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| Alphabetical [« »] behind 3 beholden 4 beholder 1 being 1045 beings 115 belbes 1 belief 20 | Frequency [« »] 1125 if 1115 other 1103 what 1045 being 1042 there 977 mind 974 can | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances being |
Book, Chapter
1 Ded | reader’s fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired 2 Ded | at least preserve it from being condemned without reading, 3 Ded | deserve no consideration, for being somewhat out of the common 4 Ded | is not the less so for being newly brought out of the 5 Read | intervals of interruption, being apt to cause some repetitions. 6 Read | anything here, but what, being spun out of my own coarse 7 Read | appearing therefore in print being on purpose to be as useful 8 Read | quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than 9 Read | explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of 10 Read | virtue, in one place, which, being in disrepute, passes for 11 Read | to him, “innate notions, being conditional things, depending 12 Read | circumstances” in order to their being exerted are—he will I suppose 13 Int | Design. This, therefore, being my purpose—to inquire into 14 Int | bountiful Author of our being, for that proportion and 15 Int | grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not 16 Int | thoughts into the vast ocean of Being; as if all that boundless 17 Int | the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, 18 I, I | receives in its very first being, and brings into the world 19 I, I | if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making 20 I, I | the understanding without being perceived, I can see no 21 I, I | clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take not the 22 I, I | equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by 23 I, I | from others by this note of being known when we come to the 24 I, I | the precise time of their being known and assented to were, 25 I, I | understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational 26 I, I | innate, but acquired; it being about those first which 27 I, I | the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those 28 I, I | general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than 29 I, I | be and not to be,” they being upon this ground equal. 30 I, I | as to the difference of being more general, that makes 31 I, I | this maxim more remote from being innate; those general and 32 I, I | general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first 33 I, I | considered.~21. These maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, 34 I, I | notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, 35 I, I | gaining assent, when, by being in the understanding, by 36 I, I | self-evident truths upon their being proposed: but it is clear 37 I, I | themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, 38 I, I | the signification of them being more large, comprehensive, 39 I, I | but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any further 40 I, I | several degrees of assent, being the business of the following 41 I, I | very principles of their being, and imprinted there in 42 I, I | standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of 43 I, I | can be supposed innate;—it being impossible that any truth 44 I, I | be innate thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind 45 I, I | argument in it against their being innate: that these characters, 46 I, I | and illiterate people, being of all others the least 47 I, I | known to naturals; which being stamped immediately on the 48 I, I | in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their 49 I, I | are frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation 50 I, I | sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to 51 I, II | and the doubt of their being native impressions on the 52 I, II | three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones: 53 I, II | understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby, that this 54 I, II | I doubt not but, without being written on their hearts, 55 I, II | any of these rules, which, being the most obvious deductions 56 I, II | it is no truth at all: it being a command, and not a proposition, 57 I, II | falsehood. To make it capable of being assented to as true, it 58 I, II | duty be so) are so far from being innate, that it is not every 59 I, II | cannot be supposed innate; it being impossible that men should, 60 I, II | but these are so far from being innate moral principles, 61 I, II | and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain 62 I, II | When I had written this, being informed that my Lord Herbert 63 I, II | notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of 64 I, II | proposition so far from being certain, that it will not 65 I, II | the word peccata, or sins, being put, as it usually is, to 66 I, II | in words at all, which, being in most of these principles 67 I, II | no such thing at all: it being all one to have no rule, 68 I, II | retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they 69 I, II | the inclination, and some being taught that they ought not 70 I, II | borrowed principles; which being reputed and presumed to 71 I, III | for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, 72 I, III | understandings. They are so far from being brought into the world with 73 I, III | years old, whether a man, being a creature consisting of 74 I, III | number must be so too; it being impossible to have an idea 75 I, III | any argument against the being of a God; any more than 76 I, III | names for them. For, men being furnished with words, by 77 I, III | the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on 78 I, III | of fire. The name of God being once mentioned in any part 79 I, III | powerful, wise, invisible Being, the suitableness of such 80 I, III | requisite to the end of such a being; and I doubt not but to 81 I, III | the reason in both cases, being, that they never employed 82 I, III | of that incomprehensible Being, or several parts of his 83 I, III | name; for those wise men being very few, perhaps one of 84 I, III | skill born with us. For, being fitted with faculties to 85 I, III | an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea 86 I, III | been in the mind before, being that which distinguishes 87 I, III | of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are 88 I, III | is,—that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is 89 I, III | the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it 90 I, III | perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being 91 I, III | being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing 92 I, III | the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For, though 93 I, III | without any notion of such a Being. And if any person hath 94 I, III | the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays 95 I, III | conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased 96 I, III | the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when 97 II, I | object of thinking. Every man being conscious to himself that 98 II, I | applied about whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, 99 II, I | minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at 100 II, I | our own minds;—which we being conscious of, and observing 101 II, I | REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets 102 II, I | are born into the world, being surrounded with bodies that 103 II, I | having ideas, and perception, being the same thing. I know it 104 II, I | the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, 105 II, I | competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul 106 II, I | night or no. The question being about a matter of fact, 107 II, I | waking or sleeping: without being sensible of it. Our being 108 II, I | being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary 109 II, I | till we can think without being conscious of it.~11. It 110 II, I | because it is the condition of being awake. But whether sleeping 111 II, I | man’s consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything 112 II, I | in a sleeping man without being conscious of it, I ask whether, 113 II, I | happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to 114 II, I | to consist in the soul’s being united to the very same 115 II, I | without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine 116 II, I | make it a much more noble being than those do whom they 117 II, I | his own incomprehensible being, to be so idly and uselessly 118 II, I | to itself or others, or being any way useful to any other 119 II, I | and order of a rational being, those who are acquainted 120 II, I | of none but such, which, being occasioned from the body, 121 II, I | anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving 122 II, I | as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. 123 II, I | know the objects which, being most familiar with it, have 124 II, II | feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the 125 II, II | those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, 126 II, II | of his own understanding being muchwhat the same as it 127 II, II | atom of what is already in being. The same inability will 128 II, II | such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and 129 II, III | possible if we would; there being a great many more of them 130 II, IV | of our own bodies; that being generally called hard by 131 II, IV | because the parts of water, being more easily separable from 132 II, IV | golden globe thus filled, being put into a press, which 133 II, IV | space:—the extension of body being nothing but the cohesion 134 II, IV | of a concave superficies being equally as clear without 135 II, IV | more than a man who, not being blind or deaf, has distinct 136 II, VII | infinite wise Author of our being, having given us the power 137 II, VII | work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties 138 II, VII | the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the 139 II, VII | knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our 140 II, VII | minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well 141 II, VII | one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the 142 II, VIII | to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive and 143 II, VIII | viz. that all sensation being produced in us only by different 144 II, VIII | ideas, v.g. taste, sound, being, with a signification of 145 II, VIII | most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the 146 II, VIII | particles on our senses. For, it being manifest that there are 147 II, VIII | produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive 148 II, VIII | or square figure; and by being removed from one place to 149 II, VIII | it has not. These ideas, being all effects of the operations 150 II, VIII | warm to the other. Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, 151 II, VIII | perhaps I intended. But, it being necessary to make the nature 152 II, VIII | into natural philosophy; it being necessary in our present 153 II, VIII | when they operate without being distinctly discerned;—whereby 154 II, VIII | itself. For, our senses being able to observe a likeness 155 II, VIII | it. But our senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness 156 II, IX | by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, 157 II, IX | rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of sensation, 158 II, IX | very first moment of its being and constitution.~7. Which 159 II, IX | necessities of their life and being there: so, after they are 160 II, IX | most familiar at first, being various according to the 161 II, IX | knowledge. Perception then being the first step and degree 162 II, IX | found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees ( 163 II, IX | conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter 164 II, X | yellow or sweet,—the object being removed. This is memory, 165 II, X | the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas 166 II, X | have use of. But, our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions 167 II, X | great business of the senses being, to make us take notice 168 II, XI | having them unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish 169 II, XI | difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and 170 II, XI | Abstraction. The use of words then being to stand as outward marks 171 II, XI | internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, 172 II, XI | accordingly. Thus the same colour being observed to-day in chalk 173 II, XI | several of these faculties being exercised at first principally 174 II, XI | best way to come to truth being to examine things as really 175 II, XII | For the materials in both being such as he has no power 176 II, XII | signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in discourses, 177 II, XII | these I call simple modes as being contained within the bounds 178 II, XII | the beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of 179 II, XII | sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, 180 II, XIII | often as we will, without being ever able to come to any 181 II, XIII | of angle it pleases: and being able also to shorten any 182 II, XIII | part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of 183 II, XIII | certain parts of the board being that which determines the 184 II, XIII | we made the comparison) being that which determined the 185 II, XIII | matter we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly 186 II, XIII | distance we call place, being made by men for their common 187 II, XIII | place of each chess-man being determined only within that 188 II, XIII | by the chess-board; there being another use of designing 189 II, XIII | of the idea of place here being, to know in what part of 190 II, XIII | in it; space and solidity being as distinct ideas as thinking 191 II, XIII | by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation, 192 II, XIII | their inseparability; motion being nothing but change of distance 193 II, XIII | as a tree and a pebble, being in the same sense body, 194 II, XIII | term; which is so far from being suspected to have three 195 II, XIII | the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest, are a wall 196 II, XIII | distinct. But the question being here,—Whether the idea of 197 II, XIII | same idea.~25. Extension being inseparable from body, proves 198 II, XIII | measure and possibility of all being only from their narrow and 199 II, XIII | live, move, and have our being,” are to be understood in 200 II, XIV | one another. And nothing being a measure of duration but 201 II, XIV | irregularly very swift; or if, being constantly equally swift, 202 II, XIV | which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do. For 203 II, XIV | body of the universe, (for being finite, it must be at a 204 II, XIV | duration and extension. But it being at least as conceivable 205 II, XIV | bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thought, 206 II, XIV | any other motion had its being; which is no more difficult 207 II, XIV | of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of 208 II, XIV | of the chaos, or angels, being created before there was 209 II, XIV | minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I 210 II, XIV | years, &c.~Fourthly, by being able to repeat those measures 211 II, XIV | years hence.~Fifthly, by being able to repeat ideas of 212 II, XIV | eternity of that infinite Being which must necessarily have 213 II, XV | and duration, yet, they being ideas of general concernment, 214 II, XV | yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one easily allows, 215 II, XV | immensity. His infinite being is certainly as boundless 216 II, XV | That duration and extension being used as names of affections 217 II, XV | For duration and space being in themselves uniform and 218 II, XV | the first incomprehensible Being. But when applied to any 219 II, XV | period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shows 220 II, XV | of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind, and 221 II, XV | all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends 222 II, XV | were all but one single being; and we may truly say, they 223 II, XV | and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality 224 II, XV | have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation 225 II, XV | in our thoughts that any being does now exist tomorrow, 226 II, XV | man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends 227 II, XV | God’s infinite duration, being accompanied with infinite 228 II, XV | other; every part of space being in every part of duration, 229 II, XVI | as the most remote; two being as distinct from one, as 230 II, XVI | several names: all numeration being but still the adding of 231 II, XVI | simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many 232 II, XVI | will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion.~6. 233 II, XVI | Because their language being scanty, and accommodated 234 II, XVII | to that first and supreme Being our idea of infinite, in 235 II, XVII | Finite then, and infinite, being by the mind looked on as 236 II, XVII | naturally leads us. For, it being considered by us, either 237 II, XVII | confines of all bodies, being exactly the same, differing 238 II, XVII | though in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from 239 II, XVII | idea of immensity; so, by being able to repeat the idea 240 II, XVII | whether there were any real being, whose duration has been 241 II, XVII | of parts are capable of being augmented by every addition 242 II, XVII | space, duration, and number, being capable of increase by repetition, 243 II, XVII | as our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endless 244 II, XVII | any quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated 245 II, XVII | parts of such an idea not being perceived to be, as they 246 II, XVII | end, as it were: for there being in number nothing less than 247 II, XVII | as before. And these two being put together, are that infinite 248 II, XVII | the former additions; it being indeed but the addition 249 II, XVII | little;—our idea of infinity being, as I may say, a growing 250 II, XVII | one will; the like also being in the infinity of space 251 II, XVII | negation of an end; which being negative, the negation of 252 II, XVII | is the first instant of being, and is not by any body 253 II, XVII | to make it infinite,—it being always enlarging, always 254 II, XVII | comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and 255 II, XVII | undeterminate intimation of being still greater. For to say, 256 II, XVII | when applied to an eternal Being, and to a finite; since, 257 II, XVII | infinite duration; there being nothing more inconceivable 258 II, XVII | if it signify anything, being not quantum, finite or infinite 259 II, XVII | complete idea of eternal being. I think it unavoidable 260 II, XVII | notion of an eternal, wise Being, who had no beginning: and 261 II, XVII | negation of a beginning, being but the negation of a positive 262 II, XVII | either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive 263 II, XVII | necessary to admit some Eternal Being, and so to consider the 264 II, XVII | the real existence of that Being as taken up and commensurate 265 II, XVII | without a kernel in it: it being no more necessary that there 266 II, XVII | the matter requires; there being few simple ideas whose modes 267 II, XVIII | belong to mixed modes, as being made up of ideas of divers 268 II, XVIII | those senses. But they, being such as generally we have 269 II, XVIII | great concernment of men being with men one amongst another, 270 II, XVIII | certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of any 271 II, XVIII | enough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken 272 II, XIX | made by an external object, being distinct from all other 273 II, XX | consideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being 274 II, XX | being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man’s children 275 II, XX | last, envy and anger, not being caused by pain and pleasure 276 II, XX | changes in it; which not being always sensible, do not 277 II, XX | truth. But the passions being of much more concernment 278 II, XXI | This idea how got. The mind being every day informed, by the 279 II, XXI | inquiry, my present business being not to search into the original 280 II, XXI | common apprehension; yet they being not, perhaps, so truly active 281 II, XXI | considered as one of them; being one of those that make a 282 II, XXI | relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action 283 II, XXI | in it from rest to motion being little more an action, than 284 II, XXI | to my purpose; sensation being one of those ways whereby 285 II, XXI | confusion in men’s thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it 286 II, XXI | forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or 287 II, XXI | will doubt it: and yet, being locked fast in, it is evident 288 II, XXI | at liberty. A waking man, being under the necessity of having 289 II, XXI | his virtue square: liberty being as little applicable to 290 II, XXI | or obeys not the will: it being altogether as proper and 291 II, XXI | great confusion. For these being all different powers in 292 II, XXI | distinct agents. For, it being asked, what it was that 293 II, XXI | a man to be free without being able to be free.~21. But 294 II, XXI | preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, 295 II, XXI | tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to 296 II, XXI | That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting 297 II, XXI | is very manifest. For, it being unavoidable that the action 298 II, XXI | preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, 299 II, XXI | cannot be free. Nor is any being, as far I can comprehend 300 II, XXI | will, i.e. to prefer the being or not being of anything 301 II, XXI | prefer the being or not being of anything in its power, 302 II, XXI | motion if he would. This being so, it is plain that a man 303 II, XXI | room twenty feet square, being at the north side of his 304 II, XXI | consists freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, 305 II, XXI | determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their 306 II, XXI | will. Thirdly, the will being nothing but a power in the 307 II, XXI | willing or volition; yet, it being a very simple act, whosoever 308 II, XXI | whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be misled 309 II, XXI | distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness 310 II, XXI | different from it), that it being “deferred makes the heart 311 II, XXI | we shall find that, we being capable but of one determination 312 II, XXI | it; pain and uneasiness being, by every one, concluded 313 II, XXI | so to set us on action, being only possible, but not infallibly 314 II, XXI | greatest confessed good being often neglected, to satisfy 315 II, XXI | the present moment not being our eternity, whatever our 316 II, XXI | determines the will. But we being in this world beset with 317 II, XXI | that are judged capable of being then removed. For, the will 318 II, XXI | then removed. For, the will being the power of directing our 319 II, XXI | to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an 320 II, XXI | pleasure and pain; there being pleasure and pain of the 321 II, XXI | confessed good, without being concerned for it, or moved 322 II, XXI | feel no uneasiness without being moved. And therefore, being 323 II, XXI | being moved. And therefore, being uneasy in the want of whatever 324 II, XXI | infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness 325 II, XXI | All uneasiness therefore being removed, a moderate portion 326 II, XXI | attainment.~46. Why not being desired, it moves not the 327 II, XXI | at present pressed with, being the getting out of misery, 328 II, XXI | its activity, our wills being under the determination 329 II, XXI | there is any in the mind, being only, which desire shall 330 II, XXI | endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the 331 II, XXI | for consideration. There being in us a great many uneasinesses, 332 II, XXI | liberty. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution 333 II, XXI | choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency 334 II, XXI | very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the 335 II, XXI | constitution as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing 336 II, XXI | Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.~ 337 II, XXI | is under the necessity of being happy; and the more any 338 II, XXI | the more any intelligent being is so, the nearer is its 339 II, XXI | unbiased give its judgment, being that whereon a right direction 340 II, XXI | the act of his choice from being determined for or against 341 II, XXI | take, though all aim at being happy, we must consider 342 II, XXI | or, through disuse, not being able, by the contemplation 343 II, XXI | For, the pain or pleasure being just so great and no greater 344 II, XXI | that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. 345 II, XXI | that every intelligent being really seeks happiness, 346 II, XXI | very great one, the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting 347 II, XXI | present. For, its greatness being no more than what shall 348 II, XXI | designs to be so. For that being intended for a state of 349 II, XXI | happy or miserable, without being able to move himself one 350 II, XXI | the force of the wind? The being acted by a blind impulse 351 II, XXI | satisfied in that; and so being happy, till some new desire, 352 II, XXI | contemplation of the end, and the being more or less persuaded of 353 II, XXI | incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty, 354 II, XXI | she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy infallibility, 355 II, XXI | reason in controverted points being so rare, and exact ones 356 II, XXI | Mobility, or the power of being moved; which by our senses 357 II, XXI | to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of those 358 II, XXI | But my present purpose being only to inquire into the 359 II, XXII | kind. These mixed modes, being also such combinations of 360 II, XXII | reflection offers them, without being able to make any one idea, 361 II, XXII | several combinations. For, it being once furnished with simple 362 II, XXII | whether they had any real being: though I do not deny but 363 II, XXII | man’s father; yet, there being no name standing precisely 364 II, XXII | the end of language; which being to mark, or communicate 365 II, XXII | names of mixed modes; which being fleeting and transient combinations 366 II, XXII | in the things themselves, being actions that required time 367 II, XXII | infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily 368 II, XXII | names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, 369 II, XXII | signify but the effect. Power being the source from whence all 370 II, XXIII | substances, how made. The mind being, as I have declared, furnished 371 II, XXIII | constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one 372 II, XXIII | to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, 373 II, XXIII | was—a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what 374 II, XXIII | talk like children: who, being questioned what such a thing 375 II, XXIII | general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, 376 II, XXIII | of substance in general being thus made we come to have 377 II, XXIII | we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without 378 II, XXIII | the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there 379 II, XXIII | Because every substance, being as apt, by the powers we 380 II, XXIII | powers; as the power of being melted, but of not spending 381 II, XXIII | spending itself in the fire; of being dissolved in aqua regia, 382 II, XXIII | comprehension of any finite being. We are furnished with faculties ( 383 II, XXIII | be inconsistent with our being, or at least well-being, 384 II, XXIII | colours, their appearances being so wholly different. And 385 II, XXIII | solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with substance, 386 II, XXIII | thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas 387 II, XXIII | extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance 388 II, XXIII | there is some corporeal being without me, the object of 389 II, XXIII | there is some spiritual being within me that sees and 390 II, XXIII | without an immaterial thinking being.~16. No idea of abstract 391 II, XXIII | not here). For my soul, being a real being as well as 392 II, XXIII | For my soul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly 393 II, XXIII | with any other body, or being, as body itself; and so 394 II, XXIII | and cannot but know, that, being united to his body, it constantly 395 II, XXIII | enough of its motion, its being separated from the body 396 II, XXIII | conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible, nor 397 II, XXIII | cohesion of solid parts) from being clearer, or more distinct, 398 II, XXIII | body, the substance of each being equally unknown to us; and 399 II, XXIII | and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to 400 II, XXIII | well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction 401 II, XXIII | independent from thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent 402 II, XXIII | incomprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find that we come 403 II, XXIII | suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of 404 II, XXIII | frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent wherein 405 II, XXIII | ideas of) to that sovereign Being, which we call God, being 406 II, XXIII | Being, which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, 407 II, XXIII | best we can, the Supreme Being. For, though in his own 408 II, XXIII | ideas, and some of them, being relative, are again compounded 409 II, XXIII | compounded of others: all which being, as has been shown, originally 410 II, XXIII | other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple 411 II, XXIII | of most general use, as being the best and quickest we 412 II, XXIV | should make one idea; it being as easy to the mind to unite 413 II, XXV | Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that 414 II, XXV | almost infinite number: he being capable of as many relations 415 II, XXV | knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection 416 II, XXV | are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct 417 II, XXV | only for ideas; and those being all either simple, or made 418 II, XXV | Fourthly, That relation being the considering of one thing 419 II, XXVI | operation of some other being. From this observation we 420 II, XXVI | natura, which had before no being, and this we call creation.~ 421 II, XXVII | of comparing, is the very being of things, when, considering 422 II, XXVII | things one beginning; it being impossible for two things 423 II, XXVII | or subtraction of matter being made, it is the same. For, 424 II, XXVII | renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction that two 425 II, XXVII | relations. All other things being but modes or relations ultimately 426 II, XXVII | itself; which determines a being of any sort to a particular 427 II, XXVII | the same with itself. For, being at that instant what it 428 II, XXVII | the vegetable life. That being then one plant which has 429 II, XXVII | For this organization, being at any one instant in any 430 II, XXVII | applied to stands for: it being one thing to be the same 431 II, XXVII | of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea 432 II, XXVII | Personal identity. This being premised, to find wherein 433 II, XXVII | is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 434 II, XXVII | me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to 435 II, XXVII | which he calls self:—it not being considered, in this case, 436 II, XXVII | the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness 437 II, XXVII | that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, 438 II, XXVII | by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein 439 II, XXVII | reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, 440 II, XXVII | cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing 441 II, XXVII | identity at all. The question being what makes the same person; 442 II, XXVII | where they do partake in it) being united into one person, 443 II, XXVII | continued life. For, it being the same consciousness that 444 II, XXVII | as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any 445 II, XXVII | personal identity; there being no question about the same 446 II, XXVII | action it could not: but it being a present representation 447 II, XXVII | who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that 448 II, XXVII | same consciousness, not being the same individual act, 449 II, XXVII | For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the 450 II, XXVII | Whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the 451 II, XXVII | the same immaterial being, being conscious of the action 452 II, XXVII | would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of 453 II, XXVII | siege of Troy, (for souls being, as far as we know anything 454 II, XXVII | making the same person, by being united to any body, than 455 II, XXVII | For as to this point of being the same self, it matters 456 II, XXVII | same or other substances—I being as much concerned, and as 457 II, XXVII | punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one 458 II, XXVII | man only. And the same man being presumed to be the same 459 II, XXVII | united in the same conscious being: but, consciousness removed, 460 II, XXVII | than any other immaterial being. For, whatsoever any substance 461 II, XXVII | by any other immaterial being anywhere existing.~25. Consciousness 462 II, XXVII | This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or 463 II, XXVII | to the present thinking being is a part of that very same 464 II, XXVII | or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at 465 II, XXVII | between that punishment and being created miserable? And therefore, 466 II, XXVIII| one simple idea, which, being capable of parts or degrees, 467 II, XXVIII| origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, 468 II, XXVIII| marked out in mankind, there being occasion, both in laws and 469 II, XXVIII| growth of languages; which being suited only to the convenience 470 II, XXVIII| called moral relation, as being that which denominates our 471 II, XXVIII| well to be examined; there being no part of knowledge wherein 472 II, XXVIII| vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions 473 II, XXVIII| action itself For that, being a natural convenience or 474 II, XXVIII| punishments that enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable 475 II, XXVIII| hath established; there being nothing that so directly 476 II, XXVIII| their approbation right, few being depraved to that degree 477 II, XXVIII| moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection 478 II, XXVIII| collection of simple ideas, being found by me to agree or 479 II, XXVIII| respect they are relative, it being their conformity to, or 480 II, XXVIII| stealing: but that name, being commonly understood to signify 481 II, XXVIII| child. So the word friend, being taken for a man who loves 482 II, XXVIII| word man, or intelligent being; secondly, the idea of love; 483 II, XXVIII| signification of relative words, being very often other supposed 484 II, XXVIII| whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly 485 II, XXVIII| any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple 486 II, XXVIII| mistaken in the manner of it), being that on which I grounded 487 II, XXVIII| relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in 488 II, XXVIII| Because relative words, being the marks of this comparison, 489 II, XXIX | The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by 490 II, XXIX | objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to 491 II, XXIX | i.e. different, without being perceived to be so. No idea, 492 II, XXIX | Now every idea a man has, being visibly what it is, and 493 II, XXIX | the other of those names, being left out; and so the distinction, 494 II, XXIX | idea of a leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished 495 II, XXIX | not sufficiently distinct: being either the same with it, 496 II, XXIX | as ranked under names, being those that for the most 497 II, XXIX | another. Our complex ideas, being made up of collections, 498 II, XXIX | very distinct; so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate 499 II, XXIX | and familiar names. For, being satisfied in that part of 500 II, XXIX | which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing