2. As for the second condition, that the Church remain silent as to its
thought concerning private property and the family, it also appears to us to be
unacceptable, in view not only of the total incompatibility between Communism
and Catholic doctrine but also ‑ and especially ‑ of the right of
property in its relation to the love of God, the virtue of justice, and the
sanctification of souls.
This second condition is rejected first of all on the
basis of a reason of a general kind. The Communist doctrine, atheistic,
materialistic, relativistic, and evolutionist, collides in the most radical way
with the Catholic concept of a personal God, who promulgated for mankind a Law
which contains all the principles of morality fixed, immutable, and in agreement
with the natural order. Communist "culture," considered in all its
aspects and in each one of them, leads to the denial of morality and of law.
The collision of Communism with the Church does not occur then merely in the
matter of the family and property. And so it is that the Church would have to
be silent about all morality and about all notion of law.
Therefore, we do not see what tactical result would be
achieved by such an "ideological armistice" between Catholics and
Communists, that is, one circumscribed to these two points, if the ideological
struggle continued in respect to all the other points.
****************
Let us consider, however, for the sake of argument
the hypothesis of the Church remaining silent in regard only to the family and
private property.
It is so absurd to admit that the Church accept
restrictions in her preaching in matters concerning the family that we shall
not even detain ourselves in an analysis of this hypothesis.
But let us imagine that a Communist State were to give
the Church complete liberty to preach about the family but not about private
property. In such a case, what should our response be?
At first glance, one would say that the mission of the
Church consists essentially in promoting the knowledge and love of God, rather
than in advocating or maintaining a political, social, or economic regime. And
that souls can know and love God without being instructed about the principle
of private property.
It would seem then that the Church should be able to
agree as a lesser evil to a compromise in which She would keep silent about the
right of property in order to receive in exchange the freedom to instruct and
sanctify souls, speaking to them of God and the eternal destiny of man, and
administering to them the sacraments.
****************
This way of looking at the teaching and sanctifying
mission of the Church collides with a preliminary objection. If any given
earthly government demanded, as a condition for the Church's liberty, that She
renounce the preaching of any one of the precepts of the Law, She could not
accept this liberty, which would only be a sham.
We affirm that this liberty would be a sham because
the teaching mission of the Church has as its objective the teaching of a
doctrine which is an indivisible whole. Either She is free to fulfill the mandate
of Our Lord Jesus Christ, teaching that whole, or She must consider herself
oppressed and persecuted. If her complete liberty is not recognized, She must ‑
due to her militant nature ‑ fight against the oppressor. The Church
cannot accept a partial silencing of her teaching function nor a partial oppression
in order to obtain a partial liberty. It would be a complete betrayal of her mission.
***
Besides this preliminary objection, based on the
teaching mission of the Church, it is necessary to raise another one,
concerning her function as the educator of the human will for the attainment of
sanctity.
This objection is based on the fact that a clear
knowledge of the principle of private property and respect for this principle
in practice are absolutely necessary for a truly Christian formation of souls:
a) FROM THE P01NT OF VIEW OF THE LOVE OF GOD: The
knowledge and love of the Law are inseparable from the knowledge and love of
God. For the Law is in a certain way the mirror of the Divine Sanctity. And
this, which one can say of each of its precepts, is principally true when it is
considered as a whole. To renounce the teaching of the two precepts of the
Decalogue which form the foundation of private property would be the same as to
present a disfigured image of this whole and, therefore, of God Himself. Now,
where souls have a disfigured idea of God, they are formed according to an erroneous
model, which is incompatible with true sanctification.
b) FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUE OF
JUSTICE: The cardinal virtues are, as the name says, the hinges upon which all
sanctity is supported. For a soul to sanctify itself, it must know them
rightly, love them sincerely, and practice them genuinely.
It happens that the whole notion of justice is founded
upon the principle that every man, his neighbor individually considered, and
human society are the holders respectively of rights, to which there
correspond naturally obligations. In other words, the notions of
"mine" and "thine" are to be found in the very foundation
of the concept ofjustice.
Now it is precisely the notion of "mine" and
“thine” which in economic matters leads directly and ineluctably to the
principle of private property.
Hence it is that, without the right knowledge of the
legitimacy and of the extension of private property, and moreover of its
limitation, there is no right knowledge of the cardinal virtue of justice. And
without that knowledge, a true love and a true practice of justice are
impossible; in short, sanctification is impossible.
c) FROM A MORE GENERAL P01NT OF VIEW ‑ THAT OF
THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL, AND OF ITS SANCTIFICATION: The
explanation of this argument presupposes as given that the right formation of
the intelligence and the will is, under various aspects, favorable to
sanctification and, under other aspects, even identified with it. And it
presupposes that, on the contrary, everything prejudicial to the right
formation of the intellect and will is, under various aspects, incompatible
with sanctification.
We are going to show that a society in which private
property does not exist is gravely opposed to the right development of the
faculties of the soul, especially of the will. And for this reason it is in
itself incompatible with the sanctification of men.
In passing, we shall also refer, for analogous reasons,
to other consequences of the community of goods, those that are prejudicial to
the culture of the people and its development. We shall do this because the
true development of culture is not only a factor favorable to the
sanctification of the people but also a fruit of that sanctification.
Accordingly, a proper cultural life is intimately connected with our theme.
Let us approach the question by making clear an
essential point frequently forgotten by those who treat the institution of
private property, that is, it is necessary to the equilibrium and to the
sanctification of men.
To justify this thesis, we should recall first that
the pontifical documents, when they treat of capital, labor, and the social
problem, leave not the least doubt about the fact that private property is not
only legitimate but also indispensable to the individual as well as to the
common good ‑ indispensable for both the material interests of man and
for that of his soul.
It is indeed certain that these same papal documents
have vehemently risen up against the numerous excesses and abuses that
beginning, in the main, in the nineteenth century, have occurred in the matter
of private property. But the fact that the abuses men make of an institution
are very reprehensible and pernicious does not mean absolutely that the institution
is not intrinsically excellent. Rather, one should tend in most instances to
think the contrary: “corruptio optimi pessima" ‑ the worst is
perhaps almost always the corruption of what is in itself the best. Nothing is
so sacred and holy, in itself, andfrom every point of view, as the priesthood.
Nothing
is worse than its corruption. And for this same reason one understands
why the Holy See, so severely opposed to the abuses of private property, is
even more severe when curbing the abuses of the priesthood.
There are many reasons why the institution of private
property is indispensable to individuals, families, and peoples. A complete
exposition of these reasons would exceed the scope of this work. Let us limit
ourselves to the explanation of that which is most directly important to our
theme: As we affirmed recently, this institution is necessary to the
equilibrium and sanctification of man.
Being naturally endowed with intelligence and with will,
man tends, by his own spiritual faculties to provide everything necessary for
his welfare; from whence comes a certain number of rights. Accordingly, he has
the right to seek for himself the things that he needs and to appropriate them
when they have no owner. He also has the right of providing, in a stable way,
for the necessities of tomorrow by taking possession of the ground,
cultivating it, and producing for this cultivation his instruments of labor.
In short, it is because he has a soul that man irrefragably tends to be an
owner. And it is in this, say Leo XIII and St. Pius X, that this position in
relation to material goods distinguishes him from irrational animals:
"Man has not only the simple use of earthly goods, as do the brutes, but
also the right of stable ownership, in respect to both those goods which use
consumes and those which use does not consume." (Encylical Rerum Novarum).
(St.Pius X, "Motu Propio" on Catholic Popular Action, Dec. 18, 1903 ‑
ASS, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 341‑343).
Now, since, in the case of man, directing his own
destiny and providing his own subsistence is the proximate, necessary, and
constant object of the exercise of the intelligence and the will, and owning
property is the normal means for him to be sure and to feel sure of his future
and to be his own master and to feel that he is his own master, it follows that
to abolish private property, and as a consequence deliver the individual like a
helpless ant to the direction of the State, is to deprive his mind of some of
the basic conditions for its normal functioning; it is to cause the atrophy of
the faculties of the soul through lack of exercise; it is, in short, to deform
it profoundly. Whence arises, to a great extent, the sadness that characterizes
the populations subjected to Communism, as well as the tedium, the neurosis,
and the suicides which are becoming more and more frequent in certain highly
socialized countries of the Occident.
It is indeed well known that the unexercised faculties
of the soul tend to atrophy. It is also known, however, that adequate exercise
can develop these faculties, at times even prodigiously. Upon this fact are
founded a great number of didactic and ascetic practices approved by the
greatest masters and consecrated by experience.
Since sanctity is the perfection of the soul, it is
easy to understand how important the foregoing conclusions are to the salvation
and sanctification of men. The condition of proprietorship, of itself, creates
circumstances highly propitious for the right and virtuous exercise of the
faculties of the soul. Without accepting the utopian ideal of a society in
which each individual, without exception, is a proprietor, or in which there
are not unequal fortunes, great, medium, and small, it behooves us to affirm that
the greatest possible diffusion of property favors the spiritual welfare, and
obviously the cultural as well, not only of individuals and families but also
of society. On the other hand, proletarization creates conditions highly
unfavorable to the salvation, sanctification, and cultural formation of peoples,
families, and individuals.
For greater facility of exposition, let us consider
now some objections to the argument expounded under this letter "c":
Do those who are not proprietors go insane in a
society where there is private property? Is it impossible for them to sanctify
themselves?
In responding to this objection, it is reasonable for
us to consider the fact that private property is an institution which favors
nonproprietors indirectly, but in a very genuine way. For when a great number
of persons take adequate advantage of the moral and cultural benefits which the
condition of ownership confers upon them, there results therefrom an elevated
social environment, which by the natural communication of souls favors even the
non-owners. Accordingly, the situation in which the non-owners find
themselves in such a society is not identical with that of individuals living
in a regime where no private property exists.
Is private property then the cause of the moral and
cultural elevation of the peoples?
We say that property is a most important condition
for the spiritual and cultural good of individuals, families, and peoples. We
do not say it is the cause of sanctification. It is like the freedom of the
Church, which is a condition for her development. But the Church, persecuted,
flourished admirably in the catacombs. It would be exaggerated to say, for
example, that it necessarily follows that the more diffused the institution of
property,the more virtuous and cultured the people will be. This would amount
to making that which is supernatural depend on matter and that which is
cultural depend on the economy.
However, it is certain that it is not licit for any
people to contravene the designs of Providence by abolishing an institution,
such as private property, which has been imposed by the natural order of
things, and institution constituting a very important condition for the good of
souls both in the religious and the cultural planes. And any people proceeding
in this way prepares the factors for its moral and cultural degradation and,
therefore, for its complete ruin.
If this is so, how was it possible for so much culture
to exist in Imperial Rome where the majority of the population consisted of
proletarians and slaves? And how was it possible for several slaves, both in
Rome and in Greece, to attain an elevated moral and cultural level?
The difference between a
brightly lighted room and one with only a flickering light is not as great as
the difference between a room with only a flickering light and one in total
darkness. This is so because the evil produced by the total lack of an important
good ‑ in this case, the light ‑ is always incomparably greater
than that produced by the insufficiency of this good. The Roman society had,
though to a lesser degree than was desirable, a vast and cultured propertied
class: whence the existence in the Empire, at least in a certain proportion, of
the cultural benefits of property. The situation would be very different in a
country entirely deprived of a propertied class; from this point of view, it
would be in complete darkness.
Some person may perhaps object that experience
contradicts this theoretical conclusion, since among the Russian people there
is an undeniable cultural and technical progress in spite of the community of
goods imposed by the Marxist regime.
Even here the response is not difficult.
It is obvious that the resources drained from the four
cardinal points of the compass of this vast empire are subject to the will of
the Soviet government. It disposes arbitrarily of the talents, the work, and of
the production of hundreds of millions of persons.
Accordingly, we see that the Soviet government was by
no means lacking in the resources needed to construct a certain number of
artificial environments which would represent for it a great technical or
cultural development (an anti‑cultural development, we should more
properly say). Without denying the volume of the results obtained in this way,
we nevertheless can legitimately express some surprise that they are not much
greater, since a totally anti-natural Moloch State that does not produce
Moloch results in the artificial order is not really effectual.
Moreover, this hot‑house intellectual flowering
is entirely cut off from the population. It does not constitute a product of
the society. It does not result from a germination in the womb of the society.
Rather it is obtained outside of it and with the blood extracted therefrom. It
grows and manifests itself outside of society and, in a certain sense, against
it.
Such production is not the index of the culture of a
nation, just as the products of a hot‑house on an abandoned rural
property are not a valid proof of the suitable cultivation of that property.
Returning now to the objection concerning Imperial
Rome, we note that there were slaves, it is true, who attained surprising moral
and intellectual levels: marvels of grace in the moral plane, and of nature, which
even now fill us with wonder. These glorious exceptions, however, are not
sufficient to deny the obvious truth that the servile condition is, in itself,
oppressive and harmful for the soul of the slave from both the religious and
the cultural point of view. And they are not sufficient to deny another obvious
truth: that slavery, already in itself morally and culturally noxious, would
have been incomparably more so for the slaves of antiquity if there had been
no patricians and freemen and society had been composed only of men with
neither autonomy nor property, such as occurs in a Communist regime.
But someone will finally ask is the religious state,
then, not intrinsically harmful to souls, in view of the vows of obedience and
poverty which constitute it? Don't these vows hamper man's tendency to provide
for himself?
The answer is easy. This state is highly beneficial
to souls which grace attracts to exceptional ways. If this state were to be
lived by a whole society, it would be harmful, for that which is suitable for
exceptions is not suitable for all. For this reason, the community of goods
among the faithful was never generalized in the primitive Church and ended up,
being eliminated. It is notable also that the Communist‑Protestant
experiences of certain collective bodies in the 16th century resulted in
spectacular failures.
***
These multiple arguments and objections having been
pondered, the thesis holds good that it is vain to keep silent about the
immorality of a complete community of goods in order to obtain, in return for
this silence, the sanctification of souls through freedom of worship and a
relative freedom of preaching.
Moreover, even though this monstrous pact were
accepted, not even by these means would the dreamed of coexistence be
practical. Indeed, in a society without private property, the upright souls
would always tend, by the very dynamism of their virtue, to create conditions
favorable for themselves. For everything that exists tends to fight for its own
survival by destroying adverse circumstances and by implanting propitious
ones. On the other hand, anything ceasing to fight against circumstances
gravely unfavorable to itself is destroyed by them.
Whence it is that virtue would be in a perpetual
struggle against the Communist society where it flourished, and would tend
perpetually to eliminate the community of goods. And the Communist society
would be in a perpetual struggle against virtue and would tend to asphyxiate
it. All this is just exactly the opposite of the dreamed of coexistence.
3. In regard to the third condition, it seems to us to
be equally unacceptable, for the necessity of tolerating a lesser evil cannot
lead to the renouncing of its total destruction.
When the Church resolves to tolerate a lesser evil,
She does not thereby imply that this evil should not be combated with all
efficiency. All the more so when this "lesser" evil is most grave in
itself.
In other words, the Church must form in the faithful,
and renew in them at every moment, a most vivid regret that it was necessary to
accept the lesser evil. And with this regret, She must raise up in them the
efficacious resolution to do everything to remove the circumstances that made
it necessary to accept the lesser evil.
Now, acting thus, the Church would destroy the
possibility of coexistence. And moreover, it seems to us, She could not act in
any other way within the imperatives of her sublime mission.
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