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| Alphabetical [« »] troubling 3 troy 1 truce 1 true 302 truer 1 truest 2 truly 50 | Frequency [« »] 302 find 302 innate 302 nature 302 true 301 clear 299 bodies 297 propositions | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances true |
Book, Chapter
1 Read | which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was 2 Read | ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon 3 Read | whether these rules were true or false: and pursuant thereto 4 Read | corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of 5 Read | concerned whether they are true or false, will be able to 6 Int | give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have 7 I, I | misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that 8 I, I | all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable 9 I, I | utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to 10 I, I | But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of 11 I, I | the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire 12 I, I | to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have 13 I, I | propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, 14 I, II | question. They are equally true, though not equally evident. 15 I, II | knowing or admitting the true ground of morality; which 16 I, II | they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves 17 I, II | every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is 18 I, II | of being assented to as true, it must be reduced to some 19 I, II | certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for 20 I, II | prescribed by God—which is the true and only measure of virtue 21 I, II | worship of God,” will be most true and certain, but of very 22 I, II | may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it 23 I, II | minds of all men, (however true and certain it may be,) 24 I, II | so? Indeed this is a very true proposition, and fit to 25 I, II | assertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument 26 I, II | which all mankind allow for true, are innate; those that 27 I, II | is impossible should be true. But yet all those propositions, 28 I, II | or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, 29 I, III | And which then shall be true? Which innate? Or are there 30 I, III | teacher, than represent the true God? He that shall observe 31 I, III | Gross ideas of God. What true or tolerable notion of a 32 I, III | a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, 33 I, III | all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity 34 I, III | thoughts and reason, attained true notions in this as well 35 I, III | nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed 36 I, III | to have the same and the true ideas of him. How many even 37 I, III | follow. Every one that hath a true idea of God and worship, 38 I, III | every one will find it true in himself of the evidence 39 I, III | much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating 40 I, III | though they happen to be true. What in them was science, 41 I, III | I conceive are the only true ones, whereon to establish 42 I, III | observation whether they be true or not; and this is enough 43 II, I | from the body; which if true, to inquire after the beginning 44 II, I | is no appearance. It is true, we have sometimes instances 45 II, I | have any ideas, I think the true answer is,—when he first 46 II, II | colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.~ 47 II, IX | answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons 48 II, X | memory of some men, it is true, is very tenacious, even 49 II, XI | because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions 50 II, XI | in other places.~15. The true beginning of human knowledge. 51 II, XI | given a short, and, I think, true history of the first beginnings 52 II, XIII | Virgil was printed: which is true, though the book itself 53 II, XIII | infinite space: though it be true that the word place has 54 II, XIII | of scarlet colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without 55 II, XIII | compatible to pure space.~It is true, a man may consider so much 56 II, XIII | proves it not the same. It is true, the idea of extension joins 57 II, XIV | should not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine 58 II, XIV | reckoning Of 5639 should be true, (as it may be as well as 59 II, XV | in or without body. It is true, we can easily in our thoughts 60 II, XVII | foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, 61 II, XXI | appropriation that disguises its true sense, serve a little to 62 II, XXI | determines the will? the true and proper answer is, The 63 II, XXI | present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind. But 64 II, XXI | which sentence, allowed for true, and made good by constant 65 II, XXI | doing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools 66 II, XXI | creatures might not mistake true felicity, we are endowed 67 II, XXI | The necessity of pursuing true happiness the foundation 68 II, XXI | and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so 69 II, XXI | preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest 70 II, XXI | a steady prosecution of true felicity,—That they can 71 II, XXI | does not interfere with our true happiness, and mislead us 72 II, XXI | direction of our conduct to true happiness depends; it is 73 II, XXI | relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that 74 II, XXI | due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites 75 II, XXI | conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated 76 II, XXI | present, and there take its true dimensions? This is the 77 II, XXI | pleasure and pain, or the true degrees of happiness or 78 II, XXI | morality, established upon its true foundations, cannot but 79 II, XXI | motions and in thinking. True notions concerning the nature 80 II, XXIII | which, according to the true import of the word, is, 81 II, XXIII | together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, 82 II, XXIII | considered, if we will have true distinct notions of the 83 II, XXIII | thing, which perhaps is true: but I affirm, when they 84 II, XXIII | internal constitution, and true nature of things, being 85 II, XXVII | talk, there was something true, but a great deal false 86 II, XXVII | whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they 87 II, XXVII | whilst dreaming we take for true—will be difficult to conclude 88 II, XXVII | though it were never so true, that the same spirit that 89 II, XXVII | those bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the case: 90 II, XXVIII| if I mistake not, is the true nature of all law, properly 91 II, XXVIII| hands. This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude; 92 II, XXVIII| which they are so constantly true to, could not generally 93 II, XXVIII| corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of 94 II, XXVIII| sweetness; which is equally true of all the rest: though, 95 II, XXVIII| action is compared to be true or false. Thirdly, That 96 II, XXVIII| moral relations, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing 97 II, XXVIII| rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure 98 II, XXVIII| by that which is not the true rule: yet I am not mistaken 99 II, XXIX | contained in our idea. It is true that he that thinks so may 100 II, XXIX | infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear idea of division, 101 II, XXX | or inadequate;~Thirdly, true or false.~First, by real 102 II, XXX | simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and 103 II, XXXI | ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in 104 II, XXXII | Chapter XXXII~Of True and False Ideas ~1. Truth 105 II, XXXII | ideas are oftentimes termed true or false (as what words 106 II, XXXII | ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still 107 II, XXXII | wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which we 108 II, XXXII | themselves be said to be true or false, no more than a 109 II, XXXII | anything can be said to be true or false.~2. Ideas and words 110 II, XXXII | words may be said to be true, inasmuch as they really 111 II, XXXII | words may be said to be true, in a metaphysical sense 112 II, XXXII | way exist are said to be true, i.e. really to be such 113 II, XXXII | Though in things called true, even in that sense, there 114 II, XXXII | appearance in the mind, either true or false. But it is not 115 II, XXXII | ideas are capable of being true or false, but in the more 116 II, XXXII | extraneous to them may be true or false. Whenever the mind 117 II, XXXII | then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind, 118 II, XXXII | supposition, as it happens to be true or false, so the ideas themselves 119 II, XXXII | substances, are the one true and the other false; the 120 II, XXXII | from them, they pass for true or false. And thus much 121 II, XXXII | are what they should be, true ideas. Nor do they become 122 II, XXXII | may be sometimes called true or false; yet if we will 123 II, XXXII | where any idea is called true or false, it is from some 124 II, XXXII | supposed to make, that is true or false. For truth or falsehood, 125 II, XXXII | Ideas in themselves neither true nor false. Any idea, then, 126 II, XXXII | one had rather call them true or false, it is fit he use 127 II, XXXII | knowledge about them right and true knowledge; but when we come 128 III, II | language of his subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit 129 III, III | genus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed 130 III, III | incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real constitutions 131 III, III | them; and will always be true, as long as the same name 132 III, IV | explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of the cause 133 III, IV | pine-apple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that 134 III, IV | very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. 135 III, V | things existing? Or is it true because any one has been 136 III, V | are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind 137 III, V | the greatest hindrances of true knowledge, but are so well 138 III, VI | imply potential sorts. It is true, I have often mentioned 139 III, VI | is more remote from the true internal constitution from 140 III, VI | of substances into their true species and genera, were 141 III, VI | names annexed to them. It is true every substance that exists 142 III, VI | For, granting this to be true, it would help us in the 143 III, VI | same individual will be a true man to the one which is 144 III, VI | such prefixed bounds. It is true that many particular substances 145 III, VI | comprehensive signs, than the true and precise nature of things 146 III, VI | This is adjusted to the true end of speech, which is 147 III, VI | gold: so that it would be true gold to him, and belong 148 III, VI | other side it would not be true gold, or of that species, 149 III, VI | species. And thus anything is true gold, perfect metal. All 150 III, VI | I think it nevertheless true, that the boundaries of 151 III, VI | certainty. For let it be ever so true, that all gold, i.e. all 152 III, VI | essence, and so whether it be true gold or no.~51. Conclusion. 153 III, VII | God would bring you to the true religion.”~Fourthly, “But 154 III, IX | with in its search after true knowledge. These two uses 155 III, IX | sufficient remedy. It is true, common use, that is, the 156 III, IX | out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, 157 III, IX | required to find out the true meaning of ancient authors. 158 III, IX | stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; 159 III, IX | these qualities being the true ground of their union in 160 III, IX | philosophical use. It is true, as to civil and common 161 III, IX | in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, 162 III, X | even inquisitive men from true knowledge, hath been propagated 163 III, X | essences of substances. It is true the names of substances 164 III, X | thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.~31. Summary. 165 III, X | far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding, 166 III, X | him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of a horse 167 III, XI | will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from 168 III, XI | in less time, teach the true signification of many terms, 169 III, XI | we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of 170 III, XI | intelligent readers into the true meaning of it; but where 171 IV, I | certainty, and is in effect true knowledge. That which is 172 IV, I | this truth knows it to be true, when that demonstration 173 IV, I | certain, that what was once true in the case, is always true; 174 IV, I | true in the case, is always true; what ideas once agreed 175 IV, I | what he once knew to be true, he will always know to 176 IV, I | he will always know to be true; as long as he can remember 177 IV, I | before he could know it to be true in another like triangle, 178 IV, I | reads in his book to be true; though he has not in actual 179 IV, I | first discovered it to be true. Such a memory as that, 180 IV, I | knows the proposition to be true, remembering he once saw 181 IV, II | intuitive knowledge. It is true, the perception produced 182 IV, II | and colours, I think holds true in all secondary qualities 183 IV, III | discover by our ideas (the only true way of certain and universal 184 IV, III | without which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-existence 185 IV, III | know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has 186 IV, III | are unable to distinguish true from false, certain from 187 IV, III | such general ideas, will be true of every particular thing 188 IV, III | perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general 189 IV, IV | the more knowing. If it be true, that all knowledge lies 190 IV, IV | nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything, 191 IV, IV | mathematically, i.e. precisely true, in his life. But yet the 192 IV, IV | figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real 193 IV, IV | archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle, 194 IV, IV | to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, wherever 195 IV, IV | existence in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have 196 IV, IV | are Tully’s Offices less true, because there is nobody 197 IV, IV | writ but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i.e. in 198 IV, IV | deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action 199 IV, IV | 9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral 200 IV, IV | perjury, &c., were as real and true ideas before, as after the 201 IV, IV | And our ideas being thus true, though not perhaps very 202 IV, V | mental proposition, which is true or false, according as such 203 IV, V | real beings, and so have as true propositions made about 204 IV, V | it will be altogether as true a proposition to say all 205 IV, V | propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of 206 IV, VI | be certainly known to be true, where the real essence 207 IV, VI | whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen to 208 IV, VI | one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently 209 IV, VII | are put together. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect 210 IV, VII | earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all 211 IV, VII | proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it understands 212 IV, VII | self-evident, or to be received for true; which being settled in 213 IV, VII | they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last extremity; 214 IV, VII | never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they sometimes 215 IV, VII | himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to 216 IV, VII | establishing our minds in true knowledge, that if our notions 217 IV, VII | this predication is as true and identical in its signification, 218 IV, VII | as this predication is true and identical, that “body 219 IV, VII | space is not body,” is as true and evidently certain as 220 IV, VII | these principles are less true or of less force in proving 221 IV, VII | us no certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, 222 IV, VIII | though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to 223 IV, VIII | any one, that they are all true and self-evident. I grant 224 IV, VIII | and all such are equally true, equally certain, and equally 225 IV, VIII | in the search of real and true knowledge. ~ 226 IV, XI | of a dream make thereby a true history.~2. Instance: whiteness 227 IV, XI | it will also be always true, and as long as my memory 228 IV, XI | it will also be equally true that a certain number of 229 IV, XI | beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v.g., that all 230 IV, XI | in the world; but will be true of all such creatures, whenever 231 IV, XI | propositions that are known to be true concern abstract ideas. 232 IV, XI | abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they 233 IV, XI | ideas, always actually be true. For names being supposed 234 IV, XI | abstract ideas that are once true must needs be eternal verities. ~ 235 IV, XII | habitudes; we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the 236 IV, XII | disposal of others.~7. The true method of advancing knowledge 237 IV, XII | and fusibility, will hold true, if malleableness, fixedness, 238 IV, XII | pleasure, have promoted true knowledge, or helped to 239 IV, XII | profitable knowledge.~13. The true use of hypotheses. Not that 240 IV, XIV | what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being 241 IV, XIV | same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving 242 IV, XV | judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the 243 IV, XV | it, i.e. receives it for true: in which case the foundation 244 IV, XV | us presume things to be true, before we know them to 245 IV, XV | Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the 246 IV, XV | pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind 247 IV, XV | receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs 248 IV, XV | persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge 249 IV, XV | inducements to receive them for true. The grounds of it are, 250 IV, XV | though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet 251 IV, XVI | the same manner, is very true. These probabilities rise 252 IV, XVI | any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled 253 IV, XVI | revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable 254 IV, XVII | sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles: sometimes 255 IV, XVII | and take propositions for true, without being certain they 256 IV, XVII | proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, 257 IV, XVII | true, to draw in another as true, i.e. to see or suppose 258 IV, XVII | of art, not knowing the true forms of syllogism, nor 259 IV, XVII | easily perceive, what are the true ideas upon which the inference 260 IV, XVII | first book of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it, 261 IV, XVII | added the right helps of true art and learning, (which 262 IV, XVII | assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are 263 IV, XVII | In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition too, 264 IV, XVII | observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and 265 IV, XVII | of all the four, brings true instruction with it, and 266 IV, XVII | natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reason 267 IV, XVIII | any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction 268 IV, XVIII | which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles 269 IV, XVIII | has that the contrary is true, and so is bound to consider 270 IV, XVIII | possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence 271 IV, XVIII | proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation, 272 IV, XVIII | hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be made of 273 IV, XIX | that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) 274 IV, XIX | there is to me that it is true, as that the love of truth 275 IV, XIX | which it has not, that it is true: which is in effect to love 276 IV, XIX | probable that it may not be true. In any truth that gets 277 IV, XIX | strong persuasion that it is true, a perception that it is 278 IV, XIX | from God, or so much as true. But however it be called 279 IV, XIX | such as they know to be true, but take to be true. For 280 IV, XIX | be true, but take to be true. For where a proposition 281 IV, XIX | proposition is known to be true, revelation is needless: 282 IV, XIX | but do not know, to be true, whatever they may call 283 IV, XIX | revealed be in itself evidently true, or visibly probable, or, 284 IV, XIX | grounded and manifested to be true, is this, That God is the 285 IV, XIX | these men receive it for true, because they presume God 286 IV, XIX | For they know it to be true the same way that any other 287 IV, XIX | they say they know it to be true, because it is a revelation 288 IV, XIX | strongly believe it to be true. For all the light they 289 IV, XIX | if they believe it to be true because it is a revelation, 290 IV, XIX | other reason, that it is true, then they believe it to 291 IV, XIX | believe any proposition to be true, any action to be right, 292 IV, XIX | in the mind, what. Light, true light, in the mind is, or 293 IV, XIX | may safely receive it for true, and be guided by it in 294 IV, XIX | revelation, or so much as for true, till we have some other 295 IV, XX | assent to that which is not true.~But if assent be grounded 296 IV, XX | or other of these to be true, (let them choose which 297 IV, XX | certainly knows it to be true of itself, by its own evidence, 298 IV, XX | in itself not evidently true.~9. Instilled in childhood. 299 IV, XX | at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there 300 IV, XX | that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis, or right principles, 301 IV, XX | assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the 302 IV, XX | can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the