1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-2000 | 2001-2500 | 2501-3000 | 3001-3500 | 3501-4000 | 4001-4500 | 4501-4737
Part, Question
2001 2, 27 | God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which
2002 2, 27 | it is accounted a special virtue. ~On the other hand joy
2003 2, 27 | that might ~cause a special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[
2004 2, 28 | 4) Whether peace is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[
2005 2, 28 | 1/1~Whether peace is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[
2006 2, 28 | would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter
2007 2, 28 | unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts
2008 2, 28 | Therefore ~peace is a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[
2009 2, 28 | merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is ~meritorious
2010 2, 28 | Therefore ~peace is a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[
2011 2, 28 | Therefore ~peace is a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[
2012 2, 28 | Para. 1/1~On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but
2013 2, 28 | Therefore peace is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[
2014 2, 28 | all ~arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a
2015 2, 28 | nor do they each have a virtue from which ~they proceed,
2016 2, 28 | A[3]), there is no other virtue except ~charity whose proper
2017 2, 28 | which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated ~above (FS, Q[
2018 2, 28 | vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its ~various
2019 2, 28 | either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only
2020 2, 28 | mercy stands only for ~the virtue.]~We must now go on to consider
2021 2, 28 | 3) Whether mercy is a virtue?~(4) Whether it is the greatest
2022 2, 28 | 1/1~Whether mercy is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2023 2, 28 | seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of ~
2024 2, 28 | For the chief part of ~virtue is choice as the Philosopher
2025 2, 28 | counsel cannot be called a virtue. But mercy ~hinders counsel,
2026 2, 28 | Therefore mercy is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2027 2, 28 | Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis ~
2028 2, 28 | Therefore mercy is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2029 2, 28 | mercy is not a special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2030 2, 28 | is not ~an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God
2031 2, 28 | neither ~is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral
2032 2, 28 | Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because ~neither is it
2033 2, 28 | Therefore mercy is not a ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2034 2, 28 | Therefore mercy is a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2035 2, 28 | which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas,
2036 2, 28 | it is essential to human virtue that the movements ~of the
2037 2, 28 | follows that mercy is a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2038 2, 28 | do not require any other virtue ~besides charity. But mercy
2039 2, 28 | Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having ~
2040 2, 28 | as a virtue, is a moral virtue having ~relation to the
2041 2, 28 | assume ~the character of a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2042 2, 28 | Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[
2043 2, 28 | of life embraces ~every virtue. Therefore the sum total
2044 2, 28 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its
2045 2, 28 | Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like God, the ~
2046 2, 28 | God, the ~better is that virtue: since man is the better
2047 2, 28 | Para. 1/2~I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of others
2048 2, 28 | mercy is not the greatest ~virtue, unless that subject be
2049 2, 29 | beneficence is a special virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[
2050 2, 29 | will belong to some special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[
2051 2, 29 | good ~to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to
2052 2, 29 | require: because all acts of virtue must be modified with ~a
2053 2, 29 | I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature,
2054 2, 29 | beneficence is a special virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[
2055 2, 29 | beneficence is a special virtue. For precepts ~are directed
2056 2, 29 | precepts ~are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose
2057 2, 29 | Therefore beneficence is a ~virtue distinct from charity.~Aquin.:
2058 2, 29 | beneficence is a ~special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[
2059 2, 29 | beneficence is a distinct virtue ~from charity.~Aquin.: SMT
2060 2, 29 | goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither ~
2061 2, 29 | beneficence is not a distinct ~virtue from charity, but denotes
2062 2, 29 | habits but about acts of ~virtue: wherefore distinction of
2063 2, 30 | External acts belong to that virtue which regards the ~motive
2064 2, 30 | 2~Reply OBJ 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways:
2065 2, 30 | just; and such an act ~of virtue can be without the virtue,
2066 2, 30 | virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having
2067 2, 30 | delight, and ~such an act of virtue cannot be without the virtue.~
2068 2, 30 | virtue cannot be without the virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[
2069 2, 30 | proper elicited act of one virtue being ~commanded by another
2070 2, 30 | being ~commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing
2071 2, 30 | directing it to this ~other virtue's end. It is in this way
2072 2, 30 | does not detract ~from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (
2073 2, 30 | precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all ~almsgiving
2074 2, 30 | far as it is necessary to ~virtue, namely, in so far as it
2075 2, 31 | But ~justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore
2076 2, 31 | do not belong to the same virtue. Now it ~is an act of charity
2077 2, 31 | as the ~contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity
2078 2, 31 | justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further
2079 2, 31 | directed to the end of some virtue, such as ~temperance or
2080 2, 31 | action belongs chiefly to the virtue to ~whose end it is directed.
2081 2, 31 | an act of charity, which virtue commands it, so to speak,
2082 2, 31 | precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful ~acts are evil
2083 2, 31 | the other hand, acts of virtue ~must not be done anyhow,
2084 2, 31 | this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a ~circumstance
2085 2, 31 | takes away the ~good of virtue, such an act is contrary
2086 2, 31 | such as not to destroy the ~virtue altogether, though it does
2087 2, 31 | perfectly attain the good of ~virtue, it is not against a precept.
2088 2, 31 | is not contrary to ~the virtue, whereas if we depart much
2089 2, 31 | depart much from the mean virtue is destroyed ~in its act.
2090 2, 31 | in a life of goodness and virtue, this does not ~seem to
2091 2, 31 | Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows the ~
2092 2, 31 | far as ~it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous
2093 2, 32 | thing in the downfall of virtue ~resulting from vice: and
2094 2, 32 | Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of a thing ~consists in
2095 2, 33 | not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth should ~
2096 2, 33 | general kind of object, which ~virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it
2097 2, 33 | not constitute a special virtue or ~vice, unless it be determined
2098 2, 33 | spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said
2099 2, 33 | are in the acts of each virtue are ~directed to one spiritual
2100 2, 33 | which ~there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it
2101 2, 33 | Hence it is proper to each ~virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual
2102 2, 33 | which is in each act of ~virtue, belongs, not to any special
2103 2, 33 | forces him to do acts of ~virtue that he is not bound to
2104 2, 34 | sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is ~contrary,
2105 2, 34 | envy is ~contrary, not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which
2106 2, 34 | the latter. Now pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to ~
2107 2, 37 | charity, ~which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief
2108 2, 38 | is contrary to an act of virtue. ~But war is contrary to
2109 2, 38 | 2) every power, art or ~virtue that regards the end, has
2110 2, 39 | a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their public authority, ~
2111 2, 41 | the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin opposed
2112 2, 41 | is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is
2113 2, 41 | opposition to a special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[
2114 2, 42 | the mode on all acts of virtue, since it is the form of ~
2115 2, 42 | about the other acts of virtue: for instance, this precept, ~"
2116 2, 42 | the Law are directed to virtue, as stated ~above (A[1],
2117 2, 42 | 3]). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (Q[33], ~
2118 2, 42 | Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one
2119 2, 42 | are given ~about acts of virtue, and so there had to be
2120 2, 42 | are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished
2121 2, 42 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing
2122 2, 42 | are given about acts of virtue, an act is ~a matter of
2123 2, 42 | according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is ~requisite for
2124 2, 42 | requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it
2125 2, 42 | that prescribes an act of virtue does not ~prescribe the
2126 2, 42 | prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
2127 2, 42 | from another and higher ~virtue, but it does prescribe the
2128 2, 42 | belongs to its own proper ~virtue, and this mode is signified
2129 2, 42 | fortitudine tua" (Dt.), ~"ex tota virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus
2130 2, 42 | essential ~to an act of virtue comes under the precept
2131 2, 42 | charity is essential to the virtue, since ~it is based on the
2132 2, 43 | above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is directed to the good ~
2133 2, 43 | which is ~an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural
2134 2, 43 | faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Q[4], ~
2135 2, 43 | wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.~Aquin.:
2136 2, 43 | an acquired intellectual virtue, for the ~latter is attained
2137 2, 43 | that is an intellectual virtue to ~pronounce right judgment
2138 2, 43 | which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual
2139 2, 43 | wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, ~is merely speculative.
2140 2, 43 | Reply OBJ 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number
2141 2, 43 | wisdom as an ~intellectual virtue, since it attains to God
2142 2, 45 | singulars?~(4) Whether it is virtue?~(5) Whether it is a special
2143 2, 45 | Whether it is a special virtue?~(6) Whether it appoints
2144 2, 45 | 1~Whether prudence is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2145 2, 45 | seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says ~(De
2146 2, 45 | science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the ~Predicaments (
2147 2, 45 | Therefore prudence is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2148 2, 45 | 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there
2149 2, 45 | there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue ~
2150 2, 45 | virtue: but "there is a virtue ~of art," as the Philosopher
2151 2, 45 | wherefore art is not a ~virtue. Now there is prudence in
2152 2, 45 | Therefore prudence is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2153 2, 45 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence
2154 2, 45 | Therefore prudence is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2155 2, 45 | of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its ~
2156 2, 45 | less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to
2157 2, 45 | have more of the ~nature of virtue, because they consider the
2158 2, 45 | prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other ~intellectual
2159 2, 45 | Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because ~art does
2160 2, 45 | art, he needs to have a virtue which will ~rectify his
2161 2, 45 | Whether prudence is a special virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2162 2, 45 | prudence is not a special virtue. For no ~special virtue
2163 2, 45 | virtue. For no ~special virtue is included in the definition
2164 2, 45 | included in the definition of virtue in general, since ~virtue
2165 2, 45 | virtue in general, since ~virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "
2166 2, 45 | prudence is not a special virtue. ~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2167 2, 45 | that "the effect of ~moral virtue is right action as regards
2168 2, 45 | the means." Now in every virtue certain things ~have to
2169 2, 45 | Therefore prudence is in every ~virtue, and consequently is not
2170 2, 45 | consequently is not a special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2171 2, 45 | OBJ 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But
2172 2, 45 | vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence
2173 2, 45 | prudence is not a ~special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2174 2, 45 | habit, it ~must be a special virtue. Now an object is called
2175 2, 45 | power, ~wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that
2176 2, 45 | that prudence is a special ~virtue, distinct from all other
2177 2, 45 | This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral ~
2178 2, 45 | in general, but of moral ~virtue, the definition of which
2179 2, 45 | includes an intellectual ~virtue, viz., prudence, which has
2180 2, 45 | matter in common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject
2181 2, 45 | as the subject of moral virtue is something that ~partakes
2182 2, 45 | partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of virtue,
2183 2, 45 | virtue has the aspect of virtue, in so far ~as it partakes
2184 2, 45 | partakes of intellectual virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2185 2, 45 | that it is ~not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a
2186 2, 45 | the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, ~it
2187 2, 45 | stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to ~the appetite.
2188 2, 45 | Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is ~
2189 2, 45 | Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue ~ensures the rectitude of
2190 2, 45 | Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity ~pre-exist
2191 2, 45 | mean" belongs to moral ~virtue by reason of itself, as
2192 2, 45 | manner of reason. But moral ~virtue tends to the mean after
2193 2, 45 | Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second
2194 2, 45 | foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5], ~OBJ[1]) it is stated
2195 2, 45 | proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely ~in conformity
2196 2, 45 | mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is ~found
2197 2, 45 | of the mean to belong to virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2198 2, 45 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature
2199 2, 45 | since it is ~an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is
2200 2, 45 | says ~(Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good
2201 2, 45 | speaking there of moral virtue. Now just ~as every moral
2202 2, 45 | Now just ~as every moral virtue that is directed to the
2203 2, 45 | simply so called to moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[
2204 2, 45 | says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is the ~same in a good man
2205 2, 45 | Since then ~prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems
2206 2, 45 | obey well," wherefore the ~virtue of a good man includes also
2207 2, 45 | of a good ruler. Yet the virtue ~of the ruler and of the
2208 2, 45 | specifically, even as the virtue ~of a man and of a woman,
2209 2, 45 | prudence alone is ~the virtue proper to a ruler, while
2210 2, 45 | of the subject is not a virtue but a true ~opinion."~Aquin.:
2211 2, 45 | Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, ~nor
2212 2, 45 | that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such. ~Aquin.:
2213 2, 45 | faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But ~there
2214 2, 45 | through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the ~appetite:
2215 2, 45 | hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (A[4]),
2216 2, 45 | 1) that "intellectual ~virtue is both originated and fostered
2217 2, 45 | prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated ~above (A[4]).
2218 2, 45 | process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now the ~engendering of
2219 2, 46 | parts can be assigned to a ~virtue in three ways. First, in
2220 2, 46 | for the perfect act of a virtue, are called ~the parts of
2221 2, 46 | called ~the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all
2222 2, 46 | prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, "memory," "reasoning," ~"
2223 2, 46 | The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species.
2224 2, 46 | The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected
2225 2, 46 | whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of ~
2226 2, 47 | 1) that ~"intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered
2227 2, 47 | other. But ~intellectual virtue is divided into understanding
2228 2, 47 | 8). But ~prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is
2229 2, 47 | which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we ~know naturally
2230 2, 47 | condition of every intellectual ~virtue, should not be appropriated
2231 2, 47 | requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not
2232 2, 47 | which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, ~since
2233 2, 47 | useful for every intellectual virtue, ~yet it belongs to prudence
2234 2, 47 | no ~man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (
2235 2, 47 | guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance
2236 2, 47 | the hindrance of acts of ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[
2237 2, 47 | both belong to ~the one virtue of prudence.~Aquin.: SMT
2238 2, 48 | 11) that "prudence is ~a virtue which is proper to the prince."
2239 2, 48 | matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence ~as their
2240 2, 48 | the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (Q[47],
2241 2, 48 | forms which are opposed to ~virtue, and which, accordingly,
2242 2, 48 | such diversity one act of virtue is ~principal as compared
2243 2, 49 | Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?~(2) Whether it is a special
2244 2, 49 | Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?~(
2245 2, 49 | Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?~(4) Whether {gnome} is
2246 2, 49 | Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?~[*These three Greek words
2247 2, 49 | deliberating well) is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2248 2, 49 | deliberating well) is not a ~virtue. For, according to Augustine (
2249 2, 49 | no man ~makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use
2250 2, 49 | deliberating well) is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2251 2, 49 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according
2252 2, 49 | deliberating well) is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2253 2, 49 | deliberating well) is ~not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2254 2, 49 | Now the perfection of ~virtue consists in right reason.
2255 2, 49 | deliberating well) ~is a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2256 2, 49 | the nature of a human ~virtue consists in making a human
2257 2, 49 | deliberating well) is a human virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2258 2, 49 | 2~Reply OBJ 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection,
2259 2, 49 | whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For ~
2260 2, 49 | also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according
2261 2, 49 | directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does
2262 2, 49 | deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from ~prudence?~
2263 2, 49 | well) is not a ~distinct virtue from prudence. For, according
2264 2, 49 | well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.~Aquin.: SMT
2265 2, 49 | these belong to the same ~virtue in practical matters. Now
2266 2, 49 | well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.~Aquin.: SMT
2267 2, 49 | deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.~Aquin.: SMT
2268 2, 49 | As stated above (A[1]), virtue is properly directed to ~
2269 2, 49 | would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of ~love,
2270 2, 49 | these belong to ~the same virtue of charity.~Aquin.: SMT
2271 2, 49 | must ~needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes
2272 2, 49 | prudence as to a ~principal virtue, without which it would
2273 2, 49 | without which it would be no virtue at all, even as ~neither
2274 2, 49 | well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, ~but that
2275 2, 49 | secondary to a principal virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2276 2, 49 | according to common law) is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2277 2, 49 | that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are not in ~us
2278 2, 49 | to common ~law) is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2279 2, 49 | in the wicked. Since then virtue is ~only in the good, it
2280 2, 49 | to ~common law) is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2281 2, 49 | common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, ~
2282 2, 49 | is no need for any other virtue directed to good ~command:
2283 2, 49 | to common law) is ~not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2284 2, 49 | or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {
2285 2, 49 | according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.~
2286 2, 49 | hand, those who lack this ~virtue are called {asynetoi}, i.e. "
2287 2, 49 | deliberating ~well), for another virtue, which judges well, and
2288 2, 49 | this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through ~
2289 2, 49 | thus a good judgment of ~virtue results from the habits
2290 2, 49 | from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is ~about
2291 2, 49 | inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges ~aright there
2292 2, 49 | of a final and principal virtue, which ~commands aright,
2293 2, 49 | general law) is a special ~virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2294 2, 49 | general ~law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (
2295 2, 49 | consequently there is no other virtue of good ~judgment called {
2296 2, 49 | Now ~there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia} (
2297 2, 49 | deliberating ~well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence.
2298 2, 49 | Therefore there ~is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {
2299 2, 49 | there is no ~intellectual virtue about such matters.~Aquin.:
2300 2, 49 | general law) is a special virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[
2301 2, 49 | necessary to have a ~higher virtue of judgment, which is called {
2302 2, 50 | sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence, ~or even of {
2303 2, 50 | counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?~Aquin.: SMT
2304 2, 50 | fittingly ~correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest
2305 2, 50 | gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a ~thing
2306 2, 50 | does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.~Aquin.: SMT
2307 2, 50 | does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.~Aquin.: SMT
2308 2, 50 | then, God causes in us ~virtue and knowledge, not only
2309 2, 50 | beatitudes are ~acts of virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[
2310 2, 50 | counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude
2311 2, 50 | resulting from perfect acts of virtue. Now none ~of the fruits
2312 2, 50 | directs in all the acts of virtue, it does ~so in a special
2313 2, 51 | are vices opposed to every virtue, not ~only vices that are
2314 2, 51 | in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is ~opposed
2315 2, 51 | but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence ~
2316 2, 51 | prudence or of any other virtue is ~included in the lack
2317 2, 51 | Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original
2318 2, 51 | of the circumstances of ~virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (
2319 2, 51 | Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too
2320 2, 51 | neither is prudence a ~general virtue: since it is concerned with
2321 2, 51 | Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas ~precipitation
2322 2, 51 | gift of counsel and to ~the virtue of prudence; albeit in different
2323 2, 51 | and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction
2324 2, 52 | special sin?~(2) To which virtue is it opposed?~(3) Whether
2325 2, 52 | diligence is required in every ~virtue. Therefore negligence is
2326 2, 52 | is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special ~
2327 2, 52 | solicitude, is required for every virtue, ~in so far as due acts
2328 2, 52 | are requisite for every virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[
2329 2, 52 | excluded by the opposite virtue. ~Therefore negligence is
2330 2, 53 | prudence is ~shared by every virtue. But it does not follow
2331 2, 54 | a ~precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts
2332 2, 54 | justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object ~under
2333 2, 54 | for prescribing an act of ~virtue as for prohibiting the act
2334 2, 55 | by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore right is not
2335 2, 55 | which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper ~
2336 2, 56 | another?~(3) Whether it is a virtue?~(4) Whether it is in the
2337 2, 56 | Whether it is a general virtue?~(6) Whether, as a general
2338 2, 56 | 6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same
2339 2, 56 | essentially the same as every ~virtue?~(7) Whether there is a
2340 2, 56 | aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the ~
2341 2, 56 | principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by
2342 2, 56 | the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper ~matter
2343 2, 56 | dealings there is a special virtue, and this ~is justice.~Aquin.:
2344 2, 56 | 1/1~Whether justice is a virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2345 2, 56 | seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written ~(Lk.
2346 2, 56 | Therefore justice is not a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2347 2, 56 | Therefore justice is not a virtue. ~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2348 2, 56 | 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action.
2349 2, 56 | justice is not a ~moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2350 2, 56 | 1~I answer that, A human virtue is one "which renders a
2351 2, 56 | Officiis i, 7) "the ~luster of virtue appears above all in justice."~
2352 2, 56 | unable to achieve the end of virtue without ~doing some particular
2353 2, 56 | justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not ~directed
2354 2, 56 | follows that it is a moral virtue. ~Now the subject of moral
2355 2, 56 | Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "
2356 2, 56 | answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that ~
2357 2, 56 | the power whose act that ~virtue aims at rectifying. Now
2358 2, 56 | be the ~subject of moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2359 2, 56 | Whether justice is a general virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2360 2, 56 | justice is not a general virtue. For justice ~is specified
2361 2, 56 | justice is not a general virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2362 2, 56 | is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are ~temperance and
2363 2, 56 | reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should
2364 2, 56 | way be reckoned a general virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2365 2, 56 | neither is justice a general virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2366 2, 56 | that "justice is ~every virtue."~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2367 2, 56 | therefore that the good of any virtue, ~whether such virtue direct
2368 2, 56 | any virtue, ~whether such virtue direct man in relation to
2369 2, 56 | directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, ~
2370 2, 56 | justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to
2371 2, 56 | general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further
2372 2, 56 | justice can be a general virtue ~rather than temperance
2373 2, 56 | may be called a general virtue: and ~in like manner injustice
2374 2, 56 | Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same
2375 2, 56 | essentially the same as all ~virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2376 2, 56 | that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially ~the same
2377 2, 56 | essentially ~the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (
2378 2, 56 | says (Ethic. v, 1) that ~"virtue and legal justice are the
2379 2, 56 | justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their ~mode
2380 2, 56 | essentially the ~same as every virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2381 2, 56 | 1~OBJ 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially
2382 2, 56 | essentially the same as all ~virtue is a part of virtue. Now
2383 2, 56 | all ~virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice,
2384 2, 56 | a part but the whole of virtue." ~Therefore the aforesaid
2385 2, 56 | essentially the same as all virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2386 2, 56 | Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through
2387 2, 56 | not change through that ~virtue directing its act to some
2388 2, 56 | justice is essentially all virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2389 2, 56 | which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. ~Therefore
2390 2, 56 | there can be no act of any virtue, that does not ~belong to
2391 2, 56 | essentially the same as all virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2392 2, 56 | Polit. iii, 2) that "the ~virtue of the good man is not strictly
2393 2, 56 | strictly the same as the virtue of the good ~citizen." Now
2394 2, 56 | good ~citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general
2395 2, 56 | justice is not the ~same as virtue in general, and it is possible
2396 2, 56 | is said to be a general virtue, ~in as much, to wit, as
2397 2, 56 | may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs ~
2398 2, 56 | proper ~object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence,
2399 2, 56 | legal ~justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence,
2400 2, 56 | justice can be given to every virtue, in so ~far as every virtue
2401 2, 56 | virtue, in so ~far as every virtue is directed to the common
2402 2, 56 | essentially the same as ~all virtue, but differs therefrom logically:
2403 2, 56 | takes legal justice for the virtue ~commanded by legal justice.~
2404 2, 56 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs
2405 2, 56 | directs its act to that ~virtue's proper end: that it should
2406 2, 56 | does not belong to that virtue considered ~strictly, for
2407 2, 56 | for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end. ~
2408 2, 56 | there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from ~
2409 2, 56 | distinct from ~every other virtue, which directs all the virtues
2410 2, 56 | the common good; and ~this virtue is legal justice.~Aquin.:
2411 2, 56 | Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according
2412 2, 56 | signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue ~
2413 2, 56 | virtue, or the particular virtue ~which is opposed to covetousness."~
2414 2, 56 | essentially ~the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice
2415 2, 56 | is the matter of ~moral virtue, for this is defined in
2416 2, 56 | the entire matter of moral virtue, ~but only about external
2417 2, 56 | certain general modes of virtue. In this ~latter sense Augustine
2418 2, 56 | Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and ~pain."
2419 2, 56 | Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is ~about the passions.~
2420 2, 56 | Reply OBJ 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain
2421 2, 56 | daring: but every moral ~virtue is directed to pleasure
2422 2, 56 | each species. Now moral virtue is ~defined (Ethic. ii,
2423 2, 56 | the conditions of a moral virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2424 2, 56 | Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary ~virtues,
2425 2, 56 | justice as ~to their principal virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2426 2, 56 | liberality is a greater virtue than justice.~Aquin.: SMT
2427 2, 56 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "
2428 2, 56 | to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good
2429 2, 56 | consideration the good of his own virtue, ~while the just man gives
2430 2, 56 | justice it would not even be a virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[
2431 2, 57 | Whether injustice is a special virtue?~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[
2432 2, 57 | But justice is a ~special virtue. Therefore injustice is
2433 2, 57 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation
2434 2, 58 | spiritual chiefly by the virtue of ~charity, which "is poured
2435 2, 58 | Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper ~
2436 2, 58 | things. The first is the virtue ~itself that pronounces
2437 2, 58 | pronounces judgment ~through the virtue of prudence conformably
2438 2, 58 | justice than to any other ~virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[
2439 2, 58 | executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which ~
2440 2, 59 | change the species of a ~virtue. Now commutative justice
2441 2, 59 | Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the ~
2442 2, 59 | reason. Since, then, one ~virtue has one form, it seems that
2443 2, 59 | is gauged ~according to virtue, in an oligarchy according
2444 2, 59 | matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the ~case of fortitude
2445 2, 59 | comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.~Aquin.: SMT
2446 2, 60 | when he is ~obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so:
2447 2, 60 | restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. Now ~time
2448 2, 60 | determinate for acts of virtue, but are ~determinable according
2449 2, 60 | circumstance is contrary to ~virtue that circumstance must be
2450 2, 61 | nothing but sin is ~opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of
2451 2, 61 | person in recognition of his virtue," as the ~Philosopher states (
2452 2, 61 | recognize him as having virtue, ~wherefore virtue alone
2453 2, 61 | having virtue, ~wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of
2454 2, 61 | honored not only for his own ~virtue, but also for another's:
2455 2, 61 | because old age is a sign of virtue, ~though this sign fail
2456 2, 62 | cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person ~
2457 2, 62 | into effect by others in virtue of their ~authority.~Aquin.:
2458 2, 62 | the sake of the good of virtue, and that he ~may avoid
2459 2, 64 | robbery, than of internal virtue which is ~forfeit through
2460 2, 65 | his subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or ~
2461 2, 65 | judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power: ~wherefore
2462 2, 65 | other judges do not judge in virtue ~of their own power, so
2463 2, 65 | the judicial sentence, ~in virtue of his power, not as a private
2464 2, 66 | Church, who will proceed, in virtue ~of her office, to the correction
2465 2, 67 | law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue ~
2466 2, 67 | virtue from man, for such virtue ~belongs to few and cannot
2467 2, 67 | life, is an act of perfect ~virtue, since "death is the most
2468 2, 67 | who have no power save by virtue of the consent ~of the litigants.
2469 2, 68 | is ~not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only
2470 2, 69 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much"
2471 2, 70 | mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act
2472 2, 70 | railing is the act of a virtue, ~viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*
2473 2, 70 | prevented from progressing in virtue on account of our being
2474 2, 71 | mortal sin. For no act of ~virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to
2475 2, 71 | ad 3), is an act of the virtue of ~charity, whereby a man
2476 2, 73 | because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is
2477 2, 75 | whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to ~
2478 2, 75 | all that is ~contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it
2479 2, 75 | unpunished that is ~contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the
2480 2, 75 | more to know the road of virtue than to know ~the faults
2481 2, 75 | about matters pertaining to ~virtue, though one should not tell
2482 2, 75 | about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so bound ~in
2483 2, 75 | another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case. ~
2484 2, 75 | anything ~sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents
2485 2, 77 | For it belongs to every virtue to perform a good deed ~
2486 2, 77 | which is a special kind of virtue.~Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[
2487 2, 77 | palm." But any part ~of a virtue deserves the life and the
2488 2, 77 | general, it belongs to ~every virtue to do good and to avoid
2489 2, 77 | taken in the sense of ~"all virtue" [*Cf. Q[58], A[5]]. And
2490 2, 77 | considered as a special virtue regards good as ~due to
2491 2, 77 | parts of any other moral virtue, is that the other ~moral
2492 2, 77 | a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a. ~material
2493 2, 77 | is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.~Aquin.:
2494 2, 77 | as legal justice is "all virtue" (Q[58], A[5]) as ~regards
2495 2, 77 | is opposed to a special virtue. But it ~is not possible
2496 2, 77 | possible to assign any special virtue to which omission is ~opposed,
2497 2, 77 | because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and because ~
2498 2, 77 | as ~justice is a special virtue, as stated above (Q[58],
2499 2, 77 | non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only under the ~aspect
2500 2, 77 | on its remoteness from ~virtue. Now contrariety is the
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