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| Alphabetical [« »] trumpet 3 trunk 3 trust 10 truth 421 truths 146 try 8 trying 1 | Frequency [« »] 427 must 425 certain 422 know 421 truth 417 different 414 great 412 how | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances truth |
Book, Chapter
1 Ded | nothing more to be desired for truth than a fair unprejudiced 2 Ded | the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried 3 Ded | not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less 4 Read | other. Its searches after truth are a sort of hawking and 5 Read | work, to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights 6 Read | they are not following truth, but some meaner consideration; 7 Read | in this Treatise of the truth whereof I am not fully persuaded, 8 Read | repetitions. But to confess the truth, I am now too lazy, or too 9 Read | he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished 10 Read | strong constitutions. The truth is, those who advised me 11 Read | have aimed sincerely at truth and usefulness, though in 12 Read | prejudice but advantage of truth, which is never injured 13 Read | oppose that of another, when truth appears against it. For 14 Read | appears against it. For it is truth alone I seek, and that will 15 Read | come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than 16 Read | Whichever of these be the truth, it is myself only am affected 17 Int | there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind 18 Int | proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. 19 I, I | thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever 20 I, I | that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse 21 I, I | dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.~2. 22 I, I | understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.~ 23 I, I | which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come 24 I, I | innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, 25 I, I | or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But 26 I, I | because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting 27 I, I | the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as 28 I, I | for. And then he knows the truth of that proposition upon 29 I, I | in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the 30 I, I | in the same place” is a truth that nobody any more sticks 31 I, I | anything de novo; when, in truth, they are taught, and do 32 I, I | universal assent. For that a truth should be innate and yet 33 I, I | unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at 34 I, I | supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of 35 I, I | but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.~26. 36 I, I | being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there 37 I, I | thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has 38 I, I | conducing to the discovery of truth or advancement of knowledge. 39 I, I | impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to 40 I, II | or to be so manifest a truth as this, that “It is impossible 41 I, II | Not that it brings their truth at all in question. They 42 I, II | discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural 43 I, II | is no derogation to their truth and certainty; no more than 44 I, II | no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three 45 I, II | Where is that practical truth that is universally received, 46 I, II | meets with. Justice and truth are the common ties of society; 47 I, II | have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow 48 I, II | speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain 49 I, II | good, not impressions of truth on the understanding. I 50 I, II | any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to 51 I, II | it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it 52 I, II | to as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means 53 I, II | means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral rules 54 I, II | men; or else, that it is a truth which all men have imprinted 55 I, II | Secondly, that it is an innate truth, known to all men, is also 56 I, II | is so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at 57 I, II | innate truth, that it is no truth at all: it being a command, 58 I, II | proposition, and so not capable of truth or falsehood. To make it 59 I, II | and urged to no purpose; truth and certainty (the things 60 I, II | they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary 61 I, II | distracted with. But, in truth, were there any such innate 62 I, II | others to question, the truth of them.~22. How men commonly 63 I, II | and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood, right and 64 I, II | of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original, 65 I, II | assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, 66 I, III | without doubt, as great a truth as any that can enter into 67 I, III | sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions that 68 I, III | mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are 69 I, III | equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can 70 I, III | utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in 71 I, III | For, though there be no truth which a man may more evidently 72 I, III | hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his faculties, 73 I, III | pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations 74 I, III | in the ensuing Discourse. Truth has been my only aim; and 75 I, III | greatest reverence is due to truth: and I hope it will not 76 I, III | consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess 77 I, III | an unbiased inquiry after truth. ~ 78 II, VIII | common opinion; but, in truth, it will be hard to determine 79 II, VIII | such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects 80 II, VIII | attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, 81 II, XI | impressions; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear 82 II, XI | thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it. 83 II, XI | by the severe rules of truth and good reason; whereby 84 II, XI | the best way to come to truth being to examine things 85 II, XIII | sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either 86 II, XX | distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions 87 II, XX | search and discovery of truth. But the passions being 88 II, XXI | absurdity; yet the will, in truth, signifies nothing but a 89 II, XXI | far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity. But the 90 II, XXI | able to understand. And, in truth, it would be very strange 91 II, XXI | really depend on them as in truth there does.~2. When we judge 92 II, XXI | And now, as a lover of truth, and not a worshipper of 93 II, XXI | unbiased indifferency followed truth, whither I thought she led 94 II, XXI | same sincere design for truth only, not been ashamed to 95 II, XXI | and thinking. These, in truth, though called and counted 96 II, XXIII | it is something: which in truth signifies no more, when 97 II, XXIII | an ambient fluid. But, in truth, the pressure of any ambient 98 II, XXIV | distinct substances: and, in truth, if we consider all these 99 II, XXVIII| common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For 100 II, XXIX | design but that of naked truth, which is not always the 101 II, XXXI | these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such 102 II, XXXII | True and False Ideas ~1. Truth and falsehood properly belong 103 II, XXXII | propositions, not to ideas. Though truth and falsehood belong, in 104 II, XXXII | metaphysical sense of the word truth; as all other things that 105 II, XXXII | as the standards of that truth; which amounts to a mental 106 II, XXXII | that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here, when 107 II, XXXII | or written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always 108 II, XXXII | then, I say, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of 109 II, XXXII | thus much concerning the truth and falsehood of our ideas, 110 II, XXXII | substances. Secondly, as to the truth and falsehood of our ideas, 111 II, XXXII | made the standard of their truth, none of them can be termed 112 II, XXXII | incomprehensible to us, their truth consists in nothing else 113 II, XXXII | existing without us. For the truth of these appearances or 114 II, XXXII | so is capable of neither truth nor falsehood. But when 115 II, XXXII | really exist together.~19. Truth or falsehood always supposes 116 II, XXXII | that is true or false. For truth or falsehood, being never 117 II, XXXII | or verbal propositions. Truth lies in so joining or separating 118 II, XXXII | in propriety of speech, truth or falsehood will, I think, 119 II, XXXIII| swallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever 120 II, XXXIII| himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. 121 II, XXXIII| pretend to, i.e. to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore 122 II, XXXIII| what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates 123 II, XXXIII| as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending 124 III, II | knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. 125 III, III | name to it. So that, in truth, every distinct abstract 126 III, V | to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they 127 III, V | easily satisfy one of the truth of this, it being so obvious 128 III, V | certain knowledge of general truth, we shall see hereafter.~ 129 III, V | small pittance of reason and truth, or possibly none at all, 130 III, V | have done some service to truth, peace, and learning, if, 131 III, VI | annexed; and so has, in truth, a reference, not so much 132 III, VI | we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences. 133 III, VI | But who can help it, if truth will have it so? For so 134 III, VI | would not only have, as in truth they have, but would also 135 III, VI | something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in its 136 III, VII | which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, 137 III, IX | nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not malleableness, 138 III, IX | which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with 139 III, IX | understandings, and the truth which it would contemplate 140 III, X | the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment 141 III, X | discover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will 142 III, X | adjudged not to him who had truth on his side, but the last 143 III, X | not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people’s rights; 144 III, X | always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing 145 III, X | the search or support of truth that there is.~16. This 146 III, X | notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a 147 III, X | have no other interest but truth. For the words they have 148 III, X | agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary 149 III, X | receive from them: yet, where truth and knowledge are concerned 150 III, X | understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by such 151 III, X | entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative 152 III, X | to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, 153 III, X | preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care 154 III, XI | to those who search after truth. But though the market and 155 III, XI | search after or maintain truth, should think themselves 156 III, XI | looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who 157 III, XI | profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for 158 III, XI | champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the 159 III, XI | and in controversies about truth. And though it would be 160 III, XI | signification must agree with the truth of things as well as with 161 IV, I | fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, 162 IV, I | the mind is possessed of truth; each of which is called 163 IV, I | to, and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one 164 IV, I | most, would know but one truth, that being all he was able 165 IV, I | because he cannot doubt the truth of it. In his adherence 166 IV, I | it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration 167 IV, I | this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like 168 IV, I | the demonstration of this truth knows it to be true, when 169 IV, I | was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that 170 IV, II | examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only 171 IV, II | arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. 172 IV, II | propositions of them of whose truth he can be certain. ~ 173 IV, III | the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring 174 IV, III | at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite 175 IV, III | of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of 176 IV, III | beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind; nothing 177 IV, III | permitting them to examine their truth or falsehood; and will not 178 IV, III | falsehood; and will not let truth have fair play in the world, 179 IV, IV | talk conformably, it is all truth, all certainty. Such castles 180 IV, IV | will be as strongholds of truth, as the demonstrations of 181 IV, IV | knowledge, and as much a truth, as that a square is not 182 IV, IV | mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging 183 IV, IV | business to inquire after truth and certainty, will, I presume, 184 IV, IV | In the same manner, the truth and certainty of moral discourses 185 IV, IV | As for other actions, the truth of that proposition concerns 186 IV, IV | in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever 187 IV, IV | of the difficulties about truth and certainty. Would we 188 IV, V | Chapter V~Of Truth in General ~1. What truth 189 IV, V | Truth in General ~1. What truth is. What is truth? was an 190 IV, V | What truth is. What is truth? was an inquiry many ages 191 IV, V | i.e. either ideas or words. Truth, then, seems to me, in the 192 IV, V | call proposition. So that truth properly belongs only to 193 IV, V | To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to 194 IV, V | very necessary to consider truth of thought, and truth of 195 IV, V | consider truth of thought, and truth of words, distinctly one 196 IV, V | to the consideration of truth: we must, I say, observe 197 IV, V | or separating signs; and truth consists in the putting 198 IV, V | propositions contain real truth, and when verbal. Every 199 IV, V | as I may call it, mental truth. But truth of words is something 200 IV, V | call it, mental truth. But truth of words is something more; 201 IV, V | Objection against verbal truth, that “thus it may all be 202 IV, V | occur the same doubt about truth, that did about knowledge: 203 IV, V | will be objected, that if truth be nothing but the joining 204 IV, V | minds, the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing 205 IV, V | we rest here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, 206 IV, V | imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concerns 207 IV, V | of what use is all such truth to us?~8. Answered, “Real 208 IV, V | to us?~8. Answered, “Real truth is about ideas agreeing 209 IV, V | doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if 210 IV, V | them to signify things, the truth they contain when put into 211 IV, V | of things. And therefore truth as well as knowledge may 212 IV, V | that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined 213 IV, V | it is they contain real truth, when these signs are joined, 214 IV, V | that such have existed.~9. Truth and falsehood in general. 215 IV, V | and falsehood in general. Truth is the marking down in words 216 IV, V | archetypes, so far only is the truth real. The knowledge of this 217 IV, V | real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what 218 IV, V | as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that 219 IV, V | conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reasoning 220 IV, V | being certain of their real truth or falsehood.~I shall begin 221 IV, V | Moral and metaphysical truth. Besides truth taken in 222 IV, V | metaphysical truth. Besides truth taken in the strict sense 223 IV, V | of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking of things 224 IV, V | things; 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the 225 IV, V | these considerations of truth, either having been before 226 IV, VI | Universal Propositions: their Truth and Certainty ~1. Treating 227 IV, VI | knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of universal 228 IV, VI | 3. Certainty twofold—of truth and of knowledge. But that 229 IV, VI | is twofold: certainty of truth and certainty of knowledge. 230 IV, VI | knowledge. Certainty of truth is, when words are so put 231 IV, VI | or being certain of the truth of any proposition.~4. No 232 IV, VI | cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition, 233 IV, VI | cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation 234 IV, VI | the signs, is to confound truth, and introduce uncertainty 235 IV, VI | the understanding. Of the truth of general propositions 236 IV, VI | that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold; since 237 IV, VI | imagined to constitute.~6. The truth of few universal propositions 238 IV, VI | universal propositions of whose truth we can be certain. Not because 239 IV, VI | is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of, 240 IV, VI | should certainly know the truth of this proposition, that 241 IV, VI | contained: and such a sort of truth and certainty as this it 242 IV, VI | that should carry general truth and certainty with them. 243 IV, VI | substances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured; 244 IV, VI | this respect; and the real truth of this proposition, that 245 IV, VI | ideas in us. This is in truth no less than to know all 246 IV, VI | are then certain of their truth or falsehood, when we perceive 247 IV, VII | infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition; and 248 IV, VII | are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently 249 IV, VII | greater; and, therefore, the truth of no general proposition 250 IV, VII | for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. 251 IV, VII | before. When God declares any truth to us, this is a revelation 252 IV, VII | afford it: and we see the truth in them by perceiving their 253 IV, VII | immediately to us: and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring 254 IV, VII | into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions. 255 IV, VII | first discoverer found the truth, without the help of the 256 IV, VII | on as general measures of truth, and served instead of principles ( 257 IV, VII | end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such cases, 258 IV, VII | those maxims, and so the truth known before the maxim is 259 IV, VII | finding and embracing of truth, and not a contest for victory. 260 IV, VII | oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled, i.e. 261 IV, VII | A strange way to attain truth and knowledge: and that 262 IV, VII | admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and students of religion 263 IV, VII | sincere search and love of truth; nay, and to make them doubt 264 IV, VII | put him in possession of truth; and I would fain know what 265 IV, VII | all its parts”: what real truth, I beseech you, does it 266 IV, VII | as to the standards of truth and falsehood. By which 267 IV, VII | as rules to measure the truth of other propositions, it 268 IV, VII | propositions have their truth and evidence from their 269 IV, VII | for the great guards of truth, will not secure them from 270 IV, VII | yet, without any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have 271 IV, VII | retain falsehood for manifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration: 272 IV, VII | ideas they stand for are in truth different, therefore these 273 IV, VII | that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions, 274 IV, VII | be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves 275 IV, VII | proof, if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, 276 IV, VIII | without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition; 277 IV, VIII | of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, 278 IV, VIII | understanding were led into all truth by them only. I grant as 279 IV, VIII | and infallibly know, the truth of these and all such propositions, 280 IV, VIII | notice of; nor doubt of their truth when he does take notice 281 IV, VIII | to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is 282 IV, VIII | knowledge. We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions 283 IV, VIII | secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain in 284 IV, VIII | triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive 285 IV, VIII | knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant 286 IV, VIII | to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and 287 IV, VIII | in the knowledge of the truth of things: v.g. he that 288 IV, VIII | are able to attain no real truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, 289 IV, IX | universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have 290 IV, X | this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and 291 IV, X | I think I may take for a truth, which every one’s certain 292 IV, X | this certain and evident truth,—That there is an eternal, 293 IV, X | confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this 294 IV, X | way of establishing this truth, and silencing atheists, 295 IV, X | it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered, 296 IV, X | this being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, 297 IV, X | from eternity. There is no truth more evident than that something 298 IV, XI | allow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure, 299 IV, XI | cases bear witness to the truth of each other’s report, 300 IV, XI | it is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist: 301 IV, XI | consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions 302 IV, XII | brought to convince one of a truth which he knows already. 303 IV, XII | not what may not pass for truth in morality, what may not 304 IV, XII | so is no certain way to truth. If, therefore, those that 305 IV, XII | instead of being guided into truth, we shall, by principles, 306 IV, XII | ideas we examine, and the truth we search after. General 307 IV, XII | all that can be put with truth and certainty concerning 308 IV, XII | could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, 309 IV, XII | little way in the search of truth and certainty. What, then, 310 IV, XII | that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at best 311 IV, XIII | needs be assured of the truth of those propositions which 312 IV, XIII | doubt of that, as of this truth, that it is impossible for 313 IV, XIV | faculties conversant about truth and falsehood:—~First, KNOWLEDGE, 314 IV, XV | for the most part carries truth with it: the man on whose 315 IV, XV | happy enough to find certain truth in everything which we have 316 IV, XV | undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet some of them border 317 IV, XV | to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact 318 IV, XV | and error among men than truth and knowledge. And if the 319 IV, XVI | mind which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge 320 IV, XVI | conclusion in their memories as a truth they have discovered; and 321 IV, XVI | concerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same 322 IV, XVI | indubitable proofs of their truth; and it carries too great 323 IV, XVI | incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or 324 IV, XVI | unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men’s belief, which 325 IV, XVI | like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter 326 IV, XVI | it is from the original truth, the less force and proof 327 IV, XVI | what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching 328 IV, XVI | more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say, 329 IV, XVI | contradistinction to reason; though in truth it be nothing else but an 330 IV, XVII | were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is that 331 IV, XVII | the leading of those into truth who are willing to find 332 IV, XVII | ingenuous searcher after truth, who has no other aim but 333 IV, XVII | allowing of the inference: the truth and reasonableness of it 334 IV, XVII | their own inquiries after truth, never use syllogisms to 335 IV, XVII | use, even to the lovers of truth, to show them the fallacies 336 IV, XVII | men who sincerely aim at truth are imposed upon by such 337 IV, XVII | of little use to discover truth or fallacy, whilst both 338 IV, XVII | reason, in the discovery of truth. Secondly, Another reason 339 IV, XVII | reason, in the discovery of truth, is, that of whatever use 340 IV, XVII | nevertheless persuaded of the truth on their side, and go away, 341 IV, XVII | and made men see where the truth lay; and therefore syllogism 342 IV, XVII | discovery or confirmation of truth in fair inquiries. And if 343 IV, XVII | reason in the discovery of truth, I think they ought to make 344 IV, XVII | particulars: whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, 345 IV, XVII | least mistake or doubt: the truth is seen all perfectly at 346 IV, XVII | perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it: 347 IV, XVII | such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining 348 IV, XVII | such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot 349 IV, XVII | fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the 350 IV, XVII | however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by 351 IV, XVII | seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities 352 IV, XVII | that, though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward 353 IV, XVIII | revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; 354 IV, XVIII | of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery 355 IV, XVIII | ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon 356 IV, XVIII | can never receive for a truth anything that is directly 357 IV, XVIII | left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures 358 IV, XVIII | have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation 359 IV, XVIII | not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently 360 IV, XVIII | to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, 361 IV, XVIII | proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its natural 362 IV, XVIII | so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, 363 IV, XVIII | as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may 364 IV, XVIII | discovered on which side the truth lay.~10. In matters where 365 IV, XVIII | improved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eternal 366 IV, XIX | Of Enthusiasm ~1. Love of truth necessary. He that would 367 IV, XIX | seriously set upon the search of truth ought in the first place 368 IV, XIX | profess himself a lover of truth: and there is not a rational 369 IV, XIX | there are very few lovers of truth, for truth’s sake, even 370 IV, XIX | few lovers of truth, for truth’s sake, even amongst those 371 IV, XIX | plain, receives not the truth in the love of it; loves 372 IV, XIX | the love of it; loves not truth for truth’s sake, but for 373 IV, XIX | it; loves not truth for truth’s sake, but for some other 374 IV, XIX | and not to the love of truth: it being as impossible 375 IV, XIX | impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above 376 IV, XIX | true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to 377 IV, XIX | in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible 378 IV, XIX | may not be true. In any truth that gets not possession 379 IV, XIX | derogation from the love of truth as such: which, as it can 380 IV, XIX | prerogative that belongs to truth alone, which is to command 381 IV, XIX | mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within 382 IV, XIX | which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and 383 IV, XIX | it the perception of the truth of the proposition, or of 384 IV, XIX | ourselves. I may perceive the truth of a proposition, and yet 385 IV, XIX | God. I may perceive the truth of a proposition in Euclid, 386 IV, XIX | these are two ways whereby truth comes into the mind, wholly 387 IV, XIX | proposition in our minds is a truth infused by God; a truth 388 IV, XIX | truth infused by God; a truth that is revealed to us by 389 IV, XIX | knowledge of this or that truth. But if they know it to 390 IV, XIX | if they know it to be a truth, they must know it to be 391 IV, XIX | see and know it to be a truth, either of these two ways, 392 IV, XIX | own minds, that it is a truth. For rational grounds from 393 IV, XIX | from proofs that it is a truth, they must acknowledge to 394 IV, XIX | peremptory in error as in truth. How come else the untractable 395 IV, XIX | right is made an argument of truth. St. Paul himself believed 396 IV, XIX | but the evidence of the truth of any proposition; and 397 IV, XIX | would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either 398 IV, XIX | he either evidences that truth by the usual methods of 399 IV, XIX | else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent 400 IV, XIX | as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her 401 IV, XIX | reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical 402 IV, XIX | inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have 403 IV, XIX | given them to justify the truth of their commission from 404 IV, XIX | from God or no. Where the truth embraced is consonant to 405 IV, XIX | which he has given us of truth. But it is not the strength 406 IV, XX | only of visible and certain truth, error is not a fault of 407 IV, XX | oracles and standards of truth, which teach one thing in 408 IV, XX | doubts, and discovering of truth: but they are cooped in 409 IV, XX | care is taken to propagate truth without knowledge; where 410 IV, XX | usually by them we judge of truth, and measure probability; 411 IV, XX | readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another: 412 IV, XX | and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges 413 IV, XX | derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an 414 IV, XX | and keep out the enemy, truth, that would captivate or 415 IV, XX | faculties in the search of any truth. If it were not so, ignorance, 416 IV, XX | bookish men could not err; or truth were to be established by 417 IV, XX | it was the embracing of truth for its own sake, that made 418 IV, XX | I think they embrace the truth; but indeed, because concerning 419 IV, XXI | this is bare speculative truth: and whatsoever can afford 420 IV, XXI | speculation and the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct 421 IV, XXI | themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in