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Alphabetical    [«  »]
humour 1
humours 1
hundred 4
hyl 407
hylarchic 1
hylas 44
hypotheses 3
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566 a
530 or
427 be
407 hyl
407 phil
403 are
388 but
George Berkeley
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

IntraText - Concordances

hyl

    Dialogue
1 1| very intent on something.~HYL. It is true, I was, and 2 1| you had not prevented me.~HYL. I was considering the odd 3 1| all mystery and riddle.~HYL. I am glad to find there 4 1| Pray, what were those?~HYL. You were represented, in 5 1| reject the contrary opinion.~HYL. What I can anything be 6 1| who believe no such thing?~HYL. You may as soon persuade 7 1| remote from Scepticism?~HYL. With all my heart. Since 8 1| do you mean by a SCEPTIC?~HYL. I mean what all men mean— 9 1| cannot be thought a sceptic.~HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. 10 1| negative side of a question?~HYL. In neither; for whoever 11 1| same degree of assurance.~HYL. True.~PHIL. And, consequently, 12 1| sceptic than the other.~HYL. I acknowledge it.~PHIL. 13 1| you in your affirmation.~HYL. Hold, Philonous, I have 14 1| imply the denying them.~HYL. I grant it. But are there 15 1| esteemed the greatest SCEPTIC?~HYL. That is what I desire.~ 16 1| you by Sensible Things?~HYL. Those things which are 17 1| intervention of others?~HYL. I do not sufficiently understand 18 1| suggested by them to be so too.~HYL. No, certainly: it were 19 1| perceived IMMEDIATELY by sense?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Doth it not 20 1| by the sense of seeing?~HYL. It doth.~PHIL. In like 21 1| causes of those sounds?~HYL. You cannot.~PHIL. And when 22 1| cause of its heat or weight?~HYL. To prevent any more questions 23 1| than tangible qualities.~HYL. We do not.~PHIL. It seems, 24 1| remains nothing sensible?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. Sensible 25 1| combinations of sensible qualities?~HYL. Nothing else.~PHIL. HEAT 26 1| then is a sensible thing?~HYL. Certainly.~PHIL. Doth the 27 1| no relation to the mind?~HYL. To EXIST is one thing, 28 1| from their being perceived?~HYL. I mean a real absolute 29 1| exist without the mind?~HYL. It must.~PHIL. Tell me, 30 1| let me know that reason.~HYL. Whatever degree of heat 31 1| greatest as well as the least?~HYL. I tell you, the reason 32 1| heat a very great pain?~HYL. No one can deny it.~PHIL. 33 1| capable of pain or pleasure?~HYL. No, certainly.~PHIL. Is 34 1| with sense and perception?~HYL. It is senseless without 35 1| be the subject of pain?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. Nor 36 1| this to be no small pain?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. What 37 1| material Substance, or no?~HYL. It is a material substance 38 1| would clear this point.~HYL. Hold, Philonous, I fear 39 1| two distinct sensations?~HYL. But one simple sensation.~ 40 1| heat immediately perceived?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And the pain?~ 41 1| is.~PHIL. And the pain?~HYL. True.~PHIL. Seeing therefore 42 1| particular sort of pain.~HYL. It seems so.~PHIL. Again, 43 1| without pain or pleasure.~HYL. I cannot.~PHIL. Or can 44 1| cold, tastes, smells? &c.~HYL. I do not find that I can.~ 45 1| ideas, in an intense degree?~HYL. It is undeniable; and, 46 1| between affirming and denying?~HYL. I think I may be positive 47 1| to you, any REAL being?~HYL. I own it.~PHIL. Is it therefore 48 1| body in nature really hot?~HYL. I have not denied there 49 1| undoubtedly real than the lesser?~HYL. True: but it was because 50 1| which exist without it?~HYL. That is no difficult matter. 51 1| any more than of pain.~HYL. I did.~PHIL. And is not 52 1| uneasiness, a pleasure?~HYL. What then?~PHIL. Consequently, 53 1| unperceiving substance, or body.~HYL. So it seems.~PHIL. Since, 54 1| degree of heat whatsoever?~HYL. On second thoughts, I do 55 1| make good my conclusion.~HYL. I could rather call it 56 1| what think you of cold?~HYL. The same that I do of heat. 57 1| thought to have cold in them.~HYL. They must.~PHIL. Can any 58 1| a man into an absurdity?~HYL. Without doubt it cannot.~ 59 1| time both cold and warm?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Suppose now 60 1| and warm to the other?~HYL. It will.~PHIL. Ought we 61 1| to believe an absurdity?~HYL. I confess it seems so.~ 62 1| principle leads to an absurdity.~HYL. But, after all, can anything 63 1| make the same judgment?~HYL. We ought.~PHIL. When a 64 1| the fibres of your flesh?~HYL. It doth.~PHIL. And when 65 1| finger, doth it any more?~HYL. It doth not.~PHIL. Since, 66 1| like it, to be in the fire.~HYL. Well, since it must be 67 1| mind, than heat and cold?~HYL. Then indeed you will have 68 1| without the mind, or no?~HYL. Can any man in his senses 69 1| sensation, or is it not?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And is not 70 1| kind of uneasiness or pain?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. If therefore 71 1| and pain, agree to them?~HYL. Hold, Philonous, I now 72 1| exist without the mind?~HYL. I see it is to no purpose 73 1| really inherent in the food?~HYL. I acknowledge I know not 74 1| displeasing sensations?~HYL. They are.~PHIL. Can you 75 1| in an unperceiving thing?~HYL. I cannot.~PHIL. Or, can 76 1| which we perceive in them?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. May 77 1| perceiving substance or mind?~HYL. I think so.~PHIL. Then 78 1| external bodies, or not?~HYL. That they inhere not in 79 1| is there for that, Hylas?~HYL. Because, when any motion 80 1| sound itself is in the air.~HYL. It is this very motion 81 1| sound then a sensation?~HYL. I tell you, as perceived 82 1| exist without the mind?~HYL. No, certainly.~PHIL. How 83 1| existing without the mind?~HYL. You must distinguish, Philonous, 84 1| really nothing but motion?~HYL. I am.~PHIL. Whatever therefore 85 1| be attributed to motion?~HYL. It may.~PHIL. It is then 86 1| SWEET, ACUTE, or GRAVE.~HYL. I see you are resolved 87 1| philosophical and real?~HYL. Even so.~PHIL. And the 88 1| latter consists in motion?~HYL. I told you so before.~PHIL. 89 1| belongs? to the hearing?~HYL. No, certainly; but to the 90 1| OR FELT, but never HEARD.~HYL. Look you, Philonous, you 91 1| and the truth of things?~HYL. To deal ingenuously, I 92 1| acknowledge the same of COLOURS.~HYL. Pardon me: the case of 93 1| existing without the mind?~HYL. They are.~PHIL. And have 94 1| colours inhering in them?~HYL. Each visible object hath 95 1| what we perceive by sight?~HYL. There is not.~PHIL. And, 96 1| not perceive immediately?~HYL. How often must I be obliged 97 1| persist in the same opinion.~HYL. I do.~PHIL. Pray, is your 98 1| up of sensible qualities?~HYL. What a question that is! 99 1| from SENSIBLE QUALITIES.~HYL. You may draw as many absurd 100 1| external bodies, or some other.~HYL. The very same.~PHIL. What! 101 1| of a dark mist or vapour?~HYL. I must own, Philonous, 102 1| apparent colours from real?~HYL. Very easily. Those are 103 1| most near and exact survey.~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Is the nearest 104 1| microscope, or by the naked eye?~HYL. By a microscope, doubtless.~ 105 1| exhibits to the naked eye.~HYL. And what will you conclude 106 1| one which is less sharp?~HYL. By the former without doubt.~ 107 1| most exquisite sharpness?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Consequently 108 1| those perceived otherwise.~HYL. I confess there is something 109 1| inherent in any outward object?~HYL. It should.~PHIL. The point 110 1| distinguishing it from apparent ones.~HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied, 111 1| light then a substance?~HYL. . I tell you, Philonous, 112 1| shake the optic nerves.~HYL. Nothing else.~PHIL. And 113 1| some particular colour.~HYL. Right.~PHIL. And these 114 1| existence without the mind.~HYL. They have not.~PHIL. How 115 1| substance external to the mind?~HYL. Light and colours, as immediately 116 1| a perceiving substance.~HYL. That is what I say.~PHIL. 117 1| before in the case of sounds?~HYL. I frankly own, Philonous, 118 1| external unthinking substances?~HYL. I am.~PHIL. But what if 119 1| good against these also?~HYL. Why then I shall be obliged 120 1| object or material substance? HYL. It is.~PHIL. Have all other 121 1| which they see and feel?~HYL. Without doubt, if they 122 1| men alone for this end?~HYL. I make no question but 123 1| capable of harming them?~HYL. Certainly.~PHIL. A mite 124 1| so many visible points?~HYL. I cannot deny it.~PHIL. 125 1| they will seem yet larger?~HYL. They will.~PHIL. Insomuch 126 1| appear as some huge mountain?~HYL. All this I grant.~PHIL. 127 1| of different dimensions?~HYL. That were absurd to imagine.~ 128 1| are led into an absurdity.~HYL. There seems to be some 129 1| change in the thing itself?~HYL. I have.~PHIL. But, as we 130 1| inherent in the object?~HYL. I own I am at a loss what 131 1| hand and cold to the other?~HYL. It was.~PHIL. Is it not 132 1| great, uneven, and regular?~HYL. The very same. But does 133 1| other through a microscope.~HYL. I know not how to maintain 134 1| which doth not perceive it.~HYL. I give up the point for 135 1| very swift and very slow?~HYL. It cannot.~PHIL. Is not 136 1| only a mile in three hours.~HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. 137 1| succession of ideas in our minds?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And is it 138 1| spirit of another kind?~HYL. I own it.~PHIL. Consequently 139 1| what you just now granted?~HYL. I have nothing to say to 140 1| feel is not in the body.~HYL. I own the very SENSATION 141 1| been already determined.~HYL. I own it was; but you will 142 1| have any real existence.~HYL. I wonder, Philonous, if 143 1| in an unthinking subject.~HYL. It is just come into my 144 1| figure peculiar to each?~HYL. I think so.~PHIL. These 145 1| as the schools call them.~HYL. They are.~PHIL. That is 146 1| and motion in general.~HYL. Let it be so.~PHIL. But 147 1| any corporeal substance?~HYL. I will take time to solve 148 1| what you have no notion of.~HYL. To confess ingenuously, 149 1| distinction term SECONDARY?~HYL. What! is it not an easy 150 1| abstracted ideas of extension.~HYL. But what say you to PURE 151 1| other sensible qualities.~HYL. Let me think a little—I 152 1| repugnancy in its conception?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. Since 153 1| the other exist likewise?~HYL. It should seem so.~PHIL. 154 1| and tangible qualities?~HYL. You need say no more on 155 1| for your first opinion.~HYL. One great oversight I take 156 1| the object of the senses?~HYL. The same.~PHIL. It is then 157 1| then immediately perceived?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Make me to 158 1| perceived and a sensation.~HYL. The sensation I take to 159 1| Is it that which you see?~HYL. The same.~PHIL. And what 160 1| figure, and extension?~HYL. Nothing.~PHIL. What you 161 1| the extension; is it not?~HYL. That is not all; I would 162 1| that unthinking substance.~HYL. You have an artful way, 163 1| the mind, the other not.~HYL. True.~PHIL. And this action 164 1| implied in a perception may?~HYL. That is my meaning.~PHIL. 165 1| an unthinking substance?~HYL. I grant it. But it is impossible 166 1| mind said to be active?~HYL. When it produces, puts 167 1| but by an act of the will?~HYL. It cannot.~PHIL. The mind 168 1| VOLITION is included in them?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. In plucking 169 1| either of these smelling?~HYL. NO.~PHIL. I act too in 170 1| breathed in that manner?~HYL. True.~PHIL. Smelling then 171 1| consequent to all this?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. But I do not 172 1| otherwise with you, Hylas?~HYL. No, the very same.~PHIL. 173 1| turn them this or that way?~HYL. Without doubt.~PHIL. But, 174 1| effect of your volition?~HYL. No, certainly.~PHIL. You 175 1| respects altogether passive? HYL. I am.~PHIL. Tell me now, 176 1| opening and turning the eyes?~HYL. Without doubt, in the former.~ 177 1| this a plain contradiction?~HYL. I know not what to think 178 1| whether it be not as I say?~HYL. I acknowledge, Philonous, 179 1| acquainted with that being?~HYL. It is not itself sensible; 180 1| obtained the idea of it?~HYL. I do not pretend to any 181 1| bears to sensible qualities?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. Be pleased 182 1| that relation consists.~HYL. Is it not sufficiently 183 1| qualities or accidents?~HYL. True.~PHIL. And consequently 184 1| consequently under extension?~HYL. I own it.~PHIL. It is therefore 185 1| distinct from extension?~HYL. I tell you, extension is 186 1| SUBSTRATUM of extension?~HYL. Just so.~PHIL. Answer me, 187 1| necessarily included in SPREADING?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Whatsoever 188 1| under which it is spread?~HYL. It must.~PHIL. Consequently, 189 1| exclusive of extension?~HYL. Aye but, Philonous, you 190 1| stands under accidents?~HYL. The very same.~PHIL. But, 191 1| must it not be extended?~HYL. It must.~PHIL. Is not therefore 192 1| absurdity with the former?~HYL. You still take things in 193 1| legs support your body?~HYL. No; that is the literal 194 1| wait for an answer, Hylas?~HYL. I declare I know not what 195 1| relation it bears to accidents?~HYL. I acknowledge it.~PHIL. 196 1| material support of them?~HYL. I did.~PHIL. That is to 197 1| which you cannot conceive?~HYL. It was wrong, I own. But 198 1| grant it actually to be so.~HYL. If it comes to that the 199 1| at the same time unseen?~HYL. No, that were a contradiction.~ 200 1| thing which is UNCONCEIVED?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. The, tree 201 1| of is conceived by you?~HYL. How should it be otherwise?~ 202 1| conceived is surely in the mind?~HYL. Without question, that 203 1| of all minds whatsoever?~HYL. That was I own an oversight; 204 1| otherwise than in the mind?~HYL. I do.~PHIL. And yet you 205 1| cannot so much as conceive?~HYL. I profess I know not what 206 1| those or the like objects?~HYL. I do.~PHIL. And have they 207 1| appearance of being distant?~HYL. They have.~PHIL. But you 208 1| to be without the mind?~HYL. By no means.~PHIL. You 209 1| wherein they are perceived.~HYL. I acknowledge it. But doth 210 1| say are without the mind.~HYL. True: but, beside all that, 211 1| the same at all distances?~HYL. They are in a continual 212 1| whole time of your approach.~HYL. It doth not; but still 213 1| succession of time and motion.~HYL. Upon the whole, I take 214 1| may be SUGGESTED by sight?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. He would not 215 1| existing only in his mind?~HYL. It is undeniable.~PHIL. 216 1| turned endwise to the eye?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. And can a 217 1| situated be perceived by sight?~HYL. It cannot.~PHIL. Doth it 218 1| immediately perceived by sight?~HYL. It should seem so.~PHIL. 219 1| colours are at a distance?~HYL. It must be acknowledged 220 1| with extension and figures?~HYL. They do.~PHIL. How can 221 1| same with regard to both?~HYL. I know not what to answer.~ 222 1| idea exist out of the mind?~HYL. To suppose that were absurd: 223 1| from what you then thought.~HYL. To speak the truth, Philonous, 224 1| or by some other faculty?~HYL. They are perceived by sense.~ 225 1| not immediately perceived?~HYL. Yes, Philonous, in some 226 1| resemblance to our ideas?~HYL. That is my meaning.~PHIL. 227 1| are perceived by sense.~HYL. In the very same.~PHIL. 228 1| composition of the whole?~HYL. Nothing else.~PHIL. And 229 1| Julius Caesar see as much?~HYL. He would.~PHIL. Consequently 230 1| perfect a degree as you?~HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. 231 1| and memory: should it not?~HYL. It should.~PHIL. Consequently, 232 1| read of any one that did.~HYL. I see, Philonous, you are 233 1| your own understanding.~HYL. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, 234 1| certain originals that do?~HYL. You take me right.~PHIL. 235 1| then like external things?~HYL. They are.~PHIL. Have those 236 1| faculties or organs of sense?~HYL. Real things, it is plain, 237 1| from all the false ones?~HYL. I profess, Philonous, I 238 1| perceptible or imperceptible?~HYL. Properly and immediately 239 1| or originals insensible?~HYL. Right.~PHIL. But how can 240 1| another sensation or idea?~HYL. I must own, I think not.~ 241 1| perfectly know your own ideas?~HYL. I know them perfectly; 242 1| existing without the mind.~HYL. Upon inquiry, I find it 243 1| principles led to Scepticism.~HYL. For the present I am, if 244 1| why do you not produce it?~HYL. A little patience, Philonous. 245 1| not this the college bell?~HYL. It rings for prayers.~PHIL. 246 1| means to extricate yourself.~HYL. Agreed.~ 247 2| THE SECOND DIALOGUE~HYL. I beg your pardon, Philonous, 248 2| now discover them to me.~HYL. I assure you I have done 249 2| or too nearly inspected.~HYL. I own there is a great 250 2| know not what way you mean.~HYL. I mean the way of accounting 251 2| ideas.~PHIL. How is that?~HYL. It is supposed the soul 252 2| are affected with ideas?~HYL. Why not, Philonous? Have 253 2| mean any sensible thing.~HYL. What else think you I could 254 2| not, long since agreed to.~HYL. I do not deny it.~PHIL. 255 2| primary idea or brain itself?~HYL. I do not explain the origin 256 2| MIND as things perceived?~HYL. I must confess they are.~ 257 2| imaginable it matters not.~HYL. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.~ 258 2| a reasonable hypothesis.~HYL. I now clearly see it was 259 2| should be the effect of that?~HYL. But I could never think 260 2| truth an arrant sceptic?~HYL. It is too plain to be denied.~ 261 2| absurd by all men of sense?~HYL. Other men may think as 262 2| leave to differ from you.~HYL. What! Have you all along 263 2| contains and supports it.~HYL. What! This is no more than 264 2| must be perceived by Him.~HYL. But, so long as we all 265 2| allow it a real existence?~HYL. It cannot be denied there 266 2| pray explain it to me.~HYL. They conceive that the 267 2| whole world made in vain?~HYL. But what say you? Are not 268 2| talk nonsense: is it not?~HYL. Without doubt.~PHIL. But, 269 2| obliges us to acknowledge.~HYL. I think I understand you 270 2| reason, and not by sense.~HYL. You are in the right.~PHIL. 271 2| your present sense of it.~HYL. I find myself affected 272 2| you think this reasonable?~HYL. No; I should think it very 273 2| unthinking, inactive Substance?~HYL. It doth.~PHIL. And, hath 274 2| properly be termed Matter.~HYL. There is indeed something 275 2| nothing of action in them.~HYL. They are.~PHIL. And are 276 2| anything else but ideas?~HYL. How often have I acknowledged 277 2| MOTION a sensible quality?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Consequently 278 2| Consequently it is no action?~HYL. I agree with you. And indeed 279 2| absurd and unreasonable?~HYL. I give up the point entirely. 280 2| motions, of that instrument?~HYL. Those I pretend to determine 281 2| motions, and an unknown shape?~HYL. I do not believe that it 282 2| even extension itself?~HYL. I do not pretend to have 283 2| ideas in your own mind?~HYL. You are always teasing 284 2| what and you know not why.~HYL. Hold, Philonous. When I 285 2| with the Divine attributes?~HYL. Make that appear and I 286 2| or notion of INSTRUMENT?~HYL. That which is common to 287 2| on the will of the agent?~HYL. I own I cannot.~PHIL. How 288 2| confession, to give up the point.~HYL. It doth not readily occur 289 2| prescription whatsoever.~HYL. I will no longer maintain 290 2| an occasion of our ideas?~HYL. As to the first point: 291 2| inactive unthinking being?~HYL. I know nothing of its nature.~ 292 2| unthinking, unknown thing.~HYL. When we see ideas produced 293 2| presence of those occasions.~HYL. That is my opinion.~PHIL. 294 2| without doubt He perceives.~HYL. Certainly; otherwise they 295 2| of producing ideas in us?~HYL. I am perfectly at a loss 296 2| and to no kind of use?~HYL. I freely own myself less 297 2| I would gladly bear it.~HYL. I think I have already 298 2| existence that you now can have.~HYL. I acknowledge it is possible 299 2| Matter’s supporting them?~HYL. We have already argued 300 2| abstract idea of ENTITY.~HYL. Nothing else; save only 301 2| unknown Matter to exist?~HYL. Oh Philonous! now you think 302 2| you mean by its EXISTENCE?~HYL. It neither thinks nor acts, 303 2| notion of its existence?~HYL. Upon a nice observation, 304 2| particular things whatsoever.~HYL. Hold, let me think a little— 305 2| any notion in your mind?~HYL. None at all.~PHIL. Pray 306 2| of your whole proceeding?~HYL. Be that as it will, yet 307 2| jargon should be treated.~HYL. To deal frankly with you, 308 2| explain or account for it.~HYL. THE REALITY of things cannot 309 2| sensible or intelligible?~HYL. Sensible things.~PHIL. 310 2| PHIL. My glove for example?~HYL. That, or any other thing 311 2| nothing too hard for you.~HYL. Upon the whole, I am content 312 2| mountain, or a centaur.~HYL. I acknowledge it; but still 313 2| possibility of such a substance?~HYL. True, but that is only 314 2| signification of words?~HYL. I thought philosophers 315 2| else understands it in?~HYL. But I am not so thoroughly 316 2| shewn to be impossible?~HYL. When a repugnancy is demonstrated 317 2| demonstrated between ideas?~HYL. I agree with you.~PHIL. 318 2| will let me know what is.~HYL. I acknowledge you have 319 3| can know nothing, Hylas?~HYL. There is not that single 320 3| know what fire or water is?~HYL. You may indeed know that 321 3| eyes to be a real tree?~HYL. KNOW? No, it is impossible 322 3| not what either truly was?~HYL. Believe me, Philonous, 323 3| like what I see and feel.~HYL. Even so.~PHIL. But is it 324 3| they are conversant about.~HYL. They do so: but you know 325 3| that they KNOW NOTHING.~HYL. That is the very top and 326 3| what it is you call for?~HYL. How often must I tell you, 327 3| Hylas, is it not as I say?~HYL. I agree with you. MATERIAL 328 3| I actually see and feel.~HYL. Not so fast, Philonous: 329 3| Do you not?~PHIL. I do.~HYL. Supposing you were annihilated, 330 3| termed the LAWS OF NATURE.~HYL. Answer me, Philonous. Are 331 3| altogether passive and inert.~HYL. And is not God an agent, 332 3| PHIL. I acknowledge it.~HYL. No idea therefore can be 333 3| of God?~PHIL. It cannot.~HYL. Since therefore you have 334 3| from that of the DEITY.~HYL. You say your own soul supplies 335 3| but know it by reflexion.~HYL. Notwithstanding all you 336 3| between Spirit and Matter.~HYL. I own myself satisfied 337 3| he saith, hath no being.~HYL. Yes, Philonous, I grant 338 3| since agreed between us.~HYL. But, be your opinion never 339 3| will be of another opinion.~HYL. But, according to your 340 3| thing that you perceive.~HYL. But still, Philonous, you 341 3| them by all our senses?~HYL. And, in consequence of 342 3| confirm it by citations.~HYL. You are not aware, Philonous, 343 3| guilt of their actions.~HYL. But the denying Matter, 344 3| some men are so fond of.~HYL. What say you to this? Since, 345 3| then perceive its motion.~HYL. I understand you; and must 346 3| inquiry, upon evidence.~HYL. After all, it seems our 347 3| subject of powers, extended?~HYL. It hath not extension; 348 3| therefore itself unextended?~HYL. I grant it.~PHIL. Is it 349 3| Is it not also active?~HYL. Without doubt. Otherwise, 350 3| common use of language?~HYL. Well then, let it not be 351 3| propriety of speech a SPIRIT.~HYL. And now I warrant you think 352 3| PHIL. Without a doubt.~HYL. To suffer pain is an imperfection?~ 353 3| imperfection?~PHIL. It is.~HYL. Are we not sometimes affected 354 3| other Being?~PHIL. We are.~HYL. And have you not said that 355 3| Spirit God?~PHIL. I grant it.~HYL. But you have asserted that 356 3| absurdity where there is none.~HYL. But, all this while you 357 3| demonstrate that point.~HYL. I lay it down for a principle, 358 3| this arguing in a circle?~HYL. In the premise I only mean 359 3| demonstration, have not yet proved.~HYL. I shall insist no longer 360 3| Hylas, by the PHENOMENA?~HYL. I mean the appearances 361 3| sense, are they not ideas?~HYL. I have told you so a hundred 362 3| on our senses. Is it not?~HYL. It is.~PHIL. Now, if you 363 3| useful and entertaining.~HYL. After all, can it be supposed 364 3| deceived mankind at all.~HYL. But the novelty, Philonous, 365 3| in a Christian country.~HYL. As for the difficulties 366 3| real things themselves.~HYL. Things! You may pretend 367 3| trust your senses, I do.~HYL. You say you believe your 368 3| any regard to speculation.~HYL. Methinks I apprehend your 369 3| perceived by the senses?~HYL. For the present, I have 370 3| they are perceived by many.~HYL. I own I can make nothing 371 3| our minds?~PHIL. It is.~HYL. But the SAME idea which 372 3| the Materialists and me.~HYL. Ay, Philonous, but they 373 3| it is less intelligible.~HYL. You have indeed clearly 374 3| a proof against neither.~HYL. I acknowledge it. But, 375 3| can be sure it exists.~HYL. But, what would you say, 376 3| what I have to say to them.~HYL. Is the mind extended or 377 3| Unextended, without doubt.~HYL. Do you say the things you 378 3| your mind?~PHIL. They are.~HYL. Again, have I not heard 379 3| PHIL. I believe you may.~HYL. Explain to me now, O Philonous! 380 3| intelligible, I would fain know.~HYL. Nay, if that be all, I 381 3| their gross, original sense.~HYL. You have, I own, satisfied 382 3| this mighty difficulty.~HYL. The Scripture account of 383 3| Moses into our dispute.~HYL. It is in vain to dispute 384 3| exist without the mind.~HYL. Pray let me see any sense 385 3| it in, you only can tell.~HYL. But, Philonous, you do 386 3| and unintelligible jargon.~HYL. I own I have no very clear 387 3| all things from eternity?~HYL. I am.~PHIL. Consequently 388 3| in the Divine intellect.~HYL. This I acknowledge.~PHIL. 389 3| are agreed in that point.~HYL. What shall we make then 390 3| derogate from those attributes?~HYL. Well, but as to this decree 391 3| what you have now objected.~HYL. I must acknowledge the 392 3| against its non-existence.~HYL. I confess, Philonous, you 393 3| and the inspired writings?~HYL. And so I am.~PHIL. Ought 394 3| metaphysical and out of the way?~HYL. In the plain sense, doubtless.~ 395 3| unphilosophical reader?~HYL. I cannot help thinking 396 3| doctrine of the Materialist?~HYL. This I have already acknowledged.~ 397 3| creation might terminate?~HYL. True.~PHIL. Is it not therefore 398 3| unintelligible to themselves and me?~HYL. I cannot contradict you.~ 399 3| should be reconciled to them.~HYL. I see you can assault me 400 3| the creation of things.~HYL. I own, Philonous, I think 401 3| of a learned, education.~HYL. I confess it seems to be 402 3| IRREGULAR VISIONS of the fancy.~HYL. I agree to all you have 403 3| opinion and yet be false?~HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied 404 3| solidly soever demonstrated.~HYL. You have satisfied me, 405 3| against your own notions.~HYL. I must needs own, Philonous, 406 3| that general confused term.~HYL. Well but, Philonous, since 407 3| substance of what I advance.~HYL. I have been a long time


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