Part, Question

3001   2, 40  |                chiefly to ~the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.~
3002   2, 40  |           object of hope is the future good considered, not ~absolutely,
3003   2, 40  |             the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above (A[1]).
3004   2, 40  |               stated above (A[1]). Now good, as ~such, is not the object
3005   2, 40  |               of the ~appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to
3006   2, 40  |               For the ~apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of
3007   2, 40  |               apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible
3008   2, 40  |              of the appetite to such a good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
3009   2, 40  |                hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a ~
3010   2, 40  |             only keeps its eye on the ~good which man intends to get,
3011   2, 40  |               hope ~is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide
3012   2, 40  |             object of hope is a future good, possible of ~attainment.
3013   2, 40  |                 since hope regards the good, ~whereas despair arises
3014   2, 40  |               in the way of obtaining ~good. Therefore hope is not contrary
3015   2, 40  |              out towards the hoped-for good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
3016   2, 40  |             hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a
3017   2, 40  |            because their objects, i.e. good ~and evil, are contrary:
3018   2, 40  |                as making the difficult good impossible to ~obtain. But
3019   2, 40  |                from the mere excess of good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
3020   2, 40  |               each of them regards the good, which is the object of
3021   2, 40  |            object of hope is a future ~good, difficult but possible
3022   2, 40  |                three conditions of the good which is the object of ~
3023   2, 40  |                and consequently are of good ~hope. Two of these causes
3024   2, 40  |                pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore
3025   2, 40  |            regards as its object, ~the good which one hopes for. But
3026   2, 40  |               hopes for. But since the good we hope for is something ~
3027   2, 40  |              then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused ~
3028   2, 40  |                fact ~that we hope that good will accrue to us through
3029   2, 40  |              towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love
3030   2, 40  |                its object, ~which is a good, difficult but possible.
3031   2, 40  |            Reply OBJ 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security
3032   2, 41  |                which of itself regards good and evil. ~Moreover, it
3033   2, 41  |                speak, some ~particular good. Wherefore it has most properly
3034   2, 41  |         instinct to hope ~for a future good, or to fear a future evil.~
3035   2, 41  |            object of hope is ~a future good, difficult but possible
3036   2, 41  |              arises from the desire of good, so fear arises ~from avoidance
3037   2, 41  |             arises from the desire of ~good, as is evident from what
3038   2, 41  |          inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil;
3039   2, 41  |           instance, despair flies from good on account of some ~difficulty;
3040   2, 41  |               unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement
3041   2, 41  |              Now ~man's evil, like his good, may be considered either
3042   2, 41  |               unwonted thing, whether ~good or evil: so that amazement
3043   2, 42  |                of inquiry:~(1) Whether good or evil is the object of
3044   2, 42  |          Whether the object of fear is good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS
3045   2, 42  |              OBJ 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For
3046   2, 42  |             But that which we love ~is good. Therefore fear regards
3047   2, 42  |                 Therefore fear regards good as its proper object.~Aquin.:
3048   2, 42  |              be feared." But this is a good thing. ~Therefore good is
3049   2, 42  |               a good thing. ~Therefore good is the object of fear.~Aquin.:
3050   2, 42  |           saints." ~Therefore even the good is an object of fear.~Aquin.:
3051   2, 42  |               vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. ~
3052   2, 42  |             implies pursuit, ~has some good for its object: and whatever
3053   2, 42  |                It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable
3054   2, 42  |              evil causes privation of ~good. Now a thing is evil from
3055   2, 42  |                is a privation of ~some good. Wherefore, since evil is
3056   2, 42  |         because it deprives one of the good that one ~pursues through
3057   2, 42  |             for fear, save loss of the good we love.~Aquin.: SMT FS
3058   2, 42  |              Para. 3/5~In another way, good stands related to evil as
3059   2, 42  |              cause: in so far as ~some good can by its power bring harm
3060   2, 42  |                power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just ~as
3061   2, 42  |               two things, namely, the ~good to which it tends, and the
3062   2, 42  |              of ~obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard
3063   2, 42  |             which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can ~
3064   2, 42  |               being a privation of the good of nature, but also from
3065   2, 42  |              contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be ~the object
3066   2, 42  |            object ~of hope is a future good difficult but possible to
3067   2, 42  |                Reply OBJ 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now
3068   2, 42  |      obtainable. Now one may obtain a ~good either of oneself, or through
3069   2, 42  |             extrinsic cause; while the good that is ~hoped for may be
3070   2, 42  |              Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is about
3071   2, 42  |                the increase of hope in good things. ~Therefore it also
3072   2, 42  |               material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider ~
3073   2, 42  |                The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. ~
3074   2, 42  |                1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself,
3075   2, 42  |               there of things that are good ~in themselves, i.e. good
3076   2, 42  |              good ~in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like
3077   2, 42  |            specifically. And such like good is no better ~for lasting
3078   2, 43  |             the object of ~pleasure is good apprehended as suitable
3079   2, 43  |                or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by
3080   2, 43  |               of ~which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended
3081   2, 43  |          through his loving a ~certain good, that whatever deprives
3082   2, 43  |        whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to ~him, and
3083   2, 43  |                contrary to ~some loved good: and thus fear, of itself,
3084   2, 43  |              once we begin to hope for good from him, we begin to ~love
3085   2, 43  |            begin to ~love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which
3086   2, 43  |               the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is feared,
3087   2, 44  |             which is requisite for the good use of reason. Therefore
3088   2, 44  |              do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear
3089   2, 44  |              be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore ~
3090   2, 44  |              one who is apt for giving good counsel: ~and in this sense,
3091   2, 44  |          hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.~Aquin.: SMT FS
3092   2, 44  |              it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ~
3093   2, 44  |               3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as
3094   2, 44  |               does. Because hope is of good ~things, as being possible
3095   2, 44  |            fear were a ~hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does
3096   2, 44  |       Therefore fear does not hinder a good action.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
3097   2, 45  |                respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they ~are
3098   2, 45  |         according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear
3099   2, 45  |              iii, 7. But ~hope regards good things, as stated above (
3100   2, 45  |          daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it ~belongs
3101   2, 45  |               to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore ~
3102   2, 45  |            else. By reason of itself, ~good is the object of pursuit,
3103   2, 45  |              of pursuit, through some ~good attaching to it; and good
3104   2, 45  |              good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance,
3105   2, 45  |               evil ~follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows
3106   2, 45  |              of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. ~
3107   2, 45  |             passions, since pursuit of good ~belongs to hope, avoidance
3108   2, 45  |           daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, ~
3109   2, 45  |            difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for. ~Aquin.:
3110   2, 45  |                argument would hold, if good and evil were not ~co-ordinate
3111   2, 45  |              has a certain relation to good, ~since it comes after good,
3112   2, 45  |            good, ~since it comes after good, as privation comes after
3113   2, 45  |               after hope which pursues good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[
3114   2, 45  |                1~Reply OBJ 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is
3115   2, 45  |             evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of
3116   2, 45  |                 just as the pursuit of good ~precedes the pursuit of
3117   2, 45  |      estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined;
3118   2, 45  |             hope regards the conjoined good. In like ~manner despair
3119   2, 45  |           despair regards directly the good which it turns away from,
3120   2, 45  |              its object: ~thus since a good is lovable, what is better
3121   2, 45  |              danger on account ~of the good of virtue which is the abiding
3122   2, 45  |               2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it
3123   2, 45  |               daring is a ~compound of good and evil; and the movement
3124   2, 45  |               movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much ~
3125   2, 46  |         Whether the object of anger is good or evil?~(3) Whether anger
3126   2, 46  |              i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is
3127   2, 46  |         Whether the object of anger is good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS
3128   2, 46  |              is a desire for something good: ~since revenge belongs
3129   2, 46  |       Therefore the object of anger is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
3130   2, 46  |               hope ~and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also
3131   2, 46  |            pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.~
3132   2, 46  |      appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple ~
3133   2, 46  |                follows and adheres to ~good, or recoils from evil: and
3134   2, 46  |        appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being
3135   2, 46  |                so far as we wish some ~good to be in him; and we hate
3136   2, 46  |              and hopes for as ~being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure
3137   2, 46  |                the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes
3138   2, 46  |                 since the lover wishes good to ~someone, as to something
3139   2, 46  |             concupiscible passions are good and evil ~absolutely considered,
3140   2, 46  |                irascible passions are ~good and evil in a certain elevation
3141   2, 46  |               of craving for ~a future good, without discriminating
3142   2, 46  |             far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he ~
3143   2, 46  |           anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is ~evident
3144   2, 47  |                naturally seeks its own good, so ~does it naturally repel
3145   2, 47  |               look upon ~it as our own good; so that if anyone despise
3146   2, 47  |               to care little about his good or evil. ~Again he that
3147   2, 48  |        gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence ~
3148   2, 48  |                grief: just ~as a great good, through being received
3149   2, 49  |                not imply the notion of good or ~evil, so it does not
3150   2, 49  |            pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because ~movements
3151   2, 49  |              aspect of an end, whereas good and ~evil are said in respect
3152   2, 49  |                consider ~both evil and good, and also changeableness,
3153   2, 49  |          nature, it has ~the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable,
3154   2, 49  |                of its form a ~thing is good, even as it is a being.
3155   2, 49  |                 as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: ~
3156   2, 49  |            habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will ~be made
3157   2, 49  |               power has a ~relation to good and evil. And, therefore,
3158   2, 49  |                powers be determined to good.~
3159   2, 50  |              custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which
3160   2, 50  |                 therefore it is by the good ~disposition of these powers,
3161   2, 50  |             these powers, to which the good disposition of the body ~
3162   2, 50  |                ordained to tend to the good which reason ~directs. Therefore
3163   2, 50  |             the power inclined to the ~good of the reason. But because
3164   2, 50  |               reason. But because this good is varied in many ways,
3165   2, 50  |              of a habit, to some fixed good of the ~reason, in order
3166   2, 52  |               it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, ~
3167   2, 53  |             reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary
3168   2, 53  |             the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to ~the assertion "
3169   2, 53  |            contrary to ~the assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii).
3170   2, 53  |                 the assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly,
3171   2, 54  |                habits are divided into good and bad?~(4) Whether one
3172   2, 54  |                habits are divided into good and bad?~Aquin.: SMT FS
3173   2, 54  |            habits are not divided into good and bad. For ~good and bad
3174   2, 54  |                into good and bad. For ~good and bad are contraries.
3175   2, 54  |           habits are not divided into ~good and bad.~Aquin.: SMT FS
3176   2, 54  |              Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, good is convertible with being;
3177   2, 54  |              specifically divided into good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS
3178   2, 54  |            manner there can be several good habits; for ~instance, human
3179   2, 54  |           habits are not divided into ~good and bad. ~Aquin.: SMT FS
3180   2, 54  |                 1/1~On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad
3181   2, 54  |              divided specifically into good and bad habits.~Aquin.:
3182   2, 54  |               to nature. In this way a good ~habit is specifically distinct
3183   2, 54  |              from a bad habit: since a good habit is ~one which disposes
3184   2, 54  |      specifically by the difference of good and bad.~Aquin.: SMT FS
3185   2, 54  |                habits are divided into good ~and bad, namely, inasmuch
3186   2, 54  |               inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not ~
3187   2, 54  |              one habit being something good, and another about something ~
3188   2, 54  |             Reply OBJ 2: It is not the good which is common to every
3189   2, 54  |           habit; but some determinate ~good by reason of suitability
3190   2, 54  |               1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Several good habits about one same specific
3191   2, 55  |              IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[
3192   2, 55  |                A[3]), are divided into good and bad, we ~must speak
3193   2, 55  |            speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues,
3194   2, 55  |             habit?~(3) Whether it is a good habit?~(4) Of the definition
3195   2, 55  |                ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." But use
3196   2, 55  |               2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Good use of free-will is said
3197   2, 55  |              is nothing else ~than the good use of free-will.~Aquin.:
3198   2, 55  |              that which makes its work good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[
3199   2, 55  |              Whether human virtue is a good habit?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
3200   2, 55  |            virtue that it should ~be a good habit. For sin is always
3201   2, 55  |       Therefore virtue is not always a good ~habit.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
3202   2, 55  |               is not only ~referred to good, but also to evil: according
3203   2, 55  |            virtue ~also is referred to good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS
3204   2, 55  |                is referred not only to good, but also to evil.~Aquin.:
3205   2, 55  |               makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says ~(
3206   2, 55  |              which makes its possessor good, and his ~work good likewise."~
3207   2, 55  |          possessor good, and his ~work good likewise."~Aquin.: SMT FS
3208   2, 55  |                any power must needs be good: for ~all evil implies defect;
3209   2, 55  |               regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue
3210   2, 55  |              an ~operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good
3211   2, 55  |              good habit, productive of good works.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
3212   2, 55  |                 so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect
3213   2, 55  |             thief or robber; ~and of a good thief or robber, as the
3214   2, 55  |         suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by
3215   2, 55  |                that ~makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem
3216   2, 55  |           goodness does not seem to be good, as neither ~is whiteness
3217   2, 55  |              to describe virtue as a ~"good quality."~Aquin.: SMT FS
3218   2, 55  |           which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality,
3219   2, 55  |     convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the ~
3220   2, 55  |           virtue, ~therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."~Aquin.:
3221   2, 55  |                pride ~lies in wait for good works in order to slay them."
3222   2, 55  |               when it is defined as "a good ~quality": for "quality"
3223   2, 55  |          virtue, and the difference, ~"good." But the definition would
3224   2, 55  |               we say ~that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."~Aquin.:
3225   2, 55  |              are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to ~evil; for
3226   2, 55  |            which is always referred to good: and ~so the distinction
3227   2, 55  |                sometimes directed unto good, ~sometimes unto evil, in
3228   2, 55  |           consequently as gone, and as good, which are convertible with
3229   2, 55  |                being and is one and is good; and that ~oneness is being
3230   2, 55  |           oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness.
3231   2, 55  |                so also are they called good or ~one, not by some distinct
3232   2, 55  |          because by them ~something is good or one. So also is virtue
3233   2, 55  |               So also is virtue called good, because by it ~something
3234   2, 55  |            because by it ~something is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[
3235   2, 55  |               2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Good, which is put in the definition
3236   2, 55  |           definition of virtue, is not good ~in general which is convertible
3237   2, 55  |         further ~than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with
3238   2, 55  |                Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in ~
3239   2, 56  |              which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise."
3240   2, 56  |           possessor good, and his work good likewise." But as work ~
3241   2, 56  |               2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Good is either the end, or something
3242   2, 56  |               And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in
3243   2, 56  |                virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, ~
3244   2, 56  |         Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has ~
3245   2, 56  |               above (Q[55], A[3]). Now good is not the object of the ~
3246   2, 56  |              which makes its possessor good," as the ~Philosopher says (
3247   2, 56  |            does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said
3248   2, 56  |               man is not said to be ~a good man on account of his science
3249   2, 56  |             habit may be directed to a good act in two ~ways. First,
3250   2, 56  |              acquires an aptness to a ~good act; for instance, by the
3251   2, 56  |               Body Para. 2/4~And since good, and, in like manner, being,
3252   2, 56  |              man is said simply to do ~good, and to be good; for instance,
3253   2, 56  |          simply to do ~good, and to be good; for instance, because he
3254   2, 56  |              which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise,"
3255   2, 56  |           possessor good, and his work good likewise," these ~latter
3256   2, 56  |               the work to ~be actually good, and the subject good simply.
3257   2, 56  |         actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind
3258   2, 56  |             they do not make the work ~good except in regard to a certain
3259   2, 56  |             they make their ~possessor good simply. For through being
3260   2, 56  |              art, a man ~is said to be good, not simply, but relatively;
3261   2, 56  |            relatively; for instance, a good ~grammarian or a good smith.
3262   2, 56  |                a good ~grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason
3263   2, 56  |               this is because he has a good will. ~Therefore the virtue
3264   2, 56  |             Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: The good of each thing is its end:
3265   2, 56  |                so to know truth is the good act of the ~intellect. Whence
3266   2, 56  |               corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man'
3267   2, 56  |             says (Rm. 7): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." ~
3268   2, 56  |               his soul that a man make good use ~of his body: "For instance,
3269   2, 56  |   concupiscible ~powers. And since the good disposition of the power
3270   2, 56  |            flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, ~but is made
3271   2, 56  |        themselves indeed, have not the good of ~virtue, but rather the
3272   2, 56  |            conformity with reason, the good of reason is begotten in ~
3273   2, 56  |               the soul, is due ~to the good disposition of these powers.
3274   2, 56  |             happens that ~anything but good is done: and so virtue must
3275   2, 56  |           power ~which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of
3276   2, 56  |             required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, ~
3277   2, 56  |               to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And
3278   2, 56  |       according to reason. And to this good ~every virtue is ordered,
3279   2, 56  |                desires its own ~proper good; for virtue, as Tully says
3280   2, 56  |             object of the ~will is the good of reason proportionate
3281   2, 56  |             will is ~confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity,
3282   2, 56  |                species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits
3283   2, 56  |                individual, such as the good of one's ~neighbor, then
3284   2, 56  |          ordained ~to the willer's own good; such as temperance and
3285   2, 56  |            virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, ~which
3286   2, 56  |          passion, ~which is the proper good of this or that man: and
3287   2, 56  |             directed to some extrinsic good.~
3288   2, 57  |             virtue is ordained to some good, as stated ~above (Q[55],
3289   2, 57  |              confers aptness ~in doing good; secondly, because besides
3290   2, 57  |             they confer aptness ~for a good work, viz. the consideration
3291   2, 57  |               truth (since this is the good ~work of the intellect):
3292   2, 57  |              of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject ~
3293   2, 57  |               has a ~fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable
3294   2, 57  |             referable to evil. Now the good of ~the intellect is truth,
3295   2, 57  |               to be made." And yet the good of these things depends,
3296   2, 57  |              speculative habit makes a good work ~as regards the use
3297   2, 57  |              has ~always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2],
3298   2, 57  |             although there cannot be a good use without the art.~Aquin.:
3299   2, 57  |                order that man may make good use of the art he has, he ~
3300   2, 57  |                art he has, he ~needs a good will, which is perfected
3301   2, 57  |               virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral
3302   2, 57  |         belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. ~vi, 5).
3303   2, 57  |              conferring aptness ~for a good work: while some habits
3304   2, 57  |               conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring
3305   2, 57  |           confers the mere aptness for good work; since it does not
3306   2, 57  |         confers not only aptness for a good work, ~but also the use:
3307   2, 57  |        appetite. On the other hand the good ~things made by art is not
3308   2, 57  |          things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the
3309   2, 57  |                man's appetite, but the good of ~those things themselves:
3310   2, 57  |            Reply OBJ 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding
3311   2, 57  |                  in so far as they are good counselors in matters of
3312   2, 57  |                simply prudent who give good counsel about all ~the concerns
3313   2, 57  |            virtue necessary to lead a ~good life. For as art is to things
3314   2, 57  |                man in order to ~lead a good life, after he has become
3315   2, 57  |                prudence that we are of good counsel," as ~stated in
3316   2, 57  |               but also ~from another's good counsel. Therefore man does
3317   2, 57  |           prudence in ~order to lead a good life, but it is enough that
3318   2, 57  |       necessary for human life. For a ~good life consists in good deeds.
3319   2, 57  |               a ~good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do
3320   2, 57  |              deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it ~matters not only
3321   2, 57  |                object of which is ~the good and the end. And to that
3322   2, 57  |             virtue necessary to lead a good life.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57]
3323   2, 57  |             Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: The good of an art is to be found,
3324   2, 57  |                 On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the active ~
3325   2, 57  |            craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his ~work
3326   2, 57  |             act, but that his ~work be good. Rather would it be necessary
3327   2, 57  |             but that he may produce a ~good work of art, and have it
3328   2, 57  |            work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence
3329   2, 57  |                man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that
3330   2, 57  |               merely that he ~may be a good man.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57]
3331   2, 57  |               OBJ 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel,
3332   2, 57  |                 Wherefore, if ~he do a good deed, he does not do well
3333   2, 57  |               order that he may lead a good life.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57]
3334   2, 57  |                a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9).
3335   2, 57  |           belongs to ~prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic.
3336   2, 57  |                Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its ~
3337   2, 57  |              act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it
3338   2, 57  |               is directed to ~being of good counsel, wheres there are
3339   2, 57  |              there are two virtues for good judgment: ~because difference
3340   2, 58  |            virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with
3341   2, 58  |              with reason: since ~man's good "consists in that which
3342   2, 58  |              man in view of ~his doing good actions, it would follow
3343   2, 58  |          Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not
3344   2, 58  |              man in view of his ~doing good deeds. Now, in man there
3345   2, 58  |             order that his deed may be good, it will be an ~intellectual
3346   2, 58  |                makes us inclined to do good works. But ~some, without
3347   2, 58  |             natural ~inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues
3348   2, 58  |                order that a choice be ~good, two things are required.
3349   2, 58  |             appetitive ~faculty to the good that is in accord with reason,
3350   2, 58  |               natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of ~
3351   2, 58  |               virtue whereby we are of good counsel" ~(Ethic. vi, 9).
3352   2, 58  |                vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the
3353   2, 58  |             object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed
3354   2, 58  |             not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also ~to judge
3355   2, 59  |         passions are not in themselves good or ~evil. For man's good
3356   2, 59  |               good or ~evil. For man's good or evil is something in
3357   2, 59  |                 are referable both to ~good and evil, for as much as
3358   2, 59  |                virtue is referable to ~good alone, as stated above (
3359   2, 59  |              in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; ~
3360   2, 59  |                 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible ~with
3361   2, 59  |               with virtue, which ~is a good condition of the mind. Therefore
3362   2, 59  |              eupatheiai}, i.e. ~"three good passions," in place of the
3363   2, 59  |              that, just ~as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods
3364   2, 59  |                and bodily goods are no good to man; so ~man's only evil
3365   2, 59  |              life of the body, is some good to man; yet not ~his supreme
3366   2, 59  |              man; yet not ~his supreme good, because he can abuse it.
3367   2, 59  |             which is ~contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and
3368   2, 59  |           pleasure is about ~a present good, while desire is for a future
3369   2, 59  |           while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a ~
3370   2, 59  |                Now the enjoyment of a ~good possessed, or the desire
3371   2, 59  |       possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not,
3372   2, 59  |          avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily ~sought
3373   2, 59  |               soul by ~directing it to good as defined by reason. Now
3374   2, 59  |              as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason ~is
3375   2, 59  |             Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: The good of anything depends on the
3376   2, 59  |                is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the
3377   2, 59  |            without a body: whereas the good ~operation of man is with
3378   2, 60  |              the formal ~aspect of the good to which moral virtue is
3379   2, 60  |                power is ~the appetible good, which varies in kind according
3380   2, 60  |           every moral virtue has ~some good operations as its product;
3381   2, 60  |                reason for this is that good and evil, in certain ~operations,
3382   2, 60  |                them: viz. in so far as good and evil in ~them depend
3383   2, 60  |              hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only ~on
3384   2, 60  |                the agent. Consequently good and evil in these ~operations
3385   2, 60  |         directed to another, that ~the good of virtue is overlooked
3386   2, 60  |                 on the one side to the good of the individual, and on
3387   2, 60  |               and on the other to the ~good of the many. But this diversity
3388   2, 60  |               human acts to the common good, does not differ, save ~
3389   2, 60  |         justice which seeks the common good is another virtue ~from
3390   2, 60  |                directed to the private good of an individual: ~wherefore
3391   2, 60  |               which directs man to the good of his ~country. But that
3392   2, 60  |              directs man to the common good is a ~general virtue through
3393   2, 60  |               own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in ~so
3394   2, 60  |                 the attainment of some good ~or the avoidance of some
3395   2, 60  |               are about some difficult good; ~while anger seeks to overcome
3396   2, 60  |              evil, even as it produces good. But there ~are various
3397   2, 60  |          virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance
3398   2, 60  |      difference between that ~which is good absolutely speaking, and
3399   2, 60  |            speaking, and that which is good and difficult ~to obtain.
3400   2, 60  |           virtues. ~Consequently man's good which is the object of love,
3401   2, 60  |                the mind: and this same good may be directed to man's ~
3402   2, 60  |              may be directed to man's ~good in himself, either in his
3403   2, 60  |               in his soul, or to man's good in ~relation to other men.
3404   2, 60  |              Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned
3405   2, 60  |                 4/6~On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses,
3406   2, 60  |               being employable for the good of the body, while the latter
3407   2, 60  |               to money considered as a good ~absolutely, as an object
3408   2, 60  |                but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and
3409   2, 60  |                    With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
3410   2, 60  |             Para. 5/6~As regards man's good in relation to other men,
3411   2, 60  |          concupiscible ~passions. This good may be pleasurable to a
3412   2, 60  |               4 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 4: Good is a more potent mover than
3413   2, 60  |             movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div.
3414   2, 60  |             daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty, ~which
3415   2, 60  |              even if it be not a great good in that particular ~kind
3416   2, 61  |              well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other ~
3417   2, 61  |               well without causing the good deed ~to be done. Now it
3418   2, 61  |             kinds of virtue: since the good ~defined by reason is not
3419   2, 61  |               virtue, as such, regards good, which is the ~object of
3420   2, 61  |               The entire structure of ~good works is built on four virtues."~
3421   2, 61  |               of which we speak now is good as ~defined by reason; which
3422   2, 61  |               defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways.
3423   2, 61  |                 and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act
3424   2, 61  |            above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by reason and
3425   2, 61  |                 basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions
3426   2, 61  |               pleasures of ~touch. The good of being firm in holding
3427   2, 61  |           being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, ~against
3428   2, 61  |                 any virtue that causes good in reason's act of ~consideration,
3429   2, 61  |           every virtue that causes the good ~of right and due in operation,
3430   2, 61  |             virtue," it is directed to good which involves the ~notion
3431   2, 61  |             virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of
3432   2, 61  |          whereby good men work for the good of their ~country and for
3433   2, 61  |               man does not shut up his good deeds within himself . . ~.
3434   2, 61  |         leisure; charity ~necessitates good works. If no one lays this
3435   2, 62  |               which tends naturally to good as ~defined by reason.~Aquin.:
3436   2, 62  |          believes and loves, by doing ~good works he ends in hoping."
3437   2, 62  |                he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact
3438   2, 62  |              to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks
3439   2, 62  |             man ~in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the
3440   2, 62  |             principal object, viz. the good hoped ~for. With regard
3441   2, 62  |              always precedes hope: for good is never ~hoped for unless
3442   2, 62  |              to be able to obtain some good. With regard to ~this, hope
3443   2, 62  |            thinks that he can obtain a good ~through someone, he begins
3444   2, 63  |               2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with
3445   2, 63  |                a natural appetite for ~good in accordance with reason.
3446   2, 63  |              is a sin: and there is no good without ~the Sovereign Good.
3447   2, 63  |            good without ~the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the
3448   2, 63  |               says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more ~efficacious than
3449   2, 63  |           virtuous habits be caused by good acts.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63]
3450   2, 63  |           perfects him in relation to ~good. Now since the notion of
3451   2, 63  |                Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species,
3452   2, 63  |         expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good must needs be ~appraised
3453   2, 63  |           human virtue directed to the good which is defined ~according
3454   2, 63  |                and rule the ~aforesaid good is established. On the other
3455   2, 63  |           virtue which directs ~man to good as defined by the Divine
3456   2, 63  |              the First Objection holds good.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[
3457   2, 63  |             direct us to ~supernatural good. Therefore there are no
3458   2, 63  |           object of ~every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue'
3459   2, 63  |              object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures
3460   2, 64  |                it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly
3461   2, 64  |         objects is the reason. But the good of that which is ~measured
3462   2, 64  |                with its rule: thus the good ~things made by art is that
3463   2, 64  |           Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists
3464   2, 64  |             but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists
3465   2, 64  |               observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii,
3466   2, 64  |                 1/3~I answer that, The good of anything consists in
3467   2, 64  |             virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above ~(Q[56],
3468   2, 64  |                Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue
3469   2, 64  |          subject to a measure. Now the good ~of intellectual virtue
3470   2, 64  |                or not. Accordingly the good of ~speculative intellectual
3471   2, 64  |              the opinion stating that "good is ~good" is contrary to
3472   2, 64  |         opinion stating that "good is ~good" is contrary to the opinion
3473   2, 64  |              the opinion stating that "good is not good": and ~between
3474   2, 64  |              stating that "good is not good": and ~between two such
3475   2, 64  |            observes the mean. For the ~good of other virtues consists
3476   2, 64  |               things. ~Accordingly the good of such virtues does not
3477   2, 64  |             Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: The good of intellectual and moral
3478   2, 64  |           hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition;
3479   2, 65  |               in us to do some kind of good ~deed, whether such inclination
3480   2, 65  |               that inclines us to do a good ~deed well; and if we take
3481   2, 65  |               he exercise ~himself, by good deeds, in all such matters,
3482   2, 65  |              if he exercise himself by good deeds in ~regard to one
3483   2, 65  |           charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can
3484   2, 65  |             can be in none ~except the good," as stated in the same
3485   2, 65  |               by them" that "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (
3486   2, 65  |              in so far as they produce good ~works that are directed
3487   2, 65  |              in so far as they produce good ~works in proportion to
3488   2, 65  |                even if his conduct ~be good."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[
3489   2, 65  |                it makes its possessor ~good," and consequently cannot
3490   2, 65  |             OBJ 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of
3491   2, 65  |               the principle of all the good works that are referable
3492   2, 65  |                each ~different kind of good work.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65]
3493   2, 65  |               directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue ~is
3494   2, 65  |           faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this ~consists
3495   2, 65  |              in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well.
3496   2, 65  |              Else, ~if what is done is good, but not well done, it will
3497   2, 65  |              it will not be perfectly ~good; wherefore neither will
3498   2, 65  |               is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the
3499   2, 65  |            should not only do ~what is good, but also that we should
3500   2, 66  |                cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence ~