Dialogue

  1 1|            no such thing?~HYL. You may as soon persuade me, the
  2 1|           your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry.
  3 1|         perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be
  4 1|       sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested
  5 1|           we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists
  6 1|            denying?~HYL. I think I may be positive in the point.
  7 1|           in a thinking substance; may we not conclude that external
  8 1|           quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance,
  9 1|            a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree
 10 1|          the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have
 11 1|            HYL. By no means.~PHIL. May we not therefore conclude
 12 1|    therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be attributed
 13 1|      attributed to motion?~HYL. It may.~PHIL. It is then good sense
 14 1|      according to you, real sounds may possibly be SEEN OR FELT,
 15 1|           Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest
 16 1|       SENSIBLE QUALITIES.~HYL. You may draw as many absurd consequences
 17 1|        artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.~
 18 1|           vanish.~PHIL. I think it may evidently be concluded from
 19 1|            all mankind beside, you may hold what you please with
 20 1|        fact ever happen?~PHIL. You may at any time make the experiment,
 21 1|         Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform
 22 1|           seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another,
 23 1|          among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it
 24 1|         the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes
 25 1|        PHIL. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without
 26 1|         body? or, because theorems may be made of extension and
 27 1|         say you to PURE INTELLECT? May not abstracted ideas be
 28 1|            that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please
 29 1|            Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind,
 30 1|          be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your
 31 1|            implied in a perception may?~HYL. That is my meaning.~
 32 1|         including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving
 33 1|        sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them EXTERNAL
 34 1|          PHIL. But, that one thing may stand under or support another,
 35 1|            hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist
 36 1|            ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own
 37 1|         have no experience of what may be SUGGESTED by sight?~HYL.
 38 1|         statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to
 39 1|       perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be
 40 1|         least possible such things may really exist. And, as long
 41 1|           our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in our
 42 1|      morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on
 43 2|           of sense?~HYL. Other men may think as they please; but
 44 2|      otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious
 45 2|           Cause of an things, yet, may there not be still a Third
 46 2|         besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate
 47 2|           of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be
 48 2|            suppose; something that may be discovered by reason,
 49 2|            a CAUSE OF THOUGHT? You may, indeed, if you please,
 50 2|       entirely. But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what
 51 2|      instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs,
 52 2|            what hath been said, it may still be an OCCASION.~PHIL.
 53 2|          the laws of disputation I may justly blame you for so
 54 2|          our minds.~PHIL. And what may be the nature of that inactive
 55 2|          other circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the
 56 2|         you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same
 57 2|      possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.~PHIL. I
 58 2|       sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with good
 59 3|         fire or water is?~HYL. You may indeed know that fire appears
 60 3|          least like them. The same may be said of all other real
 61 3|      appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as
 62 3|           thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make
 63 3|        things perceivable by sense may still exist?~PHIL. I can;
 64 3|          having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive
 65 3|          in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with
 66 3|          things, for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I
 67 3|            do not perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular
 68 3|           mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware
 69 3|      however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes
 70 3|      Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what)
 71 3|          as likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those
 72 3|       passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the
 73 3|          is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use
 74 3|        difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are
 75 3|       themselves.~HYL. Things! You may pretend what you please;
 76 3|       microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what
 77 3|             that different persons may perceive the same thing;
 78 3|            THE SAME THING, so they may, upon like occasions, still
 79 3| philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for
 80 3|      identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers
 81 3|     perceived by different persons may yet have the term SAME applied
 82 3|          you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and
 83 3|           their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive
 84 3|     discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external
 85 3|   impressions?~PHIL. I believe you may.~HYL. Explain to me now,
 86 3|           then (and not till then) may you bring the authority
 87 3|           first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently
 88 3|          But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing
 89 3|        What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only
 90 3|            ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. You may indeed raise a dust with
 91 3|        then of the creation?~PHIL. May we not understand it to
 92 3|         things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin
 93 3|            the laws of nature? You may call this a RELATIVE, or
 94 3|           ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single
 95 3|          remaining to be done? You may remember you promised to
 96 3|      objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties
 97 3|   Providence of God, because there may be some particular things
 98 3|          they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter.
 99 3|      unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument,
100 3|     Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed SOMEWHAT), which
101 3|        mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as
102 3|           to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change
103 3|           them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation