1-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | 1501-1712
Part, Question
1 1, 13 | consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the ~
2 1, 14 | understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the ~Philosopher
3 1, 14 | Reply OBJ 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according
4 1, 14 | as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De ~Anima
5 1, 19 | is ~in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically
6 1, 19 | under ~the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual
7 1, 19 | primary ~meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed
8 1, 20 | passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in
9 1, 20 | reason He loves ~without passion.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[20] A[
10 1, 20 | though without ~attributing passion to Him, as said before (
11 1, 21 | but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must ~
12 1, 21 | regarded as an affection ~of passion.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[21] A[
13 1, 23 | action of itself causes passion. If therefore ~predestination
14 1, 23 | predestination must be passion in the ~predestined.~Aquin.:
15 1, 23 | matter imply of themselves ~passion - for example, the actions
16 1, 23 | the patient in respect to ~passion and this is in the thing
17 1, 28 | as motion, and ~likewise passion; still it does not follow
18 1, 28 | not follow that action and passion are ~the same; because action
19 1, 28 | the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as ~of
20 1, 28 | half; or on action and ~passion, as the doer and the deed,
21 1, 41 | action is of itself to cause passion. But ~we do not place passions
22 1, 41 | mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement ~
23 1, 41 | which result from action and passion, and therefore it was ~necessary
24 1, 41 | movement, naturally ~involves passion; but action in that sense
25 1, 44 | OBJ 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of
26 1, 44 | 2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Passion is an effect of action.
27 1, 45 | existing. But as action and ~passion coincide as to the substance
28 1, 45 | is after the action and passion ~whose term it is, and as
29 1, 45 | as it exists, action and passion cease. ~Therefore creation
30 1, 45 | removed from ~action and passion, only relation remains,
31 1, 45 | of its being; even as in passion, which ~implies movement,
32 1, 54 | something ~beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting;
33 1, 56 | understanding is a kind of passion. ~But nothing is moved by
34 1, 63 | from the inclination of passion or of ~habit; even though
35 1, 63 | the demons. ~Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence;
36 1, 63 | is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting
37 1, 63 | first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, ~so
38 1, 63 | nature to some inordinate ~passion, as some people are said
39 1, 64 | God and the effect of His passion, they would never have ~
40 1, 41 | action is of itself to cause passion. But ~we do not place passions
41 1, 41 | mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement ~
42 1, 41 | which result from action and passion, and therefore it was ~necessary
43 1, 41 | movement, naturally ~involves passion; but action in that sense
44 1, 45 | OBJ 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of
45 1, 45 | 2 Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: Passion is an effect of action.
46 1, 46 | existing. But as action and ~passion coincide as to the substance
47 1, 46 | is after the action and passion ~whose term it is, and as
48 1, 46 | as it exists, action and passion cease. ~Therefore creation
49 1, 46 | removed from ~action and passion, only relation remains,
50 1, 46 | of its being; even as in passion, which ~implies movement,
51 1, 55 | something ~beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting;
52 1, 57 | understanding is a kind of passion. ~But nothing is moved by
53 1, 64 | from the inclination of passion or of ~habit; even though
54 1, 64 | the demons. ~Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence;
55 1, 64 | is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting
56 1, 64 | first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, ~so
57 1, 64 | nature to some inordinate ~passion, as some people are said
58 1, 65 | God and the effect of His passion, they would never have ~
59 1, 77 | first sensitive." But ~passion is not divided against its
60 1, 78 | way to be passive"; taking passion in the third ~sense. And
61 1, 78 | objection is verified of passion in the first and ~second
62 1, 78 | But in the third sense ~passion is in anything which is
63 1, 78 | if the action and the ~passion are referred to the same
64 1, 78 | power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since habits ~
65 1, 78 | of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the
66 1, 81 | simple affections without ~passion or commotion of the soul,
67 1, 81 | any sudden movement of a passion, but from ~a judgment of
68 1, 84 | first place there is the passion ~of the passive intellect
69 1, 94 | therefore ~Adam had no passion with evil as its object;
70 1, 94 | to subdue ~superabundant passion, in so far as they are in
71 1, 94 | the one ~affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow.
72 1, 96 | sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of innocence
73 1, 96 | Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state ~
74 1, 96 | Para. 1/2~I answer that, "Passion" may be taken in two senses.
75 1, 96 | natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action;
76 1, 96 | disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in ~a general
77 1, 96 | for ~he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death,
78 1, 96 | 1~Reply OBJ 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment,
79 1, 96 | passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the ~perfection
80 1, 110 | malicious act and ~unclean passion is contrived by the demons
81 1, 110 | another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive
82 1, 110 | consent to, or to resist, the passion.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[
83 1, 110 | of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive ~appetite.
84 1, 112 | good by reason ~of a sinful passion, so also do they depart
85 1, 114 | the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception
86 2, 1 | divided into action and passion, each of these receives
87 2, 1 | principle of ~acting, and passion from the act which is the
88 2, 1 | heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else than a ~
89 2, 1 | something, considered as passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3]
90 2, 6 | For just ~as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But
91 2, 6 | the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later
92 2, 6 | and ~arises from some passion or habit: or when one does
93 2, 8 | quality," or "action," or ~"passion"; whereas the good which
94 2, 9 | evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite ~
95 2, 9 | as man is ~affected by a passion, something seems to him
96 2, 9 | respect of the ~man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far
97 2, 9 | as he is subject to that ~passion, the sensitive appetite
98 2, 9 | concupiscence, or some like passion, ~by reason of the influence
99 2, 10 | moved of necessity by a passion of ~the lower appetite.
100 2, 10 | concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will ~is
101 2, 10 | moved of necessity by a passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
102 2, 10 | s power to cast aside a ~passion once. Therefore it is not
103 2, 10 | will that to ~which the passion inclines him.~Aquin.: SMT
104 2, 10 | something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved
105 2, 10 | above (Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the ~sensitive appetite
106 2, 10 | such and such ~a way by a passion, judges something to be
107 2, 10 | thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a ~
108 2, 10 | Now this influence of a ~passion on man occurs in two ways.
109 2, 10 | entirely engrossed by the passion, ~so that the judgment of
110 2, 10 | and not subject to the ~passion, the will's movement, which
111 2, 10 | necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently,
112 2, 10 | will in that man, and the passion alone holds ~its sway: or
113 2, 10 | necessarily ~follow the passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
114 2, 10 | is entirely engrossed by ~passion, as in a madman. But sometimes,
115 2, 10 | although reason is clouded by ~passion, yet something of this reason
116 2, 10 | man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold
117 2, 10 | not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, ~
118 2, 10 | it ~does according to a passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
119 2, 10 | good independently of a ~passion of the sensitive appetite.
120 2, 10 | do many things without ~passion, and through choice alone;
121 2, 10 | wherein reason resists passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[
122 2, 14 | act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the ~
123 2, 15 | something, ~through some passion; desire, for instance, or
124 2, 15 | irrational ~animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.~
125 2, 15 | The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the ~
126 2, 15 | able not to follow the ~passion: whereas irrational animals
127 2, 15 | even on account of some passion of the soul. ~Therefore
128 2, 17 | his body, to this or ~that passion. Secondly, as consequent
129 2, 20 | Phys. iii, 3), action and ~passion are one act. But the passion
130 2, 20 | passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ's
131 2, 20 | Reply OBJ 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order,
132 2, 22 | 1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?~(2) Whether
133 2, 22 | in the soul?~(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather
134 2, 22 | apprehensive ~part?~(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite
135 2, 22 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether any passion is in the soul?~Aquin.:
136 2, 22 | would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because ~passivity
137 2, 22 | Therefore there is no passion in ~the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
138 2, 22 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated
139 2, 22 | De Anima i, 3. Therefore passion ~is not in the soul.~Aquin.:
140 2, 22 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption;
141 2, 22 | corruption; since "every passion, ~when increased, alters
142 2, 22 | incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.~Aquin.:
143 2, 22 | is lost. And here we have passion in ~its most proper acceptation.
144 2, 22 | understanding as being a kind of ~passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion,
145 2, 22 | passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss
146 2, 22 | transmutation; wherefore ~passion properly so called cannot
147 2, 22 | more ~of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the
148 2, 22 | sorrow ~is more properly a passion than joy.~Aquin.: SMT FS
149 2, 22 | understanding is a ~kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii,
150 2, 22 | This argument is true of passion accompanied by ~transmutation
151 2, 22 | to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not ~
152 2, 22 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether passion is in the appetitive rather
153 2, 22 | OBJ 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part
154 2, 22 | stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is found to ~be in the apprehensive,
155 2, 22 | unless there be a previous passion in the ~apprehensive part.
156 2, 22 | apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the apprehensive part
157 2, 22 | for action is ~contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part
158 2, 22 | Therefore it seems that passion is more in the ~apprehensive
159 2, 22 | sensitive apprehension. But passion ~in the soul occurs, properly
160 2, 22 | transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive
161 2, 22 | stated (A[1]) the word "passion" ~implies that the patient
162 2, 22 | evident that the nature of passion ~is consistent with the
163 2, 22 | increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, ~because
164 2, 22 | little potentiality and passion: while in other ~things,
165 2, 22 | apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found less than in the
166 2, 22 | evident that the notion of passion is more ~consistent with
167 2, 22 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite
168 2, 22 | OBJ 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive
169 2, 22 | sensible good. Therefore passion is in the intellectual ~
170 2, 22 | force, the more intense the ~passion. But the object of the intellectual
171 2, 22 | particular good. Therefore passion is more ~consistent with
172 2, 22 | describing ~the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive
173 2, 22 | or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of ~the irrational
174 2, 22 | As stated above (A[1]) passion is properly to be found ~
175 2, 22 | therefore evident that passion is more properly in the
176 2, 22 | Reply OBJ 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the
177 2, 22 | things that ~are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty
178 2, 22 | like effects, but without passion. Hence ~Augustine says (
179 2, 23 | 3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?~(4)
180 2, 23 | 7. ~Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible
181 2, 23 | properly a concupiscible passion; but ~on account of the
182 2, 23 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of
183 2, 23 | Para. 1/4~I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as
184 2, 23 | Accordingly ~every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends
185 2, 23 | while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, ~tends
186 2, 23 | tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered
187 2, 23 | and this pertains to the ~passion of "despair." In like manner
188 2, 23 | and this belongs to the ~passion of "fear": but it also contains
189 2, 23 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?~
190 2, 23 | It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary.
191 2, 23 | has a contrary. For ~every passion of the soul is either in
192 2, 23 | A[1]). But both kinds of passion ~have their respective modes
193 2, 23 | contrariety. Therefore every passion of ~the soul has its contrary.~
194 2, 23 | 1~OBJ 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good
195 2, 23 | appetitive part. But ~a passion having good for its object,
196 2, 23 | object, is contrary to a passion having ~evil for its object.
197 2, 23 | object. Therefore every passion has a contrary.~Aquin.:
198 2, 23 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect
199 2, 23 | versa. Therefore every ~passion of the soul has a contrary.~
200 2, 23 | the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion
201 2, 23 | passion of the soul. But no passion is set ~down as being contrary
202 2, 23 | 5. Therefore ~not every passion has a contrary.~Aquin.:
203 2, 23 | 1/4~I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in
204 2, 23 | which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a ~movement
205 2, 23 | present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to ~anger according
206 2, 23 | belongs to joy, ~which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.~
207 2, 23 | 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
208 2, 23 | and this ~belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding
209 2, 23 | and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": ~
210 2, 23 | respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or ~"dislike."
211 2, 23 | and this belongs to the passion ~of "delight" or "joy";
212 2, 23 | obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is no ~longer
213 2, 23 | present gives rise to the passion of "anger."~Aquin.: SMT
214 2, 23 | which has not ~contrary passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[
215 2, 24 | soul?~(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?~(
216 2, 24 | evil?~(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the
217 2, 24 | an act?~(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?~
218 2, 24 | 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
219 2, 24 | other ~animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good
220 2, 24 | Para. 1/1~Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?~
221 2, 24 | morally ~evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.~
222 2, 24 | movement contrary to nature is ~passion." But in movements of the
223 2, 24 | will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds
224 2, 24 | 1~Reply OBJ 2: In every passion there is an increase or
225 2, 24 | derives the ~character of passion. But there is no need for
226 2, 24 | But there is no need for passion to deviate always ~from
227 2, 24 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether passion increases or decreases the
228 2, 24 | It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of
229 2, 24 | the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of
230 2, 24 | friendship and pity." Therefore ~passion decreases the goodness of
231 2, 24 | deeds without than with a passion of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
232 2, 24 | moral evil is lessened by passion: for he sins ~less, who
233 2, 24 | sins ~less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately.
234 2, 24 | deed, who does well without passion, than he who does with ~
235 2, 24 | than he who does with ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[
236 2, 24 | Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of ~pity is obedient to
237 2, 24 | moral good. Therefore a ~passion of the soul does not lessen
238 2, 24 | the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is ~evil, they
239 2, 24 | consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the ~
240 2, 24 | reason than from the mere passion ~of pity. In the second
241 2, 24 | movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence,
242 2, 24 | chooses to be affected by a ~passion in order to work more promptly
243 2, 24 | sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the
244 2, 24 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: A passion that tends to evil, and
245 2, 24 | Thes. Para. 1/1~Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?~
246 2, 24 | 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil
247 2, 24 | species, it seems that no passion is good or evil ~according
248 2, 24 | object. ~If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according
249 2, 24 | clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil ~according
250 2, 24 | there is no species of passion that is not to be found ~
251 2, 24 | man alone. Therefore no passion of ~the soul is good or
252 2, 24 | modesty ~is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions
253 2, 24 | that the ~species of a passion, as the species of an act,
254 2, 24 | the species of an act or passion. ~Secondly, according to
255 2, 24 | belong to the ~species of a passion, in so far as the object
256 2, 24 | as the object to which a passion tends, ~is, of itself, in
257 2, 25 | But the ~concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil,
258 2, 25 | it is evident that every passion of ~the irascible faculty
259 2, 25 | terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting ~rest, viz. either
260 2, 25 | Moreover, the irascible passion removes the ~obstacle that
261 2, 25 | concupiscence, ~which is the same passion as desire. But "things are
262 2, 25 | each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a
263 2, 25 | seems to be a stronger ~passion than daring, and daring,
264 2, 25 | presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as ~stated
265 2, 25 | evil gives rise to the ~passion of anger.~Aquin.: SMT FS
266 2, 25 | love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and sadness, ~
267 2, 25 | be reckoned a ~principal passion, because it is an effect
268 2, 25 | which cannot be a ~principal passion, as we shall state further
269 2, 25 | anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from
270 2, 26 | power?~(2) Whether love is a passion?~(3) Whether love is the
271 2, 26 | be identified with every passion: for ~Augustine says (De
272 2, 26 | sadness." ~But not every passion is in the concupiscible
273 2, 26 | Para. 1/1~Whether love is a passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
274 2, 26 | seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a ~passion.
275 2, 26 | passion. For no power is a ~passion. But every love is a power,
276 2, 26 | Therefore love is not a passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
277 2, 26 | a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a ~relation.
278 2, 26 | Therefore love is not a passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
279 2, 26 | Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a ~movement. But love
280 2, 26 | Therefore love is not ~a passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
281 2, 26 | viii, 5) that "love is a ~passion."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
282 2, 26 | Para. 1/1~I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent
283 2, 26 | is evident that love is a passion: ~properly so called, according
284 2, 26 | expressed by way of ~act or passion; and "charity" can be taken
285 2, 26 | which is concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil,
286 2, 26 | was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as ~
287 2, 26 | concupiscence. For "love is a passion, while ~friendship is a
288 2, 26 | same division as love, as a passion ~distinct from love. Therefore
289 2, 27 | love?~(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of
290 2, 27 | Para. 1/1~Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of
291 2, 27 | would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. ~
292 2, 27 | give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore ~another passion
293 2, 27 | passion. Therefore ~another passion is a cause of love.~Aquin.:
294 2, 27 | 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because
295 2, 27 | usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.~Aquin.:
296 2, 27 | that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not ~
297 2, 27 | reason is that every other passion of ~the soul implies either
298 2, 27 | not possible for any other passion of the soul to be ~universally
299 2, 27 | happen that some other ~passion is the cause of some particular
300 2, 28 | love?~(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?~(
301 2, 28 | he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive ~
302 2, 28 | Para. 1/1~Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?~Aquin.:
303 2, 28 | Therefore love is a wounding ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[
304 2, 28 | corruptive and a wounding passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[
305 2, 28 | wounding and corruptive passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[
306 2, 28 | Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves ~
307 2, 28 | material ~element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain
308 2, 28 | to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, ~
309 2, 28 | from love. ~For love is a passion, as stated above (Q[26],
310 2, 28 | not do ~everything from passion: but some things he does
311 2, 28 | objection takes love as a passion existing in the ~sensitive
312 2, 28 | every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also ~from love
313 2, 29 | hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite,
314 2, 30 | concupiscence is a specific passion?~(3) Whether some concupiscences
315 2, 30 | concupiscence is a specific passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[
316 2, 30 | concupiscence is not a specific passion of the ~concupiscible power.
317 2, 30 | concupiscence is not a specific passion ~of the concupiscible faculty.~
318 2, 30 | concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible faculty.~
319 2, 30 | OBJ 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty
320 2, 30 | is a ~specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated
321 2, 30 | A[4]). ~But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty
322 2, 30 | concupiscence is not ~a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.~
323 2, 30 | passions, as a specific ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[
324 2, 30 | Accordingly, concupiscence is a passion differing "in species" ~
325 2, 30 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: The passion which is directly contrary
326 2, 30 | since ~concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive
327 2, 31 | 1) Whether delight is a passion?~(2) Whether delight is
328 2, 31 | 1/1~Whether delight is a passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[
329 2, 31 | seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De ~Fide
330 2, 31 | distinguishes operation from passion, and says that ~"operation
331 2, 31 | accord with nature, while passion is a ~movement contrary
332 2, 31 | Therefore delight is not a ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[
333 2, 31 | Therefore delight is not a ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[
334 2, 31 | Therefore delight is not a ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[
335 2, 31 | apprehension ~of sense, it is a passion of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
336 2, 31 | 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those ~
337 2, 31 | sense delight is called a passion.~~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[
338 2, 31 | 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in
339 2, 31 | is a passion. But every passion is in the ~sensitive appetite.
340 2, 31 | Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, ~when
341 2, 33 | But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore expansion
342 2, 35 | inquiry:~(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?~(2) Whether
343 2, 35 | Para. 1/1~Whether pain is a passion of the soul?~Aquin.: SMT
344 2, 35 | seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no ~
345 2, 35 | of the soul. Because no ~passion of the soul is in the body.
346 2, 35 | Therefore pain is not a passion ~of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
347 2, 35 | 1~OBJ 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
348 2, 35 | Therefore pain is ~not a passion of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
349 2, 35 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
350 2, 35 | Therefore pain is not a passion of the ~soul.~Aquin.: SMT
351 2, 35 | sensitive appetite is called a passion, as ~stated above (Q[22],
352 2, 35 | is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily
353 2, 35 | perceived, there ~results the passion of pain in the sensitive
354 2, 35 | the form or species of a passion or ~movement is taken from
355 2, 35 | Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according ~
356 2, 36 | object is the cause of a passion, the present ~evil is more
357 2, 40 | make a different species of passion. ~But possibility of acquisition
358 2, 40 | answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the object.
359 2, 40 | contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty ~
360 2, 41 | inquiry:~(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?~(2) Whether
361 2, 41 | Whether fear is a special passion?~(3) Whether there is a
362 2, 41 | Para. 1/1~Whether fear is a passion of the soul? ~Aquin.: SMT
363 2, 41 | seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For ~Damascene
364 2, 41 | nature." But ~no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic.
365 2, 41 | Therefore fear is ~not a passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
366 2, 41 | 1~OBJ 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the
367 2, 41 | Therefore fear is not a ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
368 2, 41 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement
369 2, 41 | it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
370 2, 41 | chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above (
371 2, 41 | Q[22]~), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement
372 2, 41 | active ~principle: since passion is the effect of an agent.
373 2, 41 | more properly speaking, ~passion is a movement of the appetitive
374 2, 41 | properly the character of passion; ~less, however, than sorrow,
375 2, 41 | Philosopher denies that ~passion is a virtue by way of habit.~
376 2, 41 | Reply OBJ 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due
377 2, 41 | presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the agent ~
378 2, 41 | Whether fear is a special passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
379 2, 41 | that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine ~says (QQ.
380 2, 41 | a special but a general passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
381 2, 41 | Therefore it is not a special passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
382 2, 41 | if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in ~
383 2, 41 | Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it ~belongs to different
384 2, 41 | hence that is a special passion, which has a special object.
385 2, 41 | Consequently fear is a special ~passion of the soul.~Aquin.: SMT
386 2, 41 | though it were a general passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
387 2, 41 | common, yet fear is a special passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[
388 2, 42 | cause, in so far as ~it is a passion resulting from the imagination
389 2, 43 | object, is a cause of ~the passion. Now a thing may be a cause
390 2, 44 | hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, ~which
391 2, 44 | sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of counsel. ~Because
392 2, 44 | when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater ~
393 2, 44 | of right judgment, every passion, ~considered in itself,
394 2, 44 | Reply OBJ 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance
395 2, 45 | fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems ~that daring is
396 2, 45 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But
397 2, 45 | daring cannot be a principal passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[
398 2, 45 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase
399 2, 45 | face the danger not from ~passion but with due deliberation.
400 2, 46 | Whether anger is a special passion?~(2) Whether the object
401 2, 46 | Whether anger is a special passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
402 2, 46 | that anger is not a special passion. For the ~irascible power
403 2, 46 | anger is not one special ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
404 2, 46 | Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion;
405 2, 46 | passion there is a contrary passion; as ~is evident by going
406 2, 46 | them one by one. But no passion is contrary ~to anger, as
407 2, 46 | anger is not a special ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
408 2, 46 | 3: Further, one special passion does not include another.
409 2, 46 | anger is not a ~special passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
410 2, 46 | calls anger a special ~passion: and so does Cicero (De
411 2, 46 | anger is not a general passion but is ~condivided with
412 2, 46 | may be called a general ~passion, as Augustine declares (
413 2, 46 | may be called a general passion, inasmuch ~as it is caused
414 2, 46 | avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of ~contrary
415 2, 46 | love, is a concupiscible passion. ~Therefore anger is in
416 2, 46 | anger ~is a concupiscible passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[
417 2, 46 | not as though the same ~passion which at first was anger,
418 2, 46 | For, ~since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive
419 2, 46 | to whether a ~particular passion is more or less natural
420 2, 46 | reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion,
421 2, 46 | passion. Now the cause of a passion, as ~stated above (Q[36],
422 2, 46 | than desire, or any other passion, is ~to ensue from a natural
423 2, 46 | in ~anger or in any other passion, on account of the moderation
424 2, 46 | disposed to some excess of passion, such as the lion in daring, ~
425 2, 46 | species and nature of a passion are taken from its ~object.
426 2, 46 | to ~him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than
427 2, 46 | although hatred itself is a ~passion ensuing from this disposition.
428 2, 47 | anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul ~but as of judgment
429 2, 47 | through ~ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then,
430 2, 47 | through ignorance or ~through passion, either we are not angry
431 2, 47 | through ignorance or through passion takes ~away from the notion
432 2, 48 | element of anger. But the ~passion of anger forestalls the
433 2, 49 | not indeed an action ~or passion, but something after the
434 2, 49 | the manner of action or passion: thus, ~for instance, something
435 2, 49 | it were, an action or a passion of the haver and ~that which
436 2, 49 | but rather to movement or passion. Now, no ~genus should be
437 2, 49 | in regard to ~action, and passion resulting from its natural
438 2, 49 | in regard to action or ~passion, is considered in the second
439 2, 49 | although they belong to passion and ~movement, and not the
440 2, 50 | Commentary), says that ~passion or passion-like quality,
441 2, 50 | give heat, ~then we have passion, if it is transitory; or
442 2, 50 | be a certain intensity of passion or ~passion-like quality,
443 2, 53 | whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.~Aquin.:
444 2, 56 | to the good of moderated passion, ~which is the proper good
445 2, 57 | not merely from impulse or passion. And, ~since choice is about
446 2, 58 | consistent with an ~abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not
447 2, 58 | a particular case by a ~passion: thus to one who is swayed
448 2, 59 | the ~relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds
449 2, 59 | Whether moral virtue is a passion?~(2) Whether there can be
450 2, 59 | can be moral virtue with passion?~(3) Whether sorrow is compatible
451 2, 59 | moral virtue is about a passion?~(5) Whether there can be
452 2, 59 | be moral virtue without passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
453 2, 59 | Whether moral virtue is a passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
454 2, 59 | seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is ~of
455 2, 59 | Therefore moral virtue is a passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
456 2, 59 | OBJ 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for
457 2, 59 | Dei ~ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.~Aquin.:
458 2, 59 | Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three ~
459 2, 59 | reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive ~
460 2, 59 | even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the
461 2, 59 | movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, ~
462 2, 59 | it is ~evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is
463 2, 59 | vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on
464 2, 59 | of virtue; in so far as a passion ~is either opposed to reason
465 2, 59 | can be moral virtue with passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
466 2, 59 | moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the ~Philosopher says (
467 2, 59 | moral ~virtues are without passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
468 2, 59 | disease. Therefore neither is passion ~compatible with virtue.~
469 2, 59 | grasp the truth." ~Therefore passion is incompatible with moral
470 2, 59 | being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; ~this is
471 2, 59 | virtue is not freedom from passion. It ~may be said, however,
472 2, 59 | understand this of inordinate passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
473 2, 59 | 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment
474 2, 59 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every
475 2, 59 | is not the subject of a passion, as stated ~above (Q[22],
476 2, 59 | passions; now every action and ~passion is followed by pleasure
477 2, 59 | be moral virtue without passion?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
478 2, 59 | moral virtue can be without passion. For the ~more perfect moral
479 2, 59 | it is altogether without ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
480 2, 59 | virtue is altogether without ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
481 2, 59 | does all ~things without passion at all. Therefore the most
482 2, 59 | perfect virtue is ~without any passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
483 2, 59 | Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
484 2, 59 | justice cannot be ~without passion; and still less can the
485 2, 59 | proper act, which is not a passion. ~Nevertheless, joy results
486 2, 59 | in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased
487 2, 59 | the more does it cause passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
488 2, 59 | Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate ~passion.~
489 2, 59 | passion; it produces ordinate ~passion.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[
490 2, 59 | inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.~Aquin.:
491 2, 59 | angels is ~altogether without passion, as it is without a body:
492 2, 59 | operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced
493 2, 60 | answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation
494 2, 60 | reason of some inordinate passion of ~the soul. In such cases
495 2, 60 | consider ~operation and passion as concurring in the same
496 2, 60 | whereas ~the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive
497 2, 60 | virtues are directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure.~Aquin.:
498 2, 60 | objects of the same specific passion; ~because operations do
499 2, 60 | corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one
500 2, 60 | that particular ~kind of passion. Consequently there are
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