5.

 On the other hand, it is said that assertors of this kind have asserted that "the abdication of right in regards to property of whatever kind and of its use is holy and meritorious for God's sake, and that this was observed by Christ Himself in regards to Himself, [that it was] imposed upon the Apostles, and [that is was] assumed by them under a vow. Nor on this account is the usus facti for the sustenance of nature as regards Christ and the Apostles proven conclusively to be not just, but so much more just and more perfect, and more acceptible by God, and more an exemplary to the world, as more fully it was a renunciation of all right, on account of which such using can be both compared with a usus of whatever kind in whatever way and defended in court." Which assertion indeed contains many false things, since neither that Christ observed the aforesaid expropriation of all right in regards to property of whatever kind, or in usus as regards Himself, nor that He imposed this upon the Apostles, nor that [this was done] by a vow that had been taken by themselves, does the evangelical or apostolic history teach, but the contrary is more evidently manifiest. Moreover because in the aforesaid assertion there is added, that "by means of the abdication of the aforesaid right, namely of proptery, this usus facti for the sustenance of nature as regards Christ and the Apostles is not proven conclusively to be not just, but so much more just etc.," it includes an impossibility, and evidently this kind of said error [i.e. as is now explained: ]. For it is impossible that an extrinsic human act be just, if the one exercising the very act have no right to exercise it: indeed such use is necessarily proven conclusively to be not only not just but unjust. Likewise, it is absurd and erroneous, that the act of anyone, not having the right to accomplish an act of this kind, would be more just and more acceptible to God, than [the act] of one having [the right], since one would conclude that an unjust act would appear just and more acceptible to God than a just one.

Moreover from the aforementioned things they strive to infer, as has been shown, that the definition of the aforesaid supreme Pontiffs, which they defined concerning the poverty of Christ and the Apostles and concerning the rule of the aforesaid Friars Minor, (just as they have expressed it above), could not be changed by Us; far from doubt they assert false things, by saying, that Our predecessor have defined such things, as has been proved above, and thus saying besides, while sufficently impugning Our constitutions, they show that those constitutions, on which they support themselves, to be invalid, erroneous, and refuted (if their false assertions would show [themselves to be] true). For if it was not lawful for Us to establish publicly anything against the constitution of Nicholas III, Our precedessor, on which they especially found themselves, neither was it lawful for him to establish or declare anything against the statues of the aforesaid Gregory, Innocent, and Alexander; because nevertheless, according to their assertion, it is evidently known that he did. For since these [Popes] declared, in order that the order of Minors would have the use of those things, which it was lawful for them to have, which necessarily must be referred to the usus juris, as has been proven above, he himself—according to them—truly established that neither the order nor the friars should have the jus utendi, but only just the simplex usus facti, and that in addition he ordained, decreed, and established that this constitution, arrangement, and declaration of his own must be observed no less than precisely and inviolably and for all times by the friars themselves; it is not only well known, that he would have ordained [something] against the declarations of the aforesaid precedessors, but that he himself would have even revoked them, as much as pertains to these things, which his declaration contains. Also Our predecessor himself in his declaration added, that it pertained to the declaration of the Apostolic See and to the arrangement of those things, even concerning those things which he himself had declared, saying thus: "If any ambiguity should emerge in regards the aforesaid things, let this be brought to the peak of the Apostolic See, so that from its apostolic authority—to whom alone has it been conceded to compose statutes in regard to these things, and to explain what has been composed—there may be manifested in this [matter] the intention [of what was to have been expressed]." of which nevertheless the assertors of this kind assert the contrary. Besides it is clear that what they assert is false. For granted that the aforesaid Innocent III interdicted the erection of new religious [orders] in general council, his own sucessors nevertheless, (not withstanding an interdict of this kind), chose to confirm many orders, which (with some exceptions) were even dissolved in a certain measure afterwards by Our predecessor Gregory IX in general council.