Book,  Chapter

  1   Read         |        this—that there are certain propositions which, though the soul from
  2      I,  I     |         liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an
  3      I,  I     |            by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind
  4      I,  I     |             If therefore these two propositions, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “
  5      I,  I     |          truths from principles or propositions that are already known?
  6      I,  I     |          this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to
  7      I,  I     |            steps, as several other propositions, which nobody was ever so
  8      I,  I     |           as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that
  9      I,  I     |         the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient
 10      I,  I     |        infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the
 11      I,  I     |           must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally
 12      I,  I     |            must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate;
 13      I,  I     |        multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that everybody
 14      I,  I     |  prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them;
 15      I,  I     |         the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure to meet with
 16      I,  I     |            a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we
 17      I,  I     |            not only as many innate propositions as men have distinct ideas,
 18      I,  I     |            as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas
 19      I,  I     |        will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without
 20      I,  I     |     hereafter,) belongs to several propositions which nobody was yet so
 21      I,  I     |      innate.~19. Such less general propositions known before these universal
 22      I,  I     |            particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at
 23      I,  I     |            of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate
 24      I,  I     |          and the like less general propositions, are certainly known, and
 25      I,  I     |          If it be said, that these propositions, viz. “two and two are equal
 26      I,  I     |            particular self-evident propositions; and therefore it is longer
 27      I,  I     |            done with “assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding
 28      I,  I     |           reduce them into general propositions: not innate, but collected
 29      I,  I     |           assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical
 30      I,  I     |             because they assent to propositions which they are not taught,
 31      I,  I     |         afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at
 32      I,  I     |         there is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would
 33      I,  I     |          with another; and then to propositions made in such terms, whose
 34      I,  I     |            assent; though to other propositions, in themselves as certain
 35      I,  I     |         other of the forementioned propositions: and with both for the same
 36      I,  I     |            the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words
 37      I,  I     |           yet in his mind, to such propositions, however evidently true
 38      I,  I     |         heard nor thought of those propositions; which, I think, is at least
 39      I,  I     |             and thereby show these propositions not to be innate, if children
 40      I,  I     |             that these two general propositions are not the truths that
 41      I,  I     |           there be several general propositions that meet with constant
 42      I,  I     |     mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in
 43      I,  I     |            other than what several propositions, not allowed to be innate,
 44      I,  II    |           Did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds,
 45      I,  II    |         that there are such innate propositions, do not tell us what they
 46      I,  II    |             First, that these five propositions are either not all, or more
 47      I,  II    |     written. Since there are other propositions which, even by his own rules,
 48      I,  II    |          found in each of his five propositions, viz. his first, second,
 49      I,  II    |           third, fourth, and fifth propositions. For, besides that we are
 50      I,  II    |        reason to think hundreds of propositions innate principles; since
 51      I,  II    |            true. But yet all those propositions, how remote soever from
 52      I,  II    |             who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned
 53      I,  II    |            to conclude, that those propositions of whose knowledge they
 54      I,  II    |           hath not some reverenced propositions, which are to him the principles
 55      I,  II    |            such welcome and useful propositions; and till then I may with
 56      I,  III   |           parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not,
 57      I,  III   |            was impossible that the propositions made up of them should be
 58      I,  III   |        assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.~2. Ideas, especially
 59      I,  III   |            make up those universal propositions that are esteemed innate
 60      I,  III   |         examine the truth of these propositions that could fail to assent
 61      I,  III   |           ideas we do know.~20. No propositions can be innate, since no
 62      I,  III   |           as to think that certain propositions are innate when the ideas
 63      I,  III   |       innate, it can much less the propositions made up of those ideas.
 64      I,  III   |          are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness
 65      I,  III   |            the mind puts them into propositions: other truths require a
 66      I,  III   |         evident than many of those propositions that go for principles;
 67      I,  III   |     ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself,
 68      I,  III   |            have found some general propositions that could not be doubted
 69     II,  XI    |        several, even very general, propositions, which have passed for innate
 70     II,  XI    |           the true cause why those propositions find universal assent, impute
 71     II,  XI    |        together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right
 72     II,  XI    |         idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.~
 73     II,  XXXII |       falsehood properly belong to propositions, not to ideas. Though truth
 74     II,  XXXII |       propriety of speech, only to propositions: yet ideas are oftentimes
 75     II,  XXXII |            either mental or verbal propositions. Truth lies in so joining
 76     II,  XXXIII|   knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering, first,
 77    III,  I     |             being conversant about propositions, and those most commonly
 78    III,  VII   |         mind gives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another. The mind,
 79    III,  VII   |      connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one
 80    III,  VII   |          mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them which it
 81    III,  VIII  |       difference, and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever
 82    III,  VIII  |   perceives the falsehood of these propositions: humanity is animality,
 83    III,  IX    |          and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths,
 84    III,  IX    |     complex idea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw
 85    III,  IX    |          have to do with universal propositions, and would settle in their
 86    III,  IX    |          had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated
 87    III,  X     |           us when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny anything
 88    III,  X     |           be much more useful, and propositions made in them much more certain,
 89     IV,  I     |            no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics; for no mathematical
 90     IV,  I     |           knowledge of any general propositions. Nobody, I think, can deny,
 91     IV,  II    |            when I come to consider propositions, and particularly those
 92     IV,  II    |             and particularly those propositions which are called maxims,
 93     IV,  II    |         words he uses, cannot make propositions of them of whose truth he
 94     IV,  III   |          not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences,
 95     IV,  IV    |            to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree
 96     IV,  IV    |             be found to be general propositions, and notions in which existence
 97     IV,  V     |           properly belongs only to propositions: whereof there are two sorts,
 98     IV,  V     |        Which make mental or verbal propositions. To form a clear notion
 99     IV,  V     | unavoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words: and
100     IV,  V     |          instances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be
101     IV,  V     |            nature of purely mental propositions as soon as they are put
102     IV,  V     |          put into words.~4. Mental propositions are very hard to he treated
103     IV,  V     |         treat of mental and verbal propositions separately is, that most
104     IV,  V     |     suppose, that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts
105     IV,  V     |            would consider, or make propositions about the more complex ideas,
106     IV,  V     |   ourselves, and make tacit mental propositions. In substances, as has been
107     IV,  V     |         also.~5. Mental and verbal propositions contrasted. But to return
108     IV,  V     |          say, observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making:—~
109     IV,  V     |     disagreement.~Secondly, Verbal propositions, which are words, the signs
110     IV,  V     |           disagree.~6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and
111     IV,  V     |         and separating of words in propositions, as the ideas they stand
112     IV,  V     |        beings, and so have as true propositions made about them. And it
113     IV,  V     |         the other. For in both the propositions, the words are put together
114     IV,  V     |           of man; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally
115     IV,  V     |         they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal, when
116     IV,  V     |           those words.~10. General propositions to be treated of more at
117     IV,  V     |           we make use of words and propositions, I shall more at large inquire
118     IV,  V     |           real truths contained in propositions consists, and where it is
119     IV,  V     |          in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being
120     IV,  V     |           shall begin with general propositions, as those which most employ
121     IV,  VI    |            Chapter VI~Of Universal Propositions: their Truth and Certainty ~
122     IV,  VI    |         consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the
123     IV,  VI    |          understood, but in verbal propositions. All the knowledge we have,
124     IV,  VI    |         and certainty of universal propositions.~3. Certainty twofold—of
125     IV,  VI    |       words are so put together in propositions as exactly to express the
126     IV,  VI    |        explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way,
127     IV,  VI    |       uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them.
128     IV,  VI    |            Of the truth of general propositions made up of such terms we
129     IV,  VI    |         The truth of few universal propositions concerning substances is
130     IV,  VI    |          us to make many universal propositions of whose truth we can be
131     IV,  VI    |         there are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances,
132     IV,  VI    |            known, so far universal propositions may be certain. But this
133     IV,  VI    |        enable us to make universal propositions, that should carry general
134     IV,  VI    |           there can be few general propositions concerning substances of
135     IV,  VI    |         them make very few general propositions of undoubted real certainty.
136     IV,  VI    |       discovered, so far universal propositions may with certainty be made
137     IV,  VI    |   substances furnish few universal propositions about them that are certain.
138     IV,  VI    |            knowledge, or universal propositions capable of real certainty.~
139     IV,  VI    |          found in very few general propositions made concerning substances:
140     IV,  VI    |            together accordingly in propositions, can with certainty pronounce
141     IV,  VI    |         the certainty of universal propositions concerning substances is
142     IV,  VI    |           enough to make universal propositions with certainty, concerning
143     IV,  VI    |            but few general certain propositions concerning them. This is
144     IV,  VI    |           very few general certain propositions concerning man, standing
145     IV,  VI    |       reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few
146     IV,  VI    |          of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so few, and
147     IV,  VI    |           the general certainty of propositions. To conclude: general propositions,
148     IV,  VI    | propositions. To conclude: general propositions, of what kind soever, are
149     IV,  VII   |            axioms are self-evident propositions. There are a sort of propositions,
150     IV,  VII   |  propositions. There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of
151     IV,  VII   |          but consider any of those propositions which, without any proof,
152     IV,  VII   |          be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under
153     IV,  VII   |            that not only those few propositions which have had the credit
154     IV,  VII   |           infinite number of other propositions are such.~4. I. As to identity
155     IV,  VII   |        identity and diversity, all propositions are equally self-evident.
156     IV,  VII   |            us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas.
157     IV,  VII   |         this equally whether these propositions be in terms standing for
158     IV,  VII   |           well as the more general propositions; and all for the same reason,
159     IV,  VII   |         alone to these two general propositions—“whatsoever is, is”; and “
160     IV,  VII   |            either of these general propositions, perceives so clearly, and
161     IV,  VII   |        making as many self-evident propositions, as we have names for distinct
162     IV,  VII   |           we have few self-evident propositions. Secondly, as to co-existence,
163     IV,  VII   |        there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident, though
164     IV,  VII   |          and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers,
165     IV,  VII   |            the mind assent to such propositions, being nothing else but
166     IV,  VII   |           add all the self-evident propositions which may be made about
167     IV,  VII   |          and certainty of all such propositions is in this, That a man sees
168     IV,  VII   |          less general self-evident propositions.~(2) It is as plain that
169     IV,  VII   |           has demonstrated several propositions, which are so many new truths,
170     IV,  VII   |       truth and certainty of those propositions. Nor was it by them that
171     IV,  VII   |         ideas, as expressed in the propositions he demonstrated. This is
172     IV,  VII   |    traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think no step
173     IV,  VII   |             i.e. laid down certain propositions which were self-evident,
174     IV,  VII   |        syllogisms, certain general propositions—most of them, indeed, self-evident—
175     IV,  VII   |             were these two general propositions never thought on. It is
176     IV,  VII   |         know what truths these two propositions are able to teach, and by
177     IV,  VII   |           no more than bare verbal propositions, and teach us nothing but
178     IV,  VII   |          their thoughts with these propositions, made in such general terms,
179     IV,  VII   |            have these more general propositions, as formed rules and sayings,
180     IV,  VII   |          knowledge into as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar
181     IV,  VII   |         measure the truth of other propositions, it comes in time to be
182     IV,  VII   |      thought, that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence
183     IV,  VII   |       amongst so many self-evident propositions, the most general only have
184     IV,  VII   |         But yet, though both these propositions (as you see) may be equally
185     IV,  VII   |            use they will in verbal propositions, they cannot discover or
186     IV,  VII   |           consequence of these two propositions, called principles, be very
187     IV,  VII   |         use of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing
188     IV,  VII   |           of less force in proving propositions made of terms standing for
189     IV,  VII   |      complex ideas, than where the propositions are about simple ideas.
190     IV,  VII   |           terms are preserved, the propositions are about the same things,
191     IV,  VII   |       appearance are contradictory propositions; and is clear in the demonstrations
192     IV,  VII   |       serve to prove contradictory propositions; as shall yet be further
193     IV,  VII   |         truth or falsehood of such propositions, without the help of these
194     IV,  VII   |     brought as proofs to establish propositions, wherein the terms stand
195     IV,  VIII  |           Chapter VIII~Of Trifling Propositions ~1. Some propositions bring
196     IV,  VIII  |     Trifling Propositions ~1. Some propositions bring no increase to our
197     IV,  VIII  |           That there are universal propositions, which, though they be certainly
198     IV,  VIII  |            are—~2. I. As identical propositions. First, All purely identical
199     IV,  VIII  |        First, All purely identical propositions. These obviously and at
200     IV,  VIII  |         and though in such kind of propositions this great and magnified
201     IV,  VIII  |          no, may make a million of propositions of whose truth he may be
202     IV,  VIII  |            together.~How identical propositions are trifling. I know there
203     IV,  VIII  |        some who, because identical propositions are self-evident, show a
204     IV,  VIII  |            making use of identical propositions, for the improvement of
205     IV,  VIII  |           and an infinite the like propositions, for the enlarging our knowledge?
206     IV,  VIII  |           has will permit, in such propositions as these: “a law is a law,”
207     IV,  VIII  |        truth of these and all such propositions, as he that is best instructed
208     IV,  VIII  |           But what advance do such propositions give in the knowledge of
209     IV,  VIII  |      should be busy with identical propositions and insist on such maxims
210     IV,  VIII  |      offering and inculcating such propositions, in order to give the understanding
211     IV,  VIII  | disagreement of those in question. Propositions that do this are instructive;
212     IV,  VIII  |     learning to read, to have such propositions as these inculcated to him—“
213     IV,  VIII  |       these, or any such identical propositions help him one jot forwards
214     IV,  VIII  |           my calling them trifling propositions had but read and been at
215     IV,  VIII  |        have seen that by identical propositions I mean only such wherein
216     IV,  VIII  |         signification of identical propositions; and concerning all such,
217     IV,  VIII  |         them.~But if men will call propositions identical, wherein the same
218     IV,  VIII  |      certain, all that they say of propositions that are not identical in
219     IV,  VIII  |        have said relating to those propositions wherein the same term is
220     IV,  VIII  |        identical.~4. II. Secondly, propositions in which a part of any complex
221     IV,  VIII  |           Another sort of trifling propositions is, when a part of the complex
222     IV,  VIII  |         word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated
223     IV,  VIII  |          all gold is fusible. Such propositions can only serve to show the
224     IV,  VIII  |           word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than
225     IV,  VIII  |          the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty.
226     IV,  VIII  |          one is, of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in
227     IV,  VIII  |           and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something
228     IV,  VIII  |         real knowledge.~9. General propositions concerning substances are
229     IV,  VIII  |         make any universal certain propositions concerning them, any further
230     IV,  VIII  |         constitutions, the general propositions that are made about substances,
231     IV,  VIII  |    negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions
232     IV,  VIII  |           fit to be so joined; and propositions consisting of such terms,
233     IV,  VIII  |       demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby
234     IV,  VIII  |         may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without
235     IV,  VIII  |         find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions,
236     IV,  VIII  |    contribute.~12. Marks of verbal propositions. To conclude. Barely verbal
237     IV,  VIII  |            conclude. Barely verbal propositions may be known by these following
238     IV,  VIII  |            in abstract. First, All propositions wherein two abstract terms
239     IV,  VIII  |        specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem,
240     IV,  VIII  |            any term. Secondly, All propositions wherein a part of the complex
241     IV,  VIII  |             or heavy. And thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive
242     IV,  VIII  |         rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses
243     IV,  IX    |           of Existence ~1. General propositions that are certain concern
244     IV,  IX    |        take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood
245     IV,  IX    |         But, leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways of predication
246     IV,  X     |       ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves
247     IV,  XI    |            assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very
248     IV,  XI    |             but universal, certain propositions concerning this matter are
249     IV,  XI    |      knowledge. These and the like propositions we may assent to, as highly
250     IV,  XI    |    particular.~13. Only particular propositions concerning concrete existences
251     IV,  XI    |        that there are two sorts of propositions:—(1) There is one sort of
252     IV,  XI    |            1) There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence
253     IV,  XI    |           There is another sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the
254     IV,  XI    |    dependence on one another. Such propositions may be universal and certain.
255     IV,  XI    |          certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement
256     IV,  XI    |         ideas.~14. And all general propositions that are known to be true
257     IV,  XI    |    producing there general certain propositions. Many of these are called
258     IV,  XI    |         that they were any of them propositions in any one’s mind, till
259     IV,  XI    |          know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the
260     IV,  XI    |    perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are therefore called eternal
261     IV,  XI    |           because they are eternal propositions actually formed, and antecedent
262     IV,  XI    |          habitudes one to another, propositions concerning any abstract
263     IV,  XII   |      beginning one or more general propositions, as foundations whereon
264     IV,  XII   |       concerning them into general propositions. By what steps we are to
265     IV,  XII   |           to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, which have
266     IV,  XII   |     consequences from some general propositions) are the right methods of
267     IV,  XIII  |      assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement
268     IV,  XV    |           to consider; most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse—
269     IV,  XV    |            mind gives this sort of propositions is called belief, assent,
270     IV,  XV    |            always conversant about propositions whereof we have no certainty,
271     IV,  XVI   |           to take notice, that the propositions we receive upon inducements
272     IV,  XVI   |    quicksilver: these and the like propositions about particular facts,
273     IV,  XVI   |          another. Upon this ground propositions, evidently false or doubtful
274     IV,  XVI   |    mentioned, there is one sort of propositions that challenge the highest
275     IV,  XVII  |     instead of knowledge, and take propositions for true, without being
276     IV,  XVII  |           the many ways that three propositions may be put together, as
277     IV,  XVII  |            the reason why in three propositions laid together in one form,
278     IV,  XVII  |        three score ways that three propositions may be laid together, there
279     IV,  XVII  |            done by transposing the propositions, and making the medius terminus
280     IV,  XVII  |       According to reason are such propositions whose truth we can discover
281     IV,  XVII  |           2. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or probability
282     IV,  XVII  |        Contrary to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with
283     IV,  XVIII |   certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind
284     IV,  XVIII |        revelation may make us know propositions knowable also by reason,
285     IV,  XVIII |       clear evidence of reason. In propositions, then, whose certainty is
286     IV,  XVIII |      intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident deductions
287     IV,  XVIII |          in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before
288     IV,  XVIII |        possibly be mistaken in. In propositions therefore contrary to the
289     IV,  XVIII |          faith), has to do with no propositions, but those which are supposed
290     IV,  XVIII |        above reason.~Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the
291     IV,  XVIII |           reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation
292     IV,  XIX   |            ways; and contradictory propositions will be divine truths, if
293     IV,  XX    |         out many, nay most, of the propositions that, in the societies of
294     IV,  XX    |         probability, which are: I. Propositions that are not in themselves
295     IV,  XX    |          Authority.~8. I. Doubtful propositions taken for principles. The
296     IV,  XX    |         receiving into their minds propositions (especially about matters
297     IV,  XX    |          we may conclude, that, in propositions, where though the proofs