1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-2000 | 2001-2500 | 2501-3000 | 3001-3419
Part, Question
1001 2, 18 | 2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute,
1002 2, 18 | an action is said to be evil in its species, not ~because
1003 2, 18 | constitute the species of an evil act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18]
1004 2, 18 | an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would
1005 2, 18 | would not make an action ~evil, except through being repugnant
1006 2, 18 | has the species of good or evil from its end?~Aquin.: SMT
1007 2, 18 | would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do ~
1008 2, 18 | Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do
1009 2, 18 | according ~to the good and evil which are from the end.~
1010 2, 18 | Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the ~
1011 2, 18 | end. Therefore good and evil in respect of ~the end diversify
1012 2, 18 | indifferent in its species. For ~evil is the privation of good,
1013 2, 18 | it were between good ~and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1014 2, 18 | human action is good or ~evil according to its species.
1015 2, 18 | complement of goodness; and evil, when it lacks that ~complement.
1016 2, 18 | be done with a good ~or evil mind, of which it is rash
1017 2, 18 | of ~reason, it will be an evil act according to its species;
1018 2, 18 | opposite habit. ~In this way evil is a privation of good,
1019 2, 18 | something between good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1020 2, 18 | prodigal ~disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that
1021 2, 18 | belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs ~to vice. But it
1022 2, 18 | But an idle word is an evil, because ~"men . . . shall
1023 2, 18 | individual it is good or evil. And the ~reason of this
1024 2, 18 | and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to
1025 2, 18 | cannot be directed to good or evil, either ~through its end
1026 2, 18 | Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly ~speaking, if
1027 2, 18 | men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all that
1028 2, 18 | of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice. ~Thus, if
1029 2, 18 | the species of good or ~evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1030 2, 18 | the species of good or evil. For the species of an action
1031 2, 18 | constitute a species of ~good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1032 2, 18 | in a species of good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1033 2, 18 | in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from
1034 2, 18 | in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance
1035 2, 18 | in a species of good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1036 2, 18 | circumstance relating to good or evil, ~specifies an action. For
1037 2, 18 | an action. For good and evil are specific differences
1038 2, 18 | greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil.
1039 2, 18 | evil, cannot make a greater evil. But if it ~has in itself
1040 2, 18 | the character of good or evil, for this very reason it
1041 2, 18 | certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance
1042 2, 18 | new species of good or ~evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1043 2, 18 | Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is caused ~by each single
1044 2, 18 | in a species of good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
1045 2, 18 | the species ~of good or evil to a moral action, in so
1046 2, 18 | reason in respect of good or evil, except on ~the supposition
1047 2, 18 | takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take something
1048 2, 18 | reason in respect ~of good or evil, except a certain other
1049 2, 18 | The same applies to other evil or good ~actions. Consequently
1050 2, 18 | be more or less good or evil, does not make the action
1051 2, 18 | the species ~of good or evil.~
1052 2, 19 | 6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring
1053 2, 19 | on the ~degree of good or evil in the intention?~(9) Whether
1054 2, 19 | to what is ~good: since "evil is outside the scope of
1055 2, 19 | I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences
1056 2, 19 | will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the
1057 2, 19 | false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing ~
1058 2, 19 | 5]). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the ~will
1059 2, 19 | always good, but sometimes evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
1060 2, 19 | 10], ad 2). But good and ~evil are specific differences
1061 2, 19 | will at that time. And then evil results, not from his ~willing
1062 2, 19 | 1/1~Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with
1063 2, 19 | seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance ~
1064 2, 19 | Therefore the will is not evil, ~if it be at variance with
1065 2, 19 | Consequently the will is ~not evil if it be at variance with
1066 2, 19 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some
1067 2, 19 | Therefore the will is not evil when it ~is at variance
1068 2, 19 | But every such will is evil; for ~it is written (Rm.
1069 2, 19 | Therefore the will is evil when it is at ~variance
1070 2, 19 | inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance ~
1071 2, 19 | are indifferent; some are ~evil generically. And they say
1072 2, 19 | to do something which is evil generically; since ~it is
1073 2, 19 | good and forbids what is ~evil. On the other hand if a
1074 2, 19 | by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what
1075 2, 19 | with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say
1076 2, 19 | errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or ~in forbidding
1077 2, 19 | reason or conscience is not evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
1078 2, 19 | reason or conscience, is evil in some way on ~account
1079 2, 19 | by reason as ~something evil to do or to avoid. And since
1080 2, 19 | proposed by the reason as being evil, the will ~by tending thereto
1081 2, 19 | tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not
1082 2, 19 | in those that are good or evil in ~themselves. For not
1083 2, 19 | receive the character of evil, or that which is evil,
1084 2, 19 | of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the ~character
1085 2, 19 | reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it ~as
1086 2, 19 | tends to it ~as to something evil. Consequently the will is
1087 2, 19 | Consequently the will is evil, because it wills ~evil,
1088 2, 19 | evil, because it wills ~evil, not indeed that which is
1089 2, 19 | not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which
1090 2, 19 | itself, but that which is evil ~accidentally, through being
1091 2, 19 | the reason as ~something evil, the will tends to it as
1092 2, 19 | tends to it as to something evil: not as if it ~were evil
1093 2, 19 | evil: not as if it ~were evil in itself, but because it
1094 2, 19 | itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the ~
1095 2, 19 | right or erring, is always evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
1096 2, 19 | apprehends something as evil, it apprehends ~it under
1097 2, 19 | it under some species of evil; for instance, as being
1098 2, 19 | like reason. ~And then that evil is reduced to that species
1099 2, 19 | which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with
1100 2, 19 | be good. But the will is evil when it is ~at variance
1101 2, 19 | 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with
1102 2, 19 | therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring ~
1103 2, 19 | that the will is always evil when in conjunction with ~
1104 2, 19 | who slew the apostles was evil. And ~yet it was in accord
1105 2, 19 | Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by erring ~
1106 2, 19 | And since moral good and evil consist in action in so ~
1107 2, 19 | character of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not
1108 2, 19 | conscience, from being ~evil. But if the error arise
1109 2, 19 | erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring
1110 2, 19 | by that ~erring reason is evil; since this error arises
1111 2, 19 | will is excused from being evil: because this error ~arises
1112 2, 19 | from the ~entire cause, evil from each particular defect."
1113 2, 19 | the will tends be called evil, it suffices, ~either that
1114 2, 19 | suffices, ~either that it be evil in itself, or that it be
1115 2, 19 | that it be apprehended as evil. But ~in order for it to
1116 2, 19 | because he can put aside his ~evil intention. In like manner,
1117 2, 19 | inexcusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the ~
1118 2, 19 | this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory ~
1119 2, 19 | Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do
1120 2, 19 | order to give ~alms, has an evil will, although he intends
1121 2, 19 | be said to be good, if an evil ~intention is the cause
1122 2, 19 | itself, under a ~species of evil; and therefore, as willed
1123 2, 19 | as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore ~his will is
1124 2, 19 | Wherefore ~his will is evil. If, however, the intention
1125 2, 19 | already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil results from ~each particular
1126 2, 19 | the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the
1127 2, 19 | good under the species of evil, it will be evil in ~either
1128 2, 19 | species of evil, it will be evil in ~either case. But in
1129 2, 19 | on the ~degree of good or evil in the intention?~Aquin.:
1130 2, 19 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion
1131 2, 19 | good, while the will is evil. ~Therefore, for the same
1132 2, 19 | suffices to make the will ~evil: and therefore too, the
1133 2, 19 | therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is evil. ~
1134 2, 19 | evil as the intention is evil. ~But the same reasoning
1135 2, 19 | the Divine will, has an ~evil will. Therefore whoever
1136 2, 19 | the thing willed, has an evil will.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19]
1137 2, 19 | according as it appears evil, is also good. ~Thus a judge
1138 2, 19 | as killing is a ~natural evil, is also good.~Aquin.: SMT
1139 2, 20 | action can be both good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1140 2, 20 | would seem that good and evil are in the external action
1141 2, 20 | alms. Therefore good and evil are ~in the external action,
1142 2, 20 | matter. Therefore good ~and evil are in the external action,
1143 2, 20 | Therefore moral good and evil ~are first in the will.~
1144 2, 20 | thing is said to be good or ~evil, from its relation to the
1145 2, 20 | vainglory ~is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the
1146 2, 20 | that this aspect of good or evil, which the external action ~
1147 2, 20 | tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil
1148 2, 20 | evil fruit, neither can an evil tree ~bring forth good fruit."
1149 2, 20 | and the external action evil, or ~vice versa.~Aquin.:
1150 2, 20 | 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking
1151 2, 20 | that ~for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices,
1152 2, 20 | good: and if the will be evil ~either by reason of its
1153 2, 20 | that the external action is evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1154 2, 20 | not only when he wills an evil end; ~but also when he wills
1155 2, 20 | but also when he wills an evil act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20]
1156 2, 20 | the difference of good and evil is ~applicable to both the
1157 2, 20 | or punished for ~doing evil." Now works are the witnesses
1158 2, 20 | just He is. But good or ~evil is to be estimated according
1159 2, 20 | to attain good and avoid evil. If ~therefore by the external
1160 2, 20 | he who has a good or an evil will, does a good ~deed
1161 2, 20 | deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.~
1162 2, 20 | good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly,
1163 2, 20 | something with a good or an evil end in view, and does not ~
1164 2, 20 | double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly,
1165 2, 20 | something for ~a good or an evil end, and is hindered by
1166 2, 20 | more lasting in good ~or evil, and in this respect, is
1167 2, 20 | the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it
1168 2, 20 | accomplishment ~of good or evil deeds, so neither does it
1169 2, 20 | involuntariness fail to do good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1170 2, 20 | make an action that was evil, ~to be good; nor one that
1171 2, 20 | one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man ~
1172 2, 20 | action can be both good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1173 2, 20 | action can be both ~good and evil. For "movement, if continuous,
1174 2, 20 | Christ's was; and ~the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore
1175 2, 20 | act can ~be both good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1176 2, 20 | therefore good: and from the ~evil will of the servant, and
1177 2, 20 | servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the same ~action
1178 2, 20 | action can be both good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1179 2, 20 | contraries. But ~good and evil are contraries. Therefore
1180 2, 20 | cannot be both ~good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1181 2, 20 | contraries. But ~good and evil are contraries. Therefore
1182 2, 20 | cannot be both ~good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1183 2, 20 | be morally both good and evil. Whereas if it be one as
1184 2, 20 | it can be both good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[
1185 2, 20 | be in one of them while evil is in the other.~Aquin.:
1186 2, 20 | s command. Wherefore the evil will of the ~servant does
1187 2, 20 | does not make the action evil in this respect.~
1188 2, 21 | reason of its being ~good or evil?~(2) Whether it thereby
1189 2, 21 | so far as it is good or ~evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1190 2, 21 | so far as ~it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins
1191 2, 21 | its being inordinate and evil. ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1192 2, 21 | that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this
1193 2, 21 | a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an action is ~
1194 2, 21 | sinful by reason of its being evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1195 2, 21 | sinful by reason of its being evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1196 2, 21 | Para. 1/2~I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than
1197 2, 21 | whatever subject, is an evil: ~whereas sin consists properly
1198 2, 21 | and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that ~every good action
1199 2, 21 | reason of its being ~good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1200 2, 21 | intended, because no voluntary evil action can be ~ordained
1201 2, 21 | reason of its being ~good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1202 2, 21 | reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in ~
1203 2, 21 | by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, ~consequently,
1204 2, 21 | in the fact that it is evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1205 2, 21 | says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and ~incapable."
1206 2, 21 | not incur guilt from being evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1207 2, 21 | actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human action
1208 2, 21 | blame, through being good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1209 2, 21 | 1~I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than
1210 2, 21 | it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions ~alone,
1211 2, 21 | and in such like actions, ~evil, sin and guilt are one and
1212 2, 21 | of ~human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure
1213 2, 21 | so far as it is ~good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1214 2, 21 | another person. But good or evil actions are not all related ~
1215 2, 21 | Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious
1216 2, 21 | his action to a good or ~evil purpose.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1217 2, 21 | and the same applies ~to evil. Now a good action is itself
1218 2, 21 | inordinate action is his evil. Therefore a man does not ~
1219 2, 21 | that he does a good or an evil deed.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21]
1220 2, 21 | Woe to the wicked ~unto evil; for the reward of his hands
1221 2, 21 | Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a ~
1222 2, 21 | therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, ~
1223 2, 21 | directly for the ~good or evil of the whole society, retribution
1224 2, 21 | therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or ~
1225 2, 21 | Reply OBJ 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained
1226 2, 21 | ordained to the ~good or evil of another individual, are
1227 2, 21 | ordained to the good ~or evil of another, i.e. the community.~
1228 2, 21 | OBJ 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself
1229 2, 21 | according as it is good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
1230 2, 21 | that man's actions, good or evil, are not ~meritorious or
1231 2, 21 | a man's action, good or evil, does no good or ~harm to
1232 2, 21 | a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or ~
1233 2, 21 | God's sight, by good or evil deeds.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
1234 2, 21 | Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or
1235 2, 21 | whether it be good or evil." Now ~judgment implies
1236 2, 21 | human action, both good and evil, acquires merit ~or demerit
1237 2, 21 | our actions, ~good and evil, acquire merit or demerit,
1238 2, 21 | Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to God,
1239 2, 22 | Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of the
1240 2, 22 | when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion
1241 2, 22 | when we think of good or evil."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[
1242 2, 23 | contrariety of good and evil?~(3) Whether there is any
1243 2, 23 | the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions ~
1244 2, 23 | power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, ~
1245 2, 23 | or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good
1246 2, 23 | in so far as such good or evil is more ~than our animal
1247 2, 23 | therefore this very ~good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an
1248 2, 23 | passions regard good ~or evil absolutely, belong to the
1249 2, 23 | obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The ~result
1250 2, 23 | good. The same applies to evil. And this ~power is the
1251 2, 23 | contrariety of good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[
1252 2, 23 | contrariety than that of good and evil. For the ~irascible passions
1253 2, 23 | other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love
1254 2, 23 | the appetite is good or evil. ~Therefore in no appetitive
1255 2, 23 | other than that of good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[
1256 2, 23 | from the ~apprehension of evil: since just as "good is
1257 2, 23 | desire" (Ethic. i, ~1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore,
1258 2, 23 | contrariety than that of good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[
1259 2, 23 | in respect of good ~and evil: because each regards some
1260 2, 23 | each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every ~contrariety
1261 2, 23 | passions is that of good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[
1262 2, 23 | objects, i.e. of good and evil; the ~other, according to
1263 2, 23 | is ~sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now
1264 2, 23 | manner, nothing ~desires evil, as such; but all things
1265 2, 23 | things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have ~the aspect
1266 2, 23 | concupiscible passion in respect of evil, ~tends from it, as hatred,
1267 2, 23 | faculty is sensible good ~or evil, considered not absolutely,
1268 2, 23 | like manner the arduous evil, considered as an ~evil,
1269 2, 23 | evil, considered as an ~evil, has the aspect of something
1270 2, 23 | escape being subject to evil; ~and this tendency is called "
1271 2, 23 | contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope ~and fear):
1272 2, 23 | soul has either good or evil for ~its object; for these
1273 2, 23 | contrary to a passion having ~evil for its object. Therefore
1274 2, 23 | contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by
1275 2, 23 | is caused by a ~difficult evil already present: and when
1276 2, 23 | present: and when such an evil is present, the ~appetite
1277 2, 23 | of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that
1278 2, 23 | withdrawal: because the evil is ~supposed to be already
1279 2, 23 | contrariety of good and ~evil. Because the opposite of
1280 2, 23 | the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which
1281 2, 23 | s passions are good and evil; and on this distinction ~
1282 2, 23 | withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference
1283 2, 23 | difference of good and ~evil; or from the difference
1284 2, 23 | force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion.
1285 2, 23 | hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be
1286 2, 23 | contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion"
1287 2, 23 | of which, in respect of evil, is ~"sorrow" or "sadness."~
1288 2, 23 | to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
1289 2, 23 | faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in ~respect
1290 2, 23 | despair." In ~respect of evil not yet present we have "
1291 2, 23 | stated above ~(A[3]). But evil already present gives rise
1292 2, 24 | Para. 1/1 - OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (
1293 2, 24 | must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul:
1294 2, 24 | Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions
1295 2, 24 | passion of the soul is morally evil?~(3) Whether every passion
1296 2, 24 | Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?~Aquin.: SMT
1297 2, 24 | 1~Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions
1298 2, 24 | soul is morally good or ~evil. For moral good and evil
1299 2, 24 | evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "
1300 2, 24 | soul is morally good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[
1301 2, 24 | 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being
1302 2, 24 | human, i.e. moral, good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[
1303 2, 24 | blamed for ~moral good and evil. Therefore the passions
1304 2, 24 | are not morally good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[
1305 2, 24 | passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good
1306 2, 24 | are evil if our love is evil; good if our ~love is good."~
1307 2, 24 | there is no moral good ~or evil in them, since this depends
1308 2, 24 | will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the ~
1309 2, 24 | members are ~morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary.
1310 2, 24 | called ~morally good or evil. And they are said to be
1311 2, 24 | every passion of the soul is evil morally?~Aquin.: SMT FS
1312 2, 24 | of the soul are morally evil. ~For Augustine says (De
1313 2, 24 | of the soul is morally ~evil. Therefore every passion
1314 2, 24 | every passion of the soul is evil morally.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1315 2, 24 | nature is sinful ~and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (
1316 2, 24 | these passions are morally evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[
1317 2, 24 | to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these ~passions lead
1318 2, 24 | seems that they are morally evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[
1319 2, 24 | held that all passions are evil, ~while the Peripatetics
1320 2, 24 | controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled ~
1321 2, 24 | when he says that "every evil, though moderate, should
1322 2, 24 | Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation
1323 2, 24 | does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion:
1324 2, 24 | passion of the soul is ~evil, they consequently held
1325 2, 24 | since the admixture of evil either destroys good ~altogether,
1326 2, 24 | A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment
1327 2, 24 | Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?~Aquin.:
1328 2, 24 | passion of the soul is good or evil morally ~according to its
1329 2, 24 | Because moral good and evil depend on reason. ~But the
1330 2, 24 | that no passion is good or evil ~according to its species.~
1331 2, 24 | any passion were good or evil, according to its species, ~
1332 2, 24 | the object of which is evil, are specifically evil,
1333 2, 24 | is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and ~sadness.
1334 2, 24 | Therefore no passion is good or evil ~according to its species.~
1335 2, 24 | of ~the soul is good or evil according to its species.~
1336 2, 24 | some passions are good or evil ~according to their species.~
1337 2, 24 | and thus moral ~good and evil have no connection with
1338 2, 24 | this way moral good and evil can belong to the ~species
1339 2, 24 | appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason ~are no longer
1340 2, 24 | from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those
1341 2, 24 | good, and a tendency to evil, are ~themselves evil.~Aquin.:
1342 2, 24 | to evil, are ~themselves evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[
1343 2, 25 | passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes ~between
1344 2, 25 | we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it
1345 2, 25 | good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry
1346 2, 25 | difficulty in shunning the evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[
1347 2, 25 | movement towards good or evil, and ~those concupiscible
1348 2, 25 | that denote rest in good or evil. And it is ~therefore evident
1349 2, 25 | I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible ~
1350 2, 25 | good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation
1351 2, 25 | naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of ~good. Wherefore
1352 2, 25 | the object of which is evil - that is to say, ~each
1353 2, 25 | for shunning the opposite evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[
1354 2, 25 | strive to overcome a contrary evil ~that threatens soon to
1355 2, 25 | pertains to daring; or an evil ~actually present, which
1356 2, 25 | strive to overcome a ~present evil, than a future evil. Therefore
1357 2, 25 | present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to
1358 2, 25 | whose ~object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness
1359 2, 25 | 4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the ~passion
1360 2, 25 | love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, ~
1361 2, 25 | precede those whose object is evil, ~viz. daring and fear:
1362 2, 25 | through being a movement ~from evil, precedes daring. And that
1363 2, 25 | the ~reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are
1364 2, 25 | object; its movement from evil ~results from this. For
1365 2, 25 | hope; while in respect of evil, it begins ~in hatred, goes
1366 2, 25 | sadness relates to present ~evil; hope regards future good,
1367 2, 25 | future good, and fear, future evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[
1368 2, 25 | passions that regard good or evil, present or future, ~they
1369 2, 25 | implies movement towards evil; and this too ~is accidental.
1370 2, 26 | to good things, love to evil ~things, as some have maintained,"
1371 2, 26 | not in respect of good and evil, ~but as stated. Yet in
1372 2, 26 | passion, inclines many to evil, is ~the reason why some
1373 2, 27 | loved. But it happens that evil ~also is loved, according
1374 2, 27 | Therefore it seems that evil is the cause ~of love.~Aquin.:
1375 2, 27 | 1 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Evil is never loved except under
1376 2, 27 | And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends ~
1377 2, 28 | reckons what is good or evil to his ~friend, as being
1378 2, 28 | the good or suffered the evil in the person of ~his friend.
1379 2, 28 | 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy ~[zelaveris]
1380 2, 28 | strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he
1381 2, 29 | of ~inquiry:~(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object
1382 2, 29 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether evil is the cause and object
1383 2, 29 | OBJ 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause
1384 2, 29 | such, is good. If therefore evil be the ~object of hatred,
1385 2, 29 | OBJ 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (
1386 2, 29 | Douay: ~'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing
1387 2, 29 | therefore, nothing but evil be the object ~of hatred,
1388 2, 29 | same time both good and ~evil. But the same thing is lovable
1389 2, 29 | Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.~Aquin.:
1390 2, 29 | the object ~of hatred is evil. ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[
1391 2, 29 | such, ~bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as
1392 2, 29 | the object of ~love, so evil is the object of hatred.~
1393 2, 29 | hateful to another, ~and is evil; though not in itself, but
1394 2, 29 | thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not ~truly
1395 2, 29 | whereas it is not ~truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes
1396 2, 29 | sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor ~love of good is good.~
1397 2, 29 | implies a ~turning away from evil, whereas love implies a
1398 2, 29 | contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing ~
1399 2, 29 | stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing ~except in
1400 2, 29 | the difference of good and evil. Therefore ~love is stronger
1401 2, 29 | means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to
1402 2, 29 | its movement in respect of evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[
1403 2, 29 | to whom we wish and work evil. But ~sometimes a man wishes
1404 2, 29 | sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who
1405 2, 29 | the aspect of good: for "evil is outside ~the scope of
1406 2, 29 | particular ~respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man
1407 2, 29 | a man accidentally wills evil ~to himself; and thus hates
1408 2, 29 | No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend ~
1409 2, 29 | the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, ~
1410 2, 29 | of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, ~and not in
1411 2, 30 | joy: in like ~manner, the evil we apprehend makes us fear,
1412 2, 30 | apprehend makes us fear, the evil that is present ~makes us
1413 2, 30 | and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in regard
1414 2, 30 | fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes ~by the
1415 2, 30 | covetousness. For a ~small good or evil is reckoned as though it
1416 2, 30 | appetite in future good or evil is ~called hope or fear,
1417 2, 30 | fear, which regard good and evil as arduous.~Aquin.: SMT
1418 2, 31 | which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ~
1419 2, 31 | vice versa - or from an evil temperament; ~thus some
1420 2, 31 | but "good is contrary to evil, ~and evil to good," as
1421 2, 31 | is contrary to evil, ~and evil to good," as stated in Praedic.
1422 2, 31 | understood of good ~and evil as applied to virtues and
1423 2, 32 | ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as ~something
1424 2, 32 | opposition to oneself, the evil action of an ~enemy becomes
1425 2, 32 | pleasant: whereas doing ~evil to another is not pleasant,
1426 2, 34 | Whether every pleasure is evil?~(2) If not, whether every
1427 2, 34 | judge of moral ~good and evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
1428 2, 34 | Whether every pleasure is evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
1429 2, 34 | seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which ~destroys
1430 2, 34 | use of reason, seems to be evil in ~itself: since man's
1431 2, 34 | Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently
1432 2, 34 | consequently every pleasure is ~evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
1433 2, 34 | virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be
1434 2, 34 | Therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should ~
1435 2, 34 | Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every ~
1436 2, 34 | that not every ~pleasure is evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
1437 2, 34 | maintained that ~all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have
1438 2, 34 | teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of
1439 2, 34 | good, and that some are ~evil. For pleasure is a repose
1440 2, 34 | with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend
1441 2, 34 | accord with reason; ~and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite
1442 2, 34 | of which ~are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are
1443 2, 34 | actions are good, and of evil ~actions, evil; much more
1444 2, 34 | good, and of evil ~actions, evil; much more are the pleasures
1445 2, 34 | actions good, and ~those of evil actions evil.~Aquin.: SMT
1446 2, 34 | and ~those of evil actions evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
1447 2, 34 | pleasure is not morally ~evil; as neither is sleep, whereby
1448 2, 34 | reason is fettered, morally evil, ~if it be taken according
1449 2, 34 | prove that all pleasures are evil: ~because they have from
1450 2, 34 | glad when they ~have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked
1451 2, 34 | that all pleasures ~are evil, the Epicureans held that
1452 2, 34 | end may be ~either good or evil; although nothing can be
1453 2, 34 | that all ~pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans,
1454 2, 34 | some are good, and some evil; yet, ~so that no pleasure
1455 2, 34 | judge of moral good ~or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
1456 2, 34 | rule of moral ~good and evil. Because "that which is
1457 2, 34 | them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
1458 2, 34 | operations, and those are evil which ~arise from evil operations,"
1459 2, 34 | are evil which ~arise from evil operations," as stated in
1460 2, 34 | absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."~Aquin.:
1461 2, 34 | whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to
1462 2, 34 | of virtue; ~and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil
1463 2, 34 | evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
1464 2, 34 | appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the ~
1465 2, 34 | to which the ~will of the evil man gives no heed.~Aquin.:
1466 2, 34 | true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.~
1467 2, 34 | evil, whose will rests in evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[
1468 2, 35 | which the soul, by making evil ~use of it, made subject
1469 2, 35 | namely, conjunction with some evil (which ~is in so far evil
1470 2, 35 | evil (which ~is in so far evil as it deprives one of some
1471 2, 35 | not the aspect ~of good or evil in regard to the being to
1472 2, 35 | under the ~aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure
1473 2, 35 | pleasure or pain. But good ~and evil, as such, are objects of
1474 2, 35 | only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can ~refer to
1475 2, 35 | to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow
1476 2, 35 | on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having
1477 2, 35 | present good and present ~evil, are contrary to one another,
1478 2, 35 | under the ~aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can
1479 2, 35 | under the aspect of good or evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[
1480 2, 35 | things contrary (to the evil). But ~every pleasure is
1481 2, 35 | in good and to sorrow for evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[
1482 2, 35 | the object of ~sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be
1483 2, 35 | contemplation can be an evil: since the Philosopher ~
1484 2, 35 | Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is ~nothing else
1485 2, 35 | intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so
1486 2, 35 | contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (
1487 2, 35 | sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for
1488 2, 35 | sorrow is an unsuitable evil. ~Now it happens that a
1489 2, 35 | is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not
1490 2, 35 | its own sake: ~whereas the evil, which is the object of
1491 2, 35 | presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no ~
1492 2, 35 | sorrow is ~caused by some evil in the imagination. Since,
1493 2, 35 | wickedness of a woman is ~all evil." Therefore, just as the
1494 2, 35 | which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the ~
1495 2, 35 | outward pain is a conjoined evil ~repugnant to the body;
1496 2, 35 | inward pain is a conjoined evil ~repugnant to the appetite.
1497 2, 35 | being caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is ~better
1498 2, 35 | greater evil, forasmuch as evil is ~better known by an inward
1499 2, 35 | of sorrow is "one's own ~evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned
1500 2, 35 | one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and
1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-2000 | 2001-2500 | 2501-3000 | 3001-3419 |