Dialogue

  1 1|            take a turn in the garden.~PHIL. It happened well, to let
  2 1|          impart my reflexions to you.~PHIL. With all my heart, it is
  3 1|            sacred and unquestionable.~PHIL. I entirely agree with you,
  4 1|              accounts I heard of you.~PHIL. Pray, what were those?~
  5 1|               SUBSTANCE in the world.~PHIL. That there is no such thing
  6 1|              no such thing as MATTER?~PHIL. Softly, good Hylas. What
  7 1|             my opinion in this point.~PHIL. Well then, are you content
  8 1|            hear what you have to say.~PHIL. Pray, Hylas, what do you
  9 1|            that doubts of everything.~PHIL. He then who entertains
 10 1|                HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. Whether doth doubting consist
 11 1|              a suspense between both.~PHIL. He then that denies any
 12 1|              of assurance.~HYL. True.~PHIL. And, consequently, for
 13 1|                HYL. I acknowledge it.~PHIL. How cometh it to pass then,
 14 1|          reality and truth of things.~PHIL. What things? Do you mean
 15 1|           denominate a man a SCEPTIC?~PHIL. Shall we therefore examine
 16 1|                That is what I desire.~PHIL. What mean you by Sensible
 17 1|            that I mean anything else?~PHIL. Pardon me, Hylas, if I
 18 1|          sufficiently understand you.~PHIL. In reading a book, what
 19 1|               an arbitrary connexion.~PHIL. It seems then, that by
 20 1|     IMMEDIATELY by sense?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Doth it not follow from
 21 1|              of seeing?~HYL. It doth.~PHIL. In like manner, though
 22 1|              sounds?~HYL. You cannot.~PHIL. And when by my touch I
 23 1|           entirely relates to reason.~PHIL. This point then is agreed
 24 1|            qualities.~HYL. We do not.~PHIL. It seems, therefore, that
 25 1|            sensible?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. Sensible things therefore
 26 1|         qualities?~HYL. Nothing else.~PHIL. HEAT then is a sensible
 27 1|       sensible thing?~HYL. Certainly.~PHIL. Doth the REALITY of sensible
 28 1|              be PERCEIVED is another.~PHIL. I speak with regard to
 29 1|                their being perceived.~PHIL. Heat therefore, if it be
 30 1|               the mind?~HYL. It must.~PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, is this
 31 1|             object that occasions it.~PHIL. What! the greatest as well
 32 1|           reality of a lesser degree.~PHIL. But is not the most vehement
 33 1|              HYL. No one can deny it.~PHIL. And is any unperceiving
 34 1|         pleasure?~HYL. No, certainly.~PHIL. Is your material substance
 35 1|              senseless without doubt.~PHIL. It cannot therefore be
 36 1|               pain?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. Nor consequently of the
 37 1|          small pain?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. What shall we say then
 38 1|             qualities inhering in it.~PHIL. How then can a great heat
 39 1|          consequence or effect of it.~PHIL. Upon putting your hand
 40 1|             But one simple sensation.~PHIL. Is not the heat immediately
 41 1|    immediately perceived?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And the pain?~HYL. True.~
 42 1|              And the pain?~HYL. True.~PHIL. Seeing therefore they are
 43 1|               pain.~HYL. It seems so.~PHIL. Again, try in your thoughts,
 44 1|              pleasure.~HYL. I cannot.~PHIL. Or can you frame to yourself
 45 1|               do not find that I can.~PHIL. Doth it not therefore follow,
 46 1|              in a mind perceiving it.~PHIL. What! are you then in that
 47 1|               exist without the mind.~PHIL. It hath not therefore according
 48 1|            REAL being?~HYL. I own it.~PHIL. Is it therefore certain,
 49 1|              as an intense real heat.~PHIL. But, did you not say before
 50 1|            exist in such a substance.~PHIL. But how shall we be able
 51 1|               think the same of them.~PHIL. I think you granted before
 52 1|             than of pain.~HYL. I did.~PHIL. And is not warmth, or a
 53 1|             pleasure?~HYL. What then?~PHIL. Consequently, it cannot
 54 1|               body.~HYL. So it seems.~PHIL. Since, therefore, as well
 55 1|             degree of heat is a pain.~PHIL. I do not pretend that warmth
 56 1|               hope you will not deny.~PHIL. If you are resolved to
 57 1|              a lesser degree of heat.~PHIL. Those bodies, therefore,
 58 1|              in them.~HYL. They must.~PHIL. Can any doctrine be true
 59 1|              Without doubt it cannot.~PHIL. Is it not an absurdity
 60 1|            cold and warm?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Suppose now one of your
 61 1|              the other?~HYL. It will.~PHIL. Ought we not therefore,
 62 1|                I confess it seems so.~PHIL. Consequently, the principles
 63 1|               IS NO HEAT IN THE FIRE?~PHIL. To make the point still
 64 1|              judgment?~HYL. We ought.~PHIL. When a pin pricks your
 65 1|             your flesh?~HYL. It doth.~PHIL. And when a coal burns your
 66 1|               more?~HYL. It doth not.~PHIL. Since, therefore, you neither
 67 1|           reality of external things.~PHIL. But what will you say,
 68 1|             despair of seeing proved.~PHIL. Let us examine them in
 69 1|            sweet, or wormwood bitter?~PHIL. Inform me, Hylas. Is a
 70 1|             or is it not?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And is not bitterness some
 71 1|             or pain?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. If therefore sugar and
 72 1|          sugar. What say you to this?~PHIL. I say it is nothing to
 73 1|              that sugar is not sweet.~PHIL. But, for your farther satisfaction,
 74 1|           acknowledge I know not how.~PHIL. In the next place, ODOURS
 75 1|            sensations?~HYL. They are.~PHIL. Can you then conceive it
 76 1|    unperceiving thing?~HYL. I cannot.~PHIL. Or, can you imagine that
 77 1|               them?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. May we not therefore conclude
 78 1|             or mind?~HYL. I think so.~PHIL. Then as to SOUNDS, what
 79 1|         thought the subject of sound.~PHIL. What reason is there for
 80 1|          never hear any sound at all.~PHIL. And granting that we never
 81 1|               sensation called SOUND.~PHIL. What! is sound then a sensation?~
 82 1|     particular sensation in the mind.~PHIL. And can any sensation exist
 83 1|             mind?~HYL. No, certainly.~PHIL. How then can sound, being
 84 1|            undulatory motion the air.~PHIL. I thought I had already
 85 1|        nothing but motion?~HYL. I am.~PHIL. Whatever therefore agrees
 86 1|               to motion?~HYL. It may.~PHIL. It is then good sense to
 87 1|            certain motion of the air?~PHIL. It seems then there are
 88 1|               and real?~HYL. Even so.~PHIL. And the latter consists
 89 1|            HYL. I told you so before.~PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, to which
 90 1|               to the sight and touch.~PHIL. It should follow then,
 91 1|           uncouth and out of the way.~PHIL. Is it come to that? I assure
 92 1|               being without the mind.~PHIL. And I hope you will make
 93 1|              see them on the objects?~PHIL. The objects you speak of
 94 1|              the mind?~HYL. They are.~PHIL. And have true and real
 95 1|            colour which we see in it.~PHIL. How! is there anything
 96 1|             sight?~HYL. There is not.~PHIL. And, do we perceive anything
 97 1|                I tell you, we do not.~PHIL. Have patience, good Hylas;
 98 1|              same opinion.~HYL. I do.~PHIL. Pray, is your corporeal
 99 1|              who ever thought it was?~PHIL. My reason for asking was,
100 1|            understand my own meaning.~PHIL. I wish you would make me
101 1|            other.~HYL. The very same.~PHIL. What! are then the beautiful
102 1|            are only apparent colours.~PHIL. APPARENT call you them?
103 1|               upon a nearer approach.~PHIL. And those, I suppose, are
104 1|             exact survey.~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Is the nearest and exactest
105 1|              a microscope, doubtless.~PHIL. But a microscope often
106 1|           altered, or made to vanish.~PHIL. I think it may evidently
107 1|             the former without doubt.~PHIL. Is it not plain from DIOPTRICS
108 1|      exquisite sharpness?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Consequently the microscopical
109 1|            something in what you say.~PHIL. Besides, it is not only
110 1|               object?~HYL. It should.~PHIL. The point will be past
111 1|           colours: and such is light.~PHIL. Howl is light then a substance?~
112 1|             of red, blue, yellow, &c.~PHIL. It seems then the light
113 1|            nerves.~HYL. Nothing else.~PHIL. And consequent to each
114 1|        particular colour.~HYL. Right.~PHIL. And these sensations have
115 1|             mind.~HYL. They have not.~PHIL. How then do you affirm
116 1|       insensible particles of matter.~PHIL. Colours then, in the vulgar
117 1|              HYL. That is what I say.~PHIL. Well then, since you give
118 1|               of its truth until now.~PHIL. You are still then of opinion
119 1|     unthinking substances?~HYL. I am.~PHIL. But what if the same arguments
120 1|               exist only in the mind.~PHIL. Is it your opinion the
121 1|       material substance? HYL. It is.~PHIL. Have all other animals
122 1|              have any thought at all.~PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Think
123 1|             use in all other animals.~PHIL. If so, is it not necessary
124 1|         harming them?~HYL. Certainly.~PHIL. A mite therefore must be
125 1|                HYL. I cannot deny it.~PHIL. And to creatures less than
126 1|               larger?~HYL. They will.~PHIL. Insomuch that what you
127 1|                HYL. All this I grant.~PHIL. Can one and the same thing
128 1|               were absurd to imagine.~PHIL. But, from what you have
129 1|              difficulty in the point.~PHIL. Again, have you not acknowledged
130 1|            thing itself?~HYL. I have.~PHIL. But, as we approach to
131 1|              at a loss what to think.~PHIL. Your judgment will soon
132 1|               the other?~HYL. It was.~PHIL. Is it not the very same
133 1|              latter fact ever happen?~PHIL. You may at any time make
134 1|               upon such a concession.~PHIL. Odd, say you? After the
135 1|            step in my progress to it.~PHIL. That is a right you cannot
136 1|            very slow?~HYL. It cannot.~PHIL. Is not the motion of a
137 1|                HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. And is not time measured
138 1|             in our minds?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And is it not possible
139 1|          another kind?~HYL. I own it.~PHIL. Consequently the same body
140 1|            have nothing to say to it.~PHIL. Then as for SOLIDITY; either
141 1|           CAUSE of that sensation is.~PHIL. But the causes of our sensations
142 1|               to quit my old notions.~PHIL. To help you out, do but
143 1|            can this be accounted for?~PHIL. It is not my business to
144 1|        abstracted from them doth not.~PHIL. Pray what is it that distinguishes
145 1|             to each?~HYL. I think so.~PHIL. These qualities, therefore,
146 1|             call them.~HYL. They are.~PHIL. That is to say, they are
147 1|           general.~HYL. Let it be so.~PHIL. But it is a universally
148 1|             to solve your difficulty.~PHIL. But I think the point may
149 1|        confess ingenuously, I cannot.~PHIL. Can you even separate the
150 1|         mathematicians treat of them?~PHIL. I acknowledge, Hylas, it
151 1|               framed by that faculty?~PHIL. Since I cannot frame abstract
152 1|               do not find that I can.~PHIL. And can you think it possible
153 1|         conception?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. Since therefore it is impossible
154 1|               HYL. It should seem so.~PHIL. Consequently, the very
155 1|               not take time to think.~PHIL. For that matter, Hylas,
156 1|               that the former cannot.~PHIL. What object do you mean?
157 1|            the senses?~HYL. The same.~PHIL. It is then immediately
158 1|    immediately perceived?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Make me to understand the
159 1|           only, and not in the tulip.~PHIL. What tulip do you speak
160 1|               you see?~HYL. The same.~PHIL. And what do you see beside
161 1|              extension?~HYL. Nothing.~PHIL. What you would say then
162 1|            some unthinking substance.~PHIL. That the colours are really
163 1|             inquiry from the subject.~PHIL. I see you have no mind
164 1|             the other not.~HYL. True.~PHIL. And this action cannot
165 1|              HYL. That is my meaning.~PHIL. So that if there was a
166 1|          should be such a perception.~PHIL. When is the mind said to
167 1|             to, or changes, anything.~PHIL. Can the mind produce, discontinue,
168 1|             the will?~HYL. It cannot.~PHIL. The mind therefore is to
169 1|         included in them?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. In plucking this flower
170 1|              these smelling?~HYL. NO.~PHIL. I act too in drawing the
171 1|               that manner?~HYL. True.~PHIL. Smelling then is somewhat
172 1|              to all this?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. But I do not find my will
173 1|               HYL. No, the very same.~PHIL. Then, as to seeing, is
174 1|              way?~HYL. Without doubt.~PHIL. But, doth it in like manner
175 1|         volition?~HYL. No, certainly.~PHIL. You are then in these respects
176 1|        altogether passive? HYL. I am.~PHIL. Tell me now, whether SEEING
177 1|         Without doubt, in the former.~PHIL. Since therefore you are
178 1|              not what to think of it.~PHIL. Besides, since you distinguish
179 1|         cannot be conceived to exist.~PHIL. MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM call
180 1|              perceived by the senses.~PHIL. I presume then it was by
181 1|              exist without a support.~PHIL. It seems then you have
182 1|       sensible qualities?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Be pleased therefore to
183 1|             SUBSTRATUM, or SUBSTANCE?~PHIL. If so, the word SUBSTRATUM
184 1|              or accidents?~HYL. True.~PHIL. And consequently under
185 1|             extension?~HYL. I own it.~PHIL. It is therefore somewhat
186 1|            from the thing supporting?~PHIL. So that something distinct
187 1|              extension?~HYL. Just so.~PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Can a
188 1|             in SPREADING?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Whatsoever therefore you
189 1|              is spread?~HYL. It must.~PHIL. Consequently, every corporeal
190 1|            same thing with SUBSTANCE.~PHIL. Well then, let us examine
191 1|        accidents?~HYL. The very same.~PHIL. But, that one thing may
192 1|               extended?~HYL. It must.~PHIL. Is not therefore this supposition
193 1|               is not fair, Philonous.~PHIL. I am not for imposing any
194 1|            that is the literal sense.~PHIL. Pray let me know any sense,
195 1|            that I know nothing of it.~PHIL. It seems then you have
196 1|                HYL. I acknowledge it.~PHIL. And yet you asserted that
197 1|          support of them?~HYL. I did.~PHIL. That is to say, when you
198 1|               exist without the mind.~PHIL. Either, Hylas, you are
199 1|           existing after that manner.~PHIL. How say you, Hylas, can
200 1|            that were a contradiction.~PHIL. Is it not as great a contradiction
201 1|              UNCONCEIVED?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. The, tree or house therefore
202 1|               should it be otherwise?~PHIL. And what is conceived is
203 1|             conceived is in the mind.~PHIL. How then came you to say,
204 1|             THE MINDS OF ALL SPIRITS.~PHIL. You acknowledge then that
205 1|               in the mind?~HYL. I do.~PHIL. And yet you will earnestly
206 1|               manifest to the senses?~PHIL. Do you not in a dream too
207 1|              like objects?~HYL. I do.~PHIL. And have they not then
208 1|              distant?~HYL. They have.~PHIL. But you do not thence conclude
209 1|               mind?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. You ought not therefore
210 1|            deceive me in those cases?~PHIL. By no means. The idea or
211 1|               of OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?~PHIL. Upon approaching a distant
212 1|            are in a continual change.~PHIL. Sight therefore doth not
213 1|       distance suggested in the case.~PHIL. Good Hylas, do but reflect
214 1|           take it to be nothing else.~PHIL. Now, is it not plain that
215 1|       SUGGESTED by sight?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. He would not then, according
216 1|                HYL. It is undeniable.~PHIL. But, to make it still more
217 1|               to the eye?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And can a line so situated
218 1|             by sight?~HYL. It cannot.~PHIL. Doth it not therefore follow
219 1|               HYL. It should seem so.~PHIL. Again, is it your opinion
220 1|            they are only in the mind.~PHIL. But do not colours appear
221 1|            and figures?~HYL. They do.~PHIL. How can you then conclude
222 1|              know not what to answer.~PHIL. But, allowing that distance
223 1|             nothing beside our ideas?~PHIL. As for the rational deducing
224 1|             cut short your discourse.~PHIL. Are those external objects
225 1|               are perceived by sense.~PHIL. Howl Is there any thing
226 1|            immediately) by my senses.~PHIL. It seems then you will
227 1|              HYL. That is my meaning.~PHIL. And, in the same way that
228 1|                HYL. In the very same.~PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, when you
229 1|             whole?~HYL. Nothing else.~PHIL. And would not a man who
230 1|               as much?~HYL. He would.~PHIL. Consequently he hath his
231 1|                HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. Whence comes it then that
232 1|               it not?~HYL. It should.~PHIL. Consequently, it will not
233 1|               will never convince me.~PHIL. My aim is only to learn
234 1|              reasons to the contrary.~PHIL. What! Is it come to this,
235 1|               HYL. You take me right.~PHIL. They are then like external
236 1|       external things?~HYL. They are.~PHIL. Have those things a stable
237 1|            existing without the mind.~PHIL. How then is it possible
238 1|              not what to say to this.~PHIL. But neither is this all.
239 1|          perceived only by our ideas.~PHIL. Ideas then are sensible,
240 1|               insensible?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. But how can that which
241 1|              I must own, I think not.~PHIL. Is it possible there should
242 1|            can be no part of my idea.~PHIL. Consider, therefore, and
243 1|               EXIST WITHOUT THE MIND.~PHIL. You are therefore, by your
244 1|         convinced, at least silenced.~PHIL. I would fain know what
245 1|              me and recollect myself.~PHIL. Hark; is not this the college
246 1|            HYL. It rings for prayers.~PHIL. We will go in then, if
247 2|              do they force my assent.~PHIL. And is not this, think
248 2|            know not how to reject it.~PHIL. I know not what way you
249 2|              our sensations or ideas.~PHIL. How is that?~HYL. It is
250 2|        variously affected with ideas.~PHIL. And call you this an explication
251 2|        anything to object against it?~PHIL. I would first know whether
252 2|               think you I could mean?~PHIL. Sensible things are all
253 2|                HYL. I do not deny it.~PHIL. The brain therefore you
254 2|              another which I imagine.~PHIL. But are not things imagined
255 2|              I must confess they are.~PHIL. It comes, therefore, to
256 2|             to suspect my hypothesis.~PHIL. Besides spirits, all that
257 2|               There is nothing in it.~PHIL. You need not be much concerned
258 2|              as now it seems to have.~PHIL. Well then, are you at length
259 2|               too plain to be denied.~PHIL. Look! are not the fields
260 2|               much a sceptic as I am.~PHIL. There, Hylas, I must beg
261 2|              This surely is not fair.~PHIL. I deny that I agreed with
262 2|               comprehends all things.~PHIL. Aye, but here lies the
263 2|               we come by that belief?~PHIL. But neither do we agree
264 2|             SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD?~PHIL. I would gladly know that
265 2|           represent them to the mind.~PHIL. I do not understand how
266 2|            you advance comes near it.~PHIL. Few men think; yet all
267 2|              not?~HYL. Without doubt.~PHIL. But, on the other hand,
268 2|               for all that be MATTER?~PHIL. How often must I inculcate
269 2|            HYL. You are in the right.~PHIL. Pray let me know what reasoning
270 2|        whatever it be, I call Matter.~PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, hath every
271 2|             no difference in opinion.~PHIL. And doth not MATTER, in
272 2|              Substance?~HYL. It doth.~PHIL. And, hath it not been made
273 2|               to Matter, viz. MOTION.~PHIL. I find you are at every
274 2|               in them.~HYL. They are.~PHIL. And are sensible qualities
275 2|       acknowledged that they are not.~PHIL. But is not MOTION a sensible
276 2|         sensible quality?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Consequently it is no action?~
277 2|        produced the motion is active.~PHIL. Now, I desire to know,
278 2|              production of our ideas?~PHIL. An instrument say you;
279 2|               entirely unknown to me.~PHIL. What? You are then of opinion
280 2|               unperceiving substance.~PHIL. But what notion is it possible
281 2|             to have any notion of it.~PHIL. And what reason have you
282 2|           have you not to believe it?~PHIL. It is to me a sufficient
283 2|         GENERAL, which I apply to it.~PHIL. But what if it should prove
284 2|              shall give up the point.~PHIL. What mean you by the general
285 2|         composeth the general notion.~PHIL. Is it not common to all
286 2|           agent?~HYL. I own I cannot.~PHIL. How therefore can you suppose
287 2|          occur what I can answer you.~PHIL. But, methinks you should
288 2|             may still be an OCCASION.~PHIL. How many shapes is your
289 2|           excites ideas in our minds.~PHIL. And what may be the nature
290 2|           know nothing of its nature.~PHIL. Proceed then to the second
291 2|               which they are excited.~PHIL. You acknowledge then God
292 2|              HYL. That is my opinion.~PHIL. Those things which you
293 2|            Him an occasion of acting.~PHIL. Not to insist now on your
294 2|               groundless as the rest.~PHIL. Do you not at length perceive
295 2|               such a thing as MATTER.~PHIL. Either you perceive the
296 2|               loss what more to urge.~PHIL. And yet you are loath to
297 2|          indeed pretend to determine.~PHIL. I do not expect you should
298 2|              distinct from all these.~PHIL. It seems then you include
299 2|              or in anywise apprehend.~PHIL. Pray where do you suppose
300 2|              the future about Matter.~PHIL. Since you will not tell
301 2|           perceives nor is perceived.~PHIL. But what is there positive
302 2|          EXISTENCE, or how it exists.~PHIL. Continue, good Hylas, to
303 2|             anything belonging to it.~PHIL. When, therefore, you speak
304 2|               mind?~HYL. None at all.~PHIL. Pray tell me if the case
305 2|       argument against its existence.~PHIL. That from a cause, effect,
306 2|              I know not what, MATTER.~PHIL. But, are you not sensible,
307 2|               earnest in its defence?~PHIL. The reality of things!
308 2|   intelligible?~HYL. Sensible things.~PHIL. My glove for example?~HYL.
309 2|              perceived by the senses.~PHIL. But to fix on some particular
310 2|             it does not appear to me.~PHIL. But granting Matter to
311 2|             know, may actually exist.~PHIL. I deny it to be possible;
312 2|             sense of the term MATTER.~PHIL. But is it not the only
313 2|         common acceptation of a term.~PHIL. But this now mentioned
314 2|      abstracted and indefinite sense.~PHIL. . When is a thing shewn
315 2|       comprehended in its definition.~PHIL. But where there are no
316 2|                HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. Now, in that which you
317 2|            again about the same time.~PHIL. I will not fail to attend
318 3|          intended us for speculation.~PHIL. What! Say you we can know
319 3|              or what it is in itself.~PHIL. Will you tell me I do not
320 3|               in the dark as to THAT.~PHIL. Do I not know this to be
321 3|              are in their own nature.~PHIL. But surely, Hylas, I can
322 3|               not of the same colour.~PHIL. It seems, then, we are
323 3|               and feel.~HYL. Even so.~PHIL. But is it not strange the
324 3|      philosophers know better things.~PHIL. You mean, they KNOW that
325 3|        perfection of human knowledge.~PHIL. But are you all this while
326 3|               should exist in nature.~PHIL. You amaze me. Was ever
327 3|              myself am in at present.~PHIL. I assure you, Hylas, I
328 3|         without the mind. Do you not?~PHIL. I do.~HYL. Supposing you
329 3|             by sense may still exist?~PHIL. I can; but then it must
330 3|              agency included in them?~PHIL. They are altogether passive
331 3|                a being purely active?~PHIL. I acknowledge it.~HYL.
332 3|          represent the nature of God?~PHIL. It cannot.~HYL. Since therefore
333 3| notwithstanding I have no idea of it?~PHIL. As to your first question:
334 3|         Spirit. What say you to this?~PHIL. I say, in the first place,
335 3|        exploded as well as the other.~PHIL. How often must I repeat,
336 3|              and TO EXIST is another.~PHIL. I am content, Hylas, to
337 3|             being actually perceived.~PHIL. And what is perceivable
338 3|              think you he would make?~PHIL. The same that I should
339 3|              all equally in the mind?~PHIL. The ideas formed by the
340 3|       acknowledge, sounds very oddly.~PHIL. I own the word IDEA, not
341 3|           more extravagant than this?~PHIL. Yes, it is infinitely more
342 3|            and the like heinous sins.~PHIL. In answer to that, I observe,
343 3|          without gathering the votes.~PHIL. I wish both our opinions
344 3|            end in the water, crooked?~PHIL. He is not mistaken with
345 3|             are now that it does not?~PHIL. I was. But here lies the
346 3|           This is all the difference.~PHIL. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful
347 3|            you the idea of extension.~PHIL. It is therefore itself
348 3|          unextended?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. Is it not also active?~
349 3|               attribute powers to it?~PHIL. Now let me ask you two
350 3|             as active and unextended?~PHIL. My reason is this: because
351 3|              any imperfection in God?~PHIL. Without a doubt.~HYL. To
352 3|              pain is an imperfection?~PHIL. It is.~HYL. Are we not
353 3|       uneasiness by some other Being?~PHIL. We are.~HYL. And have you
354 3|               is not that Spirit God?~PHIL. I grant it.~HYL. But you
355 3|             in a plain contradiction.~PHIL. That God knows or understands
356 3|              withstand demonstration?~PHIL. Let me see how you demonstrate
357 3|               was to be demonstrated.~PHIL. You lay it down as a self-evident
358 3|               extension and solidity.~PHIL. But, allowing this to be
359 3|              the existence of Matter?~PHIL. What mean you, Hylas, by
360 3|              I perceive by my senses.~PHIL. And the appearances perceived
361 3|               you so a hundred times.~PHIL. Therefore, to explain the
362 3|                Is it not?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Now, if you can prove that
363 3|              there was no such thing?~PHIL. That every epidemical opinion,
364 3|            knows where they will end.~PHIL. Why the rejecting a notion
365 3|               there is no denying it.~PHIL. You mistake me. I am not
366 3|             which strikes the senses.~PHIL. What you call the empty
367 3|        discoverable to the naked eye?~PHIL. Strictly speaking, Hylas,
368 3|               apprehend your meaning.~PHIL. It is your opinion the
369 3|               objects and the latter?~PHIL. I grant it does. Nor have
370 3|          ideas existing in our minds?~PHIL. It is.~HYL. But the SAME
371 3|              not this highly, absurd?~PHIL. If the term SAME be taken
372 3|              perceive the same thing.~PHIL. And (not to mention your
373 3|        equally against both opinions.~PHIL. But that which makes equally
374 3|            with sensible impressions.~PHIL. And how are WE concerned
375 3|             IN A MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM?~PHIL. When I see your reasons,
376 3|               extended or unextended?~PHIL. Unextended, without doubt.~
377 3|            perceive are in your mind?~PHIL. They are.~HYL. Again, have
378 3|              of sensible impressions?~PHIL. I believe you may.~HYL.
379 3|               me about my SUBSTRATUM.~PHIL. Look you, Hylas, when I
380 3|            abuse of language in this?~PHIL. None at all. It is no more
381 3|         proselyte to your principles.~PHIL. Let me know this mighty
382 3|               perhaps agree with you.~PHIL. Moses mentions the sun,
383 3|            creation and your notions?~PHIL. If all possible sense which
384 3|             you can understand it in.~PHIL. Why, I imagine that if
385 3|       contrary to the Mosaic account?~PHIL. In answer to that, I say,
386 3|           better connected than this?~PHIL. And are not you too of
387 3|             from eternity?~HYL. I am.~PHIL. Consequently they always
388 3|              HYL. This I acknowledge.~PHIL. By your own confession,
389 3|            make then of the creation?~PHIL. May we not understand it
390 3|           change argues imperfection.~PHIL. Pray consider what you
391 3|               do not distinctly know.~PHIL. What would you have? Do
392 3|           this point of the creation.~PHIL. I would fain know why you
393 3|           writings?~HYL. And so I am.~PHIL. Ought the historical part
394 3|               plain sense, doubtless.~PHIL. When Moses speaks of herbs,
395 3|              cannot help thinking so.~PHIL. And are not all ideas,
396 3|            have already acknowledged.~PHIL. The creation, therefore,
397 3|           might terminate?~HYL. True.~PHIL. Is it not therefore evident
398 3|              I cannot contradict you.~PHIL. Moses tells us of a creation.
399 3|               me with my own weapons.~PHIL. Then as to ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE;
400 3|          myself towards your notions.~PHIL. When a man is swayed, he
401 3|               seems to be as you say.~PHIL. As a balance, therefore,
402 3|              notion of IMMATERIALISM!~PHIL. After all, is there anything
403 3|      difficulty will occur hereafter?~PHIL. Pray, Hylas, do you in
404 3|              satisfied me, Philonous.~PHIL. But, to arm you against
405 3|             in words than in opinion.~PHIL. With all my heart: retain
406 3|         altered in my former notions.~PHIL. I do not pretend to be
407 3|          directly opposite to theirs.~PHIL. You see, Hylas, the water