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| Alphabetical [« »] twilight 3 twin 1 twins 1 two 473 two-fold 3 two-legged 2 twofold 4 | Frequency [« »] 510 body 506 cannot 489 were 473 two 467 own 461 should 448 much | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances two |
Book, Chapter
1 Read | occasioned, besides others, two contrary faults, viz., that 2 Read | there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the 3 I, I | understanding. If therefore these two propositions, “Whatsoever 4 I, I | must signify one of these two things: either that as soon 5 I, I | in the discovery of these two maxims. It will here perhaps 6 I, I | self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet 7 I, I | which are signified by one, two, and three.~17. Assenting 8 I, I | innate, then “that one and two are equal to three, that 9 I, I | and thus, that one and two are equal to three, that 10 I, I | are equal to three, that two and two are equal to four, 11 I, I | equal to three, that two and two are equal to four, and a 12 I, I | they are understood. That “two bodies cannot be in the 13 I, I | easier understood of the two, “The same is not different”; 14 I, I | hearing, as that “one and two are equal to three,” that “ 15 I, I | 20. “One and one equal to Two, &c., not general nor useful,” 16 I, I | these propositions, viz. “two and two are equal to four,” “ 17 I, I | propositions, viz. “two and two are equal to four,” “red 18 I, I | has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly 19 I, I | I say next, that these two general propositions are 20 I, I | any ground to think these two speculative Maxims innate: 21 I, II | triangle being equal to two right ones: because it is 22 I, II | of which come under these two general words made use of 23 I, III | impossibility” and “identity” are two innate ideas? Are they such 24 I, III | impossibility and identity stand for two ideas, so far from being 25 I, III | Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, 26 I, III | made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal. 27 I, III | triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as 28 I, III | a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon 29 II, I | materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, 30 II, I | the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material 31 II, I | receive from one of these two. External objects furnish 32 II, I | not come in one of these two ways. Let any one examine 33 II, I | mind but what one of these two have imprinted;—though perhaps, 34 II, I | when he is waking, are two persons: since waking Socrates 35 II, I | sleeping and waking man are two persons. The soul, during 36 II, I | here, then, the bodies of two men with only one soul between 37 II, I | is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as Castor 38 II, I | make the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul 39 II, I | should be the same person two days, or two moments, together.~ 40 II, I | same person two days, or two moments, together.~13. Impossible 41 II, I | mention again the absurdity of two distinct persons, which 42 II, I | as has been said, to make two persons in one man. And 43 II, II | to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. 44 II, IV | hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moved 45 II, IV | for ever hinder any other two bodies, that move towards 46 II, IV | For a man may conceive two bodies at a distance, so 47 II, IV | than water. For, though the two flat sides of two pieces 48 II, IV | though the two flat sides of two pieces of marble will more 49 II, IV | way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if 50 II, IV | hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble, as much 51 II, IV | coming together of any other two bodies, if it be not put 52 II, IV | others that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound 53 II, VI | have from reflection. The two great and principal actions 54 II, VI | them in himself, are these two:— Perception, or Thinking; 55 II, VI | called the Will; and these two powers or abilities in the 56 II, VII | most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.~3. As motives 57 II, VII | Existence and Unity are two other ideas that are suggested 58 II, VII | it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation 59 II, VIII | existing without us. These are two very different things, and 60 II, VIII | of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still 61 II, VIII | any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate 62 II, VIII | a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its 63 II, VIII | qualities depend.~The other two are only powers to act differently 64 II, VIII | thought so. But, though the two latter sorts of qualities 65 II, VIII | of sensible qualities in two different external objects, 66 II, IX | of hunger and warmth are two: which probably are some 67 II, X | hath received. This is done two ways.~First, by keeping 68 II, X | by the understanding.~8. Two defects in the memory, oblivion 69 II, X | memories; wherein there may be two defects:—~First, That it 70 II, XI | mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same, or 71 II, XI | more confusion between the two ideas of sweet and bitter, 72 II, XI | it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and sweet, 73 II, XI | same colours taken from two very different bodies.~4. 74 II, XI | different, and so consequently two, to cast about and consider 75 II, XI | or hearing, yet if one or two of them be stolen from them 76 II, XII | The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or 77 II, XII | ideas, and come to the other two in their due places. As 78 II, XII | which it received from those two sources, and which are the 79 II, XII | the more tolerable of the two.~5. Simple and mixed modes 80 II, XII | Of these modes, there are two sorts which deserve distinct 81 II, XII | substances also, there are two sorts of ideas:—one of single 82 II, XII | we can have are all from two sources. If we trace the 83 II, XIII | contrariety. For the idea of two is as distinct from that 84 II, XIII | barely in length between any two beings, without considering 85 II, XIII | of distance between any two bodies or points; so in 86 II, XIII | betwixt anything, and any two or more points, which are 87 II, XIII | was yesterday, from any two or more points, which have 88 II, XIII | extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,~12. 89 II, XIII | one from another, to make two superficies, where before 90 II, XIII | is, to make in the mind two superficies, where before 91 II, XIII | divide, without considering two superficies separate one 92 II, XIII | actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one 93 II, XIII | of distance between any two things; but this cannot 94 II, XIII | nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily 95 II, XIII | stress on the sound of these two syllables, substance, to 96 II, XIII | which is or may be between two bodies at a distance, that 97 II, XIII | is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily 98 II, XIII | from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas; and 99 II, XIII | it as lying between any two bodies or positive beings, 100 II, XIII | it should happen that any two thinking men should really 101 II, XIV | between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that 102 II, XIV | though it be certain that two, and perhaps all of them, 103 II, XIV | strike successively the two sides of the room: it is 104 II, XIV | heard the blow against the two distant walls, could perceive 105 II, XIV | pace of our ideas, as where two sounds or pains, &c., take 106 II, XIV | change of distance between two bodies, which we have from 107 II, XIV | cannot be done, because no two different parts of succession 108 II, XIV | distinguish them by.~21. No two parts of duration can be 109 II, XIV | duration one to another; for two successive lengths of duration, 110 II, XIV | certainly knows that the two successive swings of a pendulum 111 II, XIV | be exact. Since then no two portions of succession can 112 II, XIV | Abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred and 113 II, XIV | dial between the marks of two hours, I can as distinctly 114 II, XIV | is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge 115 II, XV | length, and make it equal to two spans, or two paces; and 116 II, XV | it equal to two spans, or two paces; and so, as often 117 II, XV | than place. Within these two are confined, and by the 118 II, XV | a foot square, or lasted two years; the other shows the 119 II, XV | 12. Duration has never two parts together, expansion 120 II, XV | perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but 121 II, XV | expansion. Such a combination of two distinct ideas is, I suppose, 122 II, XVI | it, as the most remote; two being as distinct from one, 123 II, XVI | as distinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of 124 II, XVI | hundred; and the idea of two as distinct from the idea 125 II, XVI | us to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas, which 126 II, XVI | idea, marked by the name two. And whosoever can do this, 127 II, XVI | add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his tale, 128 II, XVI | mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different 129 II, XVII | former, make the idea of two feet; and by the addition 130 II, XVII | because it is made up of two parts, very different, if 131 II, XVII | number as before. And these two being put together, are 132 II, XVII | seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension, 133 II, XVII | add together the ideas of two days, or two paces, which 134 II, XVII | the ideas of two days, or two paces, which are positive 135 II, XVII | duration or space, he could add two infinities together; nay, 136 II, XVIII | extension; swift and slow are two different ideas of motion, 137 II, XX | reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. 138 II, XX | passions all men have. These two last, envy and anger, not 139 II, XXI | action, and there being but two sorts of action whereof 140 II, XXI | Will and understanding two powers in mind or spirit. 141 II, XXI | power, though it be the two latter only that use allows 142 II, XXI | understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a 143 II, XXI | has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion; 144 II, XXI | of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.~9. 145 II, XXI | or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot 146 II, XXI | liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest? 147 II, XXI | desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; 148 II, XXI | misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds 149 II, XXI | minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once; much 150 II, XXI | that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, viz. motion 151 II, XXI | leave to make use of these two new words, to avoid the 152 II, XXII | themselves: thus, by seeing two men wrestle or fence, we 153 II, XXII | and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in 154 II, XXII | to be any other but these two. For whatever sort of action 155 II, XXIII | of that distance between two points, one may certainly 156 II, XXIII | change of distance, between two spirits; and so conceive 157 II, XXIII | may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies, one 158 II, XXIII | as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it 159 II, XXIII | no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces, which 160 II, XXIII | spirit than body; since two bodies, placed by one another 161 II, XXIII | body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or properties 162 II, XXIII | distinct clear ideas, of two primary qualities or properties 163 II, XXV | beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. 164 II, XXV | why the mind thus brings two things together, and as 165 II, XXV | the referring or comparing two things one to another; from 166 II, XXV | 6. Relation only betwixt two things. Whatsoever doth 167 II, XXV | no relation but betwixt two things considered as two 168 II, XXV | two things considered as two things. There must always 169 II, XXV | must always be in relation two ideas or things, either 170 II, XXV | comparing or considering two things together, and giving 171 II, XXV | necessary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly 172 II, XXV | name for: v.g. comparing two men in reference to one 173 II, XXV | dam and chick between the two cassiowaries in St. James’ 174 II, XXV | whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, 175 II, XXVI | originals of things into two sorts:—~First, When the 176 II, XXVI | this invasion was from the two extremes; and so do all 177 II, XXVI | little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different 178 II, XXVII | conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind 179 II, XXVII | that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, 180 II, XXVII | beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it 181 II, XXVII | it being impossible for two things of the same kind 182 II, XXVII | another. For example: could two bodies be in the same place 183 II, XXVII | the same time; then those two parcels of matter must be 184 II, XXVII | by the same reason that two particles of matter may 185 II, XXVII | being a contradiction that two or more should be one, identity 186 II, XXVII | place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind. 187 II, XXVII | other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined 188 II, XXVII | whereof is, that, in these two cases—a mass of matter and 189 II, XXVII | he had taken care to have two interpreters by him, the 190 II, XXVII | change of substance, no more two persons, than a man be two 191 II, XXVII | two persons, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes 192 II, XXVII | it will be possible that two thinking substances may 193 II, XXVII | remaining, there can be two persons. As to the second 194 II, XXVII | remaining, there may be two distinct persons; which 195 II, XXVII | did,—thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat 196 II, XXVII | individual man, should be two persons. To help us a little 197 II, XXVII | possible for the same man to be two distinct persons, as any 198 II, XXVII | distinct persons, as any two that have lived in different 199 II, XXVII | consciousness.~Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable 200 II, XXVII | consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies: I ask, 201 II, XXVII | the night—man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates 202 II, XXVII | would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much 203 II, XXVII | as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? Nor 204 II, XXVII | and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial 205 II, XXVII | as in the former instance two persons with the same body. 206 II, XXVII | substance become a part of two different persons; and the 207 II, XXVIII| of such a calf, or that two pigeons are cousin-germans. 208 II, XXVIII| contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; 209 II, XXVIII| yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative 210 II, XXVIII| which confusion of these two distinct considerations 211 II, XXIX | to be ranked under those two different names) distinct, 212 II, XXIX | Confusion concerns always two ideas. Confusion making 213 II, XXIX | a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated, 214 II, XXIX | separated, concerns always two ideas; and those most which 215 II, XXIX | where there are supposed two different ideas, marked 216 II, XXIX | different ideas, marked by two different names, which are 217 II, XXIX | distinct as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by, 218 II, XXIX | able to distinguish these two ideas one from another, 219 II, XXIX | one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the 220 II, XXIX | think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them distinct 221 II, XXIX | the bare figure of these two pieces of gold; as he could, 222 II, XXIX | the first division into two halves does. I must confess, 223 II, XXIX | but no distinct ideas of two such extensions. It is plain 224 II, XXIX | eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years, is as 225 II, XXXI | fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in 226 II, XXXI | solubility in aqua regia, two other powers, relating to 227 II, XXXII | real existence. Thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur, 228 II, XXXII | mind received from those two flowers were exactly the 229 II, XXXIII| and if they are more than two which are thus united, the 230 II, XXXIII| accidental connexion of two ideas, which either the 231 II, XXXIII| his mind, so cements those two ideas together, that he 232 II, XXXIII| to any person, and these two constantly together possess 233 II, XXXIII| mind; and then one body in two places at once, shall unexamined 234 II, XXXIII| seeing and examining. When two things, in themselves disjoined, 235 II, XXXIII| mistakes that follow in two ideas that they have been 236 II, XXXIII| error; and the confusion of two different ideas, which a 237 III, II | them a secret reference to two other things.~First, They 238 III, II | another, which is to speak two languages. But in this men 239 III, II | we shall speak of these two different ways of applying 240 III, III | and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently 241 III, III | we rank things into. For two species may be one, as rationally 242 III, III | be one, as rationally as two different essences be the 243 III, III | the other. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in 244 III, III | vary one from another, with two distinct names annexed to 245 III, III | annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, if you 246 III, III | essentially different as any two of the most remote or opposite 247 III, III | most familiar use.~These two sorts of essences, I suppose, 248 III, III | there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of 249 III, III | it is as impossible that two things partaking exactly 250 III, III | different properties, as that two figures partaking of the 251 III, III | my finger; wherein these two essences are apparently 252 III, IV | to define, when we change two words of the same signification 253 III, IV | ideas of one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so 254 III, IV | sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant 255 III, IV | one from another, that no two can be more so. And therefore, 256 III, IV | is the genus of the other two: v.g. there is nothing that 257 III, V | species of animals, these two, viz. shape and voice, commonly 258 III, VI | gold depend. How far these two are different, though they 259 III, VI | difference in nature between any two particular beings, without 260 III, VI | different properties in any two individual substances of 261 III, VI | different properties in two circles, or two equilateral 262 III, VI | properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That 263 III, VI | whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, 264 III, VI | but he that says they are two distinct species is in the 265 III, VI | neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex ideas differ 266 III, VI | component parts, they make two different, and not one and 267 III, VI | sensible substances there are two sorts: one of organized 268 III, VI | and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. 269 III, VI | but in the place thereof two or three little branches 270 III, VI | name, but men that make two different abstract ideas, 271 III, VI | different between these two, which the watchmaker has 272 III, VI | Eve he makes use of these two new words kinneah and niouph. 273 III, VI | killed a man: but yet the two names kinneah and niouph, ( 274 III, VI | plain then, that here were two distinct complex ideas of 275 III, VI | modes, with names to them, two distinct species of actions 276 III, VI | consisted the essences of these two distinct species of actions? 277 III, VI | stands for the same idea in two who would communicate their 278 III, VI | children, that found these two words, kinneah and niouph, 279 III, VII | it.~Secondly, “I saw but two plants”; here it shows that 280 III, VIII | distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the 281 III, VIII | therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be 282 III, VIII | language, which permits not any two abstract words, or names 283 III, IX | after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct; 284 III, IX | and imperfection, for the two first of these reasons; 285 III, IX | Substances chiefly for the two latter.~6. The names of 286 III, IX | moral words, have seldom in two different men the same precise 287 III, IX | which that substance has to two other bodies, which have 288 III, X | signified. Of these there are two sorts:—~I. Some words introduced 289 III, X | clapped upon him, one of the two names men are commonly disgusted 290 III, X | in common use, stand for two distinct ideas, is plain 291 III, X | rendered useless, these two great rules, religion and 292 III, X | For if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely 293 III, X | matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof 294 III, X | 21. This abuse contains two false suppositions. But 295 III, X | complex ideas which any two men use for the same just 296 III, X | considering or comparing two things together, and so 297 III, XI | to which they give these two names, one holds and the 298 III, XI | other denies, that these two names may be affirmed one 299 III, XI | the signification of these two names, it were impossible 300 IV, I | agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Knowledge then seems 301 IV, I | but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When 302 IV, I | a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more 303 IV, I | perceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily 304 IV, I | the relation between any two ideas, of what kind soever, 305 IV, I | yellow,” is of identity. “Two triangles upon equal bases 306 IV, I | upon equal bases between two parallels are equal,” is 307 IV, I | Habitual knowledge is of two degrees. Of habitual knowledge 308 IV, I | also, vulgarly speaking. two degrees:~First, The one 309 IV, I | a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that 310 IV, I | a triangle are equal to two right ones,” one who has 311 IV, I | before. The agreement of the two ideas joined in that proposition 312 IV, I | a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability 313 IV, I | triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always 314 IV, I | will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he 315 IV, II | agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, 316 IV, II | that three are more than two and equal to one and two. 317 IV, II | two and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the 318 IV, II | perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives 319 IV, II | agreement or disagreement of two ideas, is, because those 320 IV, II | angles of a triangle and two right ones, cannot by an 321 IV, II | compared with any other one, or two, angles; and so of this 322 IV, II | finding those equal to two right ones. comes to know 323 IV, II | to know their equality to two right ones.~3. Demonstration 324 IV, II | show the agreement of any two others, are called proofs; 325 IV, II | agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs and 326 IV, II | agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination ( 327 IV, II | agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by an intuitive perception 328 IV, II | demonstratively, the just equality of two angles, or extensions, or 329 IV, II | certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness; because 330 IV, II | beings without us. These two, viz. intuition and demonstration, 331 IV, II | senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. If any one 332 IV, II | think, we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge 333 IV, II | agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, its clearness or 334 IV, II | triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician 335 IV, III | immediate comparing any two ideas; or, 2. By reason, 336 IV, III | agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention 337 IV, III | our ideas: because between two different ideas we would 338 IV, III | in men’s minds, do these two names of the different substances, 339 IV, III | cannot know certainly any two to co-exist, any further 340 IV, III | no one subject can have two smells or two colours at 341 IV, III | subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. 342 IV, III | infusion of lignum nephriticum, two colours at the same time? 343 IV, III | as that it should have two different figures and textures 344 IV, III | has three angles equal to two right ones. Again: “No government 345 IV, III | in the mathematics.~19. Two things have made moral ideas 346 IV, III | mathematics. From whence these two inconveniences follow:—First, 347 IV, III | agreement or disagreement of two remote ones.~The great help 348 IV, III | perceive the agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities 349 IV, III | constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know without 350 IV, III | equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive 351 IV, III | this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly mutable, 352 IV, III | their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must 353 IV, IV | yet, I think, there be two sorts of ideas that we may 354 IV, IV | three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also 355 IV, IV | supposition, that these two names, man and beast, stand 356 IV, IV | founded on one of these two suppositions, which are 357 IV, V | propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal; 358 IV, V | and verbal; as there are two sorts of signs commonly 359 IV, V | we must, I say, observe two sorts of propositions that 360 IV, V | in his head the idea of two lines, viz. the side and 361 IV, V | joins or separates those two ideas, viz. the idea of 362 IV, V | that of man; and so these two propositions are equally 363 IV, VI | barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist separately; 364 IV, VI | to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary 365 IV, VI | triangles are all equal to two right ones.~11. The qualities 366 IV, VII | that idea it is; and that two distinct ideas, when they 367 IV, VII | proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms, 368 IV, VII | the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different, 369 IV, VII | therefore, alone to these two general propositions—“whatsoever 370 IV, VII | to any other ideas. These two general maxims, amounting 371 IV, VII | necessary connexion between two ideas that, in the subject 372 IV, VII | self-evident proposition, that two bodies cannot be in the 373 IV, VII | one and one are equal to two”; that “if you take from 374 IV, VII | five fingers of one hand two, and from the five fingers 375 IV, VII | fingers of the other hand two, the remaining numbers will 376 IV, VII | I think, are meant these two things: first, that these 377 IV, VII | be what it is, and every two distinct ideas being known 378 IV, VII | impossible to know that one and two are equal to three, but 379 IV, VII | a one knows that one and two are equal to three, without 380 IV, VII | does he know that one and two are equal to three, better 381 IV, VII | mind than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, 382 IV, VII | prove that one and one are two, that two and two are four, 383 IV, VII | one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three 384 IV, VII | one are two, that two and two are four, that three times 385 IV, VII | are four, that three times two are six? Which being known 386 IV, VII | and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different 387 IV, VII | the ideas of one and of two, the idea of yellow, and 388 IV, VII | one, and not the idea of two; and that the idea of yellow 389 IV, VII | of itself, or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are 390 IV, VII | any one built upon these two maxims, what is, is; and 391 IV, VII | discover the connexion of two others, this is a revelation 392 IV, VII | less certain, were these two general propositions never 393 IV, VII | fain know what truths these two propositions are able to 394 IV, VII | the same subject, these two ideas are not exactly one 395 IV, VII | as the ideas of one and two, white and black, or as 396 IV, VII | cannot be a vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. 397 IV, VII | the consequence of these two propositions, called principles, 398 IV, VII | to this proposition, that two are equal to two, will also 399 IV, VII | proposition, that two are equal to two, will also have need of 400 IV, VII | probation to convince him that two are not three, that white 401 IV, VII | circle, &c., or any other two [determined] distinct ideas 402 IV, VIII | can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with 403 IV, VIII | All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed 404 IV, VIII | that name; or that these two names signify the same idea. 405 IV, VIII | barely verbal.~When by these two rules we have examined the 406 IV, X | than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows 407 IV, X | being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible 408 IV, X | three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as 409 IV, X | itself greater angles than two right ones.~6. And therefore 410 IV, X | of thing that must be.~9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative 411 IV, X | incogitative. There are but two sorts of beings in the world 412 IV, XI | looking upon it: of which two, his perception is so distinct, 413 IV, XI | an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure, which 414 IV, XI | it appears that there are two sorts of propositions:—( 415 IV, XII | advantage they received from two or three general maxims, 416 IV, XII | concerning his body can these two relative terms give him, 417 IV, XII | it by the help of these two relative terms, whole and 418 IV, XII | inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from 419 IV, XII | inch from a red line of two inches, the remaining parts 420 IV, XII | the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal, or 421 IV, XII | which, I say, of these two is the clearer and first 422 IV, XII | me, in short, to be these two:—~First, The first is to 423 IV, XII | instance of this. That these two (and not the relying on 424 IV, XII | equal to the squares of the two other sides. The knowledge 425 IV, XIII | the pains to compare one, two, and three, to six, cannot 426 IV, XIII | three angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little 427 IV, XIII | he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, 428 IV, XIV | agreement or disagreement of two ideas which they are desirous 429 IV, XIV | agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a view 430 IV, XIV | perceiving it. Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about 431 IV, XV | agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention 432 IV, XV | to show their equality to two right ones; and so, by an 433 IV, XV | three angles in equality to two right ones: and thus he 434 IV, XV | triangle to be equal to two right ones, assents to it, 435 IV, XV | a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes 436 IV, XV | grounds of probability are two: conformity with our own 437 IV, XV | it are, in short, these two following:—~First, The conformity 438 IV, XVI | inducements of probability are of two sorts: either concerning 439 IV, XVI | falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, 440 IV, XVI | that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon 441 IV, XVII | faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz. sagacity and 442 IV, XVII | agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration, 443 IV, XVII | such a connexion of the two ideas of the inferred proposition. 444 IV, XVII | connexion it hath with the two other, whose agreement should 445 IV, XVII | visible connexion with those two it has been placed between, 446 IV, XVII | on each side with those two it is immediately placed 447 IV, XVII | strengthens the connexion of any two ideas immediately put together, 448 IV, XVII | immediately applied to; then those two remote ones, or, as they 449 IV, XVII | juxta-position; which view of any two it has equally, whenever 450 IV, XVII | intermediate idea and the two other ideas it is set between 451 IV, XVII | agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, and consequently 452 IV, XVII | agreement or disagreement of the two in question, would not the 453 IV, XVII | disagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some 454 IV, XVII | to a nonplus. But these two latter are our fault, and 455 IV, XVII | Now of these there are two sorts, which I shall take 456 IV, XVII | agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared 457 IV, XVII | agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention 458 IV, XVII | is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree, 459 IV, XVII | agreement or disagreement of two ideas one with another, 460 IV, XVII | a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same 461 IV, XVIII | a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent 462 IV, XVIII | measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and the three 463 IV, XVIII | affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, 464 IV, XVIII | for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore 465 IV, XIX | men than either of those two, or both together: men being 466 IV, XIX | that inclination? These are two very different perceptions, 467 IV, XIX | believing. For these are two ways whereby truth comes 468 IV, XIX | a truth, either of these two ways, they in vain suppose 469 IV, XX | men of one, some but of two syllogisms, and no more; 470 IV, XX | there will be always these two ways left of evading the 471 IV, XX | apparent probabilities:~13. Two means of evading probabilities: 472 IV, XX | When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, 473 IV, XX | agreement or disagreement of any two ideas.~If this be so, the