ~perfect good, the very essence of happiness,
1659   2, 2   |                result from the perfect good even in that ~way. For it
1660   2, 2   |             way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which
1661   2, 2   |             makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the ~body,
1662   2, 2   |                cannot be man's perfect good. For since ~the rational
1663   2, 2   |        Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the
1664   2, 2   |           sense, is not ~man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as
1665   2, 2   |            trifle as compared with the good of ~the soul. Hence it is
1666   2, 2   |             the same whether we desire good, or desire ~delight, which
1667   2, 2   |            than the appetite's rest in good: thus it ~is owing to the
1668   2, 2   |            there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, ~
1669   2, 2   |          something else, ~i.e. for the good, which is the object of
1670   2, 2   |                same way as they desire good: and ~yet they desire delight
1671   2, 2   |               delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as ~
1672   2, 2   |             the ~supreme and essential good, but that every delight
1673   2, 2   |             delight results from some ~good, and that some delight results
1674   2, 2   |             the essential and ~supreme good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7]
1675   2, 2   |                Para. 1/1 ~Whether some good of the soul constitutes
1676   2, 2   |                It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes
1677   2, 2   |                 For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:
1678   2, 2   |               that for which we desire good, more than the ~good that
1679   2, 2   |            desire good, more than the ~good that we desire for it: thus
1680   2, 2   |               love money. But whatever good a man desires, he ~desires
1681   2, 2   |             happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however,
1682   2, 2   |               happiness consists in no good of the ~soul.~Aquin.: SMT
1683   2, 2   |                habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is
1684   2, 2   |               last end, is the perfect good ~fulfilling the desire.
1685   2, 2   |            will, is for the ~universal good. And any good inherent to
1686   2, 2   |                universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is
1687   2, 2   |             the soul is a participated good, ~and consequently a portioned
1688   2, 2   |               consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them
1689   2, 2   |              man can ~desire, thus the good of the soul is not only
1690   2, 2   |             constitutes happiness is a good ~of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
1691   2, 2   |                loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend
1692   2, 2   |               loved as that ~for which good is desired; and thus, too,
1693   2, 2   |              the soul, ~is an inherent good of the soul; but that which
1694   2, 2   |                1/1~Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?~
1695   2, 2   |           would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. ~
1696   2, 2   |              nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then
1697   2, 2   |                does not reach out to a good surpassing ~his capacity.
1698   2, 2   |         capacity does not include that good which ~surpasses the limits
1699   2, 2   |            made happy ~by some created good. Consequently some created
1700   2, 2   |              Consequently some created good constitutes man's ~happiness.~
1701   2, 2   |             impossible for any created good to constitute man's ~happiness.
1702   2, 2   |               happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite ~
1703   2, 2   |            appetite, is the ~universal good; just as the object of the
1704   2, 2   |              will, save the ~universal good. This is to be found, not
1705   2, 2   |             satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone ~
1706   2, 2   |              universal fount itself of good, which is the ~common object
1707   2, 2   |              the infinite and ~perfect good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8]
1708   2, 2   |             last end of man is not the good of the universe, ~but God
1709   2, 2   |               1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Created good is not less than that good
1710   2, 2   |             good is not less than that good of which man is ~capable,
1711   2, 2   |               but it is less ~than the good of which he is capable,
1712   2, 2   |         infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and
1713   2, 2   |                a finite and restricted good.~
1714   2, 3   |               happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to ~
1715   2, 3   |              to God to ~be the supreme good. Since, then, there are
1716   2, 3   |              last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone
1717   2, 3   |                is called man's supreme good, because it is the ~attainment
1718   2, 3   |               enjoyment of the supreme good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1]
1719   2, 3   |                by the aggregate of all good things." But state does ~
1720   2, 3   |               it is the perfect common good; and he ~signified this
1721   2, 3   |               by the ~aggregate of all good things," thus implying that
1722   2, 3   |              in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed
1723   2, 3   |           happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).~Aquin.:
1724   2, 3   |                united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs
1725   2, 3   |                by the aggregate of all good things." But some goods ~
1726   2, 3   |               happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in ~Ethic.
1727   2, 3   |                united to the Uncreated Good, Which is ~his last end,
1728   2, 3   |         includes the ~aggregate of all good things, by being united
1729   2, 3   |               universal source of ~all good; not that it requires each
1730   2, 3   |               requires each individual good. But in this ~imperfect
1731   2, 3   |               happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object
1732   2, 3   |               is the supreme good. But good is the object of ~the will.
1733   2, 3   |              whatever he desires: ~for good things make a man happy,
1734   2, 3   |                already possesses some ~good - i.e. a good will." Therefore
1735   2, 3   |          possesses some ~good - i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness
1736   2, 3   |             disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the
1737   2, 3   |             will is reckoned among the good ~things which make a man
1738   2, 3   |             happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical ~intellect
1739   2, 3   |           intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
1740   2, 3   |                Hence we are said to be good, in reference ~to the perfection
1741   2, 3   |                Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the
1742   2, 3   |           highest object is the Divine Good, which is the ~object, not
1743   2, 3   |               intellect is ordained to good which is ~outside of it:
1744   2, 3   |              speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the ~contemplation
1745   2, 3   |    contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man
1746   2, 3   |             man is ~perfected and made good thereby: such a good the
1747   2, 3   |              made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect
1748   2, 4   |         appetite ~being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since
1749   2, 4   |            attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without ~concomitant
1750   2, 4   |                 Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose;
1751   2, 4   |         because ~that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident
1752   2, 4   |               attain to the ~universal good, but to some particular
1753   2, 4   |                 but to some particular good which is delightful. And ~
1754   2, 4   |               apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which
1755   2, 4   |             its purpose is directed to good rather than to ~delight.
1756   2, 4   |              does not seem the beloved good for the sake of ~delight:
1757   2, 4   |                that it delights in the good ~gained which it loves.
1758   2, 4   |             objects, the ~true and the good: of which the true corresponds
1759   2, 4   |             corresponds to vision, and good to ~delight. Therefore there
1760   2, 4   |               4:7,8): "I have fought a good fight, I have ~finished
1761   2, 4   |             under the common notion of good which he knows. And this
1762   2, 4   |            Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But ~this
1763   2, 4   |              are ~confident and have a good will to be absent . . .
1764   2, 4   |              it ~does not possess that good in every way that it would
1765   2, 4   |                of the body is a bodily good. But ~it has been shown
1766   2, 4   |                like a herb." Therefore good disposition of the body
1767   2, 4   |             does not consist in bodily good as its object: ~but bodily
1768   2, 4   |                its object: ~but bodily good can add a certain charm
1769   2, 4   |                by the aggregate of all good things." But some of ~man'
1770   2, 4   |            nothing but this," - "It is good for me to adhere to my God." ~
1771   2, 4   |                be the aggregate of all good ~things, because whatever
1772   2, 4   |               things, because whatever good there be in these things,
1773   2, 4   |                glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice
1774   2, 4   |             delight ~in possessing any good whatever, without someone
1775   2, 4   |              written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me ~together
1776   2, 4   |              but for ~the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he
1777   2, 4   |         operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that ~he may delight
1778   2, 4   |              delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be
1779   2, 4   |              be helped ~by them in his good work. For in order that
1780   2, 4   |        understood of the possession of good ~that does not fully satisfy.
1781   2, 4   |             God a sufficiency of every good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8]
1782   2, 5   |                attaining the Sovereign Good. But ~we cannot arrive at
1783   2, 5   |              attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, ~therefore, is
1784   2, 5   |              is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. Now,
1785   2, 5   |              is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because
1786   2, 5   |              the universal and perfect good, and because his will can ~
1787   2, 5   |               Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass ~
1788   2, 5   |             the perfect and sufficient good" ~(Ethic. i, 7) it brings
1789   2, 5   |             rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if
1790   2, 5   |                can be no still greater good. Therefore either man ~is
1791   2, 5   |             itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; ~and the attainment or
1792   2, 5   |              or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good ~itself,
1793   2, 5   |             that same Good. As to that Good ~itself, Which is the object
1794   2, 5   |             there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, ~God, by enjoying
1795   2, 5   |       attainment or ~enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier
1796   2, 5   |                 more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now,
1797   2, 5   |              is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is ~the
1798   2, 5   |               enjoyment of the Supreme Good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2]
1799   2, 5   |            Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they ~have the Infinite
1800   2, 5   |                they ~have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good
1801   2, 5   |             Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good," as ~Augustine
1802   2, 5   |              Which is "the good of all good," as ~Augustine says (Enarr.
1803   2, 5   |              participation of the same good. And the ~addition of other
1804   2, 5   |         participation in the Sovereign Good does not ~destroy the nature
1805   2, 5   |           participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by ~knowing
1806   2, 5   |             these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore
1807   2, 5   |                 perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil,
1808   2, 5   |             neither can the desire for good be satiated in ~this life.
1809   2, 5   |              man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be ~abiding.
1810   2, 5   |             enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3]
1811   2, 5   |                perfect and ~sufficient good," it must needs set man'
1812   2, 5   |       naturally desires to hold to the good that he has, ~and to have
1813   2, 5   |            opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If ~this
1814   2, 5   |               just as the true ~is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi,
1815   2, 5   |              to see It. ~Because every good that one possesses and yet
1816   2, 5   |               fills the soul ~with all good things, since it unites
1817   2, 5   |                  and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me together
1818   2, 5   |                of the condition of the good, ~the participation of which
1819   2, 5   |                that can attain perfect good, although it needs ~help
1820   2, 5   |            which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect ~
1821   2, 5   |                attains some imperfect ~good, although it need no help
1822   2, 5   |           which can attain the perfect good of ~happiness, but needs
1823   2, 5   |             capable of attaining ~this good, but attains some imperfect
1824   2, 5   |             but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.~Aquin.:
1825   2, 5   |                the whole universe to a good which is outside the universe;
1826   2, 5   |               in the order of man to a good which is ~outside the universe,
1827   2, 5   |               5]) that ~Happiness is a good surpassing created nature.
1828   2, 5   |            Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether any good works are necessary that
1829   2, 5   |              capacity for the perfect ~good, one has it without movement,
1830   2, 5   |             Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs
1831   2, 5   |             not; since the apprehended good is the object of the ~appetite (
1832   2, 5   |               consists in the ~perfect good, as stated above (AA[3],
1833   2, 5   |             above (AA[3],4). But since good is the object of ~the will,
1834   2, 5   |              of ~the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely
1835   2, 5   |              as the final and perfect ~good, which is the general notion
1836   2, 5   |               wish is fulfilled" is a ~good and adequate definition;
1837   2, 5   |            desire, except the perfect ~good which is Happiness. But
1838   2, 6   |              Happiness is man's proper good, those acts ~which are proper
1839   2, 6   |               apprehended as something good and suitable to nature,
1840   2, 6   |              but concupiscence regards good. Now evil ~of itself is
1841   2, 6   |           counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with the will. ~
1842   2, 7   |          according to their quality of good or evil. But it ~seems that
1843   2, 7   |                as they are found to be good or ~evil, better or worse:
1844   2, 7   |               1 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Good directed to the end is said
1845   2, 7   |                Ethic. i, ~6) that "the good in the genus 'relation'
1846   2, 7   |            hinders their being called ~good or bad according to their
1847   2, 7   |         valiantly for the sake of" the good of ~the virtue or fortitude,
1848   2, 8   |                 Whether the will is of good only?~(2) Whether it is
1849   2, 8   |               1~Whether the will is of good only?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8]
1850   2, 8   |                that the will is not of good only. For the same ~power
1851   2, 8   |          regards white and black. But ~good and evil are opposites.
1852   2, 8   |                the will is not only of good, but ~also of evil.~Aquin.:
1853   2, 8   |            volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.~Aquin.:
1854   2, 8   |              Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, good and being are convertible.
1855   2, 8   |           Therefore the will is not of good only.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8]
1856   2, 8   |                that "all things desire good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[
1857   2, 8   |         appetite is ~only of something good. The reason of this is that
1858   2, 8   |             being ~and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every
1859   2, 8   |           inclination is to ~something good. And hence it is that the
1860   2, 8   |                Ethic. i, 1) ~that "the good is that which all desire."~
1861   2, 8   |              natural appetite tends to good existing in a ~thing; so
1862   2, 8   |          voluntary appetite tends to a good which is ~apprehended. Consequently,
1863   2, 8   |            requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that
1864   2, 8   |             that it be ~apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher
1865   2, 8   |                 3) that ~"the end is a good, or an apparent good."~Aquin.:
1866   2, 8   |              is a good, or an apparent good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[
1867   2, 8   |               will is referred both to good and ~evil: but to good by
1868   2, 8   |              to good and ~evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil,
1869   2, 8   |        Wherefore the ~actual desire of good is called "volition" [*In
1870   2, 8   |                 just as volition is of good, so ~nolition is of evil.~
1871   2, 8   |             the object of the will ~is good. Wherefore the will can
1872   2, 8   |                as ~are contained under good, such as to be moved or
1873   2, 8   |            either ~under the aspect of good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1]
1874   2, 8   |        apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus ~that the
1875   2, 8   |                evil is considered as a good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[
1876   2, 8   |             are in different genera of good: because the end, which
1877   2, 8   |            because the end, which is a good either ~of rectitude or
1878   2, 8   |                  passion"; whereas the good which is useful, and is
1879   2, 8   |             colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of
1880   2, 8   |               power. But that which is good and willed in itself is
1881   2, 8   |             other ~hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves,
1882   2, 8   |              is a different species of good from the means, which are
1883   2, 8   |             means, which are a useful ~good. Therefore the will is not
1884   2, 8   |          righteous are ~not species of good in an equal degree, but
1885   2, 9   |                at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not."
1886   2, 9   |       shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the
1887   2, 9   |                will as some particular good: ~and always the art or
1888   2, 9   |                who intends ~the common good - i.e. the order of the
1889   2, 9   |              included in the universal good, as a particular good. But
1890   2, 9   |        universal good, as a particular good. But as to the ~determination
1891   2, 9   |              moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under
1892   2, 9   |                which is apprehended as good ~and fitting, moves the
1893   2, 9   |             that a thing appear to ~be good and fitting, happens from
1894   2, 9   |              affected: thus that seems good to a man when ~angered,
1895   2, 9   |           angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in
1896   2, 9   |                the cause of other than good things, ~according to Gn.
1897   2, 9   |              made, and they ~were very good." If, therefore man's will
1898   2, 9   |              ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else
1899   2, 9   |          Himself, Who is the universal good: while ~every other good
1900   2, 9   |               good: while ~every other good is good by participation,
1901   2, 9   |             while ~every other good is good by participation, and is
1902   2, 9   |                 and is some particular good, ~and a particular cause
1903   2, 9   |           object of the will, which is good. And without this universal ~
1904   2, 9   |              which is true or apparent good. ~Nevertheless, sometimes
1905   2, 9   |        something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those
1906   2, 10  |             Body Para. 2/2~Now this is good in general, to which the
1907   2, 10  |                 naturally which is the good; just as to ~the intellect
1908   2, 10  |            what a thing is." And under good in general are ~included
1909   2, 10  |             the object of sight, so is good the ~object of the will.
1910   2, 10  |            offered an object which is ~good universally and from every
1911   2, 10  |         offered an object that is ~not good from every point of view,
1912   2, 10  |                  And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good,
1913   2, 10  |          non-good, consequently, that ~good alone which is perfect and
1914   2, 10  |          lacking in nothing, is such a good that ~the will cannot not-will
1915   2, 10  |               they are lacking in some good, can be ~regarded as non-goods:
1916   2, 10  |                as we have said ~of the good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
1917   2, 10  |             because it is the ~perfect good. In like manner whatever
1918   2, 10  |          Apostle says (Rm. 7:19): "The good which I ~will I do not;
1919   2, 10  |            something to be fitting and good, which he ~would not judge
1920   2, 10  |              not only by the universal good ~apprehended by the reason,
1921   2, 10  |                the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. ~Wherefore
1922   2, 10  |               moved to some particular good independently of a ~passion
1923   2, 11  |               end. Now the end and the good is the object ~of the appetitive
1924   2, 11  |                the intellect, but as a good and an end, is ~the object
1925   2, 11  |            power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive
1926   2, 11  |              which is the ~end and the good, but also the universal
1927   2, 11  |          formality of the end and the ~good; and such knowledge belongs
1928   2, 11  |               by which the end and the good are ~known in the particular.
1929   2, 11  |           enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore ~
1930   2, 13  |                proposed to it as being good, through being ordained
1931   2, 13  |                of the soul towards the good ~which is chosen. Consequently
1932   2, 13  |           prudence that a ~man makes a good choice of means." But prudence
1933   2, 13  |             thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order
1934   2, 13  |               body is ~ordained to the good of the soul, consequently
1935   2, 13  |                the universal notion of good: but the term or perfection
1936   2, 13  |          respect ~of something that is good for one to do. Now this
1937   2, 13  |               of ~what is possible and good for him that wills. But
1938   2, 13  |                will is the apprehended good, we ~must judge of the object
1939   2, 13  |               which is apprehended as ~good, and yet is not really good;
1940   2, 13  |            good, and yet is not really good; so is choice sometimes
1941   2, 13  |                reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can apprehend ~
1942   2, 13  |               reason can apprehend ~as good, not only this, viz. "to
1943   2, 13  |             consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good,
1944   2, 13  |             good, and the lack of some good, which has ~the aspect of
1945   2, 13  |                be avoided. The perfect good alone, ~which is Happiness,
1946   2, 13  |              it is not of the ~perfect good, which is Happiness, but
1947   2, 14  |             matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (
1948   2, 14  |               which are most certainly good in ~the opinion of wise
1949   2, 14  |        spiritual men are not certainly good in the ~opinion of many,
1950   2, 16  |                 possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is
1951   2, 16  |              inasmuch as there is some good in money. ~But in regard
1952   2, 17  |                various ~perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define
1953   2, 17  |              as ~it can judge it to be good to will something, so it
1954   2, 17  |                15): "For I do not that good which ~I will": and a gloss
1955   2, 18  |                Out. Para. 1/3 - OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS,
1956   2, 18  |               We must now consider the good and evil of human acts.
1957   2, 18  |             First, how a human ~act is good or evil; secondly, what
1958   2, 18  |        secondly, what results from the good or evil of a ~human act,
1959   2, 18  |              the first ~will be of the good and evil of human acts,
1960   2, 18  |           general; the second, of ~the good and evil of internal acts;
1961   2, 18  |                acts; the third, of the good and evil of ~external acts.~
1962   2, 18  |          Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?~(
1963   2, 18  |               actions?~(2) Whether the good or evil of a human action
1964   2, 18  |              Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?~(
1965   2, 18  |              action has the species of good or evil from its end?~(7)
1966   2, 18  |               action in the species of good ~or evil?~(11) Whether every
1967   2, 18  |               action in the species of good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS
1968   2, 18  |          Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?~
1969   2, 18  |             that every human action is good, and that none is ~evil.
1970   2, 18  |                 save in ~virtue of the good. But no evil is done in
1971   2, 18  |               is done in virtue of the good. Therefore ~no action is
1972   2, 18  |                perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph. ix,
1973   2, 18  |                only according as it is good. ~Therefore every action
1974   2, 18  |              Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.~Aquin.:
1975   2, 18  |              evil, but every action is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1976   2, 18  |          answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of
1977   2, 18  |              and evil in actions as of good and ~evil in things: because
1978   2, 18  |           things, each one has so much good as it has being: since ~
1979   2, 18  |                as it has being: since ~good and being are convertible,
1980   2, 18  |             said ~to be either evil or good. But since this same fulness
1981   2, 18  |                of the ~very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in
1982   2, 18  |           being, ~it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain
1983   2, 18  |              it there ~were nothing of good there, there would be neither
1984   2, 18  |           action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there
1985   2, 18  |             action done is a deficient good, which is good ~in a certain
1986   2, 18  |               deficient good, which is good ~in a certain respect, but
1987   2, 18  |            Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the good or evil of a man's action
1988   2, 18  |                 It would seem that the good or evil of an action is
1989   2, 18  |                iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human action
1990   2, 18  |             which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not
1991   2, 18  |              it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is ~not
1992   2, 18  |                stated above (A[1]) the good or evil of an action, as ~
1993   2, 18  |              some call such an action "good in its genus"; for ~instance, "
1994   2, 18  |           Although external things are good in themselves, ~nevertheless
1995   2, 18  |               an ~action is said to be good from the fact that it can
1996   2, 18  |             fact that it can produce a good ~effect. Consequently the
1997   2, 18  |                Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?~
1998   2, 18  |             seem that an action is not good or evil from a ~circumstance.
1999   2, 18  |               above (Q[7], A[1]). But "good and evil are in ~things
2000   2, 18  |            respect of an accident. But good and ~evil belong to an action
 
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