Dialogue

 1 1|           touch, more than tangible qualities.~HYL. We do not.~PHIL. It
 2 1|          you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?~
 3 1|           else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible
 4 1|            combinations of sensible qualities?~HYL. Nothing else.~PHIL.
 5 1|         substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.~PHIL. How
 6 1|              But there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality
 7 1|        regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can no more
 8 1|           thus distinguished: those qualities, as perceived by us, are
 9 1|          OUR SENSES. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of
10 1|             have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive,
11 1|             assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar.
12 1|           bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by the
13 1|         cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds
14 1|             the other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist
15 1|             senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there
16 1|              or made up of sensible qualities?~HYL. What a question that
17 1|             substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something
18 1|          something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight: but,
19 1|      nothing distinct from SENSIBLE QUALITIES.~HYL. You may draw as many
20 1|          point as to those sensible qualities which are alone thought
21 1|          all those termed SECONDARY QUALITIES, have certainly no existence
22 1|              you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided
23 1|           or, briefly, ALL SENSIBLE QUALITIES BESIDE THE PRIMARY; which
24 1|           brought against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these
25 1|         includes all other sensible qualities did not also include extension?
26 1| philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should
27 1|          Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there
28 1|             I think so.~PHIL. These qualities, therefore, stripped of
29 1|         from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the
30 1|             from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians
31 1|          and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any
32 1|      regarding what other sensible. qualities it is attended with, as
33 1|            even from other sensible qualities.~HYL. Let me think a little—
34 1|             from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that
35 1|    conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther
36 1|           it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear
37 1|          other visible and tangible qualities?~HYL. You need say no more
38 1|         hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence
39 1|           them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to
40 1|             sensible; its modes and qualities only being perceived by
41 1|         conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist
42 1|       relation it bears to sensible qualities?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Be pleased
43 1|           spread under the sensible qualities or accidents?~HYL. True.~
44 1|          you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really
45 1|      conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive
46 1|        quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together
47 1|             we went through all the qualities by name one after another,
48 1|            prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone
49 1|             them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them
50 1|           mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object
51 1|           words, since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &
52 2|              PHIL. And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?~
53 2|          both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to
54 2|         convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving
55 2|     instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?~
56 2|             it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me
57 2|         will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant
58 2|            those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive,
59 3|     themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should
60 3|          weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really
61 3|          colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot
62 3|             as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects:
63 3|           agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects immediately
64 3|           be no SUBSTRATUM of those qualities but spirit; in which they
65 3|            but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence
66 3|      proportional to those sensible qualities; which to suppose is plainly
67 3|            be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But
68 3|      dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the
69 3|          Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend its
70 3|             and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the
71 3|          figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of
72 3|             from all those sensible qualities, and by its EXISTENCE something
73 3|            stripped of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived
74 3|            a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind.