Part, Question

 1   1, 5  |       existence is a ~particular appetible, and goodness a universal
 2   1, 5  |         and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, ~absolutely,
 3   1, 19 |         moves the willer, as the appetible the ~appetite, as stated
 4   1, 48 |         that good is everything ~appetible; and thus, since every nature
 5   1, 59 |           for it is moved by the appetible object ~understood. Now
 6   1, 60 | themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; ~others being
 7   1, 60 |        something else, and being appetible ~on account of something
 8   1, 49 |         that good is everything ~appetible; and thus, since every nature
 9   1, 60 |           for it is moved by the appetible object ~understood. Now
10   1, 61 | themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; ~others being
11   1, 61 |        something else, and being appetible ~on account of something
12   1, 79 |         it is accidental to ~the appetible object whether it be apprehended
13   1, 79 |        wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not
14   1, 79 |          by its ~nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite
15   1, 79 |    themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers
16   1, 81 |    intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the ~appetible
17   1, 81 |         appetible good; and the ~appetible good, the idea of which
18   1, 84 |       practical judgment of ~the appetible object. But in the absolute
19   1, 105|           moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and
20   1, 110|   anything be apprehended as an ~appetible good, so far does he move
21   2, 1  |     visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, ~cannot be
22   2, 6  |         is ~moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside
23   2, 6  |        not only by proposing the appetible ~to the senses, or by effecting
24   2, 6  |          own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement ~is
25   2, 9  |      intellect in presenting the appetible object to the ~will, stands
26   2, 9  | imagination in representing ~the appetible will to the sensitive appetite.
27   2, 9  |        Anima iii, 10) that "the ~appetible object is a mover not moved,
28   2, 9  |             the end is in things appetible, what the ~principle is
29   2, 10 |          same relation to things appetible, as the first principles
30   2, 16 |          of the appetite to ~the appetible: whereas to use implies
31   2, 16 |            because that which is appetible absolutely is better than
32   2, 16 |       better than that which is ~appetible only as directed to something
33   2, 18 |        far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a
34   2, 19 |      considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to ~the will before
35   2, 26 |      love." In the ~same way the appetible object gives the appetite,
36   2, 26 |     follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the ~appetitive
37   2, 26 |      Anima iii, 10; because ~the appetible object moves the appetite,
38   2, 26 |          the realization of ~the appetible object, so that the movement
39   2, 26 |   wrought in the appetite by the appetible ~object is called "love,"
40   2, 26 |          in the ~appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that
41   2, 26 |           in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that
42   2, 26 |       appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have ~complacency
43   2, 60 |        Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of ~reason
44   2, 60 |         appetitive power is ~the appetible good, which varies in kind
45   2, 64 |          movement in ~respect of appetible objects is the reason. But
46   2, 73 |         directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives ~
47   2, 73 |        turns, ~and which is some appetible good, but rather from that
48   2, 75 |          a thing is proposed as ~appetible to the senses, and because
49   2, 80 |      inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is ~said to move the appetite:
50   2, 53 |          through the good of the appetible ~object, but by way of suggestion.
51   2, 53 |       implies ~direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "
52   2, 107|           since it is something ~appetible: and in like manner the "
53   2, 130|        sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory
54   2, 156|        First, in relation to the appetible object to ~which anger tends,
55   2, 156|        First, on the part of the appetible object, ~as when one desires
56   2, 156|        of being angry. As to the appetible ~object which it desires,
57   2, 173|         is an inclination ~to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly
58   2, 178|          it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful,