| Table of Contents | Words: Alphabetical - Frequency - Inverse - Length - Statistics | Help | IntraText Library | ||
| Alphabetical [« »] gold 179 golden 1 gone 12 good 258 goodness 25 goods 3 gospel 1 | Frequency [« »] 265 up 264 existence 259 never 258 good 254 duration 253 come 251 understanding | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances good |
Book, Chapter
1 Ded | allow me a place in your good thoughts, I had almost said 2 Ded | but it would be want of good manners not to acknowledge 3 Read | heavy hours. If it has the good luck to prove so of any 4 Read | where I think I have a very good one. I will not therefore 5 Read | same, and the nourishment good, yet every one not be able 6 Read | satisfied. If I have not the good luck to please, yet nobody 7 Read | that I have not had the good luck to receive any light 8 Read | mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be everywhere rightly 9 Read | or virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes 10 Read | careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, 11 I, I | of reason,) would be as good a proof that they were innate, 12 I, I | them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason 13 I, II | inclinations of the appetite to good, not impressions of truth 14 I, II | broken. I grant the objection good where men, though they transgress, 15 I, II | every one to be just and good. It is therefore little 16 I, II | knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to satisfy 17 I, II | its own nature right and good—then this proposition, “ 18 I, II | there are many which have as good a title as this to be received 19 I, II | other, that men even of good understanding in other matters, 20 I, III | principles. I am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought 21 I, III | is so. I think it a very good argument to say,—the infinitely 22 I, III | in the world, however of good parts, do either totally 23 I, III | knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician as any in 24 II, I | thoughts, without doing any good to itself or others, or 25 II, I | at all; since they find a good part of their lives pass 26 II, VIII | that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof 27 II, IX | be bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing 28 II, IX | a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness 29 II, X | for them, were almost as good be without them quite, since 30 II, XI | severe rules of truth and good reason; whereby it appears 31 II, XIII | might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian 32 II, XIII | a sufficient answer and good doctrine from our European 33 II, XIII | argument is at least as good, that, where nothing hinders, ( 34 II, XIV | slip out of his account a good part of that duration, and 35 II, XIV | no new ideas in us, but a good while one after another. 36 II, XIV | properly we call time.~18. A good measure of time must divide 37 II, XV | things, depending upon His good pleasure, all things exist 38 II, XVI | far or steadily, till a good while after they are well 39 II, XVI | are well furnished with good store of other ideas: and 40 II, XX | them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise 41 II, XX | and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, 42 II, XX | or considered by us.~2. Good and evil, what. Things then 43 II, XX | evil, what. Things then are good or evil, only in reference 44 II, XX | pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause or 45 II, XX | possession of any other good or absence of any evil. 46 II, XX | evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I 47 II, XX | 3. Our passions moved by good and evil. Pleasure and pain 48 II, XX | that which causes them,—good and evil, are the hinges 49 II, XX | uneasiness. For whatsoever good is proposed, if its absence 50 II, XX | unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the 51 II, XX | approaching possession of a good; and we are then possessed 52 II, XX | are then possessed of any good, when we have it so in our 53 II, XX | in the possession of that good; for he needs but to reflect 54 II, XX | mind, upon the thought of a good lost, which might have been 55 II, XX | unattainableness of any good, which works differently 56 II, XX | by the consideration of a good we desire obtained by one 57 II, XX | constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure operates 58 II, XX | various considerations of good and evil. I might perhaps 59 II, XXI | turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not 60 II, XXI | generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for 61 II, XXI | for want of some absent good. All pain of the body, of 62 II, XXI | in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain 63 II, XXI | felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, 64 II, XXI | another of absent positive good; and here also the desire 65 II, XXI | as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain 66 II, XXI | it. But here all absent good does not, according to the 67 II, XXI | because the absence of good is not always a pain, as 68 II, XXI | is. And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered 69 II, XXI | desire determines the will. Good and evil, present and absent, 70 II, XXI | desire, fixed on some absent good: either negative, as indolence 71 II, XXI | bare contemplation of these good ends to which we are carried 72 II, XXI | 35. The greatest positive good determines not the will, 73 II, XXI | consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines 74 II, XXI | that good, the greater good, determines the will, that 75 II, XXI | forced to conclude that good, the greater good, though 76 II, XXI | conclude that good, the greater good, though apprehended and 77 II, XXI | of this confessed greater good; but any other uneasiness 78 II, XXI | which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he confesses 79 II, XXI | want of viewing the greater good; for he sees and acknowledges 80 II, XXI | resolutions to pursue the greater good; but when the uneasiness 81 II, XXI | the great acknowledged good loses its hold, and the 82 II, XXI | allowed for true, and made good by constant experience, 83 II, XXI | the relish even of those good things which we have: a 84 II, XXI | may be said that absent good may, by contemplation, be 85 II, XXI | in the mind as a present good, able to counterbalance 86 II, XXI | the mind of whatever is good is there only, like other 87 II, XXI | one jot moved, towards the good things of another life, 88 II, XXI | determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation 89 II, XXI | the state of all absent good, and that which, in the 90 II, XXI | possible. For, all absent good, by which alone, barely 91 II, XXI | infinitely greater possible good should regularly and constantly 92 II, XXI | were so that the greater good in view determines the will, 93 II, XXI | determines the will, so great a good, once proposed, could not 94 II, XXI | this infinitely greatest good, without ever letting it 95 II, XXI | of the mind fixed to that good.~39. But any great uneasiness 96 II, XXI | and in view the greater good. But that it is not so, 97 II, XXI | infinitely greatest confessed good being often neglected, to 98 II, XXI | ever-lasting unspeakable, good, which has sometimes moved 99 II, XXI | 43. Happiness and misery, good and evil, what they are. 100 II, XXI | pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to produce 101 II, XXI | of pleasure be in itself good; and what is apt to produce 102 II, XXI | rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find 103 II, XXI | pleasure, has the nature of good, and vice versa.~44. What 104 II, XXI | and vice versa.~44. What good is desired, what not. Though 105 II, XXI | be that which is called good and evil, and all good be 106 II, XXI | called good and evil, and all good be the proper object of 107 II, XXI | desire in general; yet all good, even seen and confessed 108 II, XXI | his happiness. All other good, however great in reality 109 II, XXI | things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without 110 II, XXI | determined to any pursuit of good cheer, poignant sauces, 111 II, XXI | may have a clear view of good, great and confessed good, 112 II, XXI | good, great and confessed good, without being concerned 113 II, XXI | happiness, as soon as any good appears to make a part of 114 II, XXI | it.~45. Why the greatest good is not always desired. This, 115 II, XXI | That the greater visible good does not always raise men’ 116 II, XXI | present misery. but all absent good does not at any time make 117 II, XXI | removed, a moderate portion of good serves at present to content 118 II, XXI | to the greatest apparent good. That this is so, I think 119 II, XXI | far surpassing all the good that is to be found here. 120 II, XXI | by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determined 121 II, XXI | attraction of remoter absent good. We are seldom at ease, 122 II, XXI | order to happiness,—absent good, though thought on, confessed, 123 II, XXI | confessed, and appearing to be good, not making any part of 124 II, XXI | consideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power 125 II, XXI | proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn and 126 II, XXI | will, and be pursued. For good, though appearing and allowed 127 II, XXI | mind, there is no room for good, barely as such, to come 128 II, XXI | view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going 129 II, XXI | its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought 130 II, XXI | should be determined by good, as that the power of acting 131 II, XXI | own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we 132 II, XXI | that we may attain the good we choose. And therefore, 133 II, XXI | determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have 134 II, XXI | cannot choose what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty 135 II, XXI | general, which is our greatest good, and which, as such, our 136 II, XXI | then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined 137 II, XXI | happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the 138 II, XXI | which is their greatest good. For, the inclination and 139 II, XXI | and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth 140 II, XXI | till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire. 141 II, XXI | minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things; 142 II, XXI | possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts, 143 II, XXI | that they do not all pursue good; but that the same thing 144 II, XXI | that the same thing is not good to every man alike. This 145 II, XXI | use of your sight, wine is good for you; but if the pleasure 146 II, XXI | the choosing of a remote good as an end to be pursued. 147 II, XXI | which he then judges to be good. For, though his will be 148 II, XXI | by that which is judged good by his understanding, yet 149 II, XXI | himself wrong measures of good and evil; which, however 150 II, XXI | contemplation of remote and future good, to raise in himself desires 151 II, XXI | from our desires of absent good; which desires always bear 152 II, XXI | relish we have of any absent good; in both which we are apt 153 II, XXI | Our judgment of present good or evil always right. In 154 II, XXI | judgments men make of future good and evil, whereby their 155 II, XXI | seem: the apparent and real good are, in this case, always 156 II, XXI | it is felt, the present good or evil is really so much 157 II, XXI | never err in our choice of good: we should always infallibly 158 II, XXI | judgments have regard to future good and evil only. But since 159 II, XXI | the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw 160 II, XXI | carry the mind out to absent good, according to the necessity 161 II, XXI | are not moved by absent good. For, in this narrow scantling 162 II, XXI | remote and even apparent good that affects us. Because 163 II, XXI | desire of the greatest absent good. For, whilst such thoughts 164 II, XXI | behaviour here, the measures of good and evil that govern his 165 II, XXI | remember that things are judged good or bad in a double sense:—~ 166 II, XXI | That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely 167 II, XXI | pain, are considered as good and evil.~64. No one chooses 168 II, XXI | mistakes that which is really good or evil; that which is the 169 II, XXI | the greatness of future good and evil, which is that 170 II, XXI | judgment, which is concerning good or evil, as it is considered 171 II, XXI | its embraces.~67. Absent good unable to counterbalance 172 II, XXI | Add to this, that absent good, or, which is the same thing, 173 II, XXI | actions. (II) As to things good or bad in their consequences, 174 II, XXI | is in them to procure us good or evil in the future, we 175 II, XXI | proceeding, to venture a greater good for a less, upon uncertain 176 II, XXI | man sees what would do him good or harm, what would make 177 II, XXI | other known or apparent good. For since we find that 178 II, XXI | cannot enjoy all sorts of good, but one excludes another; 179 II, XXI | on every apparent greater good, unless it be judged to 180 II, XXI | both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often 181 II, XXI | it, when it is a remote good. But, which way ever it 182 II, XXI | possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary 183 II, XXI | comes not to pass. If the good man be in the right, he 184 II, XXI | our happiness: but every good, nay, every greater good, 185 II, XXI | good, nay, every greater good, does not constantly move 186 II, XXI | the particular apparent good which we then desire makes 187 II, XXII | of one who made show of good qualities which he had not; 188 II, XXIII | appears all red; but by a good microscope, wherein its 189 II, XXVII | nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had so much 190 II, XXVII | and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say this 191 II, XXVII | affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to 192 II, XXVIII| so made up, are morally good or bad.~5. Moral good and 193 II, XXVIII| morally good or bad.~5. Moral good and evil. Good and evil, 194 II, XXVIII| 5. Moral good and evil. Good and evil, as hath been shown, ( 195 II, XXVIII| pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is only 196 II, XXVIII| actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us, 197 II, XXVIII| of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, 198 II, XXVIII| to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his 199 II, XXVIII| deviation from his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the 200 II, XXVIII| most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; 201 II, XXVIII| and advances the general good of mankind in this world, 202 II, XXVIII| lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any 203 II, XXVIII| laws the rules of moral good and evil. These three then, 204 II, XXVIII| denominate their actions good or bad.~14. Morality is 205 II, XXVIII| forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, sin or duty: and 206 II, XXVIII| actions are considered as good, bad, or indifferent; and 207 II, XXVIII| be regular or irregular, good or bad; and so, as far as 208 II, XXVIII| loves and is ready to do good to another, has all these 209 II, XXVIII| motion; fifthly, the idea of good, which signifies anything 210 II, XXVIII| ideas, of which the word good in general signifies any 211 II, XXXI | any other original but the good liking and will of him that 212 II, XXXIII| cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing 213 II, XXXIII| this case, and you were as good preach ease to one on the 214 III, IV | and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly 215 III, IV | of what is, or is not a good definition.~7. Simple ideas, 216 III, V | to have sometimes very good and approved words in their 217 III, VI | several species, that in a good picture, we readily say, 218 III, VI | like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the 219 III, VI | state of a grown man, with a good understanding, but in a 220 III, VII | clearness and beauty of a good style. To think well, it 221 III, IX | than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on 222 III, IX | debate having been managed a good while, by variety of arguments 223 III, IX | the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the 224 III, X | really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their 225 III, X | latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man; it 226 III, X | stands for, pronounces a good word; but so long means 227 III, XI | tongue shall accompany only a good understanding; or that men’ 228 III, XI | though it have not always the good fortune to be understood; 229 III, XI | unguibus should not be a good definition of the name man, 230 III, XI | where others (who have as good eyes, but yet by use have 231 IV, III | being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the 232 IV, III | attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For, 233 IV, III | demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied by definitions, 234 IV, III | arguments either to make good their beauty, or varnish 235 IV, III | to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the Wise Architect. 236 IV, IV | changelings; which is as good a word to signify something 237 IV, XI | us in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which 238 IV, XII | was (as I suppose) the good success it seemed to have 239 IV, XII | have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims 240 IV, XIII | omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know 241 IV, XVI | attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a 242 IV, XVI | his knowledge of it is a good proof; but if another equally 243 IV, XVI | only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and 244 IV, XVII | of the cover of wit and good language, show it in its 245 IV, XVII | whether the inference be good or no; and so syllogism 246 IV, XVII | always such who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing 247 IV, XVII | afforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be 248 IV, XVIII | reason, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities 249 IV, XVIII | and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, 250 IV, XVIII | impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a sally of 251 IV, XIX | do, and who then has so good a title to expect it as 252 IV, XIX | from God, the reason is good: but then it will be demanded 253 IV, XIX | they, who were mistaken. Good men are men still liable 254 IV, XIX | truths or excite them to good actions, by the immediate 255 IV, XX | their affairs are in no very good posture. How men, whose 256 IV, XX | of moment after it, and good and evil to depend on choosing 257 IV, XX | vice in wrong measures of good.~17. IV. Authority. The 258 IV, XXI | the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable