Part, Question

1501   2, 35  |             is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however, as ~
1502   2, 35  |          something that is neither ~evil nor one's own, but another'
1503   2, 35  |              however, as one's own ~evil: and thus we have "envy."
1504   2, 35  |            the ~latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many
1505   2, 35  |         Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper ~object
1506   2, 36  |       rather by the ~presence of an evil?~(2) Whether desire is a
1507   2, 36  |          good or by the presence of evil? ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[
1508   2, 36  |          than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De
1509   2, 36  |            good ~rather than for an evil that is present.~Aquin.:
1510   2, 36  |              12) that "the dreaded ~evil gives rise to fear, the
1511   2, 36  |           rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow."~
1512   2, 36  |            10] and FP, Q[48], A[3], evil is the privation ~of good:
1513   2, 36  |          sorrow for the presence of evil. But sorrow is a ~movement
1514   2, 36  |            reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is ~
1515   2, 36  |       regards ~chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.~
1516   2, 36  |               so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the
1517   2, 36  |            regards good rather than evil: and ~therefore, forasmuch
1518   2, 36  |             a passion, the present ~evil is more properly the cause
1519   2, 36  |           good is apprehended as an evil, just as ~the loss of evil
1520   2, 36  |          evil, just as ~the loss of evil is apprehended as a good:
1521   2, 36  |            sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above (A[1]):
1522   2, 36  |         pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the
1523   2, 36  |             rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle ~
1524   2, 36  |           towards the ~avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence
1525   2, 36  |            the appetite to fly from evil, as stated above. ~And hence
1526   2, 36  |    appetitive movements that regard evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[
1527   2, 36  |            good ~and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards
1528   2, 36  |           But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power
1529   2, 36  |             above (A[1]), a present evil, is cause of ~sorrow or
1530   2, 36  |          which is the cause of ~the evil being present, should be
1531   2, 36  |            be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary
1532   2, 36  |          presence of the corruptive evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[
1533   2, 37  |       sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the ~
1534   2, 37  |            a present evil: and this evil, from the ~very fact that
1535   2, 37  |        wishes to ~enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause of sorrow
1536   2, 37  |             whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the ~other hand,
1537   2, 37  |           hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the
1538   2, 37  |            force of the ~afflicting evil is such as to shut out all
1539   2, 37  |         soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger ~
1540   2, 37  |              impression than future evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[
1541   2, 38  |          Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present
1542   2, 38  |            sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as ~
1543   2, 38  |              4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of
1544   2, 39  |            1) Whether all sorrow is evil?~(2) Whether sorrow can
1545   2, 39  |         bodily pain is the greatest evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1546   2, 39  |             1~Whether all sorrow is evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1547   2, 39  |             seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa ~[*
1548   2, 39  |          xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from its very ~nature."
1549   2, 39  |               Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. ~
1550   2, 39  |          what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. ~
1551   2, 39  |            Therefore, all sorrow is evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1552   2, 39  |             the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But ~all avoid sorrow,
1553   2, 39  |        sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1554   2, 39  |             Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause
1555   2, 39  |          bodily ~pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause
1556   2, 39  |             bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual
1557   2, 39  |             spiritual sorrow ~is an evil of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
1558   2, 39  |            the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure
1559   2, 39  |             contrary to pleasure in evil. But ~pleasure in evil is
1560   2, 39  |           in evil. But ~pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation
1561   2, 39  |            But ~pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation
1562   2, 39  |             glad when they had done evil." ~Therefore sorrow for
1563   2, 39  |                Therefore sorrow for evil is good.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1564   2, 39  |              A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered ~
1565   2, 39  |           and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the mere ~fact
1566   2, 39  |        being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an ~evil, because
1567   2, 39  |         present evil, is itself an ~evil, because it hinders the
1568   2, 39  |         thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something
1569   2, 39  |             account of this present evil. For if he were not to be ~
1570   2, 39  |       goodness, that, ~supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or
1571   2, 39  |          sorrow on the ~part of the evil that causes it, but not
1572   2, 39  |         that ~feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of
1573   2, 39  |               inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun the
1574   2, 39  |        perception and ~rejection of evil. The same also applies to
1575   2, 39  |             and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness
1576   2, 39  |         perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards ~
1577   2, 39  |           sorrow, perception of the evil is ~sometimes due to a right
1578   2, 39  |         while the rejection of the ~evil is the act of the will,
1579   2, 39  |         disposed and detesting that evil. Now ~every virtuous good
1580   2, 39  |            2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will
1581   2, 39  |            reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is
1582   2, 39  |     appetite ensues from a present ~evil. One is that whereby the
1583   2, 39  |           is opposed to the present evil; ~and, in this respect,
1584   2, 39  |             expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, ~
1585   2, 39  |              not as ~though it were evil in itself, but because it
1586   2, 39  |        because it is an occasion of evil; ~either through one's being
1587   2, 39  |            headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident ~in the case
1588   2, 39  |       avoiding it. Because the very evil is in ~itself a thing to
1589   2, 39  |            earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more
1590   2, 39  |            for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.~Aquin.: SMT
1591   2, 39  |            hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Q[37],
1592   2, 39  |         bodily pain is the greatest evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1593   2, 39  |           that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst ~is
1594   2, 39  |       certain pain is ~the greatest evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1595   2, 39  |             pain is man's ~greatest evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1596   2, 39  |            part: ~while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of
1597   2, 39  |        supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part. But ~
1598   2, 39  |           wise: while his ~greatest evil is to suffer pain."~Aquin.:
1599   2, 39  |        contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was
1600   2, 39  |             changeable things is an evil of guilt. For ~Augustine
1601   2, 39  |          this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the ~punishment
1602   2, 39  |          pain is not man's greatest evil. ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1603   2, 39  |          pain to be man's ~greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain
1604   2, 39  |            something that is ~truly evil, or for something that is
1605   2, 39  |        something that is apparently evil, but good in ~reality. Now
1606   2, 39  |             for that which is truly evil cannot be the ~greatest
1607   2, 39  |             cannot be the ~greatest evil: for there is something
1608   2, 39  |            either not to reckon ~as evil that which is really evil,
1609   2, 39  |           evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again,
1610   2, 39  |            that which is apparently evil, but really good, cannot
1611   2, 39  |             cannot be the ~greatest evil, for it would be worse to
1612   2, 39  |          pain to be ~man's greatest evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1613   2, 39  |        judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of
1614   2, 39  |     approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in
1615   2, 39  |            and ~yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the
1616   2, 39  |           cannot be man's ~greatest evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[
1617   2, 39  |           the will being opposed to evil is a good. ~And for this
1618   2, 39  |         pain cannot be the greatest evil; because ~it has an admixture
1619   2, 39  |        worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as ~
1620   2, 39  |          Therefore that which is an evil to the ~soul is a greater
1621   2, 39  |           to the ~soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil
1622   2, 39  |          evil than that which is an evil to the body. Therefore ~
1623   2, 40  |            from fear, which regards evil. Secondly, that ~it is future;
1624   2, 40  |           while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in
1625   2, 40  |            despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining ~
1626   2, 40  |             objects, i.e. good ~and evil, are contrary: for this
1627   2, 40  |             Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however
1628   2, 40  |       sometimes however it ~regards evil accidentally, as making
1629   2, 40  |      obtained; security regards an ~evil to be avoided. Wherefore
1630   2, 41  |            then, fear is of ~future evil, it seems that it is not
1631   2, 41  |         that fear, since it regards evil, ~belongs to the appetitive
1632   2, 41  |             itself regards good and evil. ~Moreover, it belongs to
1633   2, 41  |              it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak,
1634   2, 41  |           which regards the present evil: because fear ~regards future
1635   2, 41  |        because fear ~regards future evil, which is not so strong
1636   2, 41  |          strong a motive as present evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
1637   2, 41  |            to say, in so far as the evil which is really future,
1638   2, 41  |           good, or to fear a future evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
1639   2, 41  |             a kind of ~avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special
1640   2, 41  |         object of fear is ~a future evil, difficult and irresistible.
1641   2, 41  |       concupiscible: for it regards evil, ~not absolutely, but as
1642   2, 41  |          representation of a future evil which is either ~corruptive
1643   2, 41  |           arises ~from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil
1644   2, 41  |            evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of ~
1645   2, 41  |           is a fear of ~"corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from
1646   2, 41  |        there is a ~fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not
1647   2, 41  |            good or to avoid what is evil; which ~inclination is to
1648   2, 41  |           from repelling a contrary evil; both of ~which are contrary
1649   2, 41  |            fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore the species
1650   2, 41  |          power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power,
1651   2, 41  |            Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor
1652   2, 41  |             things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and ~
1653   2, 41  |               fear regards a future evil which ~surpasses the power
1654   2, 41  |            irresistible. Now ~man's evil, like his good, may be considered
1655   2, 41  |             action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, ~there is
1656   2, 41  |            2~On the other hand, the evil that consists in external
1657   2, 41  |            man considers some great evil the ~outcome of which he
1658   2, 41  |              to wit, some unwonted ~evil arises before us, and on
1659   2, 41  |          which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which ~
1660   2, 41  |             arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that,
1661   2, 41  |             thing, whether ~good or evil: so that amazement and stupor
1662   2, 42  |        inquiry:~(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?~(
1663   2, 42  |         object of fear?~(2) Whether evil of nature is the object
1664   2, 42  |            of fear?~(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?~(
1665   2, 42  |           object of fear is good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[
1666   2, 42  |            Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded
1667   2, 42  |             that fear is of ~future evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[
1668   2, 42  |         good, while avoidance is of evil. ~Consequently whatever
1669   2, 42  |          implies avoidance, ~has an evil for its object. Wherefore,
1670   2, 42  |          its very nature it regards evil as its proper ~object.~Aquin.:
1671   2, 42  |           in so far as referable to evil. This ~can be in two ways.
1672   2, 42  |             one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of ~good.
1673   2, 42  |            of ~good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that
1674   2, 42  |         some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is
1675   2, 42  |            is shunned because it is evil, it ~follows that it is
1676   2, 42  |              good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far
1677   2, 42  |            two things, namely, ~the evil from which it shrinks, and
1678   2, 42  |            power, can ~inflict that evil. In this way God is feared
1679   2, 42  |             Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether evil of nature is an object of
1680   2, 42  |           OBJ 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object
1681   2, 42  |            Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object
1682   2, 42  |             move to contraries. But evil of nature ~is an effect
1683   2, 42  |         natural ~fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems
1684   2, 42  |       things is death," which is an evil of nature.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1685   2, 42  |             imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive
1686   2, 42  |               Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary
1687   2, 42  |          the will, so a ~corruptive evil is that which is contrary
1688   2, 42  |             nature: and this is the evil ~of nature. Consequently
1689   2, 42  |             of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object
1690   2, 42  |            it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises
1691   2, 42  |        cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from ~
1692   2, 42  |         like defects. But sometimes evil ~of nature arises from a
1693   2, 42  |           assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a ~
1694   2, 42  |           the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (
1695   2, 42  |           imagination of the future evil, removes fear also. ~Now
1696   2, 42  |          happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about
1697   2, 42  |           not." ~Secondly, a future evil is considered as though
1698   2, 42  |         Body Para. 3/3~Consequently evil of nature is not feared
1699   2, 42  |      apprehended as ~future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive,
1700   2, 42  |          Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not
1701   2, 42  |             1~Reply OBJ 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens,
1702   2, 42  |         Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?~
1703   2, 42  |              It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object
1704   2, 42  |            your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object
1705   2, 42  |        sorrowful on account ~of the evil of sin. Therefore one can
1706   2, 42  |     Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
1707   2, 42  |           Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
1708   2, 42  |       disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore ~fear
1709   2, 42  |         object ~of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily
1710   2, 42  |             the proper cause of the evil ~of sin: and consequently
1711   2, 42  |            of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking,
1712   2, 42  |         respect a man ~may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it
1713   2, 42  |          point, since each regards ~evil: they differ, however, in
1714   2, 42  |            sorrow is about ~present evil, whereas fear is future
1715   2, 42  |              whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, ~
1716   2, 42  |      concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; wherefore it ~
1717   2, 42  |      wherefore it ~can be about any evil, great or small; whereas
1718   2, 42  |             irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a certain
1719   2, 42  |          other hand, fear is of ~an evil that does not lie in our
1720   2, 42  |         power: and consequently the evil ~which is feared is always
1721   2, 42  |          imagination of an imminent evil. In ~this sense it is possible
1722   2, 42  |        being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will,
1723   2, 42  |           Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the ~
1724   2, 42  |             of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that
1725   2, 42  |            things, so fear is about evil ~things. But experience
1726   2, 42  |             it also adds to fear in evil things.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
1727   2, 42  |             of fear ~is an imminent evil, which can be repelled,
1728   2, 42  |             to the greatness of the evil, or to the ~weakness of
1729   2, 42  |         First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. ~Because
1730   2, 42  |             things, whether good or evil, the more we consider ~them,
1731   2, 42  |            as sorrow for a present ~evil is mitigated in course of
1732   2, 42  |           so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking
1733   2, 42  |            to forestall the coming ~evil, were it not for the evil
1734   2, 42  |           evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.~
1735   2, 42  |             since fear is ~about an evil which cannot be easily repelled.
1736   2, 42  |         Reply OBJ 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems
1737   2, 42  |             For this reason ~sudden evil is feared more, because
1738   2, 42  |         because it seems more to be evil. However, it ~may happen
1739   2, 42  |          that the greatness of some evil is ~hidden; for instance
1740   2, 42  |           and then it is ~true that evil inspires greater fear through
1741   2, 42  |         stated above (A[2]). But an evil that cannot ~be remedied
1742   2, 42  |          there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the ~
1743   2, 42  |            and ~the same applies to evil. But things that cannot
1744   2, 42  |         that, The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends ~
1745   2, 42  |         whatever tends ~to increase evil, conduces to the increase
1746   2, 42  |           the increase of fear. Now evil is increased ~not only in
1747   2, 42  |          not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of
1748   2, 42  |          bearing on the increase of evil. Because things that exist
1749   2, 42  |              wherefore if it be ~an evil to suffer something for
1750   2, 42  |         time, we should ~reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered
1751   2, 42  |          Reply OBJ 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which
1752   2, 42  |              One, by which a future evil ~is warded off from coming.
1753   2, 42  |           which an already ~present evil is removed: and of such
1754   2, 42  |             2: Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since
1755   2, 43  |            dread the advent of some evil." But the dread of ~evil
1756   2, 43  |            evil." But the dread of ~evil being caused by someone,
1757   2, 43  |            something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and
1758   2, 43  |           which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient ~cause
1759   2, 43  |      disposed that thing is such an evil to him, ~is a cause of fear
1760   2, 43  |            a man of that good is an evil to ~him, and that consequently
1761   2, 43  |      consequently he fears it as an evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[
1762   2, 43  |            first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as
1763   2, 43  |           the cause from which that evil ensues: so that ~sometimes,
1764   2, 43  |          Reply OBJ 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated
1765   2, 43  |          But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was
1766   2, 43  |             efficient cause ~of the evil to be feared: whereas love
1767   2, 43  |           to ~repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to cause
1768   2, 43  |            causes fear of a ~future evil, is less than the defect
1769   2, 43  |           than the defect caused by evil present, which is the ~object
1770   2, 43  |       defect, if perception of ~the evil, or love of the good whose
1771   2, 43  |            suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect
1772   2, 44  |    imagination ~of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel,
1773   2, 44  |              Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears, ~is contrary,
1774   2, 44  |          counsel in order to avoid ~evil, so do we, in order to attain
1775   2, 44  |             But whereas fear is of ~evil to be avoided, so is hope
1776   2, 44  |           us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain ~magnitude,
1777   2, 44  |      attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, ~as being difficult
1778   2, 45  |          the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is ~contrary
1779   2, 45  |             Because ~daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated
1780   2, 45  |          the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance:
1781   2, 45  |           reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit,
1782   2, 45  |            avoidance, through ~some evil attaching to it. Now that
1783   2, 45  |             Consequently pursuit of evil ~follows pursuit of good;
1784   2, 45  |           good follows avoidance of evil. ~Now these four things
1785   2, 45  |       belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of
1786   2, 45  |             pursuit of the fearful ~evil belongs to daring, and the
1787   2, 45  |             would hold, if good and evil were not ~co-ordinate objects.
1788   2, 45  |    co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to
1789   2, 45  |  consequently ~daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which
1790   2, 45  |    absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet ~avoidance of evil
1791   2, 45  |             evil, yet ~avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good;
1792   2, 45  |             precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope
1793   2, 45  |          the object of daring is an evil to which, in the ~estimation
1794   2, 45  |             yet ~daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined
1795   2, 45  |          fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking,
1796   2, 45  |             a ~compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring
1797   2, 45  |          movement of daring towards evil ~presupposes the movement
1798   2, 46  |          object of anger is good or evil?~(3) Whether anger is in
1799   2, 46  |             by sorrow, which is of ~evil, it includes in itself contrariety:
1800   2, 46  |          object of anger is good or evil?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
1801   2, 46  |         that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of ~Nyssa says [*
1802   2, 46  |       obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore ~anger regards
1803   2, 46  |            Therefore ~anger regards evil as its object.~Aquin.: SMT
1804   2, 46  |         another. But hatred regards evil as its object, ~as stated
1805   2, 46  |        anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of ~sorrow.
1806   2, 46  |           can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple ~and
1807   2, 46  |           to ~good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are
1808   2, 46  |         concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done
1809   2, 46  |           in so far as we wish some evil to ~be in him. It is the
1810   2, 46  |              bears the character of evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
1811   2, 46  |        hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates,
1812   2, 46  |           the man who hates, wishes evil to ~someone, as to something
1813   2, 46  |          object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person,
1814   2, 46  | concupiscible passions are good and evil ~absolutely considered,
1815   2, 46  |    irascible passions are ~good and evil in a certain elevation or
1816   2, 46  |      Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than ~
1817   2, 46  |        object ~of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is
1818   2, 46  |            just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so ~
1819   2, 46  |             does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.
1820   2, 46  |        aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, ~
1821   2, 46  |        wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, ~whereas the angry man
1822   2, 46  |        whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry,
1823   2, 46  |           whom he is angry, not as ~evil but in so far as it has
1824   2, 46  |       hatred implies application of evil to ~evil, whereas anger
1825   2, 46  |             application of evil to ~evil, whereas anger denotes application
1826   2, 46  |      denotes application of good to evil. Now it is ~evident that
1827   2, 46  |            is ~evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice,
1828   2, 46  |             of justice, is a lesser evil, ~than simply to seek evil
1829   2, 46  |          evil, ~than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish
1830   2, 46  |            someone. Because to wish evil to someone ~under the aspect
1831   2, 46  |           hatred desires ~another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied
1832   2, 46  |         desires ~another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied
1833   2, 46  |           no particular ~measure of evil: because those things that
1834   2, 46  |            on the other hand, seeks evil only under ~the aspect of
1835   2, 46  |    vengeance. Consequently when the evil ~inflicted goes beyond the
1836   2, 46  |          above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so ~far as
1837   2, 46  |         someone, in so ~far as this evil is a means of just vengeance.
1838   2, 46  |          since he desires another's evil as such. It ~is not true,
1839   2, 46  |          not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving
1840   2, 46  |            and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "
1841   2, 46  |         above (A[6]), anger desires evil as being a ~means of just
1842   2, 47  |             naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone
1843   2, 47  |            little about his good or evil. ~Again he that hinders
1844   2, 48  |            avenged on the contrary ~evil: whence it is likened to
1845   2, 49  |        imply the notion of good or ~evil, so it does not concern
1846   2, 49  |            to the notion of good or evil: because ~movements and
1847   2, 49  |           an end, whereas good and ~evil are said in respect of an
1848   2, 49  |           species we consider ~both evil and good, and also changeableness,
1849   2, 49  |    unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. ~And since nature is the
1850   2, 49  |        power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: ~and
1851   2, 49  |          not a relation to good and evil, as will ~be made clear
1852   2, 49  |             a ~relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits
1853   2, 54  |        declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation ~
1854   2, 54  |  specifically divided into good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[
1855   2, 54  |              there can be different evil habits about one same ~object;
1856   2, 54  |           agent's nature, while an ~evil habit is one which disposes
1857   2, 54  |          nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference
1858   2, 55  |       referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5: "Woe
1859   2, 55  |             is referred to good and evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[
1860   2, 55  |     infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. ~Therefore virtue is referred
1861   2, 55  |           only to good, but also to evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[
1862   2, 55  |             needs be good: for ~all evil implies defect; wherefore
1863   2, 55  |           Div. Hom. ii) that ~every evil is a weakness. And for this
1864   2, 55  |      therefore virtue is applied to evil things: so ~that the "virtue"
1865   2, 55  |          Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive
1866   2, 55  |       habits are always referred to evil, ~as vicious habits: others
1867   2, 55  |     referred to good, sometimes to ~evil; for instance, opinion is
1868   2, 55  |             are always referred ~to evil, is expressed in the words "
1869   2, 55  |          unto good, ~sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which
1870   2, 55  |             for instance ~by having evil thoughts about a virtue,
1871   2, 55  |            that an act of virtue be evil.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[
1872   2, 57  |          and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of ~the intellect
1873   2, 57  |         truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits ~
1874   2, 58  |             contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral
1875   2, 58  |   understands that ~he should do no evil; or again by some practical
1876   2, 59  |          not in themselves good or ~evil. For man's good or evil
1877   2, 59  |             evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference
1878   2, 59  |         referable both to ~good and evil, for as much as they may
1879   2, 59  |       referable to good only, or to evil only; ~even then the movement
1880   2, 59  |         understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is ~evident that
1881   2, 59  |            because sorrow is for an evil that is already present.
1882   2, 59  |              Now they ~held that no evil can happen to a wise man:
1883   2, 59  |         good to man; so ~man's only evil is vice, which cannot be
1884   2, 59  |          abuse it. Consequently the evil which is ~contrary to this
1885   2, 59  |           was that sorrow is about ~evil present, whereas fear is
1886   2, 59  |        present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure
1887   2, 59  |          from sorrow ~for a present evil, is altogether contrary
1888   2, 59  |       unreasonable. For there is an evil ~which can be present to
1889   2, 59  |            have just stated; which ~evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore
1890   2, 59  |     rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according ~
1891   2, 59  |          proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is
1892   2, 59  |             sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned
1893   2, 60  |           for this is that good and evil, in certain ~operations,
1894   2, 60  |          viz. in so far as good and evil in ~them depend on their
1895   2, 60  |           some operations, good and evil depend only ~on commensuration
1896   2, 60  |        agent. Consequently good and evil in these ~operations depend
1897   2, 60  |            or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds
1898   2, 60  |             Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good.
1899   2, 60  |            a more potent mover than evil: because evil does ~not
1900   2, 60  |            mover than evil: because evil does ~not cause movement
1901   2, 60  |            Div. Nom. ~iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle
1902   2, 60  |        require ~virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly,
1903   2, 60  |          being, seemingly, one such evil ~corresponding to each kind
1904   2, 63  |           is more ~efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are
1905   2, 63  |        vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much ~more, therefore,
1906   2, 63  |         whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases,
1907   2, 64  |            in ~things of this sort, evil consists in discordance
1908   2, 66  |          and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it ~
1909   2, 67  |             anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, ~without the
1910   2, 67  |     life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore,
1911   2, 67  |             and ~sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge
1912   2, 67  |          God is in the nature of an evil: ~and no evil will be feared
1913   2, 67  |          nature of an evil: ~and no evil will be feared there, according
1914   2, 67  |           by opposition of good and evil, as stated above (Q[23],
1915   2, 67  |           any expectation of future evil is ~called fear.~Aquin.:
1916   2, 68  |            every one declineth from evil," and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce
1917   2, 68  |      speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for ~the sake
1918   2, 68  |          fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of
1919   2, 68  |         hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply
1920   2, 68  |             which withdraws us from evil, for ~higher motives than
1921   2, 68  |       afford us ~protection against evil temptations. But in the
1922   2, 68  |          state of glory, where all ~evil will have ceased, we shall
1923   2, 68  |       generation, ~man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov.
1924   2, 68  |          virtues ~cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible
1925   2, 68  |          But it is possible to make evil use of ~the gifts, for Gregory
1926   2, 68  |              like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they
1927   2, 70  |             good things and towards evil things. Now the ~first disposition
1928   2, 70  |           given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good
1929   2, 70  |            being disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains
1930   2, 70  |           to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3).~Aquin.:
1931   2, 70  |            Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways,"
1932   2, 71  |           FS Q[71] Out. Para. 1/2 - EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (
1933   2, 71  |        respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality
1934   2, 71  |        accord with reason, ~and his evil is to be against reason,"
1935   2, 71  |            it is, so ~the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is.
1936   2, 71  |            that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as
1937   2, 71  |           is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to ~do
1938   2, 71  |              than to be able to ~do evil: whence it also follows
1939   2, 71  |             wit, even as a ~good or evil habit stands above the corresponding
1940   2, 71  |              the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses
1941   2, 71  |            is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. ~But
1942   2, 71  |            vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. ~But vice cannot
1943   2, 71  |           is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. ~Now
1944   2, 71  |          required for good than for evil, since ~"good results from
1945   2, 71  |           and entire cause, whereas evil results from ~each single
1946   2, 71  |          the ~end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with
1947   2, 71  |           law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden,
1948   2, 71  |          forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general
1949   2, 71  |            above ~(A[1]). Now man's evil is to be against reason,
1950   2, 71  |              Again, a human ~act is evil through lacking conformity
1951   2, 71  |         pertaining to the nature of evil, and ~which is the form,
1952   2, 71  |    substance of sin, through being ~evil of themselves, as stated,
1953   2, 71  |          said that not every sin is evil through being ~forbidden,
1954   2, 71  |           reason, then every sin is evil through being ~prohibited:
1955   2, 72  |         acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, ~chiefly,
1956   2, 72  |           Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs
1957   2, 72  |            opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of ~human acts.
1958   2, 72  |              no one acts ~intending evil," as Dionysius declares (
1959   2, 72  |           first ~by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by
1960   2, 72  |     Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil results from ~each single
1961   2, 72  |            1 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Evil, as such, is a privation,
1962   2, 73  |             reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself,
1963   2, 73  |             completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees
1964   2, 73  |           is about a more difficult evil. For in ~each case there
1965   2, 73  |              more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome
1966   2, 73  |            tree cannot bring forth ~evil fruit": and the greater
1967   2, 73  |            the ~intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline
1968   2, 73  |            a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it ~
1969   2, 73  |        either evil or not: if it is evil, it ~causes, of itself,
1970   2, 73  |             of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil,
1971   2, 73  |           of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot ~make a thing
1972   2, 73  |        character of a good or of an evil act.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73]
1973   2, 73  |           either way. For if it is ~evil, it does not follow that
1974   2, 73  |           may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species,
1975   2, 73  |             above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin
1976   2, 73  |           suffices ~to make the act evil. This turning aside from
1977   2, 73  |           deemed punishable for the evil ~results of his action if
1978   2, 73  |          Ecclus. ~14:5: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will
1979   2, 74  |           says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and
1980   2, 74  |            sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be
1981   2, 74  |           both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the ~principle
1982   2, 74  |            1 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: Evil is said to be outside the
1983   2, 74  |           to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is
1984   2, 74  |             of evil. But since some evil is an ~apparent good, the
1985   2, 74  |           will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is ~in
1986   2, 74  |           OBJ 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now
1987   2, 74  |             to reason. Now good and evil ~pertaining to reason are
1988   2, 74  |           the subjects of ~good and evil moral habits, because act
1989   2, 74  |             1~Reply OBJ 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its
1990   2, 74  |             will I do ~not; but the evil which I will not, that I
1991   2, 74  |            3), as referring ~to the evil of concupiscence, which
1992   2, 74  |              If the consent to ~the evil use of things that can be
1993   2, 74  |            servant or ~slave of the evil deed."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
1994   2, 74  |           consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to ~which
1995   2, 74  |           which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything
1996   2, 74  |         consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation ~
1997   2, 75  |          For sin has the nature of ~evil, as stated above (Q[71],
1998   2, 75  |            above (Q[71], A[6]). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius ~
1999   2, 75  |             cause is either good or evil. ~It is not a good, because
2000   2, 75  |             tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mt. 7:18). Likewise