Book, Chapter

 1   II, 6 |       which produces from itself sensible objects should itself be
 2   II, 6 | therefore it must also itself be sensible. Also they argue: that cannot
 3   II, 6 |  sensibility, a part of which is sensible; therefore, because man
 4   II, 6 |        therefore, because man is sensible, the world, of which man
 5   II, 6 |     endowed with sense is itself sensible; and that that possesses
 6   II, 6 |       sensibility because man is sensible, therefore it follows that,
 7   IV, 6 |       the second God visible and sensible. But I use the term sensible,
 8   IV, 6 |     sensible. But I use the term sensible, not because He Himself
 9  VII, 3 |         depths, that it might be sensible of no pain from continual
10  VII, 5 |         body, that he may not be sensible of it. But now, since man
11  VII, 12|   eternal. The soul, he says, is sensible even of disease of the body,
12  VII, 20|        capable of suffering, and sensible of punishment? For if it
13  VII, 20|         is plain that it will be sensible of pain, and even of death.