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| Alphabetical [« »] subsist 13 subsistence 1 subsisting 2 substance 205 substances 396 substante 1 substantia 1 | Frequency [« »] 207 actions 207 perhaps 205 number 205 substance 204 senses 202 further 200 right | John Locke An essay concerning human understanding IntraText - Concordances substance |
Book, Chapter
1 I, III | by any other.~19. Idea of substance not innate. I confess there 2 I, III | and that is the idea of substance; which we neither have nor 3 I, III | signify nothing by the word substance but only an uncertain supposition 4 II, I | think. But whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, 5 II, I | defining the soul to be “a substance that always thinks,” and 6 II, IV | space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to possess 7 II, XII | operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself 8 II, XII | supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always 9 II, XII | first and chief Thus if to substance be joined the simple idea 10 II, XII | and reasoning, joined to substance, the ordinary idea of a 11 II, XIII | terms body and spirit.~17. Substance which we know not, no proof 12 II, XIII | space, void of body, be substance or accident, I shall readily 13 II, XIII | a clear distinct idea of substance.~18. Different meanings 14 II, XIII | 18. Different meanings of substance. I endeavour as much as 15 II, XIII | of these two syllables, substance, to consider whether applying 16 II, XIII | the same common nature of substance, differ not any otherwise 17 II, XIII | different modification of that substance; as a tree and a pebble, 18 II, XIII | when God is said to be a substance; for another when the soul 19 II, XIII | when the soul is called substance; and for a third when body 20 II, XIII | is called so;—if the name substance stands for three several 21 II, XIII | three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another 22 II, XIII | may not make a fourth?~19. Substance and accidents of little 23 II, XIII | forced to find out the word substance to support them. Had the 24 II, XIII | but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been 25 II, XIII | support his elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually. 26 II, XIII | Indian philosopher,—that substance, without knowing what it 27 II, XIII | European philosophers,—that substance, without knowing what it 28 II, XIII | supports accidents. So that of substance, we have no idea of what 29 II, XIII | there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show 30 II, XIII | from moving outwards be substance or accident, something or 31 II, XXI | ask, whether the will be a substance, an agent, or at least to 32 II, XXI | in these instances, the substance that hath motion or thought 33 II, XXI | the subject. Sometimes the substance or agent puts itself into 34 II, XXI | Whatsoever modification a substance has, whereby it produces 35 II, XXI | called action: v.g. a solid substance, by motion, operates on 36 II, XXI | sensible ideas of another substance, and therefore this modification 37 II, XXI | this motion in that solid substance is, when rightly considered, 38 II, XXI | power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion 39 II, XXI | in itself or in another substance when at rest. So likewise 40 II, XXI | operation of any external substance is called a power of thinking: 41 II, XXII | efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced is called, 42 II, XXIII| which therefore we call substance.~2. Our obscure idea of 43 II, XXIII| 2. Our obscure idea of substance in general. So that if any 44 II, XXIII| concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find 45 II, XXIII| we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, 46 II, XXIII| obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made 47 II, XXIII| unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the 48 II, XXIII| we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having 49 II, XXIII| speaking, intimate that the substance is supposed always something 50 II, XXIII| clear or distinct idea of substance in general. Hence, when 51 II, XXIII| support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we 52 II, XXIII| clear an idea of spiritual substance as of corporeal substance. 53 II, XXIII| substance as of corporeal substance. The same thing happens 54 II, XXIII| the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit; whereby 55 II, XXIII| subsist; by supposing a substance wherein thinking, knowing, 56 II, XXIII| as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of 57 II, XXIII| that the idea of corporeal substance in matter is as remote from 58 II, XXIII| apprehensions, as that of spiritual substance, or spirit: and therefore, 59 II, XXIII| having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more 60 II, XXIII| and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there 61 II, XXIII| and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.~6. Our ideas 62 II, XXIII| secret abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas 63 II, XXIII| has no other idea of any substance, v.g. let it be gold, horse, 64 II, XXIII| the complex one of that substance we call a loadstone; and 65 II, XXIII| subjects. Because every substance, being as apt, by the powers 66 II, XXIII| aptness we consider in any substance, to give or receive such 67 II, XXIII| primary qualities, as that the substance so altered should produce 68 II, XXIII| c., co-existing in some substance, we are able to frame the 69 II, XXIII| corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct 70 II, XXIII| being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have 71 II, XXIII| being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none 72 II, XXIII| 16. No idea of abstract substance either in body or spirit. 73 II, XXIII| far from the idea of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing 74 II, XXIII| think, is an extended solid substance, capable of communicating 75 II, XXIII| immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power 76 II, XXIII| means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: 77 II, XXIII| say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. 78 II, XXIII| minds, and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived 79 II, XXIII| have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally unknown 80 II, XXIII| difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should, by thought, 81 II, XXIII| into motion, than how a substance we know not should, by impulse, 82 II, XXIII| of body, stands thus: the substance of spirits is unknown to 83 II, XXIII| unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown 84 II, XXIII| of an immaterial knowing substance.~32. We know nothing of 85 II, XXIV | simple ideas, united in one substance. And as the mind, by putting 86 II, XXV | notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only 87 II, XXV | thing, whether simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name 88 II, XXV | which are really in any substance, but for the most part easy 89 II, XXVI | Thus, finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, 90 II, XXVI | So also, finding that the substance, wood, which is a certain 91 II, XXVI | is turned into another substance, called ashes; i.e., another 92 II, XXVI | of simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not before 93 II, XXVI | thing, either simple idea, substance, or mode, begin to be; and 94 II, XXVI | this, when referred to a substance, produced in the ordinary 95 II, XXVI | consider any simple idea or substance, as beginning to exist, 96 II, XXVII| is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all sorts 97 II, XXVII| one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and 98 II, XXVII| person, if person, man, and substance, are three names standing 99 II, XXVII| it be the same identical substance. This few would think they 100 II, XXVII| thinking thing, i.e. the same substance or no. Which, however reasonable 101 II, XXVII| it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in 102 II, XXVII| solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in 103 II, XXVII| distance of time, or change of substance, no more two persons, than 104 II, XXVII| Personal identity in change of substance. That this is so, we have 105 II, XXVII| matter. Thus, we see the substance whereof personal self consisted 106 II, XXVII| Personality in change of substance. But the question is, Whether 107 II, XXVII| is, Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, 108 II, XXVII| constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their supposition 109 II, XXVII| something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved 110 II, XXVII| identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore those who 111 II, XXVII| thinking in an immaterial substance only, before they can come 112 II, XXVII| Whether, if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances 113 II, XXVII| transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant were 114 II, XXVII| act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented 115 II, XXVII| transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible 116 II, XXVII| Whether, the same immaterial substance remaining, there can be 117 II, XXVII| Whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may be 118 II, XXVII| man; the same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, 119 II, XXVII| though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, 120 II, XXVII| place that self in what substance you please—than that I who 121 II, XXVII| consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial, 122 II, XXVII| on consciousness, not on substance. Self is that conscious 123 II, XXVII| thinking thing,—whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual 124 II, XXVII| that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate 125 II, XXVII| mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined to, or affected 126 II, XXVII| not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in 127 II, XXVII| individual, immaterial, thinking substance; in short, the same numerical 128 II, XXVII| person: the identity of substance will not do it; for whatever 129 II, XXVII| not do it; for whatever substance there is, however framed, 130 II, XXVII| as well as any sort of substance be so, without consciousness.~ 131 II, XXVII| some individual immaterial substance or no. For, granting that 132 II, XXVII| granting that the thinking substance in man must be necessarily 133 II, XXVII| identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure 134 II, XXVII| consciousness.~24. Not the substance with which the consciousness 135 II, XXVII| Indeed it may conceive the substance whereof it is now made up 136 II, XXVII| consciousness removed, that substance is no more itself, or makes 137 II, XXVII| part of it, than any other substance; as is evident in the instance 138 II, XXVII| reference to any immaterial substance, which is void of that consciousness 139 II, XXVII| being. For, whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which 140 II, XXVII| one individual immaterial substance.~But let men, according 141 II, XXVII| self, the same numerical substance is not considered as making 142 II, XXVII| have the same numerical substance become a part of two different 143 II, XXVII| separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation 144 II, XXVII| particle of matter does. Any substance vitally united to the present 145 II, XXVII| a man for an immaterial substance, independent from matter, 146 II, XXVII| names. To conclude: Whatever substance begins to exist, it must, 147 II, XXX | were found together in any substance: v.g. a rational creature, 148 II, XXX | collections of ideas as no substance ever showed us united together, 149 II, XXXI | the real essence of any substance; for then the properties 150 II, XXXI | essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real 151 II, XXXI | essence this particular substance comes to be of that species, 152 II, XXXI | their complex idea of any substance all the simple ideas they 153 II, XXXI | specific ideas of the sorts of substance, for the most part, of a 154 II, XXXI | have adequate ideas of any substance made up of a collection 155 II, XXXI | a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word gold, 156 II, XXXI | simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be 157 II, XXXI | answers all that are in that substance. Since, not having tried 158 II, XXXI | idea of the powers of any substance existing, and its relations; 159 II, XXXI | qualities or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby 160 II, XXXI | the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow 161 II, XXXI | Besides, a man has no idea of substance in general, nor knows what 162 II, XXXI | general, nor knows what substance is in itself.~14. Ideas 163 II, XXXII| having joined the ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most 164 III, II | yellow and a very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities 165 III, III | the mind proceeds to body, substance, and at last to being, thing, 166 III, III | man was a solid extended substance, having life, sense, spontaneous 167 III, VI | essence of each sort of substance is our abstract idea to 168 III, VI | to them. It is true every substance that exists has its peculiar 169 III, VI | the real essence of any substance that exists, is yet the 170 III, VI | up, the confused one of substance, or of an unknown support 171 III, VI | animals, an extended solid substance of such a certain figure 172 III, VI | no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas 173 III, VI | the complex idea of that substance wherein they are all joined 174 III, VI | Instances of a species of substance named Zahab. Let us now 175 III, VI | lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye. Home 176 III, VI | complex idea, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright 177 III, VI | forming his idea of this new substance, he takes the quite contrary 178 III, VI | gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case it 179 III, VI | stands in the place of a substance, having the real essence 180 III, VIII | abstract essence of any substance; but was the abstracted 181 III, IX | different ideas of the same substance, and therefore make the 182 III, IX | together. For, though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself 183 III, IX | signification of the name of any substance? All which together, seldom 184 III, IX | the relation which that substance has to two other bodies, 185 III, IX | several properties in the same substance; and I think I may say nobody 186 III, X | a solid extended figured substance, whereof matter is but a 187 III, X | to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without 188 III, X | but the idea of a solid substance, which is everywhere the 189 III, X | constitution or essence of any substance; but, as it were, patterns 190 III, XI | peculiar in their kind to any substance; for which precise ideas 191 III, XI | ideas, than by showing the substance itself. For, he that to 192 IV, III | disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of 193 IV, III | should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; 194 IV, III | should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the 195 IV, III | perception and thought to a substance which has the modification 196 IV, III | either as an unextended substance, or as a thinking extended 197 IV, III | For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not something 198 IV, III | our complex idea of any substance: since we neither know the 199 IV, III | clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the foundation 200 IV, IV | found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence 201 IV, VI | substratum, which we call substance; but what other qualities 202 IV, VIII | on such maxims as these: “substance is substance,” and “body 203 IV, VIII | as these: “substance is substance,” and “body is body”; “a 204 IV, VIII | acceptations annexed to them: v.g. substance, man, animal, form, soul, 205 IV, X | or beginning of any one SUBSTANCE out of nothing being once