Part, Question

2501   2, 25  |            hope is a ~movement towards good as such, which is essentially
2502   2, 25  |                 so that ~hope tends to good directly; whereas despair
2503   2, 25  |               is a movement away from ~good, a movement which is consistent
2504   2, 25  |               which is consistent with good, not as such, but in ~respect
2505   2, 25  |            wherefore its tendency from good is ~accidental, as it were.
2506   2, 25  |                  that as the desire of good is the ~reason for avoiding
2507   2, 25  |                the arduousness but the good that is the reason ~for
2508   2, 25  |       Consequently hope, which regards good more ~directly, takes precedence:
2509   2, 25  |              and directly ~towards the good as towards its proper object;
2510   2, 25  |           something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love,
2511   2, 25  |            that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present ~
2512   2, 25  |              evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.~
2513   2, 25  |             other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, ~
2514   2, 25  |               object, viz. some future good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[
2515   2, 25  |             implies movement away from good; and this is, as it ~were,
2516   2, 26  |      pertaining to the appetite; since good ~is the object of both.
2517   2, 26  |        appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its ~very
2518   2, 26  |               its ~very complacency in good is called "sensitive love,"
2519   2, 26  |              power, because it regards good absolutely, and not ~under
2520   2, 26  |              that "dilection refers to good things, love to evil ~things,
2521   2, 26  |                in reference to either ~good or bad things. Therefore
2522   2, 26  |              differ, not in respect of good and evil, ~but as stated.
2523   2, 26  |               4), "to love is to ~wish good to someone." Hence the movement
2524   2, 26  |         twofold tendency: ~towards the good which a man wishes to someone (
2525   2, 26  |                to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, man has love ~
2526   2, 26  |              concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another,
2527   2, 26  |          towards him to whom he wishes good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
2528   2, 26  |            relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, ~
2529   2, 26  |           convertible with being, ~the good, which itself has goodness,
2530   2, 26  |                itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is ~
2531   2, 26  |               that which is ~another's good, is a relative good. Consequently
2532   2, 26  |          another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with
2533   2, 26  |           loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the ~
2534   2, 26  |               that it may be another's good, is ~relative love. ~Aquin.:
2535   2, 26  |          speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, ~
2536   2, 26  |            indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the
2537   2, 26  |               But since he refers this good further to his ~own pleasure
2538   2, 27  |                of inquiry:~(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?~(
2539   2, 27  |                Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether good is the only cause of love?~
2540   2, 27  |              OBJ 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of
2541   2, 27  |                only cause of love. For good ~does not cause love, except
2542   2, 27  |              else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the ~
2543   2, 27  |               would be good. Therefore good is not the ~only cause of
2544   2, 27  |                 Nom. iv) that not "the good" only ~but also "the beautiful
2545   2, 27  |               viii, 3): "Assuredly the good ~alone is beloved." Therefore
2546   2, 27  |           alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.~
2547   2, 27  |          proper object of love ~is the good; because, as stated above (
2548   2, 27  |            everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate ~
2549   2, 27  |               follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love. ~
2550   2, 27  |             except under the aspect of good, that ~is to say, in so
2551   2, 27  |                say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is
2552   2, 27  |                is considered as ~being good simply. And thus a certain
2553   2, 27  |             which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that
2554   2, 27  |                means of iniquity, some good is gained; ~pleasure, for
2555   2, 27  |          acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to ~acknowledge one'
2556   2, 27  |           beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in ~aspect
2557   2, 27  |                 aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion
2558   2, 27  |                all seek, the notion of good is that ~which calms the
2559   2, 27  |            cognitive faculty: so that "good" ~means that which simply
2560   2, 27  |                As stated above (A[1]), good is the cause of love, as ~
2561   2, 27  |              as ~being its object. But good is not the object of the
2562   2, 27  |               some apprehension of the good ~that is loved. For this
2563   2, 27  |                for the same ~reason as good is, which can be loved only
2564   2, 27  |                with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But
2565   2, 27  |               himself, in willing ~the good that he desires. But a man
2566   2, 27  |          hinders him ~from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes
2567   2, 27  |               him from gaining his own good. This is ~why "potters quarrel
2568   2, 27  |            himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer,
2569   2, 27  |                if a good singer love a good writer, we can see ~a likeness
2570   2, 27  |           particular love: just as one good is the ~cause of another.~
2571   2, 27  |       Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is ~loved.~
2572   2, 28  |              zealous for that which is good in a good ~thing always" (
2573   2, 28  |                that which is good in a good ~thing always" (speaking
2574   2, 28  |               of friendship, he ~wills good to him, just as he wills
2575   2, 28  |               to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he ~
2576   2, 28  |               far, to wit, as he wills good to ~him as to himself. Hence
2577   2, 28  |              pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in ~the
2578   2, 28  |          concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the ~beloved,
2579   2, 28  |            account of another, or wish good to ~another on account of
2580   2, 28  |         inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his ~friend,
2581   2, 28  |            seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in
2582   2, 28  |                 and both desire and do good things for one another.~
2583   2, 28  |            satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to
2584   2, 28  |           seeks to have this extrinsic good for ~himself, he does not
2585   2, 28  |            because he wishes and does ~good to his friend, by caring
2586   2, 28  |                so far as he wills ~the good of his friend and works
2587   2, 28  |               Yet he does not will the good of ~his friend more than
2588   2, 28  |               friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow
2589   2, 28  |              the object of love is the good, which communicates ~itself
2590   2, 28  |          friendship seeks the friend's good: ~wherefore, when it is
2591   2, 28  |              that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man
2592   2, 28  |              done against the friend's good. In this way, too, ~a man
2593   2, 28  |               a man is eaten up with a good zeal, ~who strives to remedy
2594   2, 28  |               2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it
2595   2, 28  |               zeal arises from love of good. But ~through defect of
2596   2, 28  |               appetitive power to some good. Now ~nothing is hurt by
2597   2, 28  |        Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the
2598   2, 28  |              the lover; but ~love of a good which is unsuitable to the
2599   2, 28  |              is fitted to receive ~the good which is loved, inasmuch
2600   2, 28  |                they do for the love of good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[
2601   2, 28  |               2]~). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each
2602   2, 29  |               that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the ~
2603   2, 29  |              not at the same time both good and ~evil. But the same
2604   2, 29  |              only of evil, but also of good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[
2605   2, 29  |             But the object of love ~is good, as stated above (Q[26],
2606   2, 29  |              such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant,
2607   2, 29  |                 And therefore, just as good is the object of ~love,
2608   2, 29  |            thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not ~truly good;
2609   2, 29  |            good, when it is not ~truly good; so a thing may be apprehended
2610   2, 29  |            hatred of evil nor ~love of good is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS
2611   2, 29  |              evil nor ~love of good is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[
2612   2, 29  |           being ~apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.~Aquin.:
2613   2, 29  |              implies a turning towards good. ~Therefore love is not
2614   2, 29  |             Para. 1/1~On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "
2615   2, 29  |           nothing ~except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div.
2616   2, 29  |         according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore ~love
2617   2, 29  |               means to the gaining ~of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking,
2618   2, 29  |                movement in respect ~of good is stronger than its movement
2619   2, 29  |               to ~different degrees of good there are different degrees
2620   2, 29  |           everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire ~
2621   2, 29  |               save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside ~the
2622   2, 29  |              to love a ~man is to will good to him, as stated above (
2623   2, 29  |              First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself.
2624   2, 29  |                that what is desired as good in some particular ~respect,
2625   2, 29  |             himself, to ~whom he wills good. For each thing is that
2626   2, 29  |                 it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill
2627   2, 29  |           apprehend ~death itself as a good, considered as putting an
2628   2, 29  |             cannot hate the truth. For good, true, ~and being are convertible.
2629   2, 29  |     convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, ~therefore, can
2630   2, 29  |               Para. 1/2~I answer that, Good, true and being are the
2631   2, 29  |              considered by reason. For good is considered in the light
2632   2, 29  |             not so considered: because good is ~"what all things seek."
2633   2, 29  |                things seek." Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the
2634   2, 29  |                are with the ~notion of good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[
2635   2, 29  |           repugnant ~or hurtful to the good we love. First, according
2636   2, 30  |                my flesh, that which is good." But desire ~for God's
2637   2, 30  |              to each power, its proper good is a matter of ~concupiscence.
2638   2, 30  |             one is in the intelligible good, ~which is the good of reason;
2639   2, 30  |       intelligible good, ~which is the good of reason; the other is
2640   2, 30  |                reason; the other is in good perceptible to the ~senses.
2641   2, 30  |              organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole ~
2642   2, 30  |         wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole ~composite.
2643   2, 30  |                 tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of ~
2644   2, 30  |               soul to seek its proper ~good by the natural appetite,
2645   2, 30  |     apprehension. But ~the craving for good, by the animal appetite,
2646   2, 30  |               Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "good when ~desired gives rise
2647   2, 30  |                A[1]; Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives ~pleasure to
2648   2, 30  |                the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this
2649   2, 30  |             power of the end or of the good, differs ~according as it
2650   2, 30  |               Reply OBJ 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence,
2651   2, 30  |             the appetite in respect of good to come: so ~that it includes
2652   2, 30  |            concupiscence in regard to ~good. But since, like fear, it
2653   2, 30  |             covetousness. For a ~small good or evil is reckoned as though
2654   2, 30  |              of the appetite in future good or evil is ~called hope
2655   2, 30  |             hope or fear, which regard good and evil as arduous.~Aquin.:
2656   2, 30  |               craving for ~pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable
2657   2, 30  |                apprehends something as good and ~suitable, and consequently
2658   2, 30  |          proper to devise something as good and ~suitable, beyond that
2659   2, 30  |           appetite is the apprehended ~good. Hence diversity of the
2660   2, 30  |            object ~of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of
2661   2, 30  |        concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds ~from
2662   2, 31  |             moved; ~for it arises from good already gained. Therefore
2663   2, 31  |             the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing
2664   2, 31  |             who has already gained the good in ~which he delights, the
2665   2, 31  |           presence of the ~pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite,
2666   2, 31  |               a ~tendency to something good, as stated above (Q[23],
2667   2, 31  |               in time: ~for it regards good already gained, which is,
2668   2, 31  |             the ~movement. But if this good gained be subject to change,
2669   2, 31  |            have not for their object a good obtained, ~as delight has.
2670   2, 31  |             the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy
2671   2, 31  |                soul is an ~apprehended good, diversity of apprehension
2672   2, 31  |              are themselves a certain ~good of the agent, and are known
2673   2, 31  |          needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into ~conjunction,
2674   2, 31  |     conjunction itself. ~For spiritual good is both greater and more
2675   2, 31  |               more beloved than bodily good: a ~sign whereof is that
2676   2, 31  |               which is an intellectual good. Likewise ~the intellectual
2677   2, 31  |          knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former ~
2678   2, 31  |              object of pleasure is the good. Since ~therefore good is
2679   2, 31  |             the good. Since ~therefore good is not contrary to good,
2680   2, 31  |                good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to
2681   2, 31  |             not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to evil, ~and
2682   2, 31  |         contrary to evil, ~and evil to good," as stated in Praedic.
2683   2, 31  |     Philosopher is to be understood of good ~and evil as applied to
2684   2, 31  |            things nothing prevents one good from being contrary ~to
2685   2, 31  |                 of which the former is good in relation ~to fire, the
2686   2, 31  |         impossible with regard to the ~good of virtue, is due to the
2687   2, 31  |              to the fact that virtue's good depends on ~fittingness
2688   2, 32  |               to us?~(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of
2689   2, 32  |             attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge ~of this
2690   2, 32  |            attainment of the ~suitable good is by means of an operation.
2691   2, 32  |        operation ~itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure
2692   2, 32  |               above (Q[31], A[1]), the good which is obtained and is
2693   2, 32  |               the part of the pleasing good which is united to us, change
2694   2, 32  |          pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide
2695   2, 32  |             with pleasure in regarding good, so ~also do desire and
2696   2, 32  |               the presence of suitable good, in ~so far as it is felt,
2697   2, 32  |                 appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas,
2698   2, 32  |                implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.~Aquin.:
2699   2, 32  |               presence of the pleasing good, that is not implied either
2700   2, 32  |              looked upon as ~something good; wherefore so far as a man
2701   2, 32  |           cause of pleasure is our own good when ~conjoined to us. But
2702   2, 32  |              action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, the ~actions
2703   2, 32  |             attainment of one's proper good, and ~the knowledge of having
2704   2, 32  |              fact that we obtain ~some good through the action of another.
2705   2, 32  |          actions of ~those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us:
2706   2, 32  |             know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men
2707   2, 32  |              thus become aware of some good existing in themselves.
2708   2, 32  |           weight from the testimony of good and wise ~men, hence men
2709   2, 32  |               as love is for something good, while admiration is ~for
2710   2, 32  |          another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own
2711   2, 32  |              are reckoned as one's own good, by ~reason of the power
2712   2, 32  |               one to reckon ~another's good as being in opposition to
2713   2, 32  |                Para. 1/1~Whether doing good to another is a cause of
2714   2, 32  |               It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause
2715   2, 32  |                obtaining one's proper ~good, as stated above (AA[1],
2716   2, 32  |                Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not ~to the obtaining
2717   2, 32  |               spending of one's proper good. Therefore it ~seems to
2718   2, 32  |             mark of ~prodigality to do good to others; while it is a
2719   2, 32  |     illiberality to ~desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone
2720   2, 32  |                4, it seems that ~doing good to others is not a cause
2721   2, 32  |               i, 11). Therefore doing ~good to others is a cause of
2722   2, 32  |               1/1~I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure
2723   2, 32  |               the effect, which is the good conferred on ~another. In
2724   2, 32  |               love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take
2725   2, 32  |               we take pleasure in the ~good we do to others, especially
2726   2, 32  |             our friends, as in our own good. ~Secondly, in consideration
2727   2, 32  |              as when a man, from doing good to ~another, hopes to get
2728   2, 32  |             another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from
2729   2, 32  |             principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure
2730   2, 32  |                is the faculty of doing good: and in this ~regard, doing
2731   2, 32  |             and in this ~regard, doing good to another becomes pleasant,
2732   2, 32  |                imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof
2733   2, 32  |           bestow a ~share of their own good. Another principle is man'
2734   2, 32  |            habitual inclination ~to do good, by reason of which doing
2735   2, 32  |               by reason of which doing good becomes connatural to him:
2736   2, 32  |              one ~whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever
2737   2, 32  |        pleasure as showing forth one's good. But in ~so far as it empties
2738   2, 32  |               it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of sadness;
2739   2, 32  |                pertaining to one's own good, ~which man loves more than
2740   2, 32  |                and reproving, one does good to ~another: for this gives
2741   2, 32  |                it is ~clear that doing good to another may be of itself
2742   2, 32  |             seems to affect ~one's own good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[
2743   2, 32  |              us does not hurt our own ~good, but increase it, it is
2744   2, 32  |              it be ~hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes
2745   2, 32  |            like is hurtful to our own ~good. First, by destroying the
2746   2, 32  |      destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of ~excess; because
2747   2, 32  |               kind of ~excess; because good, especially bodily good,
2748   2, 32  |                good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned ~
2749   2, 32  |         measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily pleasure, ~
2750   2, 32  |         directly contrary to one's own good: ~thus a potter dislikes
2751   2, 32  |             which he seeks ~as his own good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[
2752   2, 32  |              excellence of a man's own good: because they belong to
2753   2, 32  |             and presiding, a ~man does good to others, which is pleasant.~
2754   2, 32  |                are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful
2755   2, 32  |         pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as it is a remedy ~
2756   2, 32  |             things destroys the proper good, and ~consequently gives
2757   2, 32  |                contrary to ~the proper good of man.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
2758   2, 32  |                two things; rest in the good, and ~perception of this
2759   2, 33  |         conjunction with some suitable good. As a result of this apprehension, ~
2760   2, 33  |                since desire ~regards a good which is not yet possessed,
2761   2, 33  |          whereas pleasure regards the ~good that is possessed. Therefore
2762   2, 33  |                 but according as every good which is added to a thing
2763   2, 33  |               say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there
2764   2, 33  |                there is ~added another good, which is pleasure, denoting
2765   2, 33  |           repose of the ~appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly,
2766   2, 34  |              whether every pleasure is good?~(3) Whether any pleasure
2767   2, 34  |               pleasure is the greatest good?~(4) Whether pleasure is
2768   2, 34  |               which to judge of moral ~good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS
2769   2, 34  |                in ~itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with
2770   2, 34  |           about the difficult and ~the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no
2771   2, 34  |              pleasure is not something good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2772   2, 34  |                that some pleasures are good, and that some are ~evil.
2773   2, 34  |        appetitive power in some loved ~good, and resulting from some
2774   2, 34  |             first is in respect of the good in which a ~man reposes
2775   2, 34  |             reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order
2776   2, 34  |                moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the ~higher
2777   2, 34  |            actions, some of which ~are good, some evil. Now pleasures
2778   2, 34  |        Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of
2779   2, 34  |            desires of good actions are good, and of evil ~actions, evil;
2780   2, 34  |              more are the pleasures of good actions good, and ~those
2781   2, 34  |              pleasures of good actions good, and ~those of evil actions
2782   2, 34  |            concerned with all kinds of good, but with the ~making of
2783   2, 34  |              Whether every pleasure is good?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2784   2, 34  |            seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in ~the
2785   2, 34  |               there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the ~useful,
2786   2, 34  |             But everything virtuous is good; and in like ~manner everything
2787   2, 34  |            manner everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure
2788   2, 34  |       Therefore also every pleasure is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2789   2, 34  |            sake of something else, ~is good in itself, as stated in
2790   2, 34  |         pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now that which ~
2791   2, 34  |            Therefore every pleasure is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2792   2, 34  |            desired by all, seems to be good of ~itself: because good
2793   2, 34  |               good of ~itself: because good is "what all things seek,"
2794   2, 34  |                  Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently
2795   2, 34  |          consequently all pleasure is ~good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2796   2, 34  |       Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that ~consequently
2797   2, 34  |         consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus
2798   2, 34  |   discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is ~
2799   2, 34  |             simply, and that which is ~good in respect of a particular
2800   2, 34  |              individual. That which is good simply, is ~good in itself.
2801   2, 34  |              which is good simply, is ~good in itself. Now that which
2802   2, 34  |          itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be good in ~
2803   2, 34  |             not good in itself, may be good in ~respect of some individual
2804   2, 34  |          natural: thus it is sometimes good for a ~leper to eat things
2805   2, 34  |               of the appetite in ~some good, if the appetite reposes
2806   2, 34  |               reposes in that which is good simply, the ~pleasure will
2807   2, 34  |                be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man's ~
2808   2, 34  |                repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect
2809   2, 34  |                him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain ~
2810   2, 34  |                respect, or an apparent good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2811   2, 34  |              or useful, without being ~good. But the pleasant depends
2812   2, 34  |            every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which
2813   2, 34  |             Now the end may be ~either good or evil; although nothing
2814   2, 34  |             except in so far as ~it is good in respect of such and such
2815   2, 34  |              the same way as they seek good: ~since pleasure is the
2816   2, 34  |              repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it ~happens
2817   2, 34  |                 happens that not every good which is desired, is of
2818   2, 34  |               is of itself and verily ~good; so not every pleasure is
2819   2, 34  |                is of itself and verily good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2820   2, 34  |               pleasure is the greatest good?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2821   2, 34  |               pleasure is the greatest good. Because ~nothing generated
2822   2, 34  |              generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot
2823   2, 34  |               pleasure is the greatest good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2824   2, 34  |             that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by ~
2825   2, 34  |           pleasure is not the greatest good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2826   2, 34  |             that which is the greatest good is universally good, as ~
2827   2, 34  |           greatest good is universally good, as ~being good of itself:
2828   2, 34  |            universally good, as ~being good of itself: since that which
2829   2, 34  |           pleasure is not ~universally good, as stated above (A[2]).
2830   2, 34  |          pleasure is not the ~greatest good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2831   2, 34  |              Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of ~
2832   2, 34  |                that all ~pleasures are good; but he said that some are
2833   2, 34  |              but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, ~so
2834   2, 34  |              the sovereign or greatest good. But, judging from ~his
2835   2, 34  |          Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which
2836   2, 34  |             that which is the ~supreme good simply, i.e. the good as
2837   2, 34  |          supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from,
2838   2, 34  |               sense God is the Supreme Good; ~whereas we are speaking
2839   2, 34  |               speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the ~
2840   2, 34  |              things. Now the ~greatest good of everything is its last
2841   2, 34  |                God Who is ~the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment
2842   2, 34  |            pleasure being the greatest good, although every ~pleasure
2843   2, 34  |                is true of the greatest good simply, by ~participation
2844   2, 34  |                of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can ~
2845   2, 34  |             universally true ~that any good becomes better by the addition
2846   2, 34  |                the addition of another good. Moreover it ~might be said
2847   2, 34  |               pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere ~
2848   2, 34  |         perfect repose in ~the perfect good. Hence it does not follow
2849   2, 34  |           every pleasure is ~supremely good, or even good at all. Thus
2850   2, 34  |                supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science
2851   2, 34  |          certain science is supremely ~good, but not every science is.~
2852   2, 34  |                which to judge of moral good ~or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS
2853   2, 34  |              measure or rule of moral ~good and evil. Because "that
2854   2, 34  |                since ~some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore
2855   2, 34  |          because "those pleasures ~are good which result from good operations,
2856   2, 34  |             are good which result from good operations, and those are
2857   2, 34  |                this is evil, and that, good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
2858   2, 34  |            discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is
2859   2, 34  |              of every ~appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore
2860   2, 34  |       therefore man is reckoned to be ~good or bad chiefly according
2861   2, 34  |               will; since ~that man is good and virtuous, who takes
2862   2, 34  |             sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the
2863   2, 34  |              men. But the will of the ~good man takes pleasure in them
2864   2, 34  |              the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure ~
2865   2, 34  |           measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in ~the
2866   2, 34  |                will rests in ~the true good: and that man evil, whose
2867   2, 34  |          operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there ~be also pleasure
2868   2, 34  |             there ~be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of
2869   2, 35  |              viii, 14): "Had ~not some good remained in nature, we should
2870   2, 35  |                punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not
2871   2, 35  |              namely, ~conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction;
2872   2, 35  |                it deprives one of some good), and perception of ~this
2873   2, 35  |                have not the aspect ~of good or evil in regard to the
2874   2, 35  |         something under the ~aspect of good or evil is the object of
2875   2, 35  |              the pleasure or pain. But good ~and evil, as such, are
2876   2, 35  |             OBJ 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the
2877   2, 35  |           nature ~desires something as good, the removal of which being
2878   2, 35  |           sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present ~evil, are contrary
2879   2, 35  |        considered under the ~aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow
2880   2, 35  |         considered under the aspect of good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS
2881   2, 35  |                instance to rejoice ~in good and to sorrow for evil.~
2882   2, 35  |              the object of pleasure is good, so the object of ~sorrow
2883   2, 35  |   consideration of truth, which is the good of the ~intellect: it can,
2884   2, 35  |             with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But ~the
2885   2, 35  |             Para. 1/1~On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as
2886   2, 35  |          desirable for the sake of the good which is its ~object; whereas
2887   2, 35  |                pleasure is a ~suitable good; while the cause of pain
2888   2, 35  |              it happens that a certain good is suitable without any
2889   2, 35  |         Another reason is because ~the good, which is the object of
2890   2, 35  |               as ~being a privation of good: and that which is by reason
2891   2, 35  |                the loss of some loved ~good, or by the presence of some
2892   2, 35  |                suffers no ~lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession
2893   2, 35  |                cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than
2894   2, 35  |            that is more loved than the good in ~which we take pleasure.
2895   2, 35  |           loved ~more than an imagined good, it seems that, according
2896   2, 35  |            cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect
2897   2, 35  |               is ~sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another'
2898   2, 35  |             wrongs, and for another's ~good, and at the same time to
2899   2, 35  |               one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as
2900   2, 35  |               1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning:
2901   2, 36  |                caused by the loss of a good or rather by the ~presence
2902   2, 36  |               is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil? ~
2903   2, 36  |                caused by the loss of a good rather ~than by the presence
2904   2, 36  |             caused by the loss of some good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[
2905   2, 36  |             the ~object of pleasure is good, as stated above (Q[23],
2906   2, 36  |          caused chiefly by the loss of good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[
2907   2, 36  |             But the object ~of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow
2908   2, 36  |                is felt for the loss of good ~rather than for an evil
2909   2, 36  |              evil is the privation ~of good: and privation is in reality
2910   2, 36  |              to sorrow for the loss of good, ~would be the same as to
2911   2, 36  |                the present evil or the good which is lost.~Aquin.: SMT
2912   2, 36  |             pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper
2913   2, 36  |           pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and ~therefore,
2914   2, 36  |               sorrow or pain, than the good which is ~lost.~Aquin.:
2915   2, 36  |              OBJ 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil,
2916   2, 36  |               evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine ~
2917   2, 36  |                of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards ~one
2918   2, 36  |             regards, first of all, the good, and in ~consequence, the
2919   2, 36  |              towards the possession of good: while the second principle ~
2920   2, 36  |                the delay of a ~desired good, or for its entire removal.
2921   2, 36  |                for the loss of present good, in ~which we have already
2922   2, 36  |              the withdrawal of future ~good which we desire to have.~
2923   2, 36  |          appetite to the possession of good ~causes the inclination
2924   2, 36  |       appetitive movements that regard good, are ~reckoned as causing
2925   2, 36  |              that although the desired good itself is future, yet the
2926   2, 36  |              desire the conjunction of good ~and the removal of evil.
2927   2, 36  |              the desire or craving for good is reckoned ~as a cause
2928   2, 36  |            causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in
2929   2, 36  |               is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally
2930   2, 36  |            just as love or desire ~for good is a cause of sorrow, so
2931   2, 37  |                carefulness conduces to good ~work: wherefore the Apostle
2932   2, 38  |             the appetite in a suitable good; while ~sorrow arises from
2933   2, 38  |           sorrow: whereas ~the present good inclines him to pleasure.
2934   2, 38  |                itself, ~which is man's good and naturally pleasant to
2935   2, 38  |                 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Every good disposition of the body
2936   2, 39  |               sorrow can be a virtuous good?~(3) Whether it can be a
2937   2, 39  |             Whether it can be a useful good?~(4) Whether bodily pain
2938   2, 39  |           Therefore sorrow for evil is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2939   2, 39  |            answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first
2940   2, 39  |            response of the appetite in good. Secondly, ~a thing is said
2941   2, 39  |                  a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition
2942   2, 39  |               thus shame is said to be good, on the supposition of a
2943   2, 39  |               viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he ~sorrows for
2944   2, 39  |               that he ~sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not
2945   2, 39  |             has lost: for had not some good remained in his ~nature,
2946   2, 39  |                punished by the loss of good." Because, however, ~in
2947   2, 39  |            individuals - that which is good on some supposition, ~should
2948   2, 39  |                should be considered as good: just as that which is voluntary
2949   2, 39  |               sorrow can be a virtuous good?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2950   2, 39  |               sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which ~leads to
2951   2, 39  |              to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine says (
2952   2, 39  |              sorrow is not a ~virtuous good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2953   2, 39  |               2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious.
2954   2, 39  |               sorrow is not a virtuous good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2955   2, 39  |         Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2956   2, 39  |                 In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. ~
2957   2, 39  |             good, it can be a virtuous good. ~For it has been said above (
2958   2, 39  |                 A[1]) that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it ~denotes
2959   2, 39  |              evil. Now ~every virtuous good results from these two things,
2960   2, 39  |              sorrow may be a ~virtuous good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2961   2, 39  |               the root of the virtuous good; but ~excessive sorrow,
2962   2, 39  |              it fails to be a virtuous good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2963   2, 39  |              the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse ~reason
2964   2, 39  |             and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow
2965   2, 39  |              and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when ~a man
2966   2, 39  |         Whether sorrow can be a useful good?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2967   2, 39  |              sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is ~written (Ecclus.
2968   2, 39  |       Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2969   2, 39  |       Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2970   2, 39  |              of its being ~contrary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore
2971   2, 39  |             just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. ~
2972   2, 39  |              good, and pleasure in the good. ~Therefore just as pleasure
2973   2, 39  |                just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good
2974   2, 39  |                good makes one seek the good more ~earnestly, so sorrow
2975   2, 39  |              pleasure is the ~greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss.
2976   2, 39  |            happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last ~
2977   2, 39  |               Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment
2978   2, 39  |            inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of
2979   2, 39  |         sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: ~while
2980   2, 39  |                 wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst
2981   2, 39  |               Therefore man's greatest good is to be wise: while his ~
2982   2, 39  |                is apparently evil, but good in ~reality. Now pain or
2983   2, 39  |            apparently evil, but really good, cannot be the ~greatest
2984   2, 39  |              from that ~which is truly good. Hence it is impossible
2985   2, 39  |           Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, ~
2986   2, 39  |               true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right
2987   2, 39  |              the will ~in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus
2988   2, 39  |             pain or ~sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which
2989   2, 39  |          pleasure can be man's highest good, ~in the way above stated (
2990   2, 39  |             being opposed to evil is a good. ~And for this reason, sorrow
2991   2, 39  |                 it has an admixture of good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
2992   2, 40  |               desire, viz. the ~future good. Therefore hope is the same
2993   2, 40  |                of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever
2994   2, 40  |              is accidental to a future good, which is ~the object of
2995   2, 40  |           First, that it is ~something good; since, properly speaking,
2996   2, 40  |        speaking, hope regards only the good; in ~this respect, hope
2997   2, 40  |               which regards a present ~good. Thirdly, that it must be
2998   2, 40  |               which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it
2999   2, 40  |           because each ~regards future good; and because the good which
3000   2, 40  |           future good; and because the good which is not arduous is ~