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| Alphabetical [« »] knowest 2 knowing 105 knowingly 4 knowledge 869 known 199 knows 108 koinai 1 | Frequency [« »] 952 his 900 has 884 these 869 knowledge 868 such 859 at 848 more | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances knowledge |
Book, Chapter
501 IV, V | the object of that real knowledge which we have spoken of 502 IV, V | about truth, that did about knowledge: and it will be objected, 503 IV, V | disagree in men’s minds, the knowledge of truth is not so valuable 504 IV, V | distinguish real from imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer 505 IV, V | therefore truth as well as knowledge may well come under the 506 IV, V | only is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in 507 IV, V | great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and 508 IV, V | those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness 509 IV, V | and shorten our way to knowledge.~11. Moral and metaphysical 510 IV, VI | Treating of words necessary to knowledge. Though the examining and 511 IV, VI | way to clear and distinct knowledge: yet, through the prevailing 512 IV, VI | part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to 513 IV, VI | verbal propositions. All the knowledge we have, being only of particular 514 IV, VI | in the examination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth 515 IV, VI | twofold—of truth and of knowledge. But that we may not be 516 IV, VI | of truth and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is, 517 IV, VI | really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement 518 IV, VI | experimental (not universal) knowledge; and reach with certainty 519 IV, VI | For the chief part of our knowledge concerning substances is 520 IV, VI | with matter of more general knowledge, and enable us to make universal 521 IV, VI | have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine, amongst all 522 IV, VI | breathing has forced into our knowledge. But how many other extrinsical 523 IV, VI | sparingly with any general knowledge, or universal propositions 524 IV, VI | further: but that is not knowledge. We are not therefore to 525 IV, VI | concerning substances: our knowledge of their qualities and properties 526 IV, VI | certainty which is requisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge 527 IV, VI | knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, 528 IV, VI | them, there we have general knowledge; and by putting the names 529 IV, VI | What is requisite for our knowledge of substances. Before we 530 IV, VI | we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we must First 531 IV, VI | look on our certain general knowledge of substances as almost 532 IV, VI | observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. 533 IV, VI | able to afford us general knowledge. ~ 534 IV, VII | influence and govern our other knowledge.~2. Wherein that self-evidence 535 IV, VII | self-evidence consists. Knowledge, as has been shown, consists 536 IV, VII | of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will 537 IV, VII | Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation 538 IV, VII | never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its 539 IV, VII | evidence or certainty of its knowledge. Just so it is (as every 540 IV, VII | identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. 541 IV, VII | but very little intuitive knowledge: nor are there to be found 542 IV, VII | much less a self-evident knowledge: and, therefore, concerning 543 IV, VII | much influence our other knowledge. In the next place let us 544 IV, VII | upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in 545 IV, VII | foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to 546 IV, VII | them the other parts of our knowledge depend.~9. Because maxims 547 IV, VII | and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them; and next 548 IV, VII | communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is naturally 549 IV, VII | nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about.~10. 550 IV, VII | them the other parts of our knowledge do not depend. Secondly, 551 IV, VII | foundations of all our other knowledge. For if there be a great 552 IV, VII | perceived. Nor after the knowledge, that the whole is equal 553 IV, VII | who will needs have all knowledge, besides those general principles 554 IV, VII | evince, That either all knowledge does not depend on certain 555 IV, VII | which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages; and 556 IV, VII | our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And, therefore, 557 IV, VII | respect to other parts of our knowledge, and examine more particularly 558 IV, VII | these maxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived 559 IV, VII | and we are advanced in our knowledge. But in neither of these 560 IV, VII | we receive our light or knowledge from maxims. But in the 561 IV, VII | advances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discovery 562 IV, VII | by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations, 563 IV, VII | understanding in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the sciences; 564 IV, VII | think no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an 565 IV, VII | the method of acquiring knowledge, and of communicating it; 566 IV, VII | opened those secrets of knowledge. Though afterwards, when 567 IV, VII | abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him 568 IV, VII | sources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations 569 IV, VII | thought the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as I suppose, 570 IV, VII | way to attain truth and knowledge: and that which I think 571 IV, VII | helps to the advancement of knowledge.~Of great use to stop wranglers 572 IV, VII | forwards in its search after knowledge. For who ever began to build 573 IV, VII | ever began to build his knowledge on the general proposition, 574 IV, VII | deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions often involving 575 IV, VII | them in its progress in knowledge; which would be neither 576 IV, VII | For in particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself, 577 IV, VII | course, and having drawn its knowledge into as general propositions 578 IV, VII | establishing our minds in true knowledge, that if our notions be 579 IV, VII | being bare extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without 580 IV, VII | constant, clear, and distinct knowledge of our own ideas, more general 581 IV, VII | is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by 582 IV, VII | use for the improvement of knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermined 583 IV, VII | without any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think 584 IV, VII | They cannot add to our knowledge of substances, and their 585 IV, VII | or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of substances, 586 IV, VII | universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any being existing without 587 IV, VII | because, having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, 588 IV, VII | ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits 589 IV, VII | away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty; and he that 590 IV, VIII | bring no increase to our knowledge. Whether the maxims treated 591 IV, VIII | chapter be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed, 592 IV, VIII | bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are—~2. I. As identical 593 IV, VIII | also, without any real knowledge.~3. Examples. For, at this 594 IV, VIII | they would have improved in knowledge and bulk together.~How identical 595 IV, VIII | in them was contained all knowledge, and the understanding were 596 IV, VIII | the foundation of all our knowledge lies in the faculty we have 597 IV, VIII | for the improvement of knowledge, from the imputation of 598 IV, VIII | propositions, for the enlarging our knowledge? Let a man abound, as much 599 IV, VIII | instruct him or others in the knowledge of morality? Those who know 600 IV, VIII | propositions give in the knowledge of anything necessary or 601 IV, VIII | understanding in any part of knowledge, should be busy with identical 602 IV, VIII | laid on them as helps to knowledge; since they teach nothing 603 IV, VIII | light, or inlet into the knowledge of things, no better than 604 IV, VIII | or others in any sort of knowledge. It no more helps to that 605 IV, VIII | improvement of any one’s knowledge. Instances of other kinds, 606 IV, VIII | For what information, what knowledge, carries this proposition 607 IV, VIII | sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the signification 608 IV, VIII | no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a 609 IV, VIII | stands for: and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more 610 IV, VIII | sign.~8. But adds no real knowledge. We can know then the truth 611 IV, VIII | with it instructive real knowledge.~9. General propositions 612 IV, VIII | We having little or no knowledge of what combinations there 613 IV, VIII | and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how 614 IV, VIII | and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality 615 IV, VIII | advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things: 616 IV, VIII | more increases in his own knowledge than he does his riches, 617 IV, VIII | further from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, 618 IV, VIII | instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use 619 IV, VIII | search of real and true knowledge. ~ 620 IV, IX | Chapter IX~Of our Threefold Knowledge of Existence ~1. General 621 IV, IX | understanding,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. 622 IV, IX | falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence: and 623 IV, IX | repugnancy.~2. A threefold knowledge of existence. But, leaving 624 IV, IX | to inquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things, 625 IV, IX | then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence by 626 IV, IX | things by sensation.~3. Our knowledge of our own existence is 627 IV, IX | that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and 628 IV, X | Chapter X~Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God ~ 629 IV, X | some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as 630 IV, X | ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence.~ 631 IV, X | which every one’s certain knowledge assures him of, beyond the 632 IV, X | in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step 633 IV, X | knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there 634 IV, X | time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being 635 IV, X | should ever have been any knowledge: it being as impossible 636 IV, X | that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, 637 IV, X | itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the 638 IV, X | our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident 639 IV, X | me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, 640 IV, X | I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach which we 641 IV, X | could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond 642 IV, X | produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in 643 IV, X | sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence, 644 IV, X | then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally 645 IV, X | sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; since it will hence 646 IV, X | and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power than 647 IV, X | yet one small particle in knowledge and power infinitely above 648 IV, X | ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal Being only 649 IV, X | should give thought and knowledge to them.~17. And that whether 650 IV, X | narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the 651 IV, XI | Chapter XI~Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other 652 IV, XI | Existence of Other Things ~1. Knowledge of the existence of other 653 IV, XI | by actual sensation. The knowledge of our own being we have 654 IV, XI | as has been shown.~The knowledge of the existence of any 655 IV, XI | demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence 656 IV, XI | certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our 657 IV, XI | that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves 658 IV, XI | our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help 659 IV, XI | fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is.~But besides the assurance 660 IV, XI | therefore he hath certain knowledge that they are not both memory, 661 IV, XI | existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything: I must desire 662 IV, XI | perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all 663 IV, XI | exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present 664 IV, XI | it which we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood 665 IV, XI | is but probability, not knowledge.~10. Folly to expect demonstration 666 IV, XI | is for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given 667 IV, XI | existed. And thus we have knowledge of the past existence of 668 IV, XI | remember well. But this knowledge also reaches no further 669 IV, XI | make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the like propositions 670 IV, XI | not capable of any other knowledge, but what our senses give 671 IV, XI | anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of particulars. 672 IV, XI | In the former case, our knowledge is the consequence of the 673 IV, XI | our senses: in the latter, knowledge is the consequence of the 674 IV, XII | Of the Improvement of our Knowledge ~1. Knowledge is not got 675 IV, XII | Improvement of our Knowledge ~1. Knowledge is not got from maxims. 676 IV, XII | were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences were 677 IV, XII | foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that 678 IV, XII | attain a great certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by 679 IV, XII | advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in 680 IV, XII | that they had an intuitive knowledge, and by that a way to discover 681 IV, XII | multiplied observations. But knowledge began in the mind, and was 682 IV, XII | forward still to enlarge its knowledge) most attentively to lay 683 IV, XII | had before; or what new knowledge concerning his body can 684 IV, XII | it be the readiest way to knowledge to begin with general maxims, 685 IV, XII | shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts 686 IV, XII | steady names. But since the knowledge of the certainty of principles, 687 IV, XII | the way to improve our knowledge is not, I am sure, blindly, 688 IV, XII | get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one 689 IV, XII | true method of advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract 690 IV, XII | demonstrated to him.~9. Our knowledge of substances is to be improved, 691 IV, XII | In our search after the knowledge of substances, our want 692 IV, XII | matter of very little general knowledge; and the bare contemplation 693 IV, XII | for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? Here 694 IV, XII | reaches, I may have certain knowledge, but no further.~10. Experience 695 IV, XII | judgment and opinion, not knowledge and certainty. This way 696 IV, XII | getting and improving our knowledge in substances only by experience 697 IV, XII | reach very little general knowledge concerning the species of 698 IV, XII | the being of a God and the knowledge of ourselves, enough to 699 IV, XII | inquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to 700 IV, XII | part of the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with 701 IV, XII | more for the propagation of knowledge, for the supply and increase 702 IV, XII | opinion or expectation of knowledge, where it is not to be had, 703 IV, XII | scientifical demonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content 704 IV, XII | corporeal substances. The knowledge of bodies we must get by 705 IV, XII | pleasure, have promoted true knowledge, or helped to satisfy the 706 IV, XII | s progress, towards the knowledge of natural philosophy, will 707 IV, XII | surer way to profitable knowledge.~13. The true use of hypotheses. 708 IV, XII | the ways to enlarge our knowledge. But whether natural philosophy 709 IV, XII | the ways to enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, 710 IV, XII | consider and improve our knowledge in, or reason about. And 711 IV, XII | it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas; 712 IV, XII | certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.~Secondly, The other is 713 IV, XII | methods of improving our knowledge in the ideas of other modes 714 IV, XII | consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Where 715 IV, XII | thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose but 716 IV, XII | the two other sides. The knowledge that “the whole is equal 717 IV, XII | maxims, when it first got the knowledge of such truths in mathematics, 718 IV, XII | what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science 719 IV, XIII | Considerations Concerning our Knowledge ~1. Our knowledge partly 720 IV, XIII | Concerning our Knowledge ~1. Our knowledge partly necessary, partly 721 IV, XIII | necessary, partly voluntary. Our knowledge, as in other things, so 722 IV, XIII | wholly voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, 723 IV, XIII | altogether necessary, all men’s knowledge would not only be alike, 724 IV, XIII | that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or withholding 725 IV, XIII | no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or another; 726 IV, XIII | of them, which is so far knowledge: and if they have names 727 IV, XIV | XIV~Of Judgment ~1. Our knowledge being short, we want something 728 IV, XIV | has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short 729 IV, XIV | absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till 730 IV, XIV | has given us some certain knowledge, though limited to a few 731 IV, XIV | probability, supplies our want of knowledge. The faculty which God has 732 IV, XIV | want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot 733 IV, XIV | demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes 734 IV, XIV | truth and falsehood:—~First, KNOWLEDGE, whereby it certainly perceives, 735 IV, XV | and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement 736 IV, XV | and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so. But another 737 IV, XV | contrary to or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of 738 IV, XV | is to supply our want of knowledge. Our knowledge, as has been 739 IV, XV | our want of knowledge. Our knowledge, as has been shown, being 740 IV, XV | we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet some 741 IV, XV | demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and 742 IV, XV | out the bounds of human knowledge and certainty,) in the next 743 IV, XV | as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein 744 IV, XV | and certainty, faith, and knowledge, that in all the parts of 745 IV, XV | that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each 746 IV, XV | supply the defect of our knowledge and to guide us where that 747 IV, XV | of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience.~ 748 IV, XV | understanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it will proceed 749 IV, XV | past probability; it is knowledge. But if another tells me 750 IV, XV | as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, 751 IV, XV | among men than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and 752 IV, XVI | which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But, 753 IV, XVI | certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is necessary 754 IV, XVI | necessity of believing without knowledge, nay often upon very slight 755 IV, XVI | assurance approaching to knowledge. Concerning the first of 756 IV, XVI | it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon 757 IV, XVI | within the reach of our knowledge. Thus, That fire warmed 758 IV, XVI | between them and certain knowledge. Our belief, thus grounded, 759 IV, XVI | credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof; but 760 IV, XVI | proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation. Analogy 761 IV, XVI | excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well 762 IV, XVII | reasoning consists. If general knowledge, as has been shown, consists 763 IV, XVII | of our own ideas, and the knowledge of the existence of all 764 IV, XVII | for the enlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our assent. 765 IV, XVII | For it hath to do both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary 766 IV, XVII | in which it arrives at knowledge; or their probable connexion, 767 IV, XVII | The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions 768 IV, XVII | substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for 769 IV, XVII | demonstration that produces knowledge; so it likewise perceives 770 IV, XVII | instrument of reason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that, before 771 IV, XVII | reason, for the attainment of knowledge. And he himself, it is plain, 772 IV, XVII | but by the original way of knowledge, i.e. by the visible agreement 773 IV, XVII | demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest 774 IV, XVII | desirous to enlarge its knowledge, or very apt to favour the 775 IV, XVII | understanding in the attainment of knowledge. And if men skilled in and 776 IV, XVII | probability. But however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, 777 IV, XVII | Serves not to increase our knowledge, but to fence with the knowledge 778 IV, XVII | knowledge, but to fence with the knowledge we suppose we have. But 779 IV, XVII | that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then a man has little 780 IV, XVII | ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased, and that useful 781 IV, XVII | fencing with the little knowledge we have, without making 782 IV, XVII | very little of that mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed 783 IV, XVII | ways to the advancement of knowledge.~8. We can reason about 784 IV, XVII | and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit, before I leave 785 IV, XVII | could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars: whereas, 786 IV, XVII | of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. 787 IV, XVII | Every man’s reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas 788 IV, XVII | particular existences: and our knowledge and reason about other things 789 IV, XVII | whole and utmost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental 790 IV, XVII | ideas, and consequently our knowledge, is equally clear and certain, 791 IV, XVII | 14. Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning. 792 IV, XVII | been said, I call intuitive knowledge; which is certain, beyond 793 IV, XVII | light, some sparks of bright knowledge, yet the greatest part of 794 IV, XVII | to demonstration whereby knowledge is produced, which, though 795 IV, XVII | altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is 796 IV, XVII | demonstration, and produces certain knowledge; which may be called rational 797 IV, XVII | which may be called rational knowledge, as the other is intuitive.~ 798 IV, XVII | demonstrative and intuitive knowledge we have nothing but judgment 799 IV, XVII | though it never amounts to knowledge, no, not to that which is 800 IV, XVII | necessarily follows it, as knowledge does demonstration. The 801 IV, XVII | overbalance.~17. Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the 802 IV, XVII | compared together.~Rational knowledge is the perception of the 803 IV, XVII | fourth alone advances us in knowledge and judgment. The fourth 804 IV, XVII | any of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call 805 IV, XVII | advances us in our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another 806 IV, XVIII | necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want 807 IV, XVIII | ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. 808 IV, XVIII | 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as 809 IV, XVIII | matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony 810 IV, XVIII | matter of all our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on 811 IV, XVIII | surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever 812 IV, XVIII | clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our 813 IV, XVIII | traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have that this revelation 814 IV, XVIII | never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clear and 815 IV, XVIII | great a certainty as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing 816 IV, XVIII | has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah, that 817 IV, XVIII | Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, 818 IV, XVIII | can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation 819 IV, XVIII | shake or overrule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with 820 IV, XVIII | certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for 821 IV, XVIII | to our clear and distinct knowledge; v.g. the ideas of one body 822 IV, XVIII | evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible 823 IV, XVIII | contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to 824 IV, XVIII | principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: 825 IV, XVIII | anything that contradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be 826 IV, XVIII | revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the whole strength 827 IV, XVIII | certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, 828 IV, XVIII | revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have 829 IV, XVIII | principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us; render 830 IV, XVIII | and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, 831 IV, XVIII | faculties, we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being 832 IV, XVIII | reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own 833 IV, XVIII | never have so certain a knowledge that a proposition which 834 IV, XVIII | and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely revealed, or 835 IV, XVIII | certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles 836 IV, XVIII | reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened 837 IV, XVIII | eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed 838 IV, XVIII | probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can 839 IV, XVIII | not away the landmarks of knowledge: this shakes not the foundations 840 IV, XVIII | principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies 841 IV, XIX | light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind 842 IV, XIX | the ordinary methods of knowledge and principles of reason. 843 IV, XIX | common and natural ways of knowledge, so flatters many men’s 844 IV, XIX | perceive I came not by this knowledge in a natural way, and so 845 IV, XIX | their connexion. So that the knowledge of any proposition coming 846 IV, XIX | by the natural ways of knowledge, uncertain, the proposition 847 IV, XIX | enlightened, and brought into the knowledge of this or that truth. But 848 IV, XX | contrary to probability. Knowledge being to be had only of 849 IV, XX | error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment 850 IV, XX | These men’s opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are commonly 851 IV, XX | this advantage of their knowledge.~4. People hindered from 852 IV, XX | propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at 853 IV, XX | procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to 854 IV, XX | the greatest contemners of knowledge, to be found ignorant in 855 IV, XX | condition, who surpass them in knowledge. They who are blind will 856 IV, XX | anything has to our own knowledge; especially that part of 857 IV, XX | especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced, 858 IV, XX | opinions, and pretences to knowledge and learning, which with 859 IV, XX | suspend our judgment. As knowledge is no more arbitrary than 860 IV, XX | no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any 861 IV, XX | though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is 862 IV, XX | yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by stopping 863 IV, XXI | ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the 864 IV, XXI | 2. Physica. First, The knowledge of things, as they are in 865 IV, XXI | bare speculation and the knowledge of truth; but right, and 866 IV, XXI | things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the 867 IV, XXI | the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part 868 IV, XXI | would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. 869 IV, XXI | use of signs in order to knowledge, being toto coelo different,