1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-2000 | 2001-2500 | 2501-3000 | 3001-3500 | 3501-4000 | 4001-4500 | 4501-5000 | 5001-5500 | 5501-5672
Part, Question
2001 2, 2 | end. ~Secondly, because power has relation to good and
2002 2, 2 | consist ~in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather
2003 2, 2 | by virtue, rather than in power itself.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
2004 2, 2 | 1/1 ~Reply OBJ 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He
2005 2, 2 | hence He cannot use His power ~otherwise than well. But
2006 2, 2 | that he become like God in power, unless he ~become like
2007 2, 2 | man to make good use ~of power in ruling many, so is it
2008 2, 2 | of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.~
2009 2, 2 | hindrance to the good use of power: ~therefore is it that men
2010 2, 2 | supreme ~good consists in power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5]
2011 2, 2 | greater the ~scope of its power. Now just as the causality
2012 2, 2 | apprehended by sense, which is a power of ~the soul, which power
2013 2, 2 | power of ~the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now
2014 2, 2 | Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows ~the
2015 2, 2 | the intellect, ~which is a power independent of matter, knows
2016 2, 2 | belonging to it, whether power, ~habit, or act. For that
2017 2, 2 | of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but ~also
2018 2, 3 | is that of his ~highest power in respect of its highest
2019 2, 3 | object: and his highest power is ~the intellect, whose
2020 2, 3 | is the ~perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper
2021 2, 3 | proper formal object of that ~power belongs to it. Now the proper
2022 2, 3 | degree of the participating power: and thus man's final ~perfection
2023 2, 3 | object is attained by the power: and thus ~the final perfection
2024 2, 3 | final perfection of each power is to attain that in which
2025 2, 3 | that the ~perfection of any power is determined by the nature
2026 2, 5 | this is done by the Divine power, which raises ~man to the
2027 2, 5 | subject to ~man's natural power, whereby he is master of
2028 2, 5 | can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow
2029 2, 5 | subject to man's natural power, is not of ~the same species
2030 2, 5 | from the very fact that its power and action are limited:
2031 2, 5 | nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. ~Consequently
2032 2, 5 | it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, ~
2033 2, 5 | is an agent of infinite power, ~He requires before acting,
2034 2, 5 | insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows ~Happiness,
2035 2, 5 | the part of the operating power, or on the part ~of the
2036 2, 6 | cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle
2037 2, 6 | sensitive appetite which is the power of a bodily organ, is also
2038 2, 6 | their natural ~estimative power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2]
2039 2, 6 | order that it be in one's power ~to consider, to wish and
2040 2, 6 | by means of some other ~power, such as "to walk" and "
2041 2, 6 | executed by means of the motive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4]
2042 2, 6 | completely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken ~
2043 2, 6 | mean that which is in the power of the will, for example ~"
2044 2, 8 | good only. For the same ~power regards opposites; for instance,
2045 2, 8 | the will is a rational ~power, since it is "in the reason,"
2046 2, 8 | 1~Reply OBJ 1: The same power regards opposites, but it
2047 2, 8 | Reply OBJ 2: A rational power is not to be directed to
2048 2, 8 | its proper object; for ~no power seeks other than its proper
2049 2, 8 | things, it is by the same power that a thing ~passes through
2050 2, 8 | sometimes designates the power of the ~will, sometimes
2051 2, 8 | we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to ~
2052 2, 8 | to the means. For every power extends to those things
2053 2, 8 | aspect of the object of that power in any way ~whatever: thus
2054 2, 8 | which is the object of the power of ~the will, may be found
2055 2, 8 | every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act
2056 2, 8 | designates the simple act of that power: thus "to ~understand" designates
2057 2, 8 | Now the ~simple act of a power is referred to that which
2058 2, 8 | itself the object ~of that power. But that which is good
2059 2, 8 | not in reference to the power of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
2060 2, 8 | always referred to the same power; for instance, the power
2061 2, 8 | power; for instance, the power of ~sight perceives both
2062 2, 9 | this is to ~move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be
2063 2, 9 | perfection of every other ~power, is included under the object
2064 2, 9 | and always the art or power to which the universal end
2065 2, 9 | Further, no particular power can produce a universal
2066 2, 9 | appetite is a particular power, because it follows the ~
2067 2, 9 | appetite is a particular ~power, it has great influence
2068 2, 9 | not be so, had it not the power ~to move itself to will.
2069 2, 9 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: The power of the will is always actually
2070 2, 9 | reason." Now the reason is a power ~of the soul, not bound
2071 2, 9 | follows that the ~will is a power absolutely incorporeal and
2072 2, 9 | incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and ~more universal
2073 2, 9 | First, because the will is a power of the ~rational soul, which
2074 2, 9 | the ~object, which by the power of the angelic light is
2075 2, 10 | naturally, as does ~each power to its object; and again
2076 2, 10 | that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
2077 2, 10 | the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some
2078 2, 10 | the will is an immaterial power, so is the ~intellect: and
2079 2, 10 | the will is a rational ~power, since it is in the reason,
2080 2, 10 | object be, it is in man's power not to think of ~it, and
2081 2, 10 | For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider
2082 2, 10 | aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the
2083 2, 10 | The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object ~
2084 2, 10 | aspect of the mover of that power. If, ~on the other hand,
2085 2, 10 | But it is not in man's power to cast aside a ~passion
2086 2, 10 | Therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to ~which
2087 2, 10 | desire"; yet it is in the power of the will ~not to will
2088 2, 10 | be ~resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it
2089 2, 10 | be subject to the Divine power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
2090 2, 11 | an act of the appetitive power?~(2) Whether it belongs
2091 2, 11 | an act of the appetitive power?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[
2092 2, 11 | only to the appetitive ~power. For to enjoy seems nothing
2093 2, 11 | an act of the appetitive power, but of the ~intellect.~
2094 2, 11 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which
2095 2, 11 | to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to the appetite.~
2096 2, 11 | and not to the appetitive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[
2097 2, 11 | belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy
2098 2, 11 | an ~act of the appetitive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[
2099 2, 11 | object ~of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident
2100 2, 11 | the act ~of the appetitive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[
2101 2, 11 | this end, as the executive power, but the will as the ~motive
2102 2, 11 | the will as the ~motive power, moving (the powers) towards
2103 2, 11 | perfection and end of every other power is contained in ~the object
2104 2, 11 | object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained
2105 2, 11 | perfection and end of ~each power, in so far as it is a good,
2106 2, 11 | belongs to the appetitive power. ~Wherefore the appetitive
2107 2, 11 | Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to
2108 2, 11 | belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency in ~that
2109 2, 11 | belongs to the appetitive ~power, in which power delight
2110 2, 11 | appetitive ~power, in which power delight is formally completed.~
2111 2, 11 | enjoy is not the act of the ~power that achieves the end as
2112 2, 11 | as executor, but of the power that commands ~the achievement;
2113 2, 11 | belong to the appetitive power. ~Now things void of reason
2114 2, 11 | of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way ~
2115 2, 11 | upward tendency. Yet the power of command in ~respect of
2116 2, 12 | signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore ~intention is
2117 2, 12 | but of the apprehensive power. ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[
2118 2, 13 | of inquiry:~(1) Of what power is it the act; of the will
2119 2, 13 | will but to the ~cognitive power. Now there is an "ignorance
2120 2, 13 | desire of things in our power." But desire is an act of
2121 2, 13 | belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives a form
2122 2, 13 | or species ~from a higher power or habit, according as an
2123 2, 13 | since the apprehensive power presents the object ~to
2124 2, 13 | order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore ~choice is substantially
2125 2, 13 | an act of the appetitive ~power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[
2126 2, 13 | a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears in ~
2127 2, 13 | virtue, but of some other power to direct aright ~those
2128 2, 13 | is an act of a rational power; which according ~to the
2129 2, 13 | gathered from a ~twofold power in man. For man can will
2130 2, 13 | this ~is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will
2131 2, 14 | something belonging to the other power: ~consequently each act
2132 2, 14 | denominated from either power. Now it is ~evident that
2133 2, 14 | however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is not
2134 2, 15 | or of the apprehensive ~power?~(2) Whether it is to be
2135 2, 15 | appetitive or of the apprehensive power?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
2136 2, 15 | reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent ~belongs
2137 2, 15 | belongs to an apprehensive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
2138 2, 15 | sense is an apprehensive ~power. Therefore consent is the
2139 2, 15 | the act of an apprehensive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
2140 2, 15 | which is ~an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also
2141 2, 15 | belongs to an apprehensive ~power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
2142 2, 15 | belongs to the appetitive power. ~Therefore consent does
2143 2, 15 | the ~act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination
2144 2, 15 | application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far
2145 2, 15 | an act of the appetitive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
2146 2, 15 | belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.~Aquin.:
2147 2, 15 | to the subject in ~whose power it is to move the appetite:
2148 2, 15 | belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick. But ~
2149 2, 15 | irrational animals have not that power. Hence the ~comparison fails.~
2150 2, 15 | something that is already in the power of him who causes the application. ~
2151 2, 15 | which has the sovereign power of urging his members to,
2152 2, 15 | belongs to a ~lower art or power than does the end to which
2153 2, 15 | consent is an act of each power, but of the will which is
2154 2, 16 | belongs to the ~executive power; and the act of the will
2155 2, 16 | the act of the ~executive power, on the contrary execution
2156 2, 16 | respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater
2157 2, 16 | will's use of the executive power in moving it. But since ~
2158 2, 17 | conversely. And since the power of the preceding act continues
2159 2, 17 | commanding, is due to the power of the will. ~Consequently
2160 2, 17 | its ~command, moves (the power) to the execution of the
2161 2, 17 | according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement is
2162 2, 17 | is the ~appetite; and the power that executes movement is
2163 2, 17 | Reply OBJ 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement,
2164 2, 17 | animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking,
2165 2, 17 | Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called
2166 2, 17 | subject to the executive power, follows command; because
2167 2, 17 | the ~reason commands that power which has to do what was
2168 2, 17 | Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank ~
2169 2, 17 | commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another;
2170 2, 17 | another; since one ~is the power that commands, and the other
2171 2, 17 | commands, and the other is the power that receives the ~command.
2172 2, 17 | acts, the act of a ~lower power is in the position of matter
2173 2, 17 | to the act of a higher ~power, in so far as the lower
2174 2, 17 | in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher
2175 2, 17 | in virtue of the higher power ~moving it: for thus also
2176 2, 17 | diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the ~other,
2177 2, 17 | contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. ~
2178 2, 17 | most of all, are in our power; since all our ~acts are
2179 2, 17 | acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. ~
2180 2, 17 | by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by
2181 2, 17 | Therefore the act ~of that power, which is essentially rational,
2182 2, 17 | commanded, which is in our power. But to ~know and judge
2183 2, 17 | reason, is not always in ~our power. Therefore the act of the
2184 2, 17 | This act is not in ~our power: because it happens in virtue
2185 2, 17 | the reason is not in our ~power, and cannot be commanded.
2186 2, 17 | principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to
2187 2, 17 | assent or dissent is in our ~power, and is subject to our command.~
2188 2, 17 | to say, in so far as each power ~reacts on its own acts,
2189 2, 17 | it is not always in ~our power to apprehend something by
2190 2, 17 | so far as it is in ~our power, as stated above (A[5]).
2191 2, 17 | what manner it is in our power. Now it ~must be observed
2192 2, 17 | sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas
2193 2, 17 | not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ,
2194 2, 17 | depends not ~only on a power of the soul, but also on
2195 2, 17 | of vision depends on the power of sight, ~and on the condition
2196 2, 17 | only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition
2197 2, 17 | 3~Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the
2198 2, 17 | just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal ~
2199 2, 17 | regulated by a universal ~active power. Consequently in this respect
2200 2, 17 | senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything ~by
2201 2, 17 | sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man
2202 2, 17 | weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable
2203 2, 17 | weakness of the imaginative ~power, due to some organic indisposition.~~
2204 2, 17 | nutritive and ~generative power, there is room for praise
2205 2, 17 | nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason
2206 2, 17 | commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that ~
2207 2, 17 | nutritive and generative power, i.e. digestion, and ~formation
2208 2, 18 | blind man has in act the power of ~walking, whereby he
2209 2, 18 | the object of an active power is compared to the action ~
2210 2, 18 | the object of ~an active power. For the appetitive power
2211 2, 18 | power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive; in
2212 2, 18 | effect of the nutritive power; whereas food ~before being
2213 2, 18 | relation to the nutritive power as the ~matter about which
2214 2, 18 | the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the
2215 2, 18 | compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species;
2216 2, 19 | will than ~to any other power. But the acts of the other
2217 2, 19 | apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the ~goodness
2218 2, 19 | the ~command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power
2219 2, 19 | power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore ~the
2220 2, 19 | acts of the will are in our power, ~whereas the external actions
2221 2, 20 | ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. ~Therefore
2222 2, 20 | in the act of some other power prior to being in the ~act
2223 2, 20 | apprehensive or appetitive ~power of the soul; whereas the
2224 2, 20 | external action is the ~power that accomplishes the movement.
2225 2, 20 | virtue in the ~commanding power is distinct from the moral
2226 2, 20 | the moral virtue in the power ~commanded, as is declared
2227 2, 20 | belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the ~goodness
2228 2, 20 | action, which belongs to the power commanded. ~Aquin.: SMT
2229 2, 21 | agent, when it is in his ~power, so that he has dominion
2230 2, 21 | Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: ~since
2231 2, 21 | evils, is subject to ~man's power: wherefore it neither takes
2232 2, 21 | in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is
2233 2, 21 | instrument of the Divine power ~which is the principal
2234 2, 22 | sensitive appetite is the power of a ~corporeal organ, so
2235 2, 22 | corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension.
2236 2, 22 | thing by the appetitive power rather than by the ~apprehensive
2237 2, 22 | than by the ~apprehensive power: because the soul has, through
2238 2, 22 | through its appetitive power, ~an order to things as
2239 2, 22 | objects of the appetitive ~power, "are in things themselves."
2240 2, 22 | other hand the apprehensive ~power is not drawn to a thing,
2241 2, 22 | i.e. the ~apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is
2242 2, 22 | Reply OBJ 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active,
2243 2, 22 | more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior ~
2244 2, 22 | depends not only on the power of the ~agent, but also
2245 2, 23 | 4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions,
2246 2, 23 | common object of a ~single power, differ as the species of
2247 2, 23 | object of the ~concupiscible power is sensible good or evil,
2248 2, 23 | belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, ~sorrow,
2249 2, 23 | hinder the ~concupiscible power from tending towards its
2250 2, 23 | belongs to the irascible power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[
2251 2, 23 | moves the concupiscible ~power. But if it prove difficult
2252 2, 23 | contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of ~
2253 2, 23 | hence the need of ~another power tending to that good. The
2254 2, 23 | applies to evil. And this ~power is the irascible faculty.
2255 2, 23 | Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety
2256 2, 23 | 1/1~Whether in the same power, there are any passions,
2257 2, 23 | there cannot be, in the same power, ~specifically different
2258 2, 23 | no passions of the ~same power, that are not contrary to
2259 2, 23 | Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary ~
2260 2, 23 | for ~passions of the same power to differ in species, without
2261 2, 23 | are in the ~concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary
2262 2, 23 | other. Therefore in the same power there ~are passions that
2263 2, 23 | difference in their active ~power. In the passions of the
2264 2, 23 | respect of their motive power, as if they were ~natural
2265 2, 23 | causes, in the appetitive power, a certain ~inclination,
2266 2, 24 | by a kind of estimative ~power, which is subject to a higher,
2267 2, 25 | and for this ~reason the power is named after it.~Aquin.:
2268 2, 25 | other passions, that the power takes its name.~Aquin.:
2269 2, 26 | is in the concupiscible power?~(2) Whether love is a passion?~(
2270 2, 26 | is in the concupiscible power?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
2271 2, 26 | not in the concupiscible power. For it ~is written (Wis.
2272 2, 26 | But the concupiscible power, being a part ~of the sensitive
2273 2, 26 | not in the concupiscible ~power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
2274 2, 26 | is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which ~is
2275 2, 26 | passage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we ~must not
2276 2, 26 | is in the concupiscible power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
2277 2, 26 | simply in the concupiscible ~power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
2278 2, 26 | is in ~the concupiscible power."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
2279 2, 26 | belongs ~to the concupiscible power, because it regards good
2280 2, 26 | is not a passion. For no power is a ~passion. But every
2281 2, 26 | passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div.
2282 2, 26 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement
2283 2, 26 | Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle
2284 2, 26 | not in the concupiscible power, but only in the ~will,
2285 2, 27 | belongs to the ~appetitive power which is a passive faculty.
2286 2, 27 | love is in the ~appetitive power, which regards a thing as
2287 2, 28 | apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, ~as to the apprehensive
2288 2, 28 | as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to
2289 2, 28 | Para. 2/3~As the appetitive power, the object loved is said
2290 2, 28 | happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive
2291 2, 28 | and as to the appetitive power. ~As to the apprehensive
2292 2, 28 | As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed
2293 2, 28 | madness. As to the appetitive ~power, a man is said to suffer
2294 2, 28 | suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards ~something
2295 2, 28 | that the more intensely a power tends to ~anything, the
2296 2, 28 | adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now ~nothing
2297 2, 28 | senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is ~exercised
2298 2, 28 | relation of the appetitive ~power to its object. But in the
2299 2, 29 | first way, no sensitive power, whether of ~apprehension
2300 2, 29 | on which ~every sensitive power is based.~Aquin.: SMT FS
2301 2, 30 | OBJ 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter
2302 2, 30 | concupiscence is in each power of the soul, and ~not only
2303 2, 30 | because the sense is a power seated ~in a bodily organ:
2304 2, 30 | OBJ 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its
2305 2, 30 | belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to crave a thing ~
2306 2, 30 | belongs to the concupiscible power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[
2307 2, 30 | passion of the ~concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished
2308 2, 30 | object of the concupiscible power is something delightful
2309 2, 30 | diversity in its active ~power. The diversity, derived
2310 2, 30 | in regard ~to its active power causes a formal diversity
2311 2, 30 | the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good,
2312 2, 30 | is possessed of infinite power, in a certain ~sense, in
2313 2, 31 | is not in an intellectual power. ~Therefore delight is not
2314 2, 31 | not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common ~
2315 2, 31 | difference of delight in either power, that ~delight of the sensitive
2316 2, 32 | agent. Now, since human power is ~finite, operation is
2317 2, 32 | respect of the faculty or power of obtaining ~the pleasurable
2318 2, 32 | good, by ~reason of the power of love, which makes a man
2319 2, 33 | part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the ~
2320 2, 33 | the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the ~
2321 2, 33 | reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore ~pleasure does
2322 2, 33 | the use of an apprehensive power moves pleasure ~rather than
2323 2, 34 | repose of the appetitive power in some loved ~good, and
2324 2, 35 | an ~act of the sensitive power; but because the senses
2325 2, 35 | the ~interior cognitive power can perceive the present,
2326 2, 35 | disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in so far ~as
2327 2, 35 | disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are ~not contrary
2328 2, 35 | inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more ~eager
2329 2, 35 | movement of the appetitive ~power, as stated above (A[1]).
2330 2, 36 | Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?~Aquin.:
2331 2, 36 | Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?~Aquin.:
2332 2, 36 | would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a
2333 2, 36 | For that which is in the power of the agent is not present
2334 2, 36 | evil. Therefore a greater power is not ~a cause of sorrow.~
2335 2, 36 | inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power
2336 2, 36 | power. Therefore a greater power should not be ~reckoned
2337 2, 36 | appetite. But a greater power is something external. ~
2338 2, 36 | will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the body ~
2339 2, 36 | Augustine reckons a greater power as being the cause ~of sorrow.~
2340 2, 36 | noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to ~transform
2341 2, 36 | Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take
2342 2, 36 | will "resisting a stronger ~power": for were it not to resist,
2343 2, 36 | 1~Reply OBJ 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting
2344 2, 36 | OBJ 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater,
2345 2, 36 | is thus that a ~greater power is reckoned to be the cause
2346 2, 37 | pain deprives one of the power to learn?~(2) Whether the
2347 2, 37 | pain deprives one of the power to learn?~Aquin.: SMT FS
2348 2, 37 | does not deprive one of the power to ~learn. For it is written (
2349 2, 37 | destroying, increases the ~power of learning.~Aquin.: SMT
2350 2, 37 | towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn ~from
2351 2, 37 | from the action of another power: because the soul, being
2352 2, 40 | hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity ~
2353 2, 40 | trifles, which are in one's ~power to have at any time: in
2354 2, 40 | hope belong to another ~power, viz. the irascible, which
2355 2, 40 | object of the appetitive power: because the ~appetite is
2356 2, 40 | apprehensive or in the appetitive power?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
2357 2, 40 | belongs to the cognitive power. Because ~hope, seemingly,
2358 2, 40 | belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by ~"
2359 2, 40 | belongs to the cognitive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
2360 2, 40 | belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.~
2361 2, 40 | property of the cognitive power. But ~certainty is ascribed
2362 2, 40 | belongs to the cognitive ~power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
2363 2, 40 | cognitive, but of the appetitive power. ~Therefore hope belongs,
2364 2, 40 | cognitive, but to the appetitive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
2365 2, 40 | belongs to the appetitive power; ~since movement towards
2366 2, 40 | action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the
2367 2, 40 | But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by ~
2368 2, 40 | movement of the appetitive power ~ensuing from the apprehension
2369 2, 40 | two ways, ~viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly
2370 2, 40 | obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait
2371 2, 40 | far as ~the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only
2372 2, 40 | also on the thing by whose power he ~hopes to get it; according
2373 2, 40 | inspection of the cognitive power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[
2374 2, 40 | precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement ~in
2375 2, 40 | known; for the apprehensive power knows its ~own act better
2376 2, 40 | possible as compared to a power. ~For such is the division
2377 2, 40 | belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher
2378 2, 40 | is not in the cognitive power, but in the appetite, as
2379 2, 40 | everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength, ~
2380 2, 40 | virtue itself ~adds to the power of acting with ease: because
2381 2, 40 | whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness
2382 2, 41 | iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of ~{systole}" -
2383 2, 41 | a movement of a passive ~power - i.e. of a power whose
2384 2, 41 | passive ~power - i.e. of a power whose object is compared
2385 2, 41 | movement of the appetitive power; and more properly still, ~
2386 2, 41 | movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ,
2387 2, 41 | belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards
2388 2, 41 | iii, 23) that fear is "a power of desire": ~and both sorrow
2389 2, 41 | acts of the ~apprehensive power, such as understanding,
2390 2, 41 | action of our own is in our ~power. But fear regards an evil
2391 2, 41 | evil that surpasses our power, as stated above ~(A[2]).
2392 2, 41 | evil which ~surpasses the power of him that fears, so that
2393 2, 41 | actually done, is in the power ~of the doer. But it is
2394 2, 42 | says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be ~above another
2395 2, 42 | movement of the appetitive power. Now it ~belongs to the
2396 2, 42 | belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid,
2397 2, 42 | movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit, ~has some
2398 2, 42 | as ~some good can by its power bring harm to the good we
2399 2, 42 | that good which, by its power, can ~inflict that evil.
2400 2, 42 | this way, too, we fear the ~power of man; especially when
2401 2, 42 | another, ~so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a
2402 2, 42 | entirely subject to our power and will, is ~not an object
2403 2, 42 | this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that
2404 2, 42 | which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear
2405 2, 42 | does not lie in our own power: and consequently the evil ~
2406 2, 42 | whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to ~increase
2407 2, 42 | experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as
2408 2, 43 | Because those ~who are in power are very much feared. But
2409 2, 43 | But defect is contrary to power. ~Therefore defect is not
2410 2, 43 | multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet.
2411 2, 43 | is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily
2412 2, 43 | 2~But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves,
2413 2, 43 | not on ~account of the power which enables them to contend:
2414 2, 43 | account of the ~lack of power, owing to which they are
2415 2, 44 | ii, 23) that "fear is a ~power according to {systole},"
2416 2, 44 | movement of the appetitive power, while ~the bodily transmutation
2417 2, 44 | repel is due to lack of ~power, as stated above (Q[43],
2418 2, 44 | A[2]): and the weaker a power is, the ~fewer the things
2419 2, 44 | account ~of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants
2420 2, 44 | to the ~imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and
2421 2, 44 | being caused by a lack of power ~in controlling the members:
2422 2, 44 | the members: which lack of power is due to the want of ~heat,
2423 2, 45 | belong to the appetitive power. Now every ~movement of
2424 2, 45 | movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either
2425 2, 45 | things regard either our own power, as bodily ~strength, experience
2426 2, 46 | passion. For the ~irascible power takes its name from anger [
2427 2, 46 | several ~passions in this power, not only one. Therefore
2428 2, 46 | according to its ~active power. Now it happens that an
2429 2, 46 | Reply OBJ 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [
2430 2, 46 | because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because
2431 2, 46 | movement of the appetitive power follows an act of ~the apprehensive
2432 2, 46 | act of ~the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power
2433 2, 46 | power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in ~two
2434 2, 46 | these ways ~the appetitive power can tend to both good and
2435 2, 46 | were in the concupiscible power, the ~irascible would not
2436 2, 46 | movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of ~reason
2437 2, 48 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Every power that is divided in itself
2438 2, 49 | intrinsic principle is ~power and habit; but as we have
2439 2, 49 | either as to place, or ~as to power, or as to species." "In
2440 2, 49 | place: "when he ~says 'as to power,' he includes all those
2441 2, 49 | put in the ~definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v,
2442 2, 49 | principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which
2443 2, 49 | that it is posterior to power. And so habit ~and disposition
2444 2, 49 | nature ~and the notion of power is that it should be a principle
2445 2, 49 | habit is subjected in a power, implies principally ~relation
2446 2, 49 | of habit to be related to power, but ~to be related to nature.
2447 2, 49 | precedes action, to which power is ~related, therefore habit
2448 2, 49 | therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.~
2449 2, 49 | relation to an act. But power implies ~sufficiently a
2450 2, 49 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil,
2451 2, 49 | so also is habit: ~and as power does not always act, so
2452 2, 49 | 2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Power sometimes has a relation
2453 2, 49 | something else. But if a power has not a ~relation to many
2454 2, 49 | A[3]): whereas the same power has a ~relation to good
2455 2, 50 | essence or ~in respect of its power?~(3) Whether in the powers
2456 2, 50 | essence or in ~respect of its power?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[
2457 2, 50 | quality, it is prior to ~power, which belongs to the second
2458 2, 50 | Therefore habit is not in a ~power of the soul as its subject.~
2459 2, 50 | of color, in which sense power is ~the subject of habit.~
2460 2, 50 | Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies
2461 2, 50 | disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation
2462 2, 50 | habit whose subject is a power, does not imply ~relation
2463 2, 50 | Wherefore it is posterior to power. ~Or, we may say that habit
2464 2, 50 | habit takes precedence of power, as the complete ~takes
2465 2, 50 | part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so ~
2466 2, 50 | part, so ~is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits
2467 2, 50 | related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue ~related to
2468 2, 50 | related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers
2469 2, 50 | for they have not that power of using or of ~refraining,
2470 2, 50 | is separate, but in some power which is the act of some
2471 2, 50 | operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also ~
2472 2, 50 | disposition of the object to ~the power, but rather a disposition
2473 2, 50 | rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore ~
2474 2, 50 | habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the
2475 2, 50 | which is compared to the power as its object.~Aquin.: SMT
2476 2, 50 | the former is an active power. ~But the will is above
2477 2, 50 | will is above all an active power, because it moves all the ~
2478 2, 50 | 1/1~I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed
2479 2, 50 | the will is a ~rational power, it may be variously directed
2480 2, 50 | and in every appetitive power ~there must be something
2481 2, 50 | be something by which the power is inclined to its object;
2482 2, 50 | the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain
2483 2, 50 | sufficiently by the nature of the ~power itself, the power needs
2484 2, 50 | of the ~power itself, the power needs no quality to incline
2485 2, 50 | life, that the appetitive power be ~inclined to something
2486 2, 50 | inclined by the nature of ~the power, which has a relation to
2487 2, 50 | will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved (
2488 2, 50 | from the very nature of the power inclined to the ~good of
2489 2, 50 | se] is prior ~to and more power than that which is by another [
2490 2, 51 | were from nature, habit and power would be one.~Aquin.: SMT
2491 2, 51 | and whose subject is ~a power of the soul, as stated above (
2492 2, 51 | naturally to the nature of a ~power, while it cannot belong
2493 2, 51 | it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with ~
2494 2, 51 | belong to the intellective power itself ~capable of knowing
2495 2, 51 | it ~would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things
2496 2, 51 | the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species,
2497 2, 51 | habit can belong to the power.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[
2498 2, 51 | the acts of the appetitive power proceed from ~that same
2499 2, 51 | proceed from ~that same power according as it is moved
2500 2, 51 | moved by the apprehensive power ~presenting the object:
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