2.

 However, in the confirmation of the rule of the Order of Friars Minor by Honorius III, Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Alexander IV, Nicholas III, Our predecessors the Supreme Pontiffs, they assert [that] these words are contained: "This is the evangelical rule of Christ, the imitator of the Apostles, who had nothing in this world [either] as their own or in common, but in [those] things which were used, [merely] the simplex usum facti." presuming to add to these that the aforementioned Supreme Pontiffs and many general councils have defined it by the key of knowledge, that the poverty of Christ and the Apostles consisted in the perfect expropriation of whatever temporal dominon, civil and mundane, and that even their sustenance consisted solely and merely in the usus facti, from which they strive to conclude, that it has not been licit nor is it licit for their sucessors to change anything against the aforemention things. And for that reason when Our constitution in the aforesaid doctrine defined (as they assert) things contrary to the definitions of Our aforesaid predecessors, they satisfy themselves to conclude, although falsely, that is was not lawful for us to declare or establish that Christ and the Apostles in those things, which they had, had not only the simplex usus facti, but [also] the usus faciendi of them, and that scripture testifies that they did those things, by declaring [i.e. when it declared] heretical the pertinacious assertion of [those who] say that these same men did not have the least right of this kind, since [such ones] infer that the deeds of these men were not just—which is a wicked thing to say about Christ. Likewise, since the constitution : "Ad conditorem canonum," asserted against the aforesaid definitions that the Friars Minor can not have the simplex usus facti in anything, they strive similarly to argue against it.

On account of which moreover, since it was previously mentioned in the aforesaid consideration, namely, that "It is not licit for their sucessors to call again into doubt those things, which were defined once for all by the key of knowledge in faith or morals by the Supreme Pontiffs, although it is otherwise," so they say, " in reagrds to those things, which have been ordained by the Supreme Pontiffs by [means of] the key of power," it is evidently clear from the following things [that] this is directly contrary to the truth. First, indeed following [i.e. in the order presented by] these men, it is clear that the aforesaid assertors, who hold that the spiritual key is by no means knowledge, but a power of binding and loosing, by recoking it to be knowledge, have erred. In favor of which is the definition of the "key", which is given by the doctors [of theology]: "The key is the special power of binding and loosing, with which the ecclesiatic as judge should receive the worthy into the Kingdom, and exculde the unworthy ." Likewise, since the keys, of which We speak, are conferred in the imposition of priestly orders, it is however well established that knowledge is not normally conferred upon the man ordained to the priesthood: wherefore, following [the argument of] these men, it seems that knowledge is not the key, but rather the ability to bind and loose should be said to be the key. Still following [the argument of] these men, they are evidently known to have erred, who reckon that one spiritual key is knowledge, and following [the argument of] these men, of which the authority to discern between [one] leper and another they assert to be a key, and the other [key is] the power of binding and loosing. For they substitute, by means of keys of this kind concering those things, which are of the faith, and other [things], the ability to define [a matter] by means of any constitution. However the keys, which are conferred in priestly orders, by no means extend themselves to such matters, because according to the aforementioned [assertions] simple priests would be able to issue a constitution, which is evidently false. If however they maintain that those keys extend to the general authority, attributed to blessed Peter, and to his successors in the person of the same [i.e. acting in his stead] in the entrusting of the pastoral office, by means of which it seems at least evident to themselves that they have conceeded everything, without which one would be unable to exercise the care of the universal shepherd conveniently or exercise freely its office: besides it is clear that even they themselves have errred. For they say, those things, which are established by the key of knowledge, have one affect, and those things, which are established by the key of power, another, supposing that some things, by the key of knowledge, and others, by the key of power, have been determined or even defined, which is evidently false. For by means of the key of knowledge, or by the authority to discern or examen among [one] leper and another leper, (if We would call this a key), nothing other except the authority to examen [them] is attributed by means of it to him to which it has been given. However to him, to whom is given the authority of deciding concerning anything, there is not understood to have been given [the authority] to define [anything] concerining it. Wherefore it remains, that to establish anything conveniently, or to define it, each of the keys, namely, of examining and defining, is required as necessary; or that to only the key of power does it belong to establish [anything], and even to define [it]; but, just as the material light directs the keybearer in the use of a material key, so likewise he obtains as much as regards this matter from knowledge instead of light. And this Our Savior in making the promise of the keys to blessed Peter seems to have understood expressely, when He immediately adds to that: "And whatever you will bind on earth, shall be bound even in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth, will be loosed even in heavem," making no mention of knowledge.