Part, Question
1 1, 3 | speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, ~
2 1, 12| although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, ~still it
3 1, 12| capable of ~apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being
4 1, 12| the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by ~
5 1, 13| name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete ~names do
6 1, 13| abstract or concrete. But concrete ~names do not belong to
7 1, 13| subsisting thing must ~have a concrete meaning as applicable to
8 1, 13| signify His simplicity, and concrete ~names to signify His substance
9 1, 13| things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His ~subsistence
10 1, 13| first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature ~
11 1, 31| that is said of God, the concrete is predicated ~of the abstract;
12 1, 32| propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we ~are accustomed
13 1, 32| A[3], ad 1), the use of concrete and abstract ~names in God
14 1, 32| subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify ~
15 1, 32| and completeness, we ~use concrete names.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[
16 1, 32| the abstract and in ~the concrete, as when we say Deity and
17 1, 32| abstract is contained in the concrete.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[32] A[
18 1, 39| essential names taken in a concrete sense?~(5) Whether the same
19 1, 39| persons can be predicated of concrete ~essential names?~(7) Whether
20 1, 39| Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the concrete essential names can stand
21 1, 39| It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot
22 1, 39| names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal
23 1, 39| cannot be predicated of the ~concrete essential names; so that
24 1, 40| abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God."
25 1, 40| because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since
26 1, 40| God the ~abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is
27 1, 54| abstract, and ~the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow,
28 1, 39| essential names taken in a concrete sense?~(5) Whether the same
29 1, 39| persons can be predicated of concrete ~essential names?~(7) Whether
30 1, 39| Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the concrete essential names can stand
31 1, 39| It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot
32 1, 39| names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal
33 1, 39| cannot be predicated of the ~concrete essential names; so that
34 1, 40| abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God."
35 1, 40| because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since
36 1, 40| God the ~abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is
37 1, 55| abstract, and ~the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow,
38 2, 53| we take accidents in the concrete, the ~relation begins in
39 2, 53| subject and terminates in the concrete, the ~relation begins in
40 2, 53| the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and ~
41 3, 2 | belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man
42 3, 4 | signifies human nature in the concrete, ~inasmuch as it is in a
43 3, 4 | by the Son of God in the ~concrete as is signified by the word "
44 3, 4 | nature was not assumed in the concrete, as ~if the suppositum were
45 3, 16| the common nature in the concrete may stand for all ~contained
46 3, 16| signifying that nature in the concrete, as ~"man" may properly
47 3, 16| predicated of each other in the concrete.~Aquin.: SMT TP Q[16] A[
48 3, 16| and manhood; but in the concrete we say "animate" and "carnal"
49 3, 16| the abstract, but only the concrete of ~the concrete.~Aquin.:
50 3, 16| only the concrete of ~the concrete.~Aquin.: SMT TP Q[16] A[
51 3, 16| taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the hypostasis
52 3, 16| the ~nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate indifferently
53 3, 16| of ~abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "
54 3, 17| the abstract and in the concrete, for we say ~that the Son
55 3, 17| abstract, but only in the concrete, i.e. as it is signified
56 3, 17| signifying two natures in the concrete. For I can say ~that "both,
57 3, 17| abstract, but as it is in the concrete; not, indeed, in a ~distinct,
58 3, 35| signifies ~a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis
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