Part, Question

 501   2, 56  |              thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch
 502   2, 56  |          righteously, inasmuch as by ~virtue we perform righteous actions.~
 503   2, 56  |           work, this ~fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is
 504   2, 56  |             said to be the subject of virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 505   2, 56  |           Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether one virtue can be in several powers?~
 506   2, 56  |                It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers.
 507   2, 56  |              things ~are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will,
 508   2, 56  |        belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.~
 509   2, 56  |               vi, 12). Therefore one ~virtue can be in two powers.~Aquin.:
 510   2, 56  |              contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul.
 511   2, 56  |               subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot ~be in several powers
 512   2, 56  |             it is ~impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since
 513   2, 56  |           certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to ~several powers,
 514   2, 56  |          condition required for moral virtue, ~inasmuch as moral virtue
 515   2, 56  |            virtue, ~inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right
 516   2, 56  |              right reason. But moral ~virtue is essentially in the appetite.~
 517   2, 56  |       intellect can be the subject of virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 518   2, 56  |       intellect is not the subject of virtue. ~For Augustine says (De
 519   2, 56  |            Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is love. But the ~subject
 520   2, 56  |            power alone. ~Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. ~Aquin.:
 521   2, 56  |             Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as
 522   2, 56  |              Therefore the subject of virtue ~is not the intellect, but
 523   2, 56  |             Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, virtue is that "which makes its
 524   2, 56  |      intellect ~is not the subject of virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 525   2, 56  |        intellect. But the ~subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear
 526   2, 56  |          definition, above ~given, of virtue (Q[55], A[4]). Therefore
 527   2, 56  |          intellect is the subject of ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 528   2, 56  |           said above (Q[55], A[3]), a virtue is a habit ~by which we
 529   2, 56  |               such virtues. And since virtue is that ~"which makes its
 530   2, 56  |            are often ~divided against virtue; while at other times they
 531   2, 56  |               habit which is called a virtue in a relative ~sense, can
 532   2, 56  |              habit which ~is called a virtue simply, can only be the
 533   2, 56  |             good will. ~Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do
 534   2, 56  |           will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And
 535   2, 56  |      Augustine is to be understood of virtue ~simply so called: not that
 536   2, 56  |             so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that
 537   2, 56  |        speculative or practical, is a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 538   2, 56  |              This objection considers virtue simply so called.~Aquin.:
 539   2, 56  |             powers are the subject of virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 540   2, 56  |             cannot ~be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common
 541   2, 56  |            But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since
 542   2, 56  |             reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible
 543   2, 56  |       therefore impossible for ~human virtue to be in the irascible and
 544   2, 56  |      corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body:
 545   2, 56  |              cannot be the subject of virtue. ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 546   2, 56  |              De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not ~in the body but
 547   2, 56  |            the rational powers. Now ~"virtue is that by which we live
 548   2, 56  |              Q[55], ~A[4]). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible
 549   2, 56  |            the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. ~viii,
 550   2, 56  |               A[2]). ~Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible
 551   2, 56  |       competent to be the ~subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered
 552   2, 56  |              be the subject ~of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates
 553   2, 56  |              moves it: ~therefore the virtue which is in the irascible
 554   2, 56  |               be the subject of human virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 555   2, 56  |             not of itself the good of virtue, ~but is made the instrument
 556   2, 56  |         indeed, have not the good of ~virtue, but rather the infection
 557   2, 56  |             the soul. For this reason virtue is ~not in the body, but
 558   2, 56  |             this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential ~choice
 559   2, 56  |       apprehension are the subject of virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 560   2, 56  |               that it is possible for virtue to be in the ~interior sensitive
 561   2, 56  |       appetite can ~be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason.
 562   2, 56  |             these powers there can be virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 563   2, 56  |               therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of
 564   2, 56  |       appetite, ~so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of
 565   2, 56  |                Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. ~
 566   2, 56  |             of ~memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in
 567   2, 56  |              1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive ~
 568   2, 56  |               Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it
 569   2, 56  |               cannot be ~virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which
 570   2, 56  |              but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power ~
 571   2, 56  |            appetite is the subject of virtue. Whereas the ~sensitive
 572   2, 56  |               as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but
 573   2, 56  |            will can be the subject of virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 574   2, 56  |            will is not the subject of virtue. Because ~no habit is required
 575   2, 56  |               And to this good ~every virtue is ordered, since everything
 576   2, 56  |             its own ~proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his Rhetoric,
 577   2, 56  |           will is not the ~subject of virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 578   2, 56  |               1~OBJ 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or
 579   2, 56  |              ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect
 580   2, 56  |              in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the ~irascible
 581   2, 56  |          participation. ~Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.~
 582   2, 56  |               If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of
 583   2, 56  |           like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect ~
 584   2, 56  |           therefore, there will be no virtue in any ~other power, or
 585   2, 56  |              cannot be the subject of virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[
 586   2, 56  |             therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the
 587   2, 56  |               well, which ~habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper
 588   2, 56  |              the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man'
 589   2, 56  |               then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues
 590   2, 56  |                And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a
 591   2, 56  |             the will must be a moral ~virtue, unless it be theological,
 592   2, 56  |           cases there is ~no need for virtue in the will, for the nature
 593   2, 57  |         consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the ~intellectual
 594   2, 57  |             habit, which is art, is a virtue?~(4) Whether prudence is
 595   2, 57  |              4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?~(5) Whether
 596   2, 57  |              5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?~(6) Whether "
 597   2, 57  |       intellect are ~not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as
 598   2, 57  |             Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, virtue is about those things by
 599   2, 57  |            happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. i, 9). Now ~intellectual
 600   2, 57  |    speculative habit. But science and virtue ~are distinct from one another
 601   2, 57  |              answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good,
 602   2, 57  |               A[3]), ~may be called a virtue for two reasons: first,
 603   2, 57  |             his will. ~Consequently a virtue which perfects the will,
 604   2, 57  |              2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Virtue is about certain things
 605   2, 57  |           ways. In the first ~place a virtue is about its object. And
 606   2, 57  |           contemplation. ~Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its
 607   2, 57  |            Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second ~sense,
 608   2, 57  |             be set down as a habit or virtue ~distinct from the knowledge
 609   2, 57  |              Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in
 610   2, 57  |               down as an intellectual virtue, so also ~should opinion
 611   2, 57  |       therefore it is a ~more perfect virtue than science.~Aquin.: SMT
 612   2, 57  |              on understanding as on a virtue of higher ~degree: and both
 613   2, 57  |         intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[
 614   2, 57  |            art is not an intellectual virtue. For ~Augustine says (De
 615   2, 57  |              no one makes bad use of ~virtue." But one may make bad use
 616   2, 57  |                Therefore art is not a virtue. ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[
 617   2, 57  |               2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there
 618   2, 57  |               there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue ~
 619   2, 57  |               virtue. But "there is a virtue ~of art," according to the
 620   2, 57  |               Therefore art is ~not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[
 621   2, 57  |              art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be ~reckoned
 622   2, 57  |              3,4) says that art is a ~virtue; and yet he does not reckon
 623   2, 57  |               art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative
 624   2, 57  |            which is the property of a virtue that ~perfects the appetite,
 625   2, 57  |            reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it ~falls short
 626   2, 57  |              short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make
 627   2, 57  |           which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this ~reason the
 628   2, 57  |      Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a ~moral
 629   2, 57  |              of art; namely, a ~moral virtue, in so far as the good use
 630   2, 57  |               of art requires a moral virtue. ~For it is evident that
 631   2, 57  |        Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?~Aquin.: SMT FS
 632   2, 57  |            prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. ~For art is the
 633   2, 57  |              too should be reckoned a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[
 634   2, 57  |             that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different ~
 635   2, 57  |               is a different ~kind of virtue. Now it has been stated
 636   2, 57  |             habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring
 637   2, 57  |             there is need of a ~moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.
 638   2, 57  |            evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.~Aquin.:
 639   2, 57  |             cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is ~right
 640   2, 57  |             it is a distinct kind of ~virtue, as stated above.~Aquin.:
 641   2, 57  |               1~Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?~Aquin.:
 642   2, 57  |           seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a ~good
 643   2, 57  |              Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always
 644   2, 57  |              reckoned an intellectual virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[
 645   2, 57  |            answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human
 646   2, 57  |          directed to his due end by a virtue ~which perfects the soul
 647   2, 57  |          Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the ~reason,
 648   2, 57  |         ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently ~
 649   2, 57  |           Consequently ~prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good
 650   2, 57  |             things is an intellectual virtue, but ~only such as is about
 651   2, 57  |         matters that an ~intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical
 652   2, 57  |      Therefore ~"{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but
 653   2, 57  |               the lower. The highest ~virtue would therefore seem to
 654   2, 57  |       Therefore "{synesis}" is not a ~virtue annexed to prudence, but
 655   2, 57  |             but rather is a principal virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[
 656   2, 57  |            counsel. But there ~is one virtue referring to all matters
 657   2, 57  |           besides "{synesis}" ~of the virtue of "{gnome}."~Aquin.: SMT
 658   2, 57  |       subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which ~perfects the command,
 659   2, 57  |             by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}."~Aquin.:
 660   2, 57  |            discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to ~being of
 661   2, 57  |      secondary virtues to a principal virtue: ~and we shall speak of
 662   2, 58  |            inquiry:~(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?~(2) Whether
 663   2, 58  |               every virtue is a moral virtue?~(2) Whether moral virtue
 664   2, 58  |             virtue?~(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual
 665   2, 58  |             differs from intellectual virtue?~(3) Whether virtue is adequately
 666   2, 58  |      intellectual virtue?~(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into
 667   2, 58  |               moral and intellectual ~virtue?~(4) Whether there can be
 668   2, 58  |            moral without intellectual virtue?~(5) Whether, on the other
 669   2, 58  |           intellectual without moral ~virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 670   2, 58  |               Para. 1/1~Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?~Aquin.:
 671   2, 58  |               every virtue is a moral virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 672   2, 58  |              It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because
 673   2, 58  |               every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral ~virtue is
 674   2, 58  |          moral virtue. Because moral ~virtue is so called from the Latin "
 675   2, 58  |              virtues. Therefore every virtue ~is a moral virtue.~Aquin.:
 676   2, 58  |              every virtue ~is a moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 677   2, 58  |              Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is ~"a habit of choosing
 678   2, 58  |             rational mean." But every virtue is a habit of ~choosing:
 679   2, 58  |       choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice.
 680   2, 58  |         choice. And, ~moreover, every virtue consists in following the
 681   2, 58  |                2,3). Therefore every ~virtue is a moral virtue.~Aquin.:
 682   2, 58  |              every ~virtue is a moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 683   2, 58  |               Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a ~habit like a second
 684   2, 58  |                But since every human ~virtue is directed to man's good,
 685   2, 58  |             Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.~Aquin.:
 686   2, 58  |               every virtue is a moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 687   2, 58  |                   Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.~Aquin.:
 688   2, 58  |               every virtue is a moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 689   2, 58  |               discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold
 690   2, 58  |            Body Para. 2/2~Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos"
 691   2, 58  |              1]). Therefore not every virtue is a ~moral virtue, but
 692   2, 58  |              every virtue is a ~moral virtue, but only those that are
 693   2, 58  |             Reply OBJ 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice:
 694   2, 58  |              done from choice: but no virtue ~makes us choose aright,
 695   2, 58  |               Para. 1/1~Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual
 696   2, 58  |             differs from intellectual virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 697   2, 58  |              It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual ~
 698   2, 58  |             differ from intellectual ~virtue. For Augustine says (De
 699   2, 58  |             De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue is the art ~of right conduct."
 700   2, 58  |            But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral ~and intellectual
 701   2, 58  |               moral ~and intellectual virtue do not differ.~Aquin.: SMT
 702   2, 58  |           science is ~an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue
 703   2, 58  |               virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be ~distinguished
 704   2, 58  |       distinguished from intellectual virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 705   2, 58  |            says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the ~rectitude and perfection
 706   2, 58  |               vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not ~differ from intellectual.~
 707   2, 58  |          definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the definition
 708   2, 58  |              the definition of ~moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (
 709   2, 58  |             Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue ~is a habit of choosing
 710   2, 58  |              fixes the mean of moral ~virtue, belongs to an intellectual
 711   2, 58  |            belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi,
 712   2, 58  |              vi, 13. ~Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.~
 713   2, 58  |               there are two kinds ~of virtue: some we call intellectual;
 714   2, 58  |          perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man
 715   2, 58  |             Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence,"
 716   2, 58  |               a habit of intellectual virtue; ~but also that his appetite
 717   2, 58  |             means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from
 718   2, 58  |             differs from intellectual virtue, even as the ~appetite differs
 719   2, 58  |       Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the art of ~right conduct,"
 720   2, 58  |               the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence,
 721   2, 58  |               Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether virtue is adequately divided into
 722   2, 58  |             OBJ 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided
 723   2, 58  |               moral and ~intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among
 724   2, 58  |              Q[61], ~A[1]). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided
 725   2, 58  |       abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided
 726   2, 58  |            the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue ~is not
 727   2, 58  |               moral virtue. Therefore virtue ~is not adequately divided
 728   2, 58  |             says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is ~twofold, intellectual
 729   2, 58  |              1/1~I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man
 730   2, 58  |              Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection
 731   2, 58  |              will be an ~intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects
 732   2, 58  |         appetite, it will be a ~moral virtue. It follows therefore that
 733   2, 58  |            therefore that every human virtue is either ~intellectual
 734   2, 58  |           essentially an intellectual virtue. But ~considered on the
 735   2, 58  |           virtues: since intellectual virtue, which ~makes reason to
 736   2, 58  |            that action ~will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency,
 737   2, 58  |            but ~something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (
 738   2, 58  |            moral without intellectual virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 739   2, 58  |               be without intellectual virtue. ~Because moral virtue,
 740   2, 58  |   intellectual virtue. ~Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent.
 741   2, 58  |             man there may be a ~moral virtue like a second nature, inclining
 742   2, 58  |          perfected by an intellectual virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 743   2, 58  |              by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use ~
 744   2, 58  |        Therefore it seems ~that moral virtue can be without intellectual.~
 745   2, 58  |              1/1~OBJ 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do
 746   2, 58  |           prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Q[57],
 747   2, 58  |              1/1~I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the
 748   2, 58  |    understanding and ~prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence,
 749   2, 58  |             and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive ~
 750   2, 58  |       Wherefore there can be no moral virtue ~without prudence: and consequently
 751   2, 58  |       understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we
 752   2, 58  |              the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and ~consequently
 753   2, 58  |             perfected by intellectual virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 754   2, 58  |              inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of ~beginning
 755   2, 58  |               a kind of ~beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue.
 756   2, 58  |            virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this ~
 757   2, 58  |          consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as
 758   2, 58  |            intellectual without moral virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 759   2, 58  |           intellectual without moral ~virtue. Because perfection of what
 760   2, 58  |                Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of
 761   2, 58  |              does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of
 762   2, 58  |             can be without the moral ~virtue, although of all the intellectual
 763   2, 58  |               Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" ~(
 764   2, 58  |       prudence can be without a moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 765   2, 58  |             directly opposed to moral virtue; ~and yet it is not opposed
 766   2, 58  |             that can be without moral virtue. ~Now it is contrary to
 767   2, 58  |               cannot be without moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 768   2, 58  |             cannot, be ~without moral virtue. The reason for this is
 769   2, 58  |                This is done ~by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges
 770   2, 58  |           judges aright of the end of virtue, ~because "such a man is,
 771   2, 58  |            requires man to have moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[
 772   2, 58  |               art does not ~require a virtue perfecting the appetite,
 773   2, 58  |             and this is done by moral virtue.~
 774   2, 59  |             Out. Para. 1/1 - OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (
 775   2, 59  |               difference of one moral virtue from another. ~And since
 776   2, 59  |         consider (1) the ~relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different
 777   2, 59  |              different kinds of moral virtue in ~relation to the passions.
 778   2, 59  |            inquiry:~(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?~(2) Whether
 779   2, 59  |            Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?~(3) Whether
 780   2, 59  |              is compatible with moral virtue? ~(4) Whether every moral
 781   2, 59  |                4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?~(5)
 782   2, 59  |            Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?~Aquin.:
 783   2, 59  |               Para. 1/1~Whether moral virtue is a passion?~Aquin.: SMT
 784   2, 59  |              It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the
 785   2, 59  |               the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two ~passions.
 786   2, 59  |             passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.~Aquin.: SMT
 787   2, 59  |             Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary
 788   2, 59  |               hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in
 789   2, 59  |              a passion may be a moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
 790   2, 59  |              1/1~I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This
 791   2, 59  |             22], A[3]): whereas moral virtue is not a ~movement, but
 792   2, 59  |         nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable
 793   2, 59  |           sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to ~good alone,
 794   2, 59  |           other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it ~
 795   2, 59  |               the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) ~states that
 796   2, 59  |              1 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Virtue is a mean between passions,
 797   2, 59  |               concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a passion ~
 798   2, 59  |               3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue,
 799   2, 59  |              a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so ~far as "that movement
 800   2, 59  |              this sense, from being a virtue. The ~same applies to similar
 801   2, 59  |            Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?~Aquin.: SMT
 802   2, 59  |              It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion.
 803   2, 59  |             Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of
 804   2, 59  |             vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue is a kind of ~health of
 805   2, 59  |              passion ~compatible with virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
 806   2, 59  |               1~OBJ 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of
 807   2, 59  |               incompatible with moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
 808   2, 59  |               incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral ~virtue
 809   2, 59  |              virtue. Therefore moral ~virtue does not exclude the passions,
 810   2, 59  |            are compatible with moral ~virtue, if they be reduced to the
 811   2, 59  |               3) that "some ~describe virtue as being a kind of freedom
 812   2, 59  |                they ~should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "
 813   2, 59  |                were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects
 814   2, 59  |             ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion.
 815   2, 59  |              is compatible with moral virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
 816   2, 59  |           sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because ~the virtues are
 817   2, 59  |           sorrow is incompatible with virtue ~also.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
 818   2, 59  |           works is incompatible ~with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible
 819   2, 59  |           sorrow is incompatible with virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
 820   2, 59  |             mind is incompatible with virtue, which ~is a good condition
 821   2, 59  |        Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue ~and is incompatible with
 822   2, 59  |       contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in ~
 823   2, 59  |             sorrow is compatible with virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
 824   2, 59  |           just ~as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no
 825   2, 59  |             is compatible ~with moral virtue in the same way as the other
 826   2, 59  |               may be ~consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind
 827   2, 59  |              it is ~incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable.
 828   2, 59  |          dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive ~appetite
 829   2, 59  |              sorrowful, is a ~mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher
 830   2, 59  |              for things pertaining to virtue is ~incompatible with virtue:
 831   2, 59  |          virtue is ~incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in
 832   2, 59  |       incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On
 833   2, 59  |              own. On the other ~hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all
 834   2, 59  |       moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter ~how.~Aquin.:
 835   2, 59  |             Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about ~objects of pleasure
 836   2, 59  |                 Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.~Aquin.:
 837   2, 59  |               be found in every moral virtue: and ~so either all are
 838   2, 59  |             Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the ~passions;
 839   2, 59  |              1/1~I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive
 840   2, 59  |               man rejoices in acts of virtue, and ~sorrows for the contrary.
 841   2, 59  |           sorrow, so that in this way virtue is ~about pleasures and
 842   2, 59  |          something that results from ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
 843   2, 59  |            Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?~Aquin.:
 844   2, 59  |              It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion.
 845   2, 59  |               the ~more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome
 846   2, 59  |              sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rm. 7:5) they are ~
 847   2, 59  |              sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without ~passion.~
 848   2, 59  |              OBJ 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to
 849   2, 59  |            Therefore the most perfect virtue is ~without any passion.~
 850   2, 59  |            that in this sense perfect virtue is ~without the passions.
 851   2, 59  |               would follow that moral virtue ~makes the sensitive appetite
 852   2, 59  |               is not the ~function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate
 853   2, 59  |               acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily ~limbs
 854   2, 59  |              without passions. Such a virtue is justice: ~because it
 855   2, 59  |          overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause
 856   2, 59  |              1 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion;
 857   2, 60  |               there is only one moral virtue?~(2) Whether those moral
 858   2, 60  |        Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?~(4) Whether
 859   2, 60  |               there is only one moral virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[
 860   2, 60  |               there is only one moral virtue. Because just ~as the direction
 861   2, 60  |             is only one ~intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts,
 862   2, 60  |           there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their ~
 863   2, 60  |               the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing,
 864   2, 60  |               there is but one moral ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[
 865   2, 60  |             cannot be only one ~moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[
 866   2, 60  |        Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, ~
 867   2, 60  |              Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit ~
 868   2, 60  |               1]). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions
 869   2, 60  |             in a twofold relation to ~virtue. First, as its effects;
 870   2, 60  |               in this way every moral virtue has ~some good operations
 871   2, 60  |              may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about ~which
 872   2, 60  |               the matter about ~which virtue is concerned: and in this
 873   2, 60  |               in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about ~
 874   2, 60  |            another, that ~the good of virtue is overlooked by reason
 875   2, 60  |           destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in ~so far
 876   2, 60  |           operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider ~
 877   2, 60  |            effect. But in some cases ~virtue is chiefly about operations,
 878   2, 60  |               there is only one moral virtue about operations?~Aquin.:
 879   2, 60  |           that there is but one moral virtue about ~operations. Because
 880   2, 60  |                Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but ~
 881   2, 60  |           Therefore there is but ~one virtue about operations.~Aquin.:
 882   2, 60  |             save ~logically, from the virtue which directs a man's actions
 883   2, 60  |         contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both ~
 884   2, 60  |              so called is one special virtue, whose ~object is the perfect
 885   2, 60  |          sense it is not as a special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[
 886   2, 60  |            the common good is another virtue ~from that which is directed
 887   2, 60  |             ii) ~reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man
 888   2, 60  |             common good is a ~general virtue through its act of command:
 889   2, 60  |             name of ~justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically,
 890   2, 60  |          logical difference between a virtue that ~is active of itself,
 891   2, 60  |               active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the
 892   2, 60  |               the command of ~another virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[
 893   2, 60  |       Consequently, there is the same virtue of ~justice, especially
 894   2, 60  |      Therefore there is but one moral virtue ~about all the passions.~
 895   2, 60  |             since there is one moral ~virtue about contrary passions;
 896   2, 60  |                  Now there is but one virtue about ~all these three,
 897   2, 60  |               there is only one moral virtue ~about all the passions:
 898   2, 60  |          there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral ~virtue
 899   2, 60  |         virtue. Because, since moral ~virtue consists in a kind of mean,
 900   2, 60  |               for ~the unity of moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[
 901   2, 60  |       passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second ~nature,
 902   2, 60  |               they belong to the same virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[
 903   2, 60  |                belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore neither
 904   2, 60  |        diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is ~but one
 905   2, 60  |               there is ~but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure,
 906   2, 60  |             belong to one species of ~virtue: and for the same reason
 907   2, 60  |               others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according
 908   2, 60  |             Para. 1/1~OBJ 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it
 909   2, 60  |             that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas ~
 910   2, 60  |               of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions,
 911   2, 60  |    intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of ~"temperance." As regards
 912   2, 60  |            reason: hence there ~is no virtue corresponding to them; for
 913   2, 60  |            corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is about ~difficult
 914   2, 60  |             object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], ~
 915   2, 60  |          deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ~
 916   2, 60  |               this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he ~
 917   2, 60  |               Hence there is ~another virtue about the pleasures of games,
 918   2, 60  |            not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (
 919   2, 60  |                Hence there is but one virtue, ~meekness, for every form
 920   2, 60  |            anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, ~for all forms
 921   2, 60  |           difficulty, ~which requires virtue, even if it be not a great
 922   2, 61  |               division of the ~genus "virtue." Therefore none of them
 923   2, 61  |         answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood
 924   2, 61  |         understood to ~speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated
 925   2, 61  |               human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Q[56],
 926   2, 61  |        answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires ~rectitude
 927   2, 61  |               appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the ~faculty
 928   2, 61  |             the other ~hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers
 929   2, 61  |           imperfectly to the ~idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude
 930   2, 61  |            also something of ~a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (
 931   2, 61  |              Such ~is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue:
 932   2, 61  |          virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good ~defined
 933   2, 61  |         before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good,
 934   2, 61  |        prudence alone is a principal ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[
 935   2, 61  |          another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not
 936   2, 61  |               formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is
 937   2, 61  |           thus we have one principal ~virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly,
 938   2, 61  |             consider the subjects of ~virtue. For there are four subjects
 939   2, 61  |              are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. ~the
 940   2, 61  |            any be called a principal ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[
 941   2, 61  |             all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
 942   2, 61  |           above all to be a principal virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[
 943   2, 61  |               be reckoned a principal virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[
 944   2, 61  |             four formal principles of virtue as ~we understand it now.
 945   2, 61  |               that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason'
 946   2, 61  |             be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good ~of
 947   2, 61  |              be called justice; every virtue that curbs ~and represses
 948   2, 61  |          called temperance; and every virtue that ~strengthens the mind
 949   2, 61  |               so that prudence is the virtue which ~commands; justice,
 950   2, 61  |                commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions
 951   2, 61  |              equals; ~temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires
 952   2, 61  |             touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
 953   2, 61  |              necessary ~conditions of virtue are first of all "that a
 954   2, 61  |              fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is
 955   2, 61  |       Moreover, ~inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is directed to good
 956   2, 61  |              fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, ~it
 957   2, 61  |         evident that one and the same virtue is both ~habit, and virtue,
 958   2, 61  |            virtue is both ~habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.~Aquin.:
 959   2, 61  |          habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[
 960   2, 61  |             condition from which ~the virtue's name is taken as stated
 961   2, 61  |         certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they ~
 962   2, 61  |            four general conditions of virtue set down by the ~Philosopher,
 963   2, 61  |               such thing as "perfect" virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[
 964   2, 61  |             says: 'The ~four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first
 965   2, 61  |             in order to give birth to virtue: this something is ~God:
 966   2, 61  |   Consequently the exemplar of ~human virtue must needs pre-exist in
 967   2, 61  |               all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing ~
 968   2, 62  |              to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a
 969   2, 62  |            any habits ~of theological virtue, to direct the reason and
 970   2, 62  |             the Law are about acts of virtue. Now ~the Divine Law contains
 971   2, 62  |             that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby
 972   2, 62  |               which is a ~theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues
 973   2, 62  |           reckons ~as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things
 974   2, 62  |             human reason. Theological virtue, on the other ~hand, is
 975   2, 62  |               it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this
 976   2, 62  |        commonly so called, then each ~virtue is stated to be the order
 977   2, 62  |              so far as each cardinal ~virtue requires ordinate emotions;
 978   2, 62  |             not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially:
 979   2, 62  |              there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding
 980   2, 62  |         should be but one theological virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[
 981   2, 62  |              is something less than a virtue, since it is ~imperfect
 982   2, 62  |              is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion.
 983   2, 62  |               short of the notion ~of virtue. But faith and hope in things
 984   2, 62  |              human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to
 985   2, 63  |               of inquiry:~(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?~(2)
 986   2, 63  |               nature?~(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?~(
 987   2, 63  |              by infusion?~(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation,
 988   2, 63  |              same species as ~infused virtue?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[
 989   2, 63  |               Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether virtue is in us by nature? ~Aquin.:
 990   2, 63  |             OBJ 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For
 991   2, 63  |              man's nature. Therefore ~virtue is in man by nature.~Aquin.:
 992   2, 63  |             mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature.~Aquin.:
 993   2, 63  |            states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is ~
 994   2, 63  |             hindrances to science and virtue, ~which are due to the soul
 995   2, 63  |                4/6~In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively.
 996   2, 63  |              constitute the sphere of virtue's ~action, and according
 997   2, 63  |                about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature,
 998   2, 63  |               another for some ~other virtue.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[
 999   2, 63  |           Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?~
1000   2, 63  |              of the truth is lacking, virtue is a ~mockery even in the