Book,  Chapter

  1    Int        |         assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth
  2      I,  I    |         this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the
  3      I,  I    |          any truth be meant by this proposition, that men “assent to them
  4      I,  I    |         perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then
  5      I,  I    |             knows the truth of that proposition upon the same grounds and
  6      I,  I    |             ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and
  7      I,  I    |             of another. Since every proposition wherein one different idea
  8      I,  I    |            any other. But, since no proposition can be innate unless the
  9      I,  I    |            mark of innate, whatever proposition can be found that receives
 10      I,  I    |           be admitted for an innate proposition, as well as this maxim, “
 11      I,  I    |            he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before,
 12      I,  I    |             harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when demonstrated.
 13      I,  I    |         themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them,
 14      I,  I    |           hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such
 15      I,  I    |       gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were
 16      I,  I    |             quickly assents to this proposition, “That an apple is not fire,”
 17      I,  I    |           child will assent to this proposition, “That it is impossible
 18      I,  I    |          make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general
 19      I,  I    |        denied one of another in the proposition. But if propositions be
 20      I,  I    |             or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet,
 21      I,  II   |          being a command, and not a proposition, and so not capable of truth
 22      I,  II   |             be reduced to some such proposition as this: “It is the duty
 23      I,  II   |            For let us consider this proposition as to its meaning, (for
 24      I,  II   |       accounted laudable, will be a proposition so far from being certain,
 25      I,  II   |            right and good—then this proposition, “That virtue is the best
 26      I,  II   |          think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more
 27      I,  II   |          meaning. Nor is the fourth proposition (viz.”Men must repent of
 28      I,  II   |          Indeed this is a very true proposition, and fit to be incated on
 29      I,  III  |        worship, will assent to this proposition, “That God is to be worshipped,”
 30      I,  III  |             ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow; and yet millions
 31      I,  III  |             begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little question
 32      I,  III  |            certainly assent to this proposition, “That the sun is lucid,
 33      I,  III  |           that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant
 34     II,  I    |            it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, “That
 35     II,  I    |          thinks,” be a self-evident proposition, that everybody assents
 36     II,  I    |            it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof. I would
 37     II,  XXI  |           signify action: v.g. this proposition: I see the moon, or a star,
 38     II,  XXXII|          still some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation
 39     II,  XXXII|           which amounts to a mental proposition, though it be usually not
 40     II,  XXXII|            but in that tacit mental proposition, wherein a conformity and
 41     II,  XXXII|         contain in them some mental proposition. The ideas that are in a
 42    III,  VI   |    signification, that, though this proposition—“gold is fixed”—be in that
 43    III,  VII  |            more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former,
 44     IV,  I    |        square. Nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know
 45     IV,  I    |             man is said to know any proposition, which having been once
 46     IV,  I    |          memory, that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected
 47     IV,  I    |        disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived;
 48     IV,  I    |          the ideas contained in the proposition whose certainty we remember.
 49     IV,  I    |      remember. For example: in this proposition, that “the three angles
 50     IV,  I    |            two ideas joined in that proposition is perceived; but it is
 51     IV,  I    |        certain of the truth of this proposition, that the three angles of
 52     IV,  I    |            man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle
 53     IV,  I    |          Newton certainly knows any proposition that he now at any time
 54     IV,  I    |            author himself knows the proposition to be true, remembering
 55     IV,  III  |        there is no injustice,” is a proposition as certain as any demonstration
 56     IV,  III  |          can as certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle
 57     IV,  III  |        certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematics.~
 58     IV,  IV   |            at all concerned in that proposition. And therefore he is certain
 59     IV,  IV   |          actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus
 60     IV,  IV   |           foresee what names such a proposition as this is like to be charged
 61     IV,  V    |             by another name we call proposition. So that truth properly
 62     IV,  V    |         become verbal. For a mental proposition being nothing but a bare
 63     IV,  V    |           one from another. So that proposition consists in joining or separating
 64     IV,  V    |             put them into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative;
 65     IV,  V    | divisibility; and so makes a mental proposition, which is true or false,
 66     IV,  V    |             be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are
 67     IV,  V    |           our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the
 68     IV,  V    |           appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins
 69     IV,  VI   |          ideas, as expressed in any proposition. This we usually call knowing,
 70     IV,  VI   |         certain of the truth of any proposition.~4. No proposition can be
 71     IV,  VI   |           of any proposition.~4. No proposition can be certainly known to
 72     IV,  VI   |            the truth of any general proposition, unless we know the precise
 73     IV,  VI   |           this account, whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen
 74     IV,  VI   |            All gold is fixed,” is a proposition whose truth we cannot be
 75     IV,  VI   |    certainly know the truth of this proposition, that all gold is fixed.~
 76     IV,  VI   |            Is not this an universal proposition, All gold is malleable?
 77     IV,  VI   |        answer, It is a very certain proposition, if malleableness be a part
 78     IV,  VI   |         malleable, is not a certain proposition. Because, let the complex
 79     IV,  VI   |            make a certain universal proposition concerning gold in this
 80     IV,  VI   |          and the real truth of this proposition, that all gold is malleable,
 81     IV,  VII  |      affirmation or negation in the proposition.~3. Self-evidence not peculiar
 82     IV,  VII  |              which the terms in the proposition stand for. And, therefore,
 83     IV,  VII  |             attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the two
 84     IV,  VII  |      certain of the truth of such a proposition; and this equally whether
 85     IV,  VII  |      affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, “whatsoever is, is”; or
 86     IV,  VII  |           from it, as in this other proposition, “it is impossible for the
 87     IV,  VII  |              makes the truth of the proposition presently visible, and that
 88     IV,  VII  |             the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater
 89     IV,  VII  |            s own mind, whether this proposition, “a circle is a circle,”
 90     IV,  VII  |            be not as self-evident a proposition as that consisting of more
 91     IV,  VII  |             and again, whether this proposition, “blue is not red,” be not
 92     IV,  VII  |          blue is not red,” be not a proposition that the mind can no more
 93     IV,  VII  |          think it is a self-evident proposition, that two bodies cannot
 94     IV,  VII  |         cannot but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon
 95     IV,  VII  |        medius terminus to prove any proposition; and the other could as
 96     IV,  VII  |            knowledge on the general proposition, what is, is; or, it is
 97     IV,  VII  |           but such. Each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity
 98     IV,  VII  |           ground, I think that this proposition, “A hill is higher than
 99     IV,  VII  |      instance, than by this general proposition, “The whole is equal to
100     IV,  VII  |           one of another; viz. this proposition: “Extension or space is
101     IV,  VII  |             not to be, can make any proposition.~14. But they prove not
102     IV,  VII  |            certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any being
103     IV,  VII  |            being not that universal proposition, which perhaps he never
104     IV,  VII  |             give his assent to this proposition, that two are equal to two,
105     IV,  VIII |         know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed
106     IV,  VIII |             nor any other identical proposition, teaches us anything; and
107     IV,  VIII |            of the truth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without
108     IV,  VIII |          person, who can but make a proposition, and knows what he means
109     IV,  VIII |            being equivalent to this proposition, viz. what is, is; i.e.
110     IV,  VIII |            have made a self-evident proposition of oyster, i.e. oyster is
111     IV,  VIII |             knowledge, carries this proposition in it, viz. “Lead is a metal”
112     IV,  VIII |            solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say, all gold
113     IV,  VIII |       living body,” is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing
114     IV,  VIII |          made indeed an instructive proposition: because neither having
115     IV,  VIII |              Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand
116     IV,  VIII |         with words who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made,
117     IV,  XI   |      retains it always an undoubted proposition to me, that water did exist
118     IV,  XI   |          and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain, concerning
119     IV,  XI   |            particular. But yet this proposition, how certain soever, that “
120     IV,  XIV  |              which is the same, any proposition to be true or false, without
121     IV,  XV   |        induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather
122     IV,  XV   |           causes his assent to this proposition, that the three angles of
123     IV,  XV   |          the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments
124     IV,  XV   |          admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments
125     IV,  XV   |             less for or against any proposition, before it assents to or
126     IV,  XV   |      depends the probability of any proposition: and as the conformity of
127     IV,  XV   |         disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable.
128     IV,  XVII |        nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to draw
129     IV,  XVII |           two ideas of the inferred proposition. V.g. Let this be the proposition
130     IV,  XVII |   proposition. V.g. Let this be the proposition laid down, “Men shall be
131     IV,  XVII |          draw in the conclusion, or proposition inferred? V.g. “Men shall
132     IV,  XVII |             be connected, i.e. this proposition “men can determine themselves”
133     IV,  XVII |            are laid together in any proposition, whether that proposition
134     IV,  XVII |           proposition, whether that proposition be placed as a major or
135     IV,  XVII |          already. The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid
136     IV,  XVII |            has at least one general proposition in it. As if we could not
137     IV,  XVII |             Though the deducing one proposition from another, or making
138     IV,  XVIII|          side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the
139     IV,  XVIII|           discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men,
140     IV,  XVIII|         assent to the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of that
141     IV,  XVIII|            we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body
142     IV,  XVIII|           at once. And therefore no proposition can be received for divine
143     IV,  XVIII|           cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us: yet we cannot have
144     IV,  XVIII|             in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts
145     IV,  XVIII|        reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose revelation has not
146     IV,  XVIII|         believe that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or
147     IV,  XVIII|            it be revealed that that proposition, or all in that book, was
148     IV,  XVIII|              or not believing, that proposition, or book, to be of divine
149     IV,  XVIII|          certain a knowledge that a proposition which contradicts the clear
150     IV,  XVIII|       hearkened to. First, Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth
151     IV,  XVIII|         reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true or
152     IV,  XIX  |            The not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than
153     IV,  XIX  |           For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as
154     IV,  XIX  |        should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence
155     IV,  XIX  |            authority we give to any proposition more than it receives from
156     IV,  XIX  |      perception of the truth of the proposition, or of this, that it is
157     IV,  XIX  |             perceive the truth of a proposition, and yet not perceive that
158     IV,  XIX  |             perceive the truth of a proposition in Euclid, without its being,
159     IV,  XIX  |           that the knowledge of any proposition coming into my mind, I know
160     IV,  XIX  |       belief and assurance: and the proposition taken for a revelation is
161     IV,  XIX  |             to be true. For where a proposition is known to be true, revelation
162     IV,  XIX  |       already. If therefore it be a proposition which they are persuaded,
163     IV,  XIX  |        enthusiasm. For, whether the proposition supposed to be revealed
164     IV,  XIX  |           knowledge, uncertain, the proposition that must be well grounded
165     IV,  XIX  |         fails of evidence, that the proposition is from God. In all that
166     IV,  XIX  |          shall it be known that any proposition in our minds is a truth
167     IV,  XIX  |           guide, and to believe any proposition to be true, any action to
168     IV,  XIX  |             be an evidence that any proposition is a Divine Revelation.~
169     IV,  XIX  |        persuasion no Proof that any proposition is from God. This cannot
170     IV,  XIX  |        evidence of the truth of any proposition; and if it be not a self-evident
171     IV,  XIX  |            it be not a self-evident proposition, all the light it has, or
172     IV,  XIX  |          assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that
173     IV,  XIX  |       reason, and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be
174     IV,  XIX  |         this internal light, or any proposition which under that title we
175     IV,  XX   |         tending to the proof of any proposition; nor likewise the convenience
176     IV,  XX   |         imagined what reception any proposition shall find, how clearly
177     IV,  XX   |            the mind judges that the proposition has concernment in it: where