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golgotha 1
gomor 1
gone 38
good 7495
good- 1
good-counsel 1
good-will 8
Frequency    [«  »]
7641 would
7638 says
7588 christ
7495 good
7367 5
7207 fs
7146 since
St. Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologica

IntraText - Concordances

good

1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-2000 | 2001-2500 | 2501-3000 | 3001-3500 | 3501-4000 | 4001-4500 | 4501-5000 | 5001-5500 | 5501-6000 | 6001-6500 | 6501-7000 | 7001-7495

     Part, Question
2001 2, 18 | because an action ~can be good or evil in its genus as 2002 2, 18 | Therefore an ~action is not good or bad from a circumstance.~ 2003 2, 18 | Therefore human actions are good or ~evil according to circumstances.~ 2004 2, 18 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Since good and being are convertible; 2005 2, 18 | substance and of accident, so is good predicated of a ~thing both 2006 2, 18 | Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?~Aquin.: 2007 2, 18 | It would seem that the good and evil in human actions 2008 2, 18 | therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no ~ 2009 2, 18 | action is not said to be ~good or bad according to its 2010 2, 18 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, a good action may happen to be 2011 2, 18 | happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed 2012 2, 18 | Therefore an action is not good or ~evil from its end.~Aquin.: 2013 2, 18 | ii) that "if the end ~is good, the thing is good, and 2014 2, 18 | end ~is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, 2015 2, 18 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: The good in view of which one acts 2016 2, 18 | acts is not always a true ~good; but sometimes it is a true 2017 2, 18 | but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. 2018 2, 18 | good, sometimes an apparent good. And in ~the latter event, 2019 2, 18 | hinders an action that is good in one of the way ~mentioned 2020 2, 18 | that an action which is good in its species or in its ~ 2021 2, 18 | However, an ~action is not good simply, unless it is good 2022 2, 18 | good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ~" 2023 2, 18 | from any single defect, but good from the complete cause," ~ 2024 2, 18 | Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?~ 2025 2, 18 | OBJ 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions 2026 2, 18 | species. For the existence of good and evil in actions is ~ 2027 2, 18 | stated above (A[1]). But ~good and evil do not make a specific 2028 2, 18 | difference in things; for a good man ~is specifically the 2029 2, 18 | being evil. ~Consequently good and evil do not diversify 2030 2, 18 | specific effect results from a good and from an evil action: ~ 2031 2, 18 | lawful wedlock. Therefore good and ~evil actions do not 2032 2, 18 | are sometimes said to be good or bad from a ~circumstance, 2033 2, 18 | produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in 2034 2, 18 | prodigality. Therefore also good and bad actions differ in ~ 2035 2, 18 | 2~Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated 2036 2, 18 | says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is to ~be in accordance 2037 2, 18 | against reason." For ~that is good for a thing which suits 2038 2, 18 | that ~the difference of good and evil considered in reference 2039 2, 18 | Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species 2040 2, 18 | Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as ~something 2041 2, 18 | species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in accord 2042 2, 18 | transforms ~an action from good to evil; for a circumstance 2043 2, 18 | action has the species of good or evil from its end?~Aquin.: 2044 2, 18 | It would seem that the good and evil which are from 2045 2, 18 | the object. ~Therefore the good and evil which are from 2046 2, 18 | species, according ~to the good and evil which are from 2047 2, 18 | ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken 2048 2, 18 | from the end. Therefore good and evil in respect of ~ 2049 2, 18 | to an ~infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore 2050 2, 18 | evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine ( 2051 2, 18 | as though it were between good ~and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2052 2, 18 | every ~object is either good or bad. Therefore every 2053 2, 18 | Therefore every human action is good or ~evil according to its 2054 2, 18 | an action is said to be good, ~when it has its due complement 2055 2, 18 | action must ~needs be either good or bad in its species, and 2056 2, 18 | which can be done with a good ~or evil mind, of which 2057 2, 18 | of reason, it will be a good action ~according to its 2058 2, 18 | way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his ~ 2059 2, 18 | it does not take away all good, but ~leaves some. Consequently 2060 2, 18 | can be something between good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2061 2, 18 | nor is it specifically good. Thus a ~man in regard to 2062 2, 18 | evident that they are not good, ~since they depart from 2063 2, 18 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while 2064 2, 18 | or pious ~utility, it is good. Therefore every word is 2065 2, 18 | Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the ~same reason 2066 2, 18 | every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no ~individual 2067 2, 18 | in the individual it is good or evil. And the ~reason 2068 2, 18 | circumstance that makes it good or bad, at ~least in respect 2069 2, 18 | it has the character of good. ~Now it must needs be either 2070 2, 18 | the individual, must be good or bad.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[ 2071 2, 18 | it cannot be directed to good or evil, either ~through 2072 2, 18 | concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can 2073 2, 18 | Wherefore it can be ~made good or bad by something else. 2074 2, 18 | individual action is ~either good or bad, as stated above.~ 2075 2, 18 | it ~belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the 2076 2, 18 | is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct 2077 2, 18 | his body ~itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly 2078 2, 18 | action in the species of good or ~evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2079 2, 18 | action in ~the species of good or evil. For the species 2080 2, 18 | constitute a species of ~good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2081 2, 18 | action in a species of good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2082 2, 18 | action to be ~specifically good or bad.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[ 2083 2, 18 | the moral action whether ~good or bad.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[ 2084 2, 18 | action ~in the species of good or evil; since not every 2085 2, 18 | moral action in a species of good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2086 2, 18 | circumstance relating to good or evil, ~specifies an action. 2087 2, 18 | specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences 2088 2, 18 | worse; because what is not good, cannot make a ~greater 2089 2, 18 | cannot make a ~greater good; and what is not evil, cannot 2090 2, 18 | itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason 2091 2, 18 | has ~a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every 2092 2, 18 | constitutes a new species of good or ~evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2093 2, 18 | species of number; since the good consists in "number, ~weight, 2094 2, 18 | places it ~in a species of good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2095 2, 18 | circumstance gives the species ~of good or evil to a moral action, 2096 2, 18 | of reason in respect of good or evil, except on ~the 2097 2, 18 | action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take something 2098 2, 18 | of reason in respect ~of good or evil, except a certain 2099 2, 18 | applies to other evil or good ~actions. Consequently not 2100 2, 18 | action ~to be more or less good or evil, does not make the 2101 2, 18 | always change the species ~of good or evil.~ 2102 2, 19 | depends on the ~degree of good or evil in the intention?~( 2103 2, 19 | human will, in order to be good, to ~be conformed to the 2104 2, 19 | otherwise than to what is ~good: since "evil is outside 2105 2, 19 | every act of the will is good, and none bad.~Aquin.: SMT 2106 2, 19 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: 2107 2, 19 | the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness 2108 2, 19 | from which men wish for good things. But a good will 2109 2, 19 | wish for good things. But a good will is one which ~is in 2110 2, 19 | man wills that which is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[ 2111 2, 19 | Para. 1/1~I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences 2112 2, 19 | act of the ~will. Because good and evil of themselves regard 2113 2, 19 | true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing ~ 2114 2, 19 | Q[18], A[5]). Therefore good and evil in the acts of 2115 2, 19 | directed to what is truly good, but ~sometimes to the apparent 2116 2, 19 | sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure 2117 2, 19 | has indeed some measure of good, ~but not of a good that 2118 2, 19 | measure of good, ~but not of a good that is simply suitable 2119 2, 19 | of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.~Aquin.: 2120 2, 19 | 3 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Good is presented to the will 2121 2, 19 | Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good and ~evil are specific differences 2122 2, 19 | the will is fixed on some good, no ~circumstances can make 2123 2, 19 | said that a ~man wills a good when he ought not, or where 2124 2, 19 | not fixed on something ~good: since to will to do something 2125 2, 19 | is not ~to will something good. Secondly, so that the circumstance 2126 2, 19 | impossible to will something good ~when one ought not to, 2127 2, 19 | ought always to will what is good: ~except, perhaps, accidentally, 2128 2, 19 | willing some ~particular good, is prevented from willing 2129 2, 19 | at the same time another good ~which he ought to will 2130 2, 19 | willing that particular good, but from his not willing 2131 2, 19 | on what follows. But the ~good belongs to the will before 2132 2, 19 | But right desire is a good will. Therefore the goodness 2133 2, 19 | by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate 2134 2, 19 | while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to 2135 2, 19 | can tend to the universal ~good, which reason apprehends; 2136 2, 19 | only ~to the particular good, apprehended by the sensitive 2137 2, 19 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: The good considered as such, i.e. 2138 2, 19 | the will cannot desire a good that is not previously ~ 2139 2, 19 | Many say: Who showeth us good things? The ~light of Thy 2140 2, 19 | reason is able to show us good things, and guide our ~will, 2141 2, 19 | of ~actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent; 2142 2, 19 | to do ~something which is good generically, there is no 2143 2, 19 | that prescribes what is good and forbids what is ~evil. 2144 2, 19 | itself; or that what is good in ~itself, is forbidden, 2145 2, 19 | or ~in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary 2146 2, 19 | but also in those that are good or evil in ~themselves. 2147 2, 19 | but also that which is good, can ~receive the character 2148 2, 19 | refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not ~ 2149 2, 19 | will does not ~tend to this good except in so far as it is 2150 2, 19 | to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary 2151 2, 19 | saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that ~the 2152 2, 19 | 1/1~Whether the will is good when it abides by erring 2153 2, 19 | would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring ~ 2154 2, 19 | what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil when 2155 2, 19 | erring reason, the will is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[ 2156 2, 19 | Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the ~ 2157 2, 19 | errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by 2158 2, 19 | Therefore the will is ~good when it abides by erring 2159 2, 19 | sometimes not. And since moral good and evil consist in action 2160 2, 19 | the ~character of moral good and evil; but not, when 2161 2, 19 | Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the ~entire 2162 2, 19 | But ~in order for it to be good, it must be good in both 2163 2, 19 | it to be good, it must be good in both ways.~Aquin.: SMT 2164 2, 19 | commandment, belongs to a good ~will. But this can be referred 2165 2, 19 | OBJ 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, 2166 2, 19 | will, although he intends a good end. Therefore neither ~ 2167 2, 19 | rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the ~goodness 2168 2, 19 | fasting is specifically good from the very fact that ~ 2169 2, 19 | will cannot be said to be good, if an evil ~intention is 2170 2, 19 | he wills that which is good in itself, under a ~species 2171 2, 19 | then the latter may be good: and the intention does 2172 2, 19 | each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire 2173 2, 19 | even under the species of good; or to the good under the 2174 2, 19 | species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, 2175 2, 19 | order for the will to be good, it must tend to the ~good 2176 2, 19 | good, it must tend to the ~good under the species of good; 2177 2, 19 | good under the species of good; in other words, it must 2178 2, 19 | words, it must will the good for ~the sake of the good.~ 2179 2, 19 | good for ~the sake of the good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[ 2180 2, 19 | depends on the ~degree of good or evil in the intention?~ 2181 2, 19 | depends on ~the degree of good in the intention. Because 2182 2, 19 | Because on Mt. 12:35, "A good man ~out of the good treasure 2183 2, 19 | A good man ~out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth 2184 2, 19 | bringeth forth that which is good," ~a gloss says: "A man 2185 2, 19 | says: "A man does as much good as he intends." But the 2186 2, 19 | intention is the cause of the good will. Therefore a ~man's 2187 2, 19 | Therefore a ~man's will is good, according as his intention 2188 2, 19 | according as his intention is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[ 2189 2, 19 | for the same reason, in good ~actions, the will is good 2190 2, 19 | good ~actions, the will is good in proportion to the good 2191 2, 19 | good in proportion to the good intended.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2192 2, 19 | contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil. ~ 2193 2, 19 | better, and the will ~less good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[ 2194 2, 19 | a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, 2195 2, 19 | considered absolutely, is not so good as the ~intention. Yet because 2196 2, 19 | the will wills some great good ~for an end, although that 2197 2, 19 | wills to gain so great a good, is ~not proportionate to 2198 2, 19 | not proportionate to that good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[ 2199 2, 19 | on the quantity ~of the good intended, as is shown above. 2200 2, 19 | 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of 2201 2, 19 | not the whole cause of a ~good will. Hence the argument 2202 2, 19 | impossible for man's will to be good. ~Which is inadmissible.~ 2203 2, 19 | human will is the ~Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated 2204 2, 19 | ordained to ~the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.~Aquin.: 2205 2, 19 | Body Para. 2/2~Now this Good is primarily and essentially 2206 2, 19 | order that man's will be good it needs to ~be conformed 2207 2, 19 | human will, in order to be good, to be ~conformed to the 2208 2, 19 | not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. 2209 2, 19 | reason, so as to ~appear good from one point of view, 2210 2, 19 | one point of view, and not good from another point of ~view. 2211 2, 19 | according as it ~appears to be good, his will is good: and the 2212 2, 19 | to be good, his will is good: and the will of another 2213 2, 19 | it appears evil, is also good. ~Thus a judge has a good 2214 2, 19 | good. ~Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief 2215 2, 19 | a ~natural evil, is also good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[ 2216 2, 19 | aspect of the apprehended good, the more universal ~the 2217 2, 19 | the more universal ~the good to which the will tends. 2218 2, 19 | judge has care of the common good, which is justice, ~and 2219 2, 19 | which has the aspect of good ~in relation to the common 2220 2, 19 | consider the private, the good of the family, and from 2221 2, 19 | be put to death. Now the good ~of the whole universe is 2222 2, 19 | the aspect of the common good; this is His own Goodness, 2223 2, 19 | Goodness, which is ~the good of the whole universe. On 2224 2, 19 | nature, is of some particular good, ~proportionate to that 2225 2, 19 | a thing may happen to be good under a ~particular aspect, 2226 2, 19 | particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, 2227 2, 19 | that a certain ~will is good from willing something considered 2228 2, 19 | wills of various men can be good in respect ~of opposite 2229 2, 19 | in willing a particular good, unless he ~refer it to 2230 2, 19 | refer it to the common good as an end: since even the 2231 2, 19 | is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is 2232 2, 19 | man will some ~particular good with a right will, he must 2233 2, 19 | must will that particular good ~materially, and the Divine 2234 2, 19 | the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the ~ 2235 2, 19 | the Divine and universal ~good; but not as to that which 2236 2, 19 | wills it under the aspect of good. ~Consequently whoever wills 2237 2, 19 | thing under any aspect of good, has a will ~conformed to 2238 2, 20 | external action can be both good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2239 2, 20 | OBJ 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external 2240 2, 20 | give an alms. Therefore good and evil are ~in the external 2241 2, 20 | Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: 2242 2, 20 | end receives the aspect of good from its relation to ~the 2243 2, 20 | can be an end. ~Therefore good is in the act of some other 2244 2, 20 | added to matter. Therefore good ~and evil are in the external 2245 2, 20 | aright." Therefore moral good and evil ~are first in the 2246 2, 20 | actions may be said to be good or bad in two ~ways. First, 2247 2, 20 | observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said 2248 2, 20 | Secondly, a thing is said to be good or ~evil, from its relation 2249 2, 20 | evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external 2250 2, 20 | the will by the reason, as good apprehended and ~ordained 2251 2, 20 | thus it is prior to the good in the act of ~the will. 2252 2, 20 | written (Mt. 7:18): ~"A good tree cannot bring forth 2253 2, 20 | an evil tree ~bring forth good fruit." But, according to 2254 2, 20 | interior act of the will to be good, and the external action 2255 2, 20 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are 2256 2, 20 | actions which neither a good end nor a good will can 2257 2, 20 | neither a good end nor a good will can make good."~Aquin.: 2258 2, 20 | nor a good will can make good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[ 2259 2, 20 | whereas, for it to be ~good simply, it is not enough 2260 2, 20 | not enough for it to be good in one point only, it ~must 2261 2, 20 | point only, it ~must be good in every respect. If therefore 2262 2, 20 | If therefore the will be good, both from ~its proper object 2263 2, 20 | the external action ~is good. But if the will be good 2264 2, 20 | good. But if the will be good from its intention of the 2265 2, 20 | make the external action good: and if the will be evil ~ 2266 2, 20 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: If the good tree be taken to signify 2267 2, 20 | be taken to signify the good will, it must ~be in so 2268 2, 20 | Consequently the difference of good and evil is ~applicable 2269 2, 20 | makes that, which has it, good, and renders ~its action 2270 2, 20 | and renders ~its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But 2271 2, 20 | something else, that a thing is ~good merely from being subordinate; 2272 2, 20 | thus a bitter draught is good merely ~because it procures 2273 2, 20 | subordinate to some other good: thus a ~palatable medicine 2274 2, 20 | the light of a pleasurable good, ~besides being conducive 2275 2, 20 | that is rewarded for doing good, or punished for ~doing 2276 2, 20 | understand how just He is. But good or ~evil is to be estimated 2277 2, 20 | agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If ~therefore 2278 2, 20 | purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a 2279 2, 20 | or an evil will, does a good ~deed or refrains from an 2280 2, 20 | itself is ~made better in good things, or worse in evil 2281 2, 20 | wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view, 2282 2, 20 | is ~doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the 2283 2, 20 | wishes to do something for ~a good or an evil end, and is hindered 2284 2, 20 | latter is more lasting in good ~or evil, and in this respect, 2285 2, 20 | intensely ~the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse 2286 2, 20 | in the accomplishment ~of good or evil deeds, so neither 2287 2, 20 | involuntariness fail to do good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2288 2, 20 | a thing is ~judged to be good or bad according to its 2289 2, 20 | that which has it to be good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore 2290 2, 20 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are 2291 2, 20 | action that was evil, ~to be good; nor one that was good, 2292 2, 20 | be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, 2293 2, 20 | this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, 2294 2, 20 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: The good actions done by the hearers, 2295 2, 20 | external action can be both good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2296 2, 20 | external action can be both ~good and evil. For "movement, 2297 2, 20 | continuous movement can be both good and bad: for ~instance, 2298 2, 20 | same ~action can be both good and bad.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2299 2, 20 | But the passion may be good, as Christ's was; and ~the 2300 2, 20 | the same act can ~be both good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2301 2, 20 | result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: 2302 2, 20 | good will, and is therefore good: and from the ~evil will 2303 2, 20 | same ~action can be both good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2304 2, 20 | subject of contraries. But ~good and evil are contraries. 2305 2, 20 | same action cannot be both ~good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2306 2, 20 | subject of contraries. But ~good and evil are contraries. 2307 2, 20 | same action cannot be both ~good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2308 2, 20 | for ~it to be morally both good and evil. Whereas if it 2309 2, 20 | moral unity, it can be both good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2310 2, 20 | two distinct things, and good can ~be in one of them while 2311 2, 21 | by reason of its being ~good or evil?~(2) Whether it 2312 2, 21 | sinful, in so far as it is good or ~evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2313 2, 21 | sinful, in so far as ~it is good or evil. For "monsters are 2314 2, 21 | comprehensive than sin, as also is good than ~right. For every privation 2315 2, 21 | For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is 2316 2, 21 | is evil, and that ~every good action is in accord with 2317 2, 21 | by reason of its being ~good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2318 2, 21 | by reason of its being ~good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2319 2, 21 | blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens 2320 2, 21 | by reason of its being good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[ 2321 2, 21 | such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing, ~just as 2322 2, 21 | censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because ~" 2323 2, 21 | makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good" ( 2324 2, 21 | good, and makes its action good" (Ethic. ~ii, 6): wherefore 2325 2, 21 | or blame, through being good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2326 2, 21 | Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions ~ 2327 2, 21 | intending to ~produce something good; or produce something good, 2328 2, 21 | good; or produce something good, while intending to ~produce 2329 2, 21 | demeritorious in so far as it is ~good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2330 2, 21 | relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not 2331 2, 21 | agent. ~Therefore not every good or evil human action is 2332 2, 21 | putting his action to a good or ~evil purpose.~Aquin.: 2333 2, 21 | Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not 2334 2, 21 | applies ~to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind 2335 2, 21 | action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the ~agent: 2336 2, 21 | the fact that he does a good or an evil deed.~Aquin.: 2337 2, 21 | society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member 2338 2, 21 | therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, ~ 2339 2, 21 | individual to whom he has ~done good or harm; secondly, in respect 2340 2, 21 | action directly for the ~good or evil of the whole society, 2341 2, 21 | far as it conduces to the good or ~harm of an individual, 2342 2, 21 | therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves 2343 2, 21 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: A man's good or evil actions, although 2344 2, 21 | although not ordained to the ~good or evil of another individual, 2345 2, 21 | nevertheless ordained to the good ~or evil of another, i.e. 2346 2, 21 | 2~Reply OBJ 3: This very good or evil, which a man does 2347 2, 21 | God, ~according as it is good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2348 2, 21 | seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not ~meritorious 2349 2, 21 | relation to retribution for good or ~harm done to another. 2350 2, 21 | another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no good or ~ 2351 2, 21 | action, good or evil, does no good or ~harm to God; for it 2352 2, 21 | Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious 2353 2, 21 | nothing in God's sight, by good or evil deeds.~Aquin.: SMT 2354 2, 21 | God. ~Therefore not every good or evil action acquires 2355 2, 21 | judgment . . . whether it be good or evil." Now ~judgment 2356 2, 21 | every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit ~ 2357 2, 21 | each way, our actions, ~good and evil, acquire merit 2358 2, 21 | first of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his ~business 2359 2, 21 | action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or 2360 2, 22 | says ~(Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects 2361 2, 22 | object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in 2362 2, 22 | which is the ~universal good, is a more powerful active 2363 2, 22 | appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore passion is more ~ 2364 2, 22 | appetite ~when we imagine good or evil: in other words, 2365 2, 22 | irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."~Aquin.: SMT FS 2366 2, 23 | based ~on the contrariety of good and evil?~(3) Whether there 2367 2, 23 | passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the 2368 2, 23 | concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended 2369 2, 23 | in acquiring some such good, ~or in avoiding some such 2370 2, 23 | evil, in so far as such good or evil is more ~than our 2371 2, 23 | avoid; therefore this very ~good or evil, inasmuch as it 2372 2, 23 | whatever passions regard good ~or evil absolutely, belong 2373 2, 23 | those passions which regard ~good or bad as arduous, through 2374 2, 23 | either by making ~some good difficult to obtain, or 2375 2, 23 | 3 Para. 1/2~Reply OBJ 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, 2376 2, 23 | another power tending to that good. The same applies to evil. 2377 2, 23 | based on the ~contrariety of good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS 2378 2, 23 | contrariety than that of good and evil. For the ~irascible 2379 2, 23 | is ~no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, 2380 2, 23 | object of the appetite is good or evil. ~Therefore in no 2381 2, 23 | passions ~other than that of good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2382 2, 23 | from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the ~apprehension 2383 2, 23 | of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic. 2384 2, 23 | contrariety than that of good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2385 2, 23 | not differ in respect of good ~and evil: because each 2386 2, 23 | irascible passions is that of good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2387 2, 23 | contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the ~other, according 2388 2, 23 | above (A[1]), is ~sensible good or evil considered absolutely. 2389 2, 23 | considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot ~be a term 2390 2, 23 | whereto, since nothing shuns good as ~such; on the contrary, 2391 2, 23 | concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, ~ 2392 2, 23 | irascible faculty is sensible good ~or evil, considered not 2393 2, 23 | or ~arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, 2394 2, 23 | arduous, considered as ~good, is of such a nature as 2395 2, 23 | contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope ~ 2396 2, 23 | passion of the soul has either good or evil for ~its object; 2397 2, 23 | part. But ~a passion having good for its object, is contrary 2398 2, 23 | according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused 2399 2, 23 | according to contrariety of good and ~evil. Because the opposite 2400 2, 23 | opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be ~ 2401 2, 23 | difficulty. Nor, when once ~good is obtained, does there 2402 2, 23 | appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs 2403 2, 23 | the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this distinction ~ 2404 2, 23 | withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every 2405 2, 23 | arise from the difference of good and ~evil; or from the difference 2406 2, 23 | the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a ~force 2407 2, 23 | first ~place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive 2408 2, 23 | connaturalness in respect of good: and this ~belongs to the 2409 2, 23 | of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, ~it 2410 2, 23 | towards the attainment of the good ~beloved: and this belongs 2411 2, 23 | dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the 2412 2, 23 | rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs 2413 2, 23 | or ~inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed 2414 2, 23 | concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And 2415 2, 23 | absolutely. And in ~respect of good not yet obtained, we have " 2416 2, 23 | daring." But in ~respect of good obtained there is no irascible 2417 2, 24 | 24] Out. Para. 1/1 - OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS 2418 2, 24 | ARTICLES)~We must now consider good and evil in the passions 2419 2, 24 | inquiry: ~(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in 2420 2, 24 | Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?~Aquin.: 2421 2, 24 | Para. 1/1~Whether moral good and evil can be found in 2422 2, 24 | passion of the soul is morally good or ~evil. For moral good 2423 2, 24 | good or ~evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: 2424 2, 24 | passion of the soul is morally good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2425 2, 24 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists 2426 2, 24 | with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2427 2, 24 | praised and blamed for ~moral good and evil. Therefore the 2428 2, 24 | passions are not morally good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS 2429 2, 24 | evil if our love is evil; good if our ~love is good."~Aquin.: 2430 2, 24 | evil; good if our ~love is good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[ 2431 2, 24 | thus there is no moral good ~or evil in them, since 2432 2, 24 | reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because 2433 2, 24 | outward members are ~morally good or evil, inasmuch as they 2434 2, 24 | voluntary, be called ~morally good or evil. And they are said 2435 2, 24 | for sin, they rejoice ~in good works."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[ 2436 2, 24 | that moderate passions are good. This ~difference, although 2437 2, 24 | Wherefore they esteem them good, ~when they are controlled 2438 2, 24 | reason, so ~also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened 2439 2, 24 | reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a ~passion of 2440 2, 24 | soul does not lessen moral good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[ 2441 2, 24 | of evil either destroys good ~altogether, or makes it 2442 2, 24 | or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, 2443 2, 24 | the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated 2444 2, 24 | reason. For since man's good is founded on reason as 2445 2, 24 | reason as its root, that good ~will be all the more perfect, 2446 2, 24 | the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the 2447 2, 24 | perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves 2448 2, 24 | that man should both will good and do ~it in his external 2449 2, 24 | the perfection of moral ~good, that man should be moved 2450 2, 24 | man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of 2451 2, 24 | members: and so in them good does not depend on the right ~ 2452 2, 24 | 1~Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?~ 2453 2, 24 | no passion of the soul is good or evil morally ~according 2454 2, 24 | its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason. ~ 2455 2, 24 | seems that no passion is good or evil ~according to its 2456 2, 24 | therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its 2457 2, 24 | passions the object of which is good, are ~specifically good, 2458 2, 24 | good, are ~specifically good, such as love, desire and 2459 2, 24 | Therefore no passion is good or evil ~according to its 2460 2, 24 | other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore 2461 2, 24 | passion of ~the soul is good or evil according to its 2462 2, 24 | Therefore some passions are good or evil ~according to their 2463 2, 24 | natural genus; and thus moral ~good and evil have no connection 2464 2, 24 | reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the ~ 2465 2, 24 | is sorrow for ~another's good: for thus passions belong 2466 2, 24 | sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason ~are 2467 2, 24 | Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if ~ 2468 2, 24 | to good, are themselves good, if ~they tend to that which 2469 2, 24 | tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if 2470 2, 24 | consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, 2471 2, 24 | certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the 2472 2, 25 | faculty is the difficult good, ~which seems to be the 2473 2, 25 | seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible 2474 2, 25 | passions regard the absolute good, ~while the irascible passions 2475 2, 25 | restricted, viz. the difficult, ~good. Since, therefore, the absolute 2476 2, 25 | therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted 2477 2, 25 | precedes the restricted good, ~it seems that the concupiscible 2478 2, 25 | passions ~that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the 2479 2, 25 | it is looked ~upon as a good thing to pay back the evil 2480 2, 25 | realization of the arduous good. In like manner ~fear adds 2481 2, 25 | denote movement towards good or evil, and ~those concupiscible 2482 2, 25 | passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is ~therefore 2483 2, 25 | concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it ~naturally 2484 2, 25 | Para. 1/2 ~I answer that, Good and evil are the object 2485 2, 25 | concupiscible ~faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; 2486 2, 25 | since evil is privation of ~good. Wherefore all the passions, 2487 2, 25 | the object of which is good, are ~naturally before those, 2488 2, 25 | because the quest of a good is the ~reason for shunning 2489 2, 25 | A[2] Body Para. 2/2~Now good has the aspect of an end, 2490 2, 25 | proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is ~complacency 2491 2, 25 | which is ~complacency in good; while movement towards 2492 2, 25 | while movement towards good is desire or ~concupiscence; 2493 2, 25 | concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly 2494 2, 25 | is the enjoyment of the good, which ~enjoyment is, in 2495 2, 25 | way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated ~above ( 2496 2, 25 | strive simply to ~obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous 2497 2, 25 | those whose ~object is good, or evil; and this belongs 2498 2, 25 | of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in the 2499 2, 25 | movement ~arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those 2500 2, 25 | evil, those whose object is good, ~viz. hope and despair,


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