Book,  Chapter

  1   Read         |         appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit, called
  2      I,  II    |          must produce conformity of action, not barely speculative
  3     II,  I     |            never so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not
  4     II,  I     |          always thinking, always in action. That, perhaps, is the privilege
  5     II,  VII   |            to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to
  6     II,  XIX   |       probable that thinking is the action, not the essence of the
  7     II,  XIX   |      probable, that thinking is the action and not the essence of the
  8     II,  XX    |          spur to human industry and action is uneasiness. For whatsoever
  9     II,  XXI   |            relation, (a relation to action or change,) as indeed which
 10     II,  XXI   |           For all power relating to action, and there being but two
 11     II,  XXI   |        there being but two sorts of action whereof we have an idea,
 12     II,  XXI   |            rather a passion than an action in it. For, when the ball
 13     II,  XXI   |       billiard-stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion.
 14     II,  XXI   |           not the production of the action, but the continuation of
 15     II,  XXI   |         motion being little more an action, than the continuation of
 16     II,  XXI   |       figure by the same blow is an action. The idea of the beginning
 17     II,  XXI   |           of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought.
 18     II,  XXI   |           such or such a particular action. This power which the mind
 19     II,  XXI   |            directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is
 20     II,  XXI   |             The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order
 21     II,  XXI   |           voluntary. And whatsoever action is performed without such
 22     II,  XXI   |            free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that
 23     II,  XXI   |           or forbear any particular action, according to the determination
 24     II,  XXI   |           is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity
 25     II,  XXI   |    beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference
 26     II,  XXI   |           hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition,
 27     II,  XXI   |             it from, any particular action. And what is the will, but
 28     II,  XXI   |         continuing, or stopping any action, as far as it depends on
 29     II,  XXI   |        forbear doing any particular action according as its doing or
 30     II,  XXI   |             but the power to do one action is not operated on by the
 31     II,  XXI   |          the power of doing another action. For the power of thinking
 32     II,  XXI   |            is the man that does the action; it is the agent that has
 33     II,  XXI   |     preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of
 34     II,  XXI   |           the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, make it
 35     II,  XXI   |          one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest
 36     II,  XXI   |           not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or
 37     II,  XXI   |            any action, produce that action or rest, so far can he do
 38     II,  XXI   |            For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing
 39     II,  XXI   |      willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting
 40     II,  XXI   |           act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed
 41     II,  XXI   |          being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should
 42     II,  XXI   |            or non-existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary
 43     II,  XXI   |          doing or forbearance of an action in a man’s power, which
 44     II,  XXI   |         preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly
 45     II,  XXI   |          this manner, by making the action of willing to depend on
 46     II,  XXI   |           changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby
 47     II,  XXI   |           will or no, (for, when an action in his power is proposed
 48     II,  XXI   |             or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it;
 49     II,  XXI   |            in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our
 50     II,  XXI   |            power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty
 51     II,  XXI   |      forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power.
 52     II,  XXI   |         will.~28. What volition and action mean. Secondly, we must
 53     II,  XXI   |            to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its
 54     II,  XXI   |          leave here, under the word action, to comprehend the forbearance
 55     II,  XXI   |          the forbearance too of any action proposed: sitting still,
 56     II,  XXI   |     continuing in the same state or action, is only the present satisfaction
 57     II,  XXI   |           of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This
 58     II,  XXI   |             the mind to put it upon action, which for shortness’ sake
 59     II,  XXI   |       continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in
 60     II,  XXI   |             which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary
 61     II,  XXI   |             run counter. I will the action; that tends one way, whilst
 62     II,  XXI   |         never determined to any one action that may serve to remove
 63     II,  XXI   |            time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire,
 64     II,  XXI   |           34. This is the spring of action. When a man is perfectly
 65     II,  XXI   |      uneasiness—what industry, what action, what will is there left,
 66     II,  XXI   |          never is determined to any action that shall bring him out
 67     II,  XXI   |            not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed
 68     II,  XXI   |          the will to the accustomed action; which thereby gets stronger
 69     II,  XXI   |    determination of the will to one action at once, the present uneasiness
 70     II,  XXI   |             of our will to the next action will always be—the removing
 71     II,  XXI   |     determined, and so to set us on action, being only possible, but
 72     II,  XXI   |        power of setting us upon one action in preference to all others,
 73     II,  XXI   |          the will seldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary
 74     II,  XXI   |          nor is there any voluntary action performed, without some
 75     II,  XXI   |             that which keeps up the action whereon the enjoyment depends,
 76     II,  XXI   |         that determined to some new action, and the present delight
 77     II,  XXI   |    determining the will to the next action? and to that the answer
 78     II,  XXI   |         operative faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at
 79     II,  XXI   |           uneasiness is the spur to action, that is constantly most
 80     II,  XXI   |           in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry
 81     II,  XXI   |          object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else.
 82     II,  XXI   |            our willing it, but some action in our power, it is there
 83     II,  XXI   |             wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.~
 84     II,  XXI   |         turns; and no sooner is one action dispatched, which by such
 85     II,  XXI   |      determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the
 86     II,  XXI   |           the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows
 87     II,  XXI   |       determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination)
 88     II,  XXI   |             the good or evil of any action, we were not free; the very
 89     II,  XXI   |            will, and engaging us in action. This is standing still,
 90     II,  XXI   |          our will to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance
 91     II,  XXI   |      determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and
 92     II,  XXI   |          out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before
 93     II,  XXI   |            of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist
 94     II,  XXI   |        preference of each voluntary action, have their rise:~(1) From
 95     II,  XXI   |            And therefore were every action of ours concluded within
 96     II,  XXI   |          the will determined to any action in pursuit of any other
 97     II,  XXI   |             accompanies any sort of action? And as to that, it is plain,
 98     II,  XXI   |            the latter of these, any action is rendered more or less
 99     II,  XXI   |             but the pleasure of the action itself is best acquired
100     II,  XXI   |             will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined
101     II,  XXI   |         little more exact survey of action. I have said above, that
102     II,  XXI   |           ideas but of two sorts of action, viz. motion and thinking.
103     II,  XXI   |         whereby it is put into that action, purely from without, and
104     II,  XXI   |           or agent puts itself into action by its own power, and this
105     II,  XXI   |          any effect, that is called action: v.g. a solid substance,
106     II,  XXI   |      modification of motion we call action. But yet this motion in
107     II,  XXI   |             does not always signify action: v.g. this proposition:
108     II,  XXI   |        active, does not signify any action in me, whereby I operate
109     II,  XXI   |           into that motion. Such an action is the product of active
110     II,  XXII  |        which comprehend in them all action,) and power, from whence
111     II,  XXII  |             with names to them. For action being the great business
112     II,  XXII  |        every occasion to break into action, we call it disposition.
113     II,  XXII  |             us examine any modes of action, v.g. consideration and
114     II,  XXII  |            words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect.
115     II,  XXII  |          the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances
116     II,  XXII  |        subject exerting that power, action; but in the subject wherein
117     II,  XXII  |           two. For whatever sort of action besides these produce any
118     II,  XXII  |          which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the
119     II,  XXII  |              signify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all,
120     II,  XXII  |      contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are
121     II,  XXII  |       freezing seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies
122     II,  XXII  |          containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.~12.
123     II,  XXII  |             than those of power and action. I think I shall not need
124     II,  XXII  |         here that, though power and action make the greatest part of
125     II,  XXIII |            convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter;
126     II,  XXIII |            thinking, and a power of action; i.e. a power of beginning
127     II,  XXV   |        because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is
128     II,  XXVII |      extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches
129     II,  XXVII |           reflects on it, that that action was done.~10. Consciousness
130     II,  XXVII |         repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness
131     II,  XXVII | consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal
132     II,  XXVII |   consciousness the same individual action it could not: but it being
133     II,  XXVII |            representation of a past action, why it may not be possible,
134     II,  XXVII |           till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done
135     II,  XXVII |              being conscious of the action of its past duration, may
136     II,  XXVII |          justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand
137     II,  XXVII |             make my own thought and action, it will no more belong
138     II,  XXVII |          which did such and such an action some years since, by which
139     II,  XXVII |             the account of any such action, is all one as to be made
140     II,  XXVIII|      product and consequence of the action itself For that, being a
141     II,  XXVIII|            observe the relation any action hath to it, and to judge
142     II,  XXVIII|            and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with
143     II,  XXVIII|            or not conformity of any action to that rule: and therefore
144     II,  XXVIII|      thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple ideas belonging
145     II,  XXVIII|         found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to
146     II,  XXVIII|         praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if
147     II,  XXVIII|             then, as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by
148     II,  XXVIII|         mode, or particular sort of action, by particular ideas, distinguished
149     II,  XXVIII|            the positive idea of the action, and its moral relation,
150     II,  XXVIII|            express both the mode or action, and its moral rectitude
151     II,  XXVIII|            the positive idea of the action, and the reference it has
152     II,  XXVIII|            the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety
153     II,  XXVIII|          called stealing, as an ill action, disagreeing with the rule
154     II,  XXVIII|  disposition; fourthly, the idea of action, which is any kind of thought
155     II,  XXVIII|          same, whether the rule any action is compared to be true or
156     II,  XXVIII|          relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the
157     II,  XXVIII|             the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare
158     II,  XXX   |             or a complex idea of an action which may exist. But to
159     II,  XXXI  |          denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree
160     II,  XXXII |            have the idea of such an action of a man who forbears to
161     II,  XXXII |             an one as represents an action, either as I find or imagine
162     II,  XXXII |         frugality or virtue to this action, then it may be called a
163     II,  XXXIII|          thinks on the man and that action over and over, and by ruminating
164    III,  V     |             been witness to such an action? No: but it suffices here,
165    III,  V     |         idea, whether ever any such action were committed in rerum
166    III,  V     |             a particular species of action, signified by the word murder,
167    III,  V     |           as no distinct species of action; but if the point of the
168    III,  VII   |            intimate some particular action of its own, at that time,
169    III,  VII   |          They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind.
170    III,  VII   |          They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind;
171    III,  IX    |        which are not visible in the action itself; the intention of
172    III,  IX    |             the outward and visible action of him that commits either:
173    III,  IX    |           committed, and is all the action that perhaps is visible,
174     IV,  III   |            of our duty and rules of action as might place morality
175     IV,  IV    |           be true in reality of any action that exists conformable
176     IV,  IV    |         found no more appearance or action of life than there is in
177     IV,  V     |            and separating. But this action of the mind, which is so
178     IV,  VIII  |          justice, that this or that action is or is not temperate:
179     IV,  X     |     produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds,
180     IV,  XVI   |           in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in,
181     IV,  XIX   |       authority: and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves
182     IV,  XIX   |         proposition to be true, any action to be right, only because
183     IV,  XIX   |         written word of God, or the action conformable to the dictates
184     IV,  XIX   |          express for any opinion or action, we may receive it as of
185     IV,  XX    |             interest of any one; no action, no concernment of his following