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conceit 1
conceits 2
conceivable 4
conceive 52
conceived 9
conceiving 6
conception 5
Frequency    [«  »]
54 very
53 point
53 yet
52 conceive
52 its
52 notion
50 philonous
George Berkeley
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

IntraText - Concordances

conceive

   Dialogue
1 1| thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to 2 1| purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, 3 1| are.~PHIL. Can you then conceive it possible that they should 4 1| neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist 5 1| NOTION of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by 6 1| asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents 7 1| That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, 8 1| qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot 9 1| Something which you cannot conceive?~HYL. It was wrong, I own. 10 1| secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. 11 1| upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture 12 1| What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing 13 1| do at this present time conceive them existing after that 14 1| it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived 15 1| my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea 16 1| from proving that I can conceive them EXISTING OUT OF THE 17 1| that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible 18 1| which you cannot so much as conceive?~HYL. I profess I know not 19 1| the mind: or if you can conceive anything like them existing 20 1| is impossible for me to conceive or understand how anything 21 2| spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. When, 22 2| impressions in the brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you 23 2| is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, 24 2| and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a 25 2| himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he 26 2| explain it to me.~HYL. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, 27 2| not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to 28 2| to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition: 29 2| whether to say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense: 30 2| purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute 31 2| exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected 32 2| the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how 33 2| that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against 34 3| Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should 35 3| annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things 36 3| mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things 37 3| His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, without 38 3| may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, 39 3| volition, neither. can I conceive volition to be anywhere 40 3| consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything 41 3| thing the SAME or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let 42 3| sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, 43 3| besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence 44 3| say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we should 45 3| nature? None of which can WE conceive, otherwise than as performed 46 3| this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect 47 3| Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any hypothesis 48 3| score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not 49 3| it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; 50 3| cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it 51 3| frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything 52 3| And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of


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