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| Alphabetical [« »] geld 1 genders 1 genera 14 general 383 generality 1 generally 52 generals 3 | Frequency [« »] 389 because 388 parts 385 nor 383 general 382 shall 375 minds 375 several | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances general |
Book, Chapter
1 Ded | in the most abstract and general knowledge of things, beyond 2 Read | Paul, not to prove that the general measure of what men called 3 I, I | wherever they find it.~2. General assent the great argument. 4 I, I | for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be 5 I, I | thinking on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men 6 I, I | to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, 7 I, I | the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed 8 I, I | mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken 9 I, I | get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men’ 10 I, I | is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims 11 I, I | this,—that the making of general abstract ideas, and the 12 I, I | and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant 13 I, I | children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names 14 I, I | degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the 15 I, I | But though the having of general ideas and the use of general 16 I, I | general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually 17 I, I | one comes to have those general ideas about which those 18 I, I | the signification of those general terms that stand for them; 19 I, I | This evasion therefore of general assent when men come to 20 I, I | principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged 21 I, I | understanding the terms as this general one, “It is impossible for 22 I, I | be innate.~19. Such less general propositions known before 23 I, I | these, and the like less general propositions, are certainly 24 I, I | utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier 25 I, I | one equal to Two, &c., not general nor useful,” answered. If 26 I, I | not blue,” &c., are not general maxims, nor of any great 27 I, I | can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard 28 I, I | difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more 29 I, I | from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being 30 I, I | from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When 31 I, I | observations, and reduce them into general propositions: not innate, 32 I, I | to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till 33 I, I | proposition made up of such general terms; but as soon as ever 34 I, I | say next, that these two general propositions are not the 35 I, I | children join in these general abstract speculations with 36 I, I | therefore there be several general propositions that meet with 37 I, I | attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and 38 I, I | itself clearest. That the general maxims we are discoursing 39 I, I | universal assent, nor are general impressions. But there is 40 I, I | grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? 41 I, I | himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom 42 I, II | which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, “ 43 I, II | receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either 44 I, II | slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies 45 I, II | moral rules by this mark of general assent; and it is enough 46 I, II | usually is, to signify in general ill actions that will draw 47 I, II | of these principles very general, names, cannot be understood 48 I, II | which come under these two general words made use of above, 49 I, II | education, and custom, and the general opinion of those amongst 50 I, III | generations: though yet the general reception of this name, 51 I, III | another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, 52 I, III | mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; 53 I, III | be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that 54 I, III | first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have 55 I, III | When men have found some general propositions that could 56 II, I | Chapter I~Of Ideas in general, and their Original ~1. 57 II, IX | some called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the 58 II, X | in the memory of man in general;—compared with some superior 59 II, XI | perception of something in general. Unless the mind had a distinct 60 II, XI | certainty of several, even very general, propositions, which have 61 II, XI | observed in men, belonging to general ideas, and useful only to 62 II, XI | particular objects to become general; which is done by considering 63 II, XI | particular beings become general representatives of all of 64 II, XI | same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever 65 II, XI | and that the having of general ideas is that which puts 66 II, XI | in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; 67 II, XI | of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no 68 II, XI | use of words, or any other general signs.~11. Brutes abstract 69 II, XI | have no use or knowledge of general words; since many of them, 70 II, XI | which serve them instead of general words, a faculty which we 71 II, XI | exercised about all its ideas in general, yet the instances I have 72 II, XII | abstraction: and thus all its general ideas are made. This shows 73 II, XIII | that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate either 74 II, XIII | term expansion to space in general, with or without solid matter 75 II, XIV | of what we call time in general. ~ 76 II, XV | yet, they being ideas of general concernment, that have something 77 II, XV | place to expansion. Time in general is to duration as place 78 II, XV | acceptation.~First, Time in general is commonly taken for so 79 II, XVI | extension, yet they are more general in their use, and more determinate 80 II, XVIII | modes have no names. In general it may be observed, that 81 II, XVIII | knowledge would not be of general or necessary use, I leave 82 II, XVIII | by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short 83 II, XX | of pleasure and pain in general, however caused in us.~6. 84 II, XXI | that which determines the general power of directing, to this 85 II, XXI | instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this 86 II, XXI | settled a maxim, by the general consent of all mankind, 87 II, XXI | proper object of desire in general; yet all good, even seen 88 II, XXI | pursuit of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, 89 II, XXI | shall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very 90 II, XXI | happy. But, though this general desire of happiness operates 91 II, XXIII | obscure idea of substance in general. So that if any one will 92 II, XXIII | notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no 93 II, XXIII | have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing 94 II, XXIII | relative idea of substance in general being thus made we come 95 II, XXIII | distinct idea of substance in general. Hence, when we talk or 96 II, XXIII | abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of 97 II, XXIII | which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and 98 II, XXV | Concerning relation in general, these things may be considered:~ 99 II, XXV | friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, 100 II, XXV | premises concerning relation in general, I shall now proceed to 101 II, XXVI | complex idea we denote by the general name, cause, and that which 102 II, XXVII | prince. It answered, Some General or other. When they brought 103 II, XXVII | viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self,— 104 II, XXVIII| to do something. Thus, a general is one that hath power to 105 II, XXVIII| army; and an army under a general is a collection of armed 106 II, XXVIII| patron is to his client, or general to his army.~4. Ideas of 107 II, XXVIII| secures and advances the general good of mankind in this 108 II, XXVIII| of which the word good in general signifies any one: but, 109 II, XXIX | of defining of words by general terms contributes to make 110 II, XXIX | of is of what division in general or abstractedly is, and 111 II, XXX | together, and united under one general name, it is plain that the 112 II, XXXI | situation of solid parts in general, though I have none of the 113 II, XXXI | of matter on my finger a general name already in use, and 114 II, XXXI | properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular, 115 II, XXXI | no idea of substance in general, nor knows what substance 116 II, XXXIII| and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: 117 II, XXXIII| that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, 118 II, XXXIII| and our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a 119 III, I | Of Words or Language in General ~1. Man fitted to form articulate 120 III, I | another.~3. To make them general signs. But neither was this 121 III, I | improvement in the use of general terms, whereby one word 122 III, I | of: those names becoming general, which are made to stand 123 III, I | which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining 124 III, I | except proper) names are general, and so stand not particularly 125 III, II | differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular 126 III, III | Chapter III~Of General Terms ~1. The greatest part 127 III, III | greatest part of words are general terms. All things that exist 128 III, III | that make all languages are general terms: which has not been 129 III, III | things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced 130 III, III | reduced into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient. 131 III, III | is out of sight.~6. How general words are made. The next 132 III, III | to be considered is,—How general words come to be made. For, 133 III, III | particulars, how come we by general terms; or where find we 134 III, III | or where find we those general natures they are supposed 135 III, III | stand for? Words become general by being made the signs 136 III, III | being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas become 137 III, III | ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them 138 III, III | thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. 139 III, III | have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make 140 III, III | way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they 141 III, III | they easily advance to more general names and notions. For, 142 III, III | have again another and more general idea; to which having given 143 III, III | under the name animal.~9. General natures are nothing but 144 III, III | whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names 145 III, III | formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think is 146 III, III | knowledge. And he that thinks general natures or notions are anything 147 III, III | animal to it, one has a more general term, that comprehends with 148 III, III | nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive 149 III, III | unvariable, That every more general term stands for such an 150 III, III | use of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it. 151 III, III | simple ideas which the next general word or genus stands for; 152 III, III | themselves to use the next general term, it has not been out 153 III, III | in the next chapter.~11. General and universal are creatures 154 III, III | of things. To return to general words: it is plain, by what 155 III, III | what has been said, that general and universal belong not 156 III, III | words or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when 157 III, III | when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable 158 III, III | particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as 159 III, III | their signification are general. When therefore we quit 160 III, III | of our own making; their general nature being nothing but 161 III, III | signification it is that general words have. For, as it is 162 III, III | for then they would not be general terms, but proper names, 163 III, III | useless. That then which general words signify is a sort 164 III, III | abstracts and makes those general ideas.~13. They are the 165 III, III | amongst them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in 166 III, III | be ranked under? And when general names have any connexion 167 III, III | abstract idea which the general, or sortal (if I may have 168 III, III | call it from sort, as I do general from genus), name stands 169 III, III | we have annexed distinct general names.~18. Real and nominal 170 III, III | abstract idea to which the general name is annexed, but the 171 III, IV | explication made by a more general word, and its restriction, ( 172 III, IV | appearance, and so have one general name; as rationality being 173 III, IV | agree with brute in the more general idea and name of animal. 174 III, IV | simple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain 175 III, IV | they would frame yet a more general term to comprehend both 176 III, IV | by one sense. And so the general term quality, in its ordinary 177 III, V | abstract ideas, as other general names. The names of mixed 178 III, V | names of mixed modes, being general, they stand, as has been 179 III, V | signify with ease and dispatch general conceptions; wherein not 180 III, V | occasion to communicate by one general term; under which divers 181 III, V | species, essences, and their general name, at least in mixed 182 III, V | abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make 183 III, V | to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they 184 III, V | were that they might have general names for the convenience 185 III, V | the certain knowledge of general truth, we shall see hereafter.~ 186 III, V | negligent to reflect on a general miscarriage, which, though 187 III, VI | substances, as well as other general terms, stand for sorts: 188 III, VI | complex idea signified by some general name, comes into his mind; 189 III, VI | abstract idea which any general term stands for, cannot 190 III, VI | nature, without reference to general ideas in names, is to talk 191 III, VI | supposition of a sort or general abstract idea, which is 192 III, VI | things, which we rank under general names, but that idea which 193 III, VI | same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that 194 III, VI | particular things, as to their general denominations?~9. Not the 195 III, VI | or confused conception in general.~11. That the nominal essence 196 III, VI | remarked, we have need of general words, though we know not 197 III, VI | ranking of things under general names was regulated by those 198 III, VI | essences, that have made the general names that are in use amongst 199 III, VI | person; much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that 200 III, VI | comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how 201 III, VI | For we, having need of general names for present use, stay 202 III, VI | we may the easier under general names communicate our thoughts 203 III, VI | specific idea, and give it a general name; that in recording 204 III, VI | nature’s making.~32. The more general our ideas of substances 205 III, VI | For, as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending several 206 III, VI | so to make other yet more general ideas, that may comprehend 207 III, VI | nature, when they make their general ideas of substances; since 208 III, VI | But men, in making their general ideas, seeking more the 209 III, VI | furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive 210 III, VI | they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we have 211 III, VI | may observe, that the more general term is always the name 212 III, VI | So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete, 213 III, VI | else; and let us see that general terms signify not our abstract 214 III, VI | and genera is in order to general names; and how much general 215 III, VI | general names; and how much general names are necessary, if 216 III, VI | different abstract ideas, with general names annexed to them, as 217 III, VI | such thing signified by the general names which substances are 218 III, VI | abstract ideas. they being general names; which abstract ideas 219 III, VII | Is, and Is not, are the general marks, of the mind, affirming 220 III, VIII | so they become essences, general essences, whereby the sorts 221 III, IX | things, and to express in general propositions certain and 222 III, IX | common conversation, the general names of substances, regulated 223 III, IX | inquiries and debates, where general truths are to be established, 224 III, IX | seven, or a triangle? And in general the least compounded ideas 225 III, IX | scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least they 226 III, X | degree concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects 227 III, X | concern a great many other general terms I leave to be considered. 228 III, X | may observe that in the general names of substances whereof 229 III, X | which we rank under one general name. Whereas anyone who 230 III, X | remains yet another more general, though perhaps less observed, 231 III, XI | simple ideas of the more general name bird were found in 232 III, XI | to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences 233 III, XI | deduce consequences about general ideas, he would no doubt 234 IV, I | Chapter I~Of Knowledge in General ~1. Our knowledge conversant 235 IV, I | reduced this into those general rules, What is, is, and 236 IV, I | before, and without any such general rule. This then is the first 237 IV, I | and not under relation in general; since they are so different 238 IV, I | demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If then the perception, 239 IV, I | could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics; 240 IV, I | to the knowledge of any general propositions. Nobody, I 241 IV, II | imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of those sciences: 242 IV, II | knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, 243 IV, III | have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four 244 IV, III | observation of our senses, or, in general, by the necessary connexion 245 IV, III | ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say not particular 246 IV, III | primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is 247 IV, III | ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable 248 IV, III | confined it is, how far from general knowledge we need not be 249 IV, III | wanting in their own, or the general stock of knowledge. Had 250 IV, III | For what is known of such general ideas, will be true of every 251 IV, III | true. So that as to all general knowledge we must search 252 IV, III | chapters where I shall speak of general and real knowledge, this 253 IV, III | universality of our knowledge in general. ~ 254 IV, IV | that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies in 255 IV, IV | examination, be found to be general propositions, and notions 256 IV, IV | be abstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it 257 IV, V | Chapter V~Of Truth in General ~1. What truth is. What 258 IV, V | Truth and falsehood in general. Truth is the marking down 259 IV, V | marked by those words.~10. General propositions to be treated 260 IV, V | falsehood.~I shall begin with general propositions, as those which 261 IV, V | exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked after 262 IV, VI | explaining the other.~2. General truths hardly to be understood, 263 IV, VI | being only of particular or general truths, it is evident that 264 IV, VI | certain of the truth of any general proposition, unless we know 265 IV, VI | abstract idea which the general term stands for being the 266 IV, VI | species, the extent of the general word is very uncertain; 267 IV, VI | extend the application of any general term no further than to 268 IV, VI | the sorting of them under general names, according as they 269 IV, VI | introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be 270 IV, VI | understanding. Of the truth of general propositions made up of 271 IV, VI | therefore there are very few general propositions to be made 272 IV, VI | would gladly meet with one general affirmation concerning any 273 IV, VI | furnish us with matter of more general knowledge, and enable us 274 IV, VI | propositions, that should carry general truth and certainty with 275 IV, VI | discover, there can be few general propositions concerning 276 IV, VI | with them make very few general propositions of undoubted 277 IV, VI | very sparingly with any general knowledge, or universal 278 IV, VI | to be found in very few general propositions made concerning 279 IV, VI | requisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our 280 IV, VI | amongst them, there we have general knowledge; and by putting 281 IV, VI | with certainty pronounce general truths. But because the 282 IV, VI | constitutions, we can make but few general certain propositions concerning 283 IV, VI | substances. for which their general names stand, not comprehending 284 IV, VI | we can make but very few general certain propositions concerning 285 IV, VI | the rest: but can have no general certainty, whilst our specific 286 IV, VI | justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances 287 IV, VI | all.~16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions. 288 IV, VI | propositions. To conclude: general propositions, of what kind 289 IV, VI | we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be 290 IV, VI | alone is able to afford us general knowledge. ~ 291 IV, VII | terms standing for more general ideas, or such as are less 292 IV, VII | less so: v.g. whether the general idea of Being be affirmed 293 IV, VII | whether the idea of being in general be denied of not-Being, 294 IV, VII | less as well as the more general propositions; and all for 295 IV, VII | these ideas be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. 296 IV, VII | therefore, alone to these two general propositions—“whatsoever 297 IV, VII | any other ideas. These two general maxims, amounting to no 298 IV, VII | instances, as well as in those general maxims; and known also in 299 IV, VII | instances, before these general maxims are ever thought 300 IV, VII | reflection on either of these general propositions, perceives 301 IV, VII | therefore, the truth of no general proposition can be known 302 IV, VII | that consisting of more general terms, “whatsoever is, is”; 303 IV, VII | it ever thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians, 304 IV, VII | understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken 305 IV, VII | settled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus particular 306 IV, VII | and next to them, the less general or specific, which are next 307 IV, VII | them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances 308 IV, VII | pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, (which 309 IV, VII | that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that 310 IV, VII | knowledge, besides those general principles themselves, to 311 IV, VII | themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident 312 IV, VII | on certain praecognita or general maxims, called principles; 313 IV, VII | particular from the more general, or the more simple from 314 IV, VII | regarding those made in more general terms and called maxims.~ 315 IV, VII | maxims.~11. What use these general maxims or axioms have. What 316 IV, VII | shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use? By no 317 IV, VII | to prove or confirm less general self-evident propositions.~( 318 IV, VII | upon these or any other general axioms is to be found: and 319 IV, VII | them. I ask, Whether these general maxims have not the same 320 IV, VII | of these, it was not the general maxims, “what is, is;” or, “ 321 IV, VII | of the sciences without a general maxim, but distinguish between 322 IV, VII | they would see that those general maxims were not the foundations 323 IV, VII | to their minds as those general axioms which had before 324 IV, VII | the understanding than the general maxims brought to confirm 325 IV, VII | without the help of the general maxims: and so may any one 326 IV, VII | train of syllogisms, certain general propositions—most of them, 327 IV, VII | agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, and served 328 IV, VII | with, when they deny these general self-evident principles 329 IV, VII | discovery of truths. As to these general maxims, therefore, they 330 IV, VII | build his knowledge on the general proposition, what is, is; 331 IV, VII | certain, were these two general propositions never thought 332 IV, VII | attended to, as either of these general ones: only these general 333 IV, VII | general ones: only these general ones, as serving in all 334 IV, VII | insisted on. As to other less general maxims, many of them are 335 IV, VII | propositions, made in such general terms, may be used to make 336 IV, VII | reflections, and have these more general propositions, as formed 337 IV, VII | particular instance, than by this general proposition, “The whole 338 IV, VII | to him by the other, the general has more need to be let 339 IV, VII | than the particular by the general. For in particulars our 340 IV, VII | drawn its knowledge into as general propositions as it can, 341 IV, VII | conformity to these more general ones, which, in discourse 342 IV, VII | self-evident propositions, the most general only have had the title 343 IV, VII | observe concerning these general maxims, That they are so 344 IV, VII | ideas of things; I say these general maxims will serve to confirm 345 IV, VII | knowledge of our own ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure 346 IV, VII | of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language 347 IV, VIII | to us. Indeed, that most general one, what is, is, may serve 348 IV, VIII | instructive real knowledge.~9. General propositions concerning 349 IV, VIII | real constitutions, the general propositions that are made 350 IV, IX | Knowledge of Existence ~1. General propositions that are certain 351 IV, IX | certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; 352 IV, X | to add, that, though our general or specific conception of 353 IV, XI | certain, concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract 354 IV, XI | which certainty of such general propositions depends on 355 IV, XI | abstract ideas.~14. And all general propositions that are known 356 IV, XI | our minds, producing there general certain propositions. Many 357 IV, XII | the beginning one or more general propositions, as foundations 358 IV, XII | received from two or three general maxims, laid down in the 359 IV, XII | particular instance, or the general rule; and which it is that 360 IV, XII | birth to the other. These general rules are but the comparing 361 IV, XII | but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which 362 IV, XII | attentively to lay up those general notions, and make the proper 363 IV, XII | knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, 364 IV, XII | the truth we search after. General and certain truths are only 365 IV, XII | certainty concerning them into general propositions. By what steps 366 IV, XII | possessed of certain, real, and general truths; and I doubt not 367 IV, XII | afford matter of very little general knowledge; and the bare 368 IV, XII | imagine, to reach very little general knowledge concerning the 369 IV, XII | and business of mankind in general, (who are both concerned 370 IV, XII | shall consider how little general maxims, precarious principles, 371 IV, XII | those things whereof we have general or specific names; at least, 372 IV, XII | drawing consequences from some general propositions) are the right 373 IV, XVI | probability, is, when the general consent of all men, in all 374 IV, XVI | Julius Caesar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle 375 IV, XVI | This only may be said in general, That as the arguments and 376 IV, XVII | Wherein reasoning consists. If general knowledge, as has been shown, 377 IV, XVII | to speak of syllogism in general, and the use of it in reasoning, 378 IV, XVII | but what has at least one general proposition in it. As if 379 IV, XVII | them, as well as in the general.~9. Our reason often fails 380 IV, XX | laziness and oscitancy in general, or a particular aversion 381 IV, XX | candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend 382 IV, XXI | This is the first and most general division of the objects 383 IV, XXI | to me the first and most general, as well as natural division