Dialogue

  1 1|        believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however
  2 1|             entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions
  3 1|             comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery
  4 1|         disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content
  5 1|            the reality and truth of things.~PHIL. What things? Do you
  6 1|         truth of things.~PHIL. What things? Do you mean the principles
  7 1|              But are there no other things? What think you of distrusting
  8 1|          real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing
  9 1|             the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest
 10 1|           What mean you by Sensible Things?~HYL. Those things which
 11 1|         Sensible Things?~HYL. Those things which are perceived by the
 12 1|         farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses
 13 1|          immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to be SENSIBLE
 14 1|          letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense,
 15 1|           know whether you take the things suggested by them to be
 16 1|        think GOD or VIRTUE sensible things; though they may be signified
 17 1|        seems then, that by SENSIBLE THINGS you mean those only which
 18 1|           for all, that by SENSIBLE THINGS I mean those only which
 19 1|            between us—That SENSIBLE THINGS ARE THOSE ONLY WHICH ARE
 20 1|            grant it.~PHIL. Sensible things therefore are nothing else
 21 1|             the REALITY of sensible things consist in being perceived?
 22 1|             with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask,
 23 1|             the reality of external things.~PHIL. But what will you
 24 1|      altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be,
 25 1|        which you defined to be, THE THINGS WE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE
 26 1|         will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the inferences
 27 1|             nature and the truth of things?~HYL. To deal ingenuously,
 28 1|             to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade
 29 1|            framed to perceive those things which by reason of their
 30 1|            every one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore
 31 1|            to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than
 32 1|           of our sensations are not things immediately perceived, and
 33 1|        seems manifest—that sensible things are only to be perceived
 34 1|             in every perception two things, the one an action of the
 35 1|             when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering
 36 1|         former?~HYL. You still take things in a strict literal sense.
 37 1|       together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such
 38 1|            nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist
 39 1|             Is it not certain I SEE THINGS at a distance? Do we not
 40 1|             distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them
 41 1|          And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are
 42 1|           IDEAS; the other are real things or external objects, perceived
 43 1|             be pictures of external things: and that these also are
 44 1|            perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible,
 45 1|           said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that
 46 1|         that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly
 47 1|       conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only
 48 1|              you must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas,
 49 1|     existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS. Or,
 50 1|           is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as
 51 1|         They are then like external things?~HYL. They are.~PHIL. Have
 52 1|          They are.~PHIL. Have those things a stable and permanent nature,
 53 1|          organs of sense?~HYL. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed
 54 1|         they had the same effect on things existing without the mind.~
 55 1|            then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and
 56 1|           forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different
 57 1|             but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves
 58 1|             the REALITY of sensible things; since you made it to consist
 59 2|            modern way of explaining things that, I profess, I know
 60 2|          could mean?~PHIL. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable;
 61 2|  immediately perceivable; and those things which are immediately perceivable
 62 2|          imagine.~PHIL. But are not things imagined as truly IN THE
 63 2|             as truly IN THE MIND as things perceived?~HYL. I must confess
 64 2|              this way of explaining things, as you called it, could
 65 2|          satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence; and
 66 2|             How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their
 67 2|             the REALITY of sensible things consisted in AN ABSOLUTE
 68 2|            obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that
 69 2|             the reality of sensible things was to be defined after
 70 2|             allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than
 71 2|           knows and comprehends all things.~PHIL. Aye, but here lies
 72 2|           commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by
 73 2|           God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him.~
 74 2|          THEREFORE HE PERCEIVES ALL THINGS; and saying, SENSIBLE THINGS
 75 2|        THINGS; and saying, SENSIBLE THINGS DO REALLY EXIST; AND, IF
 76 2|            order, and adjustment of things—an infinite Mind should
 77 2|      eminent moderns, of SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD?~PHIL. I would gladly
 78 2|          being united with material things, so as to perceive them
 79 2|            how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert,
 80 2|             opinion that we see all things in God? If I mistake not,
 81 2|             being.” But that we see things in His essence, after the
 82 2|              It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas,
 83 2|           plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either
 84 2|             be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived
 85 2|         which latter are called RED THINGS. From all which I conclude,
 86 2|           well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which
 87 2|          understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known
 88 2|           and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there not be still
 89 2|           same thing? You allow the things immediately perceived by
 90 2|            the Supreme Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that,
 91 2|          applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed
 92 2|           Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate
 93 2|             my opinion.~PHIL. Those things which you say are present
 94 2|     allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of
 95 2|           it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately.
 96 2|      possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though
 97 2|             of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that
 98 2|    corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.~HYL. Hold, let
 99 2|           sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away
100 2|             it.~HYL. THE REALITY of things cannot be maintained without
101 2|       defence?~PHIL. The reality of things! What things? sensible or
102 2|             reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?~
103 2|         intelligible?~HYL. Sensible things.~PHIL. My glove for example?~
104 3|           the real natures of those things, or in the least like them.
105 3|           be said of all other real things, or corporeal substances,
106 3|     distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your
107 3|             with the appearances of things, and those false ones too.
108 3|             if they really knew the things they are conversant about.~
109 3|            philosophers know better things.~PHIL. You mean, they KNOW
110 3|             true and real nature of things, but even of their existence.
111 3|             sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are indebted
112 3|             or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead,
113 3|        believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain,
114 3|            my opinion that the real things are those very things I
115 3|          real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive
116 3|       understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged
117 3|             regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their
118 3|           flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse
119 3|          name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should
120 3|    perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses
121 3|          immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are
122 3|           the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved
123 3|            as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.~
124 3|        cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the
125 3|           conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may
126 3|          mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the
127 3|           knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our
128 3|           conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind?
129 3|            cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our
130 3|         extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which
131 3|             like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived.
132 3|             God, and of all created things in the mind of God. So much
133 3|             be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may exist,
134 3|          whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is,
135 3|           that, although we believe things to exist which we do not
136 3|             me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections.
137 3|             from aft other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I
138 3|          real existence of sensible things consists in their being
139 3| Materialists and me is not, whether things have a REAL existence out
140 3|    difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by
141 3|             by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear;
142 3|     whatever method you distinguish THINGS FROM CHIMERAS on your scheme,
143 3|            wit, that there are only things perceiving, and things perceived;
144 3|         only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every
145 3|            sure of the existence of things, or know any thing of their
146 3|             think there are no such things as physical or corporeal
147 3|             who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains
148 3|             the reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are
149 3|             substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses);
150 3|             judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can
151 3|         affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that
152 3|          and must needs own you say things plausible enough. But, give
153 3|             rather about words than things. We agree in the thing,
154 3|          must be a WILL. Again, the things I perceive must have an
155 3|            knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among
156 3|          that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every
157 3|            independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted
158 3|       between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable.
159 3|           be so far from explaining things, that it is itself the most
160 3|       nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be assured
161 3|            you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say,
162 3|           me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas
163 3|        ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects
164 3|             are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things
165 3|       things, I take to be the real things themselves.~HYL. Things!
166 3|             things themselves.~HYL. Things! You may pretend what you
167 3|      nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which
168 3|          empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things
169 3|          things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they
170 3|     essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree
171 3|            to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our
172 3|             our senses are not real things, but images or copies of
173 3|         change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows
174 3|           the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the
175 3|           language, or the truth of things. But, if the term SAME be
176 3|           denomination of DIFFERENT things. But who sees not that all
177 3|          Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all
178 3|           the existence of sensible things IN A MIND, which you have
179 3|          doubt.~HYL. Do you say the things you perceive are in your
180 3|             your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which
181 3|        books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as
182 3|             of the understanding as things existing in the mind. ‘Nor
183 3|        words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms
184 3|        ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal
185 3|              but of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances.
186 3|          understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist unperceived,
187 3|           out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But whether you
188 3|           the truth, and reality of things continues the same. In common
189 3|           are not termed IDEAS, but THINGS. Call them so still: provided
190 3|             have been a creation of things, of RED things. Neither
191 3|          creation of things, of RED things. Neither is this in the
192 3|             vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses,
193 3|        creation, I should have seen things produced into being—that
194 3|        manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end
195 3|     existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to
196 3|      creation, never think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical
197 3|        aware that you allow created things, in the beginning, only
198 3|     manifests the dependence of all things on God; and consequently
199 3|            this naked conception of things, divested of words, there
200 3|           the existence of sensible things consist in their being in
201 3|            a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of
202 3|          opinion, that God knew all things from eternity?~HYL. I am.~
203 3|             finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may
204 3|         immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not
205 3|         decree of God’s, for making things perceptible, what say you,
206 3|             of existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we
207 3|      acknowledge a twofold state of things—the one ectypal or natural,
208 3|          think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those
209 3|           And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be
210 3|             was not the creation of things sensible, which have only
211 3|   SUBSTRATUM? No, certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You
212 3|           with the Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge
213 3|             believe the creation of things.~HYL. I own, Philonous,
214 3|            obscure general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception,
215 3|           the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding
216 3|          not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies,
217 3|           for the regular course of things? Have they accounted, by
218 3|      absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear
219 3|            the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed
220 3|            but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed,
221 3|         that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns
222 3|     ABSOLUTE existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same
223 3|        there may be some particular things which you know not how to
224 3|           ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas in
225 3|            question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing
226 3|           non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas in truth no one
227 3|           square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. Though
228 3|             to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon
229 3|             applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without
230 3|             names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE,
231 3|      RELATION TO US? It is evident, things regard us only as they are
232 3|              and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet still
233 3|        being of opinion, that THOSE THINGS THEY IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE
234 3|   IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE ARE THE REAL THINGS; and the latter, that THE
235 3|            and the latter, that THE THINGS IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED ARE
236 3|             senses: methought I saw things by a dim light and through
237 3|        clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms, and