1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-2000 | 2001-2500 | 2501-3000 | 3001-3500 | 3501-4000 | 4001-4500 | 4501-5000 | 5001-5468
Part, Question
1501 2, 6 | to wish"; the other is an act of the ~will commanded by
1502 2, 6 | to the will's own proper act, ~violence cannot be done
1503 2, 6 | reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else
1504 2, 6 | nature of the ~will's own act, that it should be subject
1505 2, 6 | would no longer be by an act of the will, nor ~would
1506 2, 6 | A[4]) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately
1507 2, 6 | voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. ~
1508 2, 6 | Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately
1509 2, 6 | violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the
1510 2, 6 | But as to the commanded act, ~the will can suffer violence:
1511 2, 6 | agent. In like manner an act is said to ~be voluntary
1512 2, 6 | according as it ~is in act; but according as it is
1513 2, 6 | done through fear, is in act ~in so far as it is done.
1514 2, 6 | that which is done is in act, ~in so far as it is here
1515 2, 6 | conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be ~
1516 2, 6 | 24): "The involuntary ~act deserves mercy or indulgence,
1517 2, 6 | would not result in the act being involuntary, because
1518 2, 6 | some particular ~possible act. Nevertheless, this itself
1519 2, 6 | will, for example ~"not to act" or "not to will," and in
1520 2, 6 | involuntariness. For ~"the involuntary act deserves pardon," as Damascene
1521 2, 6 | threefold relationship to the act of the will: ~in one way, "
1522 2, 6 | Ignorance is "consequent" to the act of the will, in so ~far
1523 2, 6 | 3]). First, ~because the act of the will is brought to
1524 2, 6 | for in this sense "not to act" and "not to ~will" are
1525 2, 6 | of the will towards the act, which movement ~would not
1526 2, 6 | is "antecedent" to the ~act of the will, when it is
1527 2, 6 | some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound
1528 2, 6 | is concomitant with ~the act of the will.~
1529 2, 7 | is an accident of a human act?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1]
1530 2, 7 | an accident of a human ~act. For Tully says (De Invent.
1531 2, 7 | not an accident of a human act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1]
1532 2, 7 | particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances
1533 2, 7 | outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch ~
1534 2, 7 | some way touch ~the human act, are called circumstances.
1535 2, 7 | from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the ~
1536 2, 7 | the ~circumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable,
1537 2, 7 | otherwise than through the act; as place and condition
1538 2, 7 | the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which ~
1539 2, 7 | the manner in which ~the act is done.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1540 2, 7 | circumstances causes an act to be ~involuntary, according
1541 2, 7 | be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary
1542 2, 7 | they are extrinsic to the act, ~nevertheless are in a
1543 2, 7 | For a circumstance of an act is described as something ~
1544 2, 7 | as something ~outside the act. Now time and place answer
1545 2, 7 | belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the ~circumstances
1546 2, 7 | part of the substance of an act. ~But the causes of an act
1547 2, 7 | act. ~But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
1548 2, 7 | taken from the cause of the act itself. ~Accordingly, neither "
1549 2, 7 | outside the substance of the act, ~and yet in a way touching
1550 2, 7 | inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch
1551 2, 7 | touches ~the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it
1552 2, 7 | effect. It ~touches the act itself, either by way of
1553 2, 7 | or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting."
1554 2, 7 | touches the cause of the act, as to ~the final cause,
1555 2, 7 | surround [circumstant] the act by way of ~measure; but
1556 2, 7 | the others surround the act by touching it in any other
1557 2, 7 | to the substance of the act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3]
1558 2, 7 | refers to a ~quality of the act is a special circumstance;
1559 2, 7 | which the substance of the act ~depends, is not a circumstance;
1560 2, 7 | to the substance of the ~act; but that it be great or
1561 2, 7 | the end that specifies the act is not a circumstance, but
1562 2, 7 | Thus, that a valiant man act "valiantly for the sake
1563 2, 7 | circumstance; but if he act valiantly ~for the sake
1564 2, 7 | are "why" and "in what the act ~consists"?~Aquin.: SMT
1565 2, 7 | and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois e ~praxis]"
1566 2, 7 | For those in which the act is seem ~to be place and
1567 2, 7 | the most extrinsic to the ~act. Therefore those things
1568 2, 7 | those things in which the act is are not the most ~important
1569 2, 7 | form. But the cause of an act is the person ~that does
1570 2, 7 | it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it
1571 2, 7 | of all ~which touches the act on the part of the end,
1572 2, 7 | the very ~substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "
1573 2, 7 | those things "in which the act is" the Philosopher does ~
1574 2, 7 | that are affixed to the ~act itself. Wherefore Gregory
1575 2, 7 | latter's term - "in which the act is" - said, "what is done."~
1576 2, 7 | of the substance of the act, ~yet it is the most important
1577 2, 7 | most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the ~
1578 2, 7 | as it moves the ~agent to act. Wherefore the moral act
1579 2, 7 | act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by
1580 2, 7 | The person that does the act is the cause of that act, ~
1581 2, 7 | act is the cause of that act, ~inasmuch as he is moved
1582 2, 7 | that he is directed to the act; while other conditions
1583 2, 7 | important relation to the act. As to the mode, it ~is
1584 2, 7 | substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial ~
1585 2, 7 | form of the act, for in an act the substantial ~form depends
1586 2, 7 | accidental quality of the act.~
1587 2, 8 | superfluous], meaning ~thereby the act of the will; for it is in
1588 2, 8 | the ~will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1],
1589 2, 8 | the will in regard to its act, then, properly ~speaking,
1590 2, 8 | end only. Because every act denominated from a power,
1591 2, 8 | power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to ~
1592 2, 8 | understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now
1593 2, 8 | understanding. Now the ~simple act of a power is referred to
1594 2, 8 | reference to the ~simple act of the will; not in reference
1595 2, 8 | will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?~
1596 2, 8 | will is moved by the same act, to the end ~and to the
1597 2, 8 | moved to both by the same act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3]
1598 2, 8 | colors are seen by ~the same act. Therefore it is the same
1599 2, 8 | moved to both by the same act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3]
1600 2, 8 | themselves. But it ~is another act whereby the will is moved
1601 2, 8 | absolutely. And ~sometimes this act precedes the other in time;
1602 2, 8 | color is seen, by the same act the light is seen; ~but
1603 2, 8 | wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not ~
1604 2, 8 | something else: wherefore the ~act of the will can be directed
1605 2, 9 | needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and
1606 2, 9 | the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination
1607 2, 9 | the determination of the act. ~The first of these is
1608 2, 9 | by reason of which the act is specified.~Aquin.: SMT
1609 2, 9 | moves, by determining the act, after the ~manner of a
1610 2, 9 | as to the exercise of its act; ~since even the true itself
1611 2, 9 | the ~determination of the act, which the act derives from
1612 2, 9 | determination of the act, which the act derives from the object,
1613 2, 9 | appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
1614 2, 9 | governor, and can nevertheless act counter ~to his commands.
1615 2, 9 | every ~mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved,
1616 2, 9 | since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality,
1617 2, 9 | in potentiality and in ~act, in respect of the same.
1618 2, 9 | will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs ~to will
1619 2, 9 | itself from ~potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of
1620 2, 9 | wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in ~
1621 2, 9 | itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means,
1622 2, 9 | present to itself; ~but the act of the will, whereby it
1623 2, 9 | will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly
1624 2, 9 | as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the ~end.~
1625 2, 9 | essential to the ~voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic
1626 2, 9 | essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement
1627 2, 9 | A[4]). But the violent act is one "the principle of
1628 2, 9 | in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to
1629 2, 9 | it reduces itself to the act of willing the ~means. Now
1630 2, 9 | essential to the voluntary act that its principle be ~within
1631 2, 9 | Wherefore though the voluntary ~act has an inward proximate
1632 2, 9 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: For an act to be violent it is not
1633 2, 9 | to ~the exercise of its act. But this is impossible.
1634 2, 9 | evident ~that no body can act on what is incorporeal,
1635 2, 9 | impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect
1636 2, 9 | sensitive ~appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore
1637 2, 9 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the act of the will follows the
1638 2, 9 | of the will follows the act of the intellect. ~But man'
1639 2, 9 | intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also
1640 2, 10 | which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper
1641 2, 10 | potentiality: because form is act, ~whereas matter is potentiality.
1642 2, 10 | potentiality. Now movement is "the act of that which is ~in potentiality" (
1643 2, 10 | reduced from potentiality to act, ~when it wills something),
1644 2, 10 | should always be in the act of volition; but ~only when
1645 2, 10 | God's will, ~which is pure act, is always in the act of
1646 2, 10 | pure act, is always in the act of volition.~Aquin.: SMT
1647 2, 10 | to the exercise ~of its act; secondly, as to the specification
1648 2, 10 | the specification of its act, derived from ~the object.
1649 2, 10 | belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were ~
1650 2, 11 | Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)~
1651 2, 11 | Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?~(
1652 2, 11 | 1~Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?~
1653 2, 11 | the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown
1654 2, 11 | Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power,
1655 2, 11 | Therefore also to enjoy is an ~act of the appetitive power.~
1656 2, 11 | evident that fruition is the act ~of the appetitive power.~
1657 2, 11 | of ~God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as
1658 2, 11 | 1]) to enjoy is not the act of the ~power that achieves
1659 2, 11 | love. But to enjoy is an act of the will: since ~"it
1660 2, 11 | object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends
1661 2, 11 | of ~acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect,
1662 2, 12 | Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?~(
1663 2, 12 | intention of the end is the same act as volition of the ~means?~(
1664 2, 12 | Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the
1665 2, 12 | seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not ~
1666 2, 12 | Therefore ~intention is not an act of the appetitive but of
1667 2, 12 | end. But to ~ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention
1668 2, 12 | 1/1~OBJ 4: Further, an act of the will is either of
1669 2, 12 | or of the means. ~But the act of the will in respect of
1670 2, 12 | Therefore it is not an act of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1671 2, 12 | Therefore intention is an act of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1672 2, 12 | properly speaking, is an act of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1673 2, 12 | intention" indicates an ~act of the will, presupposing
1674 2, 12 | the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders
1675 2, 12 | Reply OBJ 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to
1676 2, 12 | intention presupposes an act of reason or of the ~intellect.
1677 2, 12 | intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?~
1678 2, 12 | the window; and is another act from the will to see, through
1679 2, 12 | object, come under the same act; thus it ~is the same act
1680 2, 12 | act; thus it ~is the same act of sight that perceives
1681 2, 12 | considers each by a ~distinct act; but when it assents to
1682 2, 12 | principles, there is but one act of the intellect.~Aquin.:
1683 2, 12 | But irrational ~animals act for an end; for an animal
1684 2, 13 | OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD
1685 2, 13 | Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?~(
1686 2, 13 | 1/1~Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?~Aquin.:
1687 2, 13 | would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of reason. ~
1688 2, 13 | another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice
1689 2, 13 | Therefore choice is an act ~of reason.~Aquin.: SMT
1690 2, 13 | it seems that it is an act ~of reason.~Aquin.: SMT
1691 2, 13 | power." But desire is an act of will. ~Therefore choice
1692 2, 13 | acts of the soul, that an act ~belonging essentially to
1693 2, 13 | a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love ~
1694 2, 13 | for the love ~of God, that act is materially an act of
1695 2, 13 | that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally,
1696 2, 13 | fortitude, but formally, an act ~of charity. Now it is evident
1697 2, 13 | the will ~and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends
1698 2, 13 | appetite. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to ~
1699 2, 13 | reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally
1700 2, 13 | the will, but formally an act of ~the reason. Now in such
1701 2, 13 | matters the substance of the act is as the ~matter in comparison
1702 2, 13 | is substantially not an act of the reason but of the
1703 2, 13 | Consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive ~power.~
1704 2, 13 | conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which
1705 2, 13 | account of ~an end: since they act for an end, and from desire.
1706 2, 13 | children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice." ~
1707 2, 13 | iii, 3 "movement is the act of the ~movable, caused
1708 2, 13 | in one nature, invariably act in the same way.~Aquin.:
1709 2, 13 | contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect ~assenting
1710 2, 13 | if ~he had no right to act in the appointment of the
1711 2, 13 | things. For ~choice is an act of the will, as stated above (
1712 2, 13 | matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned, ~
1713 2, 13 | perfection of the will's ~act is to be observed in its
1714 2, 13 | Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect ~
1715 2, 13 | Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect
1716 2, 13 | wills. But the incomplete act of ~the will is in respect
1717 2, 13 | possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on something
1718 2, 13 | of necessity. But every act of choosing is ~in regard
1719 2, 13 | the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which
1720 2, 13 | man can will and not will, act and not act; ~again, he
1721 2, 13 | and not will, act and not act; ~again, he can will this
1722 2, 13 | this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also this, viz. ~"
1723 2, 13 | not to will" or "not to act." Again, in all particular
1724 2, 14 | 22) that counsel is "an act of the appetite." But ~inquiry
1725 2, 14 | But ~inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore
1726 2, 14 | inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for which ~
1727 2, 14 | power: ~consequently each act can be denominated from
1728 2, 14 | it is ~evident that the act of the reason giving direction
1729 2, 14 | as to the means, and ~the act of the will tending to these
1730 2, 14 | reason, viz. order, in that act of the will, which is ~choice:
1731 2, 14 | in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of
1732 2, 14 | that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene ~
1733 2, 14 | Consequently if any human act be an end, it will not,
1734 2, 14 | But, whenever we ~do not act through the impulse of passion,
1735 2, 14 | the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the ~reason'
1736 2, 15 | OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO
1737 2, 15 | 1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of
1738 2, 15 | 4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part
1739 2, 15 | 1~Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of
1740 2, 15 | Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.~
1741 2, 15 | or absent. And since the ~act of an appetitive power is
1742 2, 15 | these grounds consent ~is an act of the appetitive power.~
1743 2, 15 | whereas the intellect, whose act does not ~consist in a movement
1744 2, 15 | precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there were
1745 2, 15 | animals, there would be no act accomplished; which ~is
1746 2, 15 | But irrational ~animals act through passion. Therefore
1747 2, 15 | the accomplishment of an act follows not only ~from consent,
1748 2, 15 | 1/1 ~OBJ 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is
1749 2, 15 | is his end, just as the ~act of the virtuous man is his
1750 2, 15 | man consents to ~his own act. Therefore consent can be
1751 2, 15 | in respect of which our act is not consent but ~something
1752 2, 15 | Reply OBJ 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself,
1753 2, 15 | his act, rather than the act itself, is the end ~of the
1754 2, 15 | delight he consents to that ~act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
1755 2, 15 | 1~Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher
1756 2, 15 | seem that consent to the act does not always belong to ~
1757 2, 15 | Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to
1758 2, 15 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said
1759 2, 15 | alone in consenting to the act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
1760 2, 15 | man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for ~
1761 2, 15 | Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher
1762 2, 15 | restraining ~them from, act, yield to the evil deed
1763 2, 15 | be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the
1764 2, 15 | Therefore consent to the act ~belongs to the higher reason;
1765 2, 15 | results. But in so far as the act of ~thinking is considered
1766 2, 15 | as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the ~lower
1767 2, 15 | follow that consent is an act of each power, but of the
1768 2, 15 | from which the voluntary act is named.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1769 2, 15 | because it ~always moves to act, according to the eternal
1770 2, 16 | 1 - OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO
1771 2, 16 | inquiry:~(1) Whether use is an act of the will?~(2) Whether
1772 2, 16 | Para. 1/1~Whether use is an act of the will?~Aquin.: SMT
1773 2, 16 | seem that use is not an act of the will. For Augustine ~
1774 2, 16 | something to another is an act of the reason to which it
1775 2, 16 | direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of ~
1776 2, 16 | executive power; and the act of the will does not follow
1777 2, 16 | will does not follow the act of the ~executive power,
1778 2, 16 | Therefore use is ~not an act of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1779 2, 16 | Therefore ~use is not an act of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1780 2, 16 | will which applies them to act, as the ~instruments are
1781 2, 16 | is, properly speaking, an act of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1782 2, 16 | applied by the will to the ~act of understanding or judging.
1783 2, 16 | something ~else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore
1784 2, 16 | thing to another is ~an act of reason; whereas to apprehend
1785 2, 16 | itself, by applying itself to act. But it does this ~when
1786 2, 16 | the means. And the ~last act that belongs to the first
1787 2, 16 | on one another, in each act ~of the will we can find
1788 2, 17 | 1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?~(
1789 2, 17 | command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?~(
1790 2, 17 | the commanded act are one act or distinct?~(5) Whether
1791 2, 17 | distinct?~(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?~(
1792 2, 17 | commanded?~(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?~(
1793 2, 17 | commanded?~(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite
1794 2, 17 | commanded?~(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?~(
1795 2, 17 | 1~Whether command is an act of the reason or of the
1796 2, 17 | seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the ~
1797 2, 17 | Therefore command is an act of ~the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1798 2, 17 | command is followed at once by act. But the act of the ~reason
1799 2, 17 | at once by act. But the act of the ~reason is not followed
1800 2, 17 | not followed at once by act: for he who judges that
1801 2, 17 | Therefore command is not an act ~of the reason, but of the
1802 2, 17 | Therefore command is an act of the reason.~Aquin.: SMT
1803 2, 17 | answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing,
1804 2, 17 | presupposing, however, an ~act of the will. In proof of
1805 2, 17 | the result is that the act of the reason precedes the
1806 2, 17 | the reason precedes the act of the will, ~and conversely.
1807 2, 17 | the power of the preceding act continues in the ~act that
1808 2, 17 | preceding act continues in the ~act that follows, it happens
1809 2, 17 | sometimes that there is an act of the will ~in so far as
1810 2, 17 | in itself something of an act of the reason, as ~we have
1811 2, 17 | conversely, that there ~is an act of the reason in so far
1812 2, 17 | itself something of an ~act of the will.~Aquin.: SMT
1813 2, 17 | is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the ~
1814 2, 17 | intimating or declaring is an act of ~the reason. Now the
1815 2, 17 | soul, to the doing of an act is the will, ~as stated
1816 2, 17 | follows that command is an act of the reason, ~presupposing
1817 2, 17 | reason, ~presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of
1818 2, 17 | to the execution of the act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[
1819 2, 17 | another; and this is an act of the reason.~Aquin.: SMT
1820 2, 17 | proves that command is an act of reason not ~absolutely,
1821 2, 17 | contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated above (
1822 2, 17 | to direct is the proper ~act of reason. Wherefore it
1823 2, 17 | directed by ~another to act; and they themselves do
1824 2, 17 | not direct themselves to act. ~Consequently in them is
1825 2, 17 | command. For command is an act of ~the reason presupposing
1826 2, 17 | the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above (
1827 2, 17 | Q[16], A[1]), use is an act of the will. ~Therefore
1828 2, 17 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the
1829 2, 17 | 1]). ~But command is an act of the reason as moved by
1830 2, 17 | the user ~is united to the act of the thing used; for one
1831 2, 17 | not simultaneous ~with the act of the thing to which the
1832 2, 17 | 1~Reply OBJ 1: Not every act of the will precedes this
1833 2, 17 | of the will precedes this act of the reason ~which is
1834 2, 17 | which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz.
1835 2, 17 | precedes, viz. choice; and an ~act of the will follows, viz.
1836 2, 17 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does
1837 2, 17 | object rank ~before the act. Now the object of use is
1838 2, 17 | Reply OBJ 3: Just as the act of the will in using the
1839 2, 17 | also we may say that this ~act whereby the will uses the
1840 2, 17 | command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?~
1841 2, 17 | the commanded act are one act, or distinct?~Aquin.: SMT
1842 2, 17 | seem that the commanded act is not one with the command ~
1843 2, 17 | distinct. But the ~commanded act belongs to one power, and
1844 2, 17 | Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.~
1845 2, 17 | sometimes the commanded ~act is separate from the command:
1846 2, 17 | given, and ~the commanded act follows not. Therefore command
1847 2, 17 | Therefore command is a distinct act from ~the act commanded.~
1848 2, 17 | a distinct act from ~the act commanded.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1849 2, 17 | precedes the ~commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.~
1850 2, 17 | But there is no ~commanded act unless by reason of the
1851 2, 17 | so, in human acts, the act of a ~lower power is in
1852 2, 17 | matter in regard to the act of a higher ~power, in so
1853 2, 17 | moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as
1854 2, 17 | the form in ~regard to the act of its instrument. Hence
1855 2, 17 | command and ~the commanded act are one human act, just
1856 2, 17 | commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one,
1857 2, 17 | in a way, one: since "the act of the mover ~and the act
1858 2, 17 | act of the mover ~and the act of the thing moved are one
1859 2, 17 | the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).~Aquin.:
1860 2, 17 | command and the commanded act can be ~separated from one
1861 2, 17 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the act of the will is commanded?~
1862 2, 17 | It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded.
1863 2, 17 | not." But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the ~
1864 2, 17 | the will. Therefore the ~act of the will is not commanded.~
1865 2, 17 | understand. Therefore ~the act of the will is not commanded.~
1866 2, 17 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded,
1867 2, 17 | to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the
1868 2, 17 | of the will precedes the act ~of reason commanding, as
1869 2, 17 | above (A[1]); for if that act of the will ~be also commanded,
1870 2, 17 | will be precedes by another act of the ~reason, and so on
1871 2, 17 | possible. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.~
1872 2, 17 | is nothing else than the ~act of the reason directing,
1873 2, 17 | certain motion, something to act. Now ~it is evident that
1874 2, 17 | the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as ~
1875 2, 17 | this it is evident that an act of the will ~can be commanded.~
1876 2, 17 | intellect and will, commands the act of the ~will for himself.~
1877 2, 17 | OBJ 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded ~
1878 2, 17 | is an act of reason, that act is commanded ~which is subject
1879 2, 17 | to reason. Now the first act of the will is not due to ~
1880 2, 17 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the act of the reason is commanded?~
1881 2, 17 | It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be
1882 2, 17 | above (A[1]). Therefore the act of the reason is ~not commanded.~
1883 2, 17 | participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason,
1884 2, 17 | Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act ~of that power, which is
1885 2, 17 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in
1886 2, 17 | the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always
1887 2, 17 | our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be
1888 2, 17 | so can it direct its own act. Consequently its act ~can
1889 2, 17 | own act. Consequently its act ~can be commanded.~Aquin.:
1890 2, 17 | must take note that the act of the reason may be considered
1891 2, 17 | as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, the ~
1892 2, 17 | And considered thus, the ~act of the reason can always
1893 2, 17 | be noticed. One is the ~act whereby it apprehends the
1894 2, 17 | truth about something. This act is not in ~our power: because
1895 2, 17 | Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in
1896 2, 17 | be commanded. The other act of the reason is that ~whereby
1897 2, 17 | of objects subject to the act ~of the reason, nothing
1898 2, 17 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the act of the sensitive appetite
1899 2, 17 | It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite
1900 2, 17 | lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. ~
1901 2, 17 | appetite. ~Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite
1902 2, 17 | FP, Q[110], A[2]. But the act of the sensitive appetite
1903 2, 17 | or ~cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite
1904 2, 17 | imagination. Therefore the ~act of the sensitive appetite
1905 2, 17 | appetite. Therefore the act of ~the sensitive appetite
1906 2, 17 | Para. 1/3~I answer that, An act is subject to our command,
1907 2, 17 | understand in ~what manner the act of the sensitive appetite
1908 2, 17 | will is ~not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal
1909 2, 17 | corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the
1910 2, 17 | or a hindrance ~to that act. Consequently the act of
1911 2, 17 | that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite
1912 2, 17 | of the soul takes in the act, follows ~apprehension.
1913 2, 17 | Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive ~appetite
1914 2, 17 | twofold relation to ~the act of the sensitive appetite.
1915 2, 17 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?~
1916 2, 17 | The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is,
1917 2, 17 | desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the
1918 2, 17 | of taking food or in the act ~of generation, and the
1919 2, 18 | acts. First, how a human ~act is good or evil; secondly,
1920 2, 18 | good or evil of a ~human act, as merit or demerit, sin
1921 2, 18 | except in so far as it is in act. Now a ~thing is evil, not
1922 2, 18 | not according as it is in act, but according as its ~potentiality
1923 2, 18 | potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its
1924 2, 18 | potentiality is ~perfected by act, it is good, as stated in
1925 2, 18 | everything is, such is the act that it ~produces. Now in
1926 2, 18 | hinders a thing from being in act in a certain ~respect, so
1927 2, 18 | respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect
1928 2, 18 | certain respect deficient in act, ~so as to cause a deficient
1929 2, 18 | as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in
1930 2, 18 | Thus a blind man has in act the power of ~walking, whereby
1931 2, 18 | from the form, ~which is an act. Therefore good and evil
1932 2, 18 | stands in relation ~to the act as its form, as it were,
1933 2, 18 | constitute the species of an evil act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1934 2, 18 | Reply OBJ 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared
1935 2, 18 | it can specify ~a moral act. And it must needs be so
1936 2, 18 | the object of the interior act of the will: while the object
1937 2, 18 | it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species
1938 2, 18 | will uses the ~limbs to act as instruments; nor have
1939 2, 18 | the species ~of a human act is considered formally with
1940 2, 18 | accidental to the interior act ~of the will, which act
1941 2, 18 | act ~of the will, which act is compared to the external
1942 2, 18 | compared to the external act, as form to matter.~Aquin.:
1943 2, 18 | The object of the external act can stand in a twofold ~
1944 2, 18 | reason, it will be an evil act according to its species;
1945 2, 18 | deliberate reason, but from some ~act of the imagination, as when
1946 2, 19 | AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)~
1947 2, 19 | goodness of the interior act of the will; under ~which
1948 2, 19 | would follow that every act of the will is good, and
1949 2, 19 | Therefore the goodness of the act of the will ~does not depend
1950 2, 19 | essential differences of the act of the ~will. Because good
1951 2, 19 | falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially
1952 2, 19 | desired. Hence it is that ~the act of the will is not always
1953 2, 19 | nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated above ~(
1954 2, 19 | causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the
1955 2, 19 | A[4]). Therefore the act also of the will derives
1956 2, 19 | goodness and malice in the act of the will: for instance,
1957 2, 19 | specific differences of the act of the will, as stated above ~(
1958 2, 19 | actions ~is taken from the act of the will. Consequently
1959 2, 19 | goodness and malice ~of the act of the will depend on some
1960 2, 19 | the goodness of the will's act depends on that ~one thing
1961 2, 19 | itself causes goodness in the act; and that one ~thing is
1962 2, 19 | accidents, as ~it were, of the act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
1963 2, 19 | Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness
1964 2, 19 | depends on another, and one act of the ~will on another.~
1965 2, 19 | Reply OBJ 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on
1966 2, 19 | circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it
1967 2, 19 | thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed
1968 2, 19 | circumstance is referred to ~the act of willing. And thus, it
1969 2, 19 | the circumstances of the act which he wills.~Aquin.:
1970 2, 19 | ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, ~and
1971 2, 19 | when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes
1972 2, 19 | when it does not cause the act ~to be involuntary. Again,
1973 2, 19 | it does ~not cause the act to be involuntary. And I
1974 2, 19 | voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, "
1975 2, 19 | negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then ~
1976 2, 19 | excuses, and ~causes the act to be involuntary.~Aquin.:
1977 2, 19 | twofold relation to the act ~of the will; first, as
1978 2, 19 | The intention precedes the act of the will ~causally, when
1979 2, 19 | God's sake; ~because the act of fasting is specifically
1980 2, 19 | hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is ~
1981 2, 19 | is ~added to a preceding act of the will; for instance,
1982 2, 19 | goodness of ~the previous act of the will does not depend
1983 2, 19 | except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent
1984 2, 19 | intention is the cause of the act of willing, the ~order to
1985 2, 19 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: The act of the will cannot be said
1986 2, 19 | intention is subsequent to the act of ~the will, then the latter
1987 2, 19 | intention does not spoil ~that act of the will which preceded,
1988 2, 19 | action, but also to the act of ~the will, as stated
1989 2, 19 | that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the
1990 2, 19 | from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills
1991 2, 19 | that the quantity in the act does not depend ~on the
1992 2, 19 | With regard to the external act this ~may happen in two
1993 2, 19 | with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens
1994 2, 19 | belongs, in a way, to the act ~of the will, inasmuch,
1995 2, 19 | intention redounds upon the act ~of the will; that is to
1996 2, 19 | the intention and in the act, ~according to their respective
1997 2, 19 | redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of
1998 2, 19 | interior act and the exterior act of the ~will: since the
1999 2, 19 | the interior ~or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
2000 2, 19 | the interior or exterior ~act, may be referred to the
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