Dialogue

 1 1|         SECONDARY. The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity,
 2 1|        still then of opinion that EXTENSION and FIGURES are inherent
 3 1|       opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense
 4 1|        the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel?~
 5 1|          it follows that both the extension by you perceived, and that
 6 1|         are each of them the true extension of the mite’s foot; that
 7 1|       from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance
 8 1|          to conclude, there is no extension or figure in an object,
 9 1|         yet I am loath to give up EXTENSION, I see so many odd consequences
10 1|    qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that no
11 1|        that no figure, or mode of extension, which we can either perceive,
12 1|        prior to and distinct from extension to be the SUBSTRATUM of
13 1|           to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension. Be the sensible quality
14 1|     cannot be denied. Figures and extension being despatched, we proceed
15 1|           do but consider that if EXTENSION be once acknowledged to
16 1|        they all evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous
17 1|          each of them. In denying extension, you have denied them all
18 1|    disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect
19 1|     between absolute and sensible extension. Now, though it be acknowledged
20 1|           with regard to ABSOLUTE EXTENSION, which is something abstracted
21 1|        one motion, or one part of extension, from another? Is it not
22 1|          That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in
23 1|         can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any
24 1|        ABSTRACT IDEA of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible
25 1|        even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas
26 1|           easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves,
27 1|           theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any
28 1|          such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular
29 1|          pure abstracted ideas of extension.~HYL. But what say you to
30 1|           Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally perceived
31 1|          to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other
32 1|        beside colour, figure, and extension?~HYL. Nothing.~PHIL. What
33 1|           are coexistent with the extension; is it not?~HYL. That is
34 1|            And consequently under extension?~HYL. I own it.~PHIL. It
35 1|     nature entirely distinct from extension?~HYL. I tell you, extension
36 1|       extension?~HYL. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter
37 1|           from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the SUBSTRATUM
38 1|           to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension?~HYL. Just so.~PHIL. Answer
39 1|           thing be spread without extension? or is not the idea of extension
40 1|  extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in
41 1|   anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension
42 1|       extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which
43 1|           being the SUBSTRATUM of extension, must have in itself another
44 1|       must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified
45 1|    distinct from and exclusive of extension?~HYL. Aye but, Philonous,
46 1|         gross literal sense under extension. The word SUBSTRATUM is
47 1|       mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without
48 1| coexisting in the same place with extension and figures?~HYL. They do.~
49 2|          sensible qualities, even extension itself?~HYL. I do not pretend
50 2|           is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind.
51 3|        extended?~HYL. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to
52 3|          raise in you the idea of extension.~PHIL. It is therefore itself
53 3|        velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.~PHIL. But,
54 3|   infinite divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition—
55 3|          infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine prescience,