1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-2000 | 2001-2237
Part, Question
501 1, 84 | above (Q[84], A[7]), the object of knowledge is ~proportionate
502 1, 84 | organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive ~power
503 1, 84 | angelic intellect, the ~object of whose cognitive power
504 1, 84 | passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and
505 1, 84 | external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in
506 1, 84 | agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the
507 1, 84 | primarily understood ~is the object, of which the species is
508 1, 84 | says (Phys. i, 1), that the object ~defined comes in our knowledge
509 1, 84 | individual things for its ~object, and intellect has the universal
510 1, 84 | has the universal for its object, it follows that ~our knowledge
511 1, 84 | complete knowledge, when ~the object is distinctly and determinately
512 1, 84 | imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and
513 1, 84 | evident that to know an object that comprises many ~things,
514 1, 84 | apprehends something about its ~object, such as its quiddity, and
515 1, 84 | is its first and proper object; ~and then it understands
516 1, 84 | the thing. For the proper object of the ~human intellect
517 1, 84 | not deceived in its proper object, as ~sight in regard to
518 1, 84 | directed to its proper object; and ~things of this kind
519 1, 84 | concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now ~the
520 1, 84 | not fail. Now ~the proper object of the intellect is the "
521 1, 84 | judgment of ~the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration
522 1, 84 | 1/2 ~I answer that, The object of our intellect in its
523 1, 84 | cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its ~relationship
524 1, 84 | itself, as being its ~proper object. The third kind of indivisible
525 1, 84 | the primary and ~proper object of the intellect.~Aquin.:
526 1, 84 | power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would perceive ~
527 1, 85 | capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect
528 1, 85 | Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each ~
529 1, 85 | the infinite, as is its object, ~which is the quiddity
530 1, 85 | has the universal for its object; while the object of ~sense
531 1, 85 | for its object; while the object of ~sense is the singular,
532 1, 85 | certain way is the indirect object of ~the intellect, as we
533 1, 86 | Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human
534 1, 86 | things for its proper natural object, as stated above (Q[84],
535 1, 86 | intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason
536 1, 86 | actual by the species of the ~object understood, is itself understood
537 1, 86 | our intellect, not as its object ~since, in the present state
538 1, 86 | of life, our intellect's object is the nature ~of a material
539 1, 86 | habit, as on account of an object ~known, but as on account
540 1, 86 | For ~what is known is the object of the knowing faculty.
541 1, 86 | the act differs ~from the object. Therefore the intellect
542 1, 86 | A[1]), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic ~
543 1, 86 | its own ~essence the first object of its act of understanding,
544 1, 86 | understanding, for this object is ~the nature of a material
545 1, 86 | the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which
546 1, 86 | is the act by which that object is known; and through the
547 1, 86 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: The object of the intellect is something
548 1, 86 | primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this
549 1, 86 | external sensible. A material object, ~however, cannot immute
550 1, 86 | act is specified by the object. But the object of ~the
551 1, 86 | specified by the object. But the object of ~the will is not the
552 1, 86 | will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore
553 1, 86 | specifically distinct from the object of the ~intellect, and therefore
554 1, 87 | Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?~Aquin.:
555 1, 87 | corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De Anima iii,
556 1, 87 | compared to the intelligible ~object as perfection is to the
557 1, 87 | receives the intelligible object and the active ~intellect
558 1, 87 | regard ~to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard
559 1, 87 | some proportion between the object and ~the faculty of knowledge;
560 1, 87 | Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?~
561 1, 87 | seem that God is the first object known by the human ~mind.
562 1, 87 | the human ~mind. For that object in which all others are
563 1, 87 | Therefore God is ~the first object known to us.~Aquin.: SMT
564 1, 87 | our first and most known object.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[
565 1, 87 | Therefore God is the first object known to our mind.~Aquin.:
566 1, 87 | that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather ~
567 1, 87 | are made": while the first object of our knowledge in this ~
568 1, 87 | thing," which is the proper object of ~our intellect, as appears
569 1, 87 | our ~intellect is not the object it understands, much less
570 1, 87 | said that ~God is the first object known by our intellect.~
571 1, 87 | He were the first known object, but because He ~is the
572 1, 88 | as the ~nature of a light object is not changed, when it
573 1, 88 | consider the intelligible object. But as the ~intellectual
574 1, 88 | Its species comes from the object, whereto the ~faculty of
575 1, 88 | species, which is ~the object's similitude; whereas the
576 1, 90 | which is suitable for the ~object in view; and he does not
577 1, 92 | by comparison with every object?~(9) Of the difference between "
578 1, 92 | comparison ~with God as its object?~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[
579 1, 92 | comparison with God as its object. For the image of the ~Divine
580 1, 92 | found in us as regards any object. Therefore the ~image of
581 1, 92 | our mind as regards any object.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[
582 1, 92 | mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and ~
583 1, 93 | as an act ~through its object. And through the intellectual
584 1, 93 | fact that its connatural object fell ~short of the excellence
585 1, 93 | that ~as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true;
586 1, 93 | R.O. 5 Para. 3/3~If any object, as some do, that he was
587 1, 94 | the sensual appetite, the ~object of which is good and evil.
588 1, 94 | passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and ~
589 1, 94 | which have ~evil as their object; as meekness with anger;
590 1, 94 | which have evil for their object were incompatible ~with
591 1, 94 | says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue ~is the difficult
592 1, 97 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation
593 1, 102 | which are moved towards an ~object. But the world does not
594 1, 104 | such also is the desirable ~object when apprehended. Therefore
595 1, 104 | Therefore God moves as the object of desire and ~apprehension.
596 1, 104 | OBJ 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension;
597 1, 104 | OBJ 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect,
598 1, 104 | intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver ~of the
599 1, 104 | is the will ~moved by its object, which is good, and by Him
600 1, 104 | be moved by good as its object, but by God ~alone sufficiently
601 1, 104 | universal good; for its object is the ~universal good;
602 1, 104 | universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the
603 1, 104 | moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power
604 1, 104 | be inclined towards ~the object of the will, which is universal
605 1, 105 | obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an
606 1, 105 | ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the
607 1, 105 | power. On the ~part of the object, both the good itself which
608 1, 105 | good itself which is the object of the will, ~moves the
609 1, 105 | and he who points ~out the object, as, for instance, one who
610 1, 105 | sufficiently, either as the object or as showing ~the object.
611 1, 105 | object or as showing ~the object. But he inclines the will
612 1, 105 | perception of the colored object.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[
613 1, 106 | operation. Now an ~intelligible object is present to the intellect
614 1, 106 | clear that the intelligible object passes from ~the first to
615 1, 106 | likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to
616 1, 106 | moved by ~the intelligible object just as sense is affected
617 1, 106 | affected by the sensible object. ~Therefore, as sense is
618 1, 106 | aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an ~angel
619 1, 107 | lover is ~united to the object loved. Now higher things
620 1, 110 | First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever ~
621 1, 110 | because he knows that the object is made known to him. ~Secondly,
622 1, 110 | always by the ~sensible object.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[
623 1, 110 | affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we ~
624 1, 110 | offer the senses a sensible object from without, ~formed by
625 2, 1 | accordance with the nature of its object. But ~the object of the
626 2, 1 | of its object. But ~the object of the will is the end and
627 2, 1 | be the last end. For the object of the will is ~the end,
628 2, 1 | is ~the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore
629 2, 1 | is ~directed to a visible object; so the first appetible,
630 2, 1 | good and the end is the object of the will. But "the ~will
631 2, 1 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: The object of the will is the end and
632 2, 1 | deliberate will. Now the ~object of the will is the good
633 2, 1 | good and the end is the object of the will. But the ~will
634 2, 1 | as ordained to the first object ~of the appetite, which
635 2, 1 | desire directed to ~any object whatever, even though one'
636 2, 1 | Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object ~
637 2, 1 | object of the will. But the object ~of the will is the universal
638 2, 2 | for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently ~
639 2, 2 | habit, or act, but ~also the object of these, which is something
640 2, 2 | to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man'
641 2, 2 | universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the
642 2, 2 | good, which is the ~common object of happiness of all the
643 2, 2 | he is capable, as of an object, and which is ~infinite.
644 2, 3 | happiness ~in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated;
645 2, 3 | supreme good. But good is the object of ~the will. Therefore
646 2, 3 | OBJ 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as
647 2, 3 | as neither is ~the first object of the sight, vision, but
648 2, 3 | will, as the will's ~first object, it follows that it does
649 2, 3 | in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is ~
650 2, 3 | intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which
651 2, 3 | Divine Good, which is the ~object, not of the practical but
652 2, 3 | far as the proper formal object of that ~power belongs to
653 2, 3 | belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the
654 2, 3 | happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.~Aquin.:
655 2, 3 | angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power:
656 2, 3 | the fulness of its formal object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8]
657 2, 3 | determined by the nature of its object. Now ~the object of the
658 2, 3 | of its object. Now ~the object of the intellect is "what
659 2, 3 | union with God as with that object, in which alone ~man's happiness
660 2, 4 | repose of the lover in the object beloved.~Aquin.: SMT FS
661 2, 4 | as it is present, is the object of ~comprehension.~Aquin.:
662 2, 4 | consist in bodily good as its object: ~but bodily good can add
663 2, 5 | nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since
664 2, 5 | Good ~itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness,
665 2, 5 | Happiness is one in its ~object. But the many mansions signify
666 2, 5 | First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which is not ~
667 2, 5 | who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, ~
668 2, 5 | Happiness is taken from the object, ~which specifies the act,
669 2, 5 | takes its species from its object. Consequently the ~argument
670 2, 5 | apprehended good is the object of the ~appetite (De Anima
671 2, 5 | But since good is the object of ~the will, the perfect
672 2, 5 | or on the part ~of the object; and thus the will does
673 2, 6 | to act, by the appetible object which is outside him, and
674 2, 6 | inclination, by the appetible object, this movement ~is not violent
675 2, 6 | inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore
676 2, 6 | whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for
677 2, 7 | the material cause, or ~object, in the circumstance "about
678 2, 7 | Thus, ~in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance
679 2, 7 | circumstance of theft that the ~object is another's property, for
680 2, 7 | voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the ~will is the end.
681 2, 7 | substantial ~form depends on the object and term or end; but it
682 2, 8 | contained under its proper object; for ~no power seeks other
683 2, 8 | seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the
684 2, 8 | proper object. Now, the object of the will ~is good. Wherefore
685 2, 8 | considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way ~
686 2, 8 | aspect of good, which is the object of the power of ~the will,
687 2, 8 | that which is in itself the object ~of that power. But that
688 2, 9 | presenting the appetible object to the ~will, stands in
689 2, 9 | 10) that "the ~appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas
690 2, 9 | other is on the part of the ~object, by reason of which the
691 2, 9 | nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently,
692 2, 9 | power, is included under the object of the will as some particular
693 2, 9 | 3~On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the
694 2, 9 | and "truth," which is the object of the intellect. And ~therefore
695 2, 9 | will, as ~presenting its object to it.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
696 2, 9 | the act derives from the object, the ~intellect moves the
697 2, 9 | moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear
698 2, 9 | will, on the part of the object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2]
699 2, 9 | end which is the will's object. Now, ~as stated above (
700 2, 9 | moved on the part of the object: whereas ~it is moved by
701 2, 9 | The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]~).
702 2, 9 | stated above (A[1]~). But the object of the will can be something
703 2, 9 | the will is moved by the object, it is evident ~that it
704 2, 9 | way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in ~so
705 2, 9 | will is on the part of the object offered from without: ~not
706 2, 9 | angel, on the part of the ~object, which by the power of the
707 2, 9 | Mover, to the ~universal object of the will, which is good.
708 2, 10 | moved of necessity by its object?~(3) Whether it is moved
709 2, 10 | does ~each power to its object; and again it is the last
710 2, 10 | wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other
711 2, 10 | which are included in the ~object of the will, as so many
712 2, 10 | moved, of necessity, by its object?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
713 2, 10 | moved, of necessity, by its object. For ~the object of the
714 2, 10 | by its object. For ~the object of the will is compared
715 2, 10 | moved of necessity by its ~object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
716 2, 10 | ordained to a universal object, as stated ~above (A[1],
717 2, 10 | moved, of necessity, by its ~object: therefore the will also,
718 2, 10 | therefore the will also, by its object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
719 2, 10 | moved of necessity by its object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
720 2, 10 | its act, derived from ~the object. As to the first way, no
721 2, 10 | As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, ~
722 2, 10 | for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power
723 2, 10 | the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another
724 2, 10 | movement of a power by its object, we must consider under
725 2, 10 | consider under what ~aspect the object moves the power. For the
726 2, 10 | of ~necessity see such an object: for it might look at that
727 2, 10 | look at that part of the ~object which is not actually colored,
728 2, 10 | actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the ~
729 2, 10 | of sight, so is good the ~object of the will. Wherefore if
730 2, 10 | if the will be offered an object which is ~good universally
731 2, 10 | the will is offered an object that is ~not good from every
732 2, 10 | a power is none but that object ~that in every respect presents
733 2, 10 | moved, of necessity, by an object which is ~such as to be
734 2, 10 | the will is moved by its ~object: inasmuch as, to wit, man
735 2, 11 | sense, which delights in its object: and for the same ~reason,
736 2, 11 | end and the good is the object ~of the appetitive power.
737 2, 11 | good and an end, is ~the object of the will. And as such
738 2, 11 | power is contained in ~the object of the appetitive power,
739 2, 11 | enjoying it, as the final object ~of his longing and the
740 2, 11 | First ~on the part of the object; by reason of its not being
741 2, 11 | possession of it. Now it is ~the object that specifies an act: but
742 2, 12 | unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained ~
743 2, 12 | that ~God is always the object of intention, but because
744 2, 12 | willing the means. Now the object, and ~that by reason of
745 2, 12 | reason of which it is an object, come under the same act;
746 2, 12 | as the end is the formal ~object in willing the means, they
747 2, 12 | they are one and the same object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[
748 2, 12 | the means which are the ~object of choice.~Aquin.: SMT FS
749 2, 13 | as the will tends to its object, according ~to the order
750 2, 13 | apprehensive power presents the object ~to the appetite. Accordingly,
751 2, 13 | the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end,
752 2, 13 | the impossible is ~not the object of choice.~Aquin.: SMT FS
753 2, 13 | proposes to the will its object, and the will ~causes the
754 2, 13 | 1~Reply OBJ 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended
755 2, 13 | good, we ~must judge of the object of the will according as
756 2, 13 | stands ~in relation to the object of choice, as the principle
757 2, 14 | and thus it will become an object of ~counsel. ~Aquin.: SMT
758 2, 15 | implies a certain union to the object of consent. Hence ~the will,
759 2, 16 | refer that which is the ~object of use to the obtaining
760 2, 16 | than anything else, is the ~object of the will's application.
761 2, 16 | Therefore it can be the object of use. ~Aquin.: SMT FS
762 2, 16 | the last end can be the object of use.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
763 2, 16 | be referred to the same ~object. But nothing hinders the
764 2, 17 | before power, so does the object rank ~before the act. Now
765 2, 17 | before the act. Now the object of use is that which is
766 2, 17 | reason. Secondly, as to the object; in ~respect of which two
767 2, 17 | 2~The reply to the third object is evident from what has
768 2, 18 | action is derived from its ~object?~(3) Whether it is derived
769 2, 18 | species derived from the object, as under its genus, or
770 2, 18 | action is derived from its object?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
771 2, 18 | is not derived ~from its object. For the object of any action
772 2, 18 | from its object. For the object of any action is a thing.
773 2, 18 | not derived from their object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
774 2, 18 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the object is compared to the action
775 2, 18 | not derived from ~their object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
776 2, 18 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared
777 2, 18 | not derived from their object. ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
778 2, 18 | has its species from its ~object, as movement from its term.
779 2, 18 | derived from its ~suitable object: hence some call such an
780 2, 18 | that which is from ~the object, for instance, "to take
781 2, 18 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: The object is not the matter "of which" (
782 2, 18 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: The object of the human action is not
783 2, 18 | action is not always the object of ~an active power. For
784 2, 18 | is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle
785 2, 18 | operation. Now since the object is in ~some way the effect
786 2, 18 | derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness
787 2, 18 | derives its species from its object, as ~stated above (A[2]).
788 2, 18 | follows that a difference of object causes ~a difference of
789 2, 18 | essential; and a difference of object may ~be essential in reference
790 2, 18 | considered in reference to the object is ~an essential difference
791 2, 18 | to say, according ~as the object is suitable or unsuitable
792 2, 18 | not ~because it has no object at all; but because it has
793 2, 18 | all; but because it has an object in ~disaccord with reason,
794 2, 18 | Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it
795 2, 18 | essential ~difference of the object, as compared to reason;
796 2, 18 | their species ~from the object. But the end is altogether
797 2, 18 | altogether apart from the object. ~Therefore the good and
798 2, 18 | of these actions has its object. The end is ~properly the
799 2, 18 | The end is ~properly the object of the interior act of the
800 2, 18 | act of the will: while the object of ~the external action,
801 2, 18 | takes its species from the object ~on which it bears; so the
802 2, 18 | as from its own proper object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
803 2, 18 | materially with regard to the object of the external action.
804 2, 18 | has the character of an object, as stated ~above.~Aquin.:
805 2, 18 | species ~derived from the object, as under its genus, or
806 2, 18 | goodness derived from the object, as a ~species is contained
807 2, 18 | takes its species from its ~object, as stated above (AA[2],
808 2, 18 | which is taken from the object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[
809 2, 18 | difference derived from the object: because the end is something
810 2, 18 | species derived from the object, as its most specific species.~
811 2, 18 | which is derived from the object, as stated above (A[6]).
812 2, 18 | species derived ~from the object, as the most specific species
813 2, 18 | species on the part of its object, can be ordained to ~an
814 2, 18 | species derived from the object, as ~under its genus.~Aquin.:
815 2, 18 | 1/2~I answer that, The object of the external act can
816 2, 18 | former. Accordingly when ~the object is not of itself ordained
817 2, 18 | difference ~derived from the object is not an essential determination
818 2, 18 | On the other hand, if the object be of ~itself ordained to
819 2, 18 | difference derived from an object which of itself ~is ordained
820 2, 18 | For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is
821 2, 18 | species from their end or ~object, as stated above (A[6];
822 2, 18 | But every end and every ~object is either good or bad. Therefore
823 2, 18 | takes its species ~from its object; while human action, which
824 2, 18 | takes its ~species from the object, in relation to the principle
825 2, 18 | reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes ~something
826 2, 18 | it may happen ~that the object of an action does not include
827 2, 18 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Every object or end has some goodness
828 2, 18 | goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species;
829 2, 18 | indifferent thus: since no object of ~human action is such
830 2, 18 | action is taken from ~its object. But circumstances differ
831 2, 18 | circumstances differ from the object. Therefore ~circumstances
832 2, 18 | circumstance added to the object that specifies the ~action,
833 2, 18 | principal ~condition of the object that determines the action'
834 2, 18 | place, in relation to the object, is considered as being ~
835 2, 18 | principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant
836 2, 18 | considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as
837 2, 18 | principal condition of the object, then it does specify the ~
838 2, 19 | Whether it depends on the object alone?~(3) Whether it depends
839 2, 19 | the will depends on the object? ~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
840 2, 19 | does not depend on ~the object. For the will cannot be
841 2, 19 | the will depended on the ~object, it would follow that every
842 2, 19 | does not depend on any object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
843 2, 19 | a thing to be. But ~the object of the will is good, by
844 2, 19 | will does not depend on the object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
845 2, 19 | presented to the will as its object by the reason: ~and in so
846 2, 19 | the will depends on the object alone?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
847 2, 19 | does not depend on ~the object alone. For the end has a
848 2, 19 | goodness not ~only from the object but also from the end, as
849 2, 19 | goodness not only ~from the object but also from the end.~Aquin.:
850 2, 19 | derived not only from the ~object but also from the circumstances,
851 2, 19 | depends ~not only on the object, but also on the circumstances.~
852 2, 19 | circumstances, and not only ~on the object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
853 2, 19 | circumstances, but on the object alone.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
854 2, 19 | and that one ~thing is the object, and not the circumstances,
855 2, 19 | Reply OBJ 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of
856 2, 19 | goodness derived ~from the object, does not differ from that
857 2, 19 | depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is
858 2, 19 | the object. Now the will's object is proposed to it ~by reason.
859 2, 19 | understood is the proportionate object of the ~will; while sensitive
860 2, 19 | way as it depends on ~the object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[
861 2, 19 | viz. on the part of the object, as stated above (Q[9], ~
862 2, 19 | some way on ~account of the object, on which the goodness or
863 2, 19 | indeed on account of the object according as it is in its ~
864 2, 19 | to avoid. And since the object of the will is ~that which
865 2, 19 | the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the ~
866 2, 19 | regards the ~means, the object of the will is one thing,
867 2, 19 | of the goodness of the ~object, as stated above.~Aquin.:
868 2, 19 | one, on the part of the object, by ~reason of a man willing
869 2, 19 | the point of view ~of the object, it is evident that the
870 2, 19 | ways. First, through the object that is ordained to the ~
871 2, 19 | But the will can will an object ~that is not proportionate
872 2, 19 | will that ~tends to that object considered absolutely, is
873 2, 19 | to the intention as its object: as when a man ~intends
874 2, 19 | Divine will, ~as its proper object. Again, that which is first
875 2, 19 | apprehended good is the object of the will. But in ~many
876 2, 19 | takes its form from the object, as does every ~act. If
877 2, 19 | the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed
878 2, 19 | end, which is the proper object of charity.~Aquin.: SMT
879 2, 19 | act ~are taken from the object considered formally, rather
880 2, 19 | formally, rather than from the ~object considered materially.~Aquin.:
881 2, 20 | derives goodness from its ~object, as stated above (Q[19],
882 2, 20 | external action is the ~object of the interior act of the
883 2, 20 | end is the will's proper object, it is ~evident that this
884 2, 20 | The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as ~
885 2, 20 | good, both from ~its proper object and from its end, if follows
886 2, 22 | receives an "intention" of the object. And this is essential to ~
887 2, 22 | the eye changed by the ~object visible, not by being colored,
888 2, 22 | by the ~intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is
889 2, 22 | Divine things, since its ~object is the sensible good. Therefore
890 2, 22 | intense the ~passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite,
891 2, 22 | powerful active force than the object of the ~sensitive appetite,
892 2, 22 | Therefore ~although the object of the intellectual appetite
893 2, 22 | greater activity ~than the object of the sensitive appetite,
894 2, 23 | greater difference in the object is required to ~diversify
895 2, 23 | included under the one common object of a ~single power, differ
896 2, 23 | concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these ~powers.
897 2, 23 | FP, Q[81], A[2], that the object of the ~concupiscible power
898 2, 23 | difficult nature, is the ~object of the irascible faculty.
899 2, 23 | from tending towards its object, either by making ~some
900 2, 23 | of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good
901 2, 23 | reason of this is that ~the object of the concupiscible faculty,
902 2, 23 | withdrawal in respect of the same object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[
903 2, 23 | 4~On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty
904 2, 23 | either good or evil for ~its object; for these are the common
905 2, 23 | passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion
906 2, 23 | passion having ~evil for its object. Therefore every passion
907 2, 24 | their species from their object. ~If, therefore, any passion
908 2, 24 | that those passions the object of which is good, are ~specifically
909 2, 24 | that those passions, ~the object of which is evil, are specifically
910 2, 24 | passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, ~
911 2, 25 | their ~objects. But the object of the irascible faculty
912 2, 25 | faculty from ~enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23],
913 2, 25 | arduous; whereas such is the ~object of the irascible faculty.~
914 2, 25 | concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the ~
915 2, 25 | arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible ~faculty.
916 2, 25 | would prove, if the formal object of the ~concupiscible faculty
917 2, 25 | arduous, just as the ~formal object of the irascible faculty
918 2, 25 | arduous. But ~because the object of the concupiscible faculty
919 2, 25 | naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the
920 2, 25 | concupiscible from resting in its object. ~Wherefore it only follows
921 2, 25 | connote rest. The third object leads to the ~same conclusion.~
922 2, 25 | yearning for the beloved object, ~is desire; and, having
923 2, 25 | that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible ~faculty.
924 2, 25 | Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are ~naturally
925 2, 25 | naturally before those, the object of which is evil - that
926 2, 25 | love, when the ~beloved object is possessed, is pleasure:
927 2, 25 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty
928 2, 25 | or hatred, those whose ~object is good, or evil; and this
929 2, 25 | hatred of evil, those whose object is good, ~viz. hope and
930 2, 25 | naturally precede those whose object is evil, ~viz. daring and
931 2, 25 | good as towards its proper object; its movement from evil ~
932 2, 25 | seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.~
933 2, 26 | Love, yearning for the object ~beloved, is desire; having
934 2, 26 | appetite; since good ~is the object of both. Wherefore love
935 2, 26 | difficulty, which is the object of the irascible ~faculty.~
936 2, 26 | same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first,
937 2, 26 | consists in complacency in that object; and ~from this follows
938 2, 26 | movement towards the appetible object. For "the ~appetitive movement
939 2, 26 | because ~the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing
940 2, 26 | realization of ~the appetible object, so that the movement ends
941 2, 26 | appetite by the appetible ~object is called "love," and is
942 2, 26 | than complacency in that ~object; and from this complacency
943 2, 26 | movement towards that same ~object, and this movement is "desire";
944 2, 26 | appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love
945 2, 26 | tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement ~
946 2, 26 | changed by the appetible object, so as to have ~complacency
947 2, 26 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: The object of love is more general
948 2, 26 | is more general than the object of ~dilection: because love
949 2, 27 | passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands ~in relation to it
950 2, 27 | love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of
951 2, 27 | s object. Now the proper object of love ~is the good; because,
952 2, 27 | cause of love, as ~being its object. But good is not the object
953 2, 27 | object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except
954 2, 28 | the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself,
955 2, 28 | the lover seeks with the object of his ~love. Moreover this
956 2, 28 | is always ~loved by the object of his love; which is evidently
957 2, 28 | the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the
958 2, 28 | in ~the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to
959 2, 28 | heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On the ~
960 2, 28 | 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which
961 2, 28 | man refuses to share the object of his love with ~another:
962 2, 28 | a movement towards the object loved," as ~Augustine says (
963 2, 28 | or ~quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus
964 2, 28 | contention, not against the object of ~love, but for it, and
965 2, 28 | whatever is opposed to the ~object of his love, is the effect
966 2, 28 | is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as ~
967 2, 28 | appetitive ~power to its object. But in the passion of love,
968 2, 29 | evil is the cause and the object of hatred?~(2) Whether love
969 2, 29 | Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?~Aquin.:
970 2, 29 | Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?~Aquin.: SMT FS
971 2, 29 | seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. ~For
972 2, 29 | If therefore evil be the ~object of hatred, it follows that
973 2, 29 | of something can ~be the object of hatred: which is clearly
974 2, 29 | nothing but evil be the object ~of hatred, it would follow
975 2, 29 | opposite of love. But the object of love ~is good, as stated
976 2, 29 | 27], A[1]). Therefore the object ~of hatred is evil. ~Aquin.:
977 2, 29 | therefore, just as good is the object of ~love, so evil is the
978 2, 29 | of ~love, so evil is the object of hatred.~Aquin.: SMT FS
979 2, 29 | agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists
980 2, 29 | keenly in the absence of the object loved; ~thus Augustine says (
981 2, 29 | as such, cannot be the object of ~hatred, neither in general
982 2, 29 | in general ~cannot be the object of hatred: because disagreement
983 2, 29 | particular truth being an object of hatred, in so far as
984 2, 29 | hinders him from gaining the object ~loved: such is the case
985 2, 29 | Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?~Aquin.:
986 2, 29 | that a thing cannot be an object of universal ~hatred. Because
987 2, 29 | Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred.~Aquin.:
988 2, 29 | Therefore nothing can be the object of ~universal hatred.~Aquin.:
989 2, 29 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "
990 2, 29 | cannot have a universal object.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[
991 2, 29 | universally. Thus we say that the object of sight ~is color considered
992 2, 30 | their objects. But ~the object of the concupiscible power
993 2, 30 | senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as the
994 2, 30 | the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty. ~
995 2, 30 | Now the diversity of this object can arise ~from the very
996 2, 30 | from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in
997 2, 30 | the nature of the active object, ~causes a material difference
998 2, 30 | towards it. Wherefore the ~object of sensible pleasure causes
999 2, 30 | this or that ~pleasurable object differ "in number."~Aquin.:
1000 2, 30 | Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not ~absolutely,
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