Book,  Chapter

  1      I,  II    |      first instances of sense and perception, there are some things that
  2      I,  III   |        mind, is, either an actual perception, or else, having been an
  3      I,  III   |       else, having been an actual perception, is so in the mind that,
  4      I,  III   |          it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is
  5      I,  III   |      Whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory,
  6      I,  III   |         consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance;
  7      I,  III   |        into actual view without a perception that it comes out of the
  8      I,  III   |       i.e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly
  9     II,  I     |  understanding with ideas is,—the perception of the operations of our
 10     II,  I     |      things without. And such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing,
 11     II,  I     |       perceive;—having ideas, and perception, being the same thing. I
 12     II,  I     |        and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly,
 13     II,  I     |          body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive)
 14     II,  I     |        subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness
 15     II,  I     |          or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery,
 16     II,  I     |    conscious, has never the least perception. I ask, then, whether Castor
 17     II,  I     |       have sometimes instances of perception whilst we are asleep, and
 18     II,  I     |          it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’
 19     II,  I     |          part of its time without perception or thought; doing very little
 20     II,  I     |        the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It
 21     II,  I     |        such operations as we call perception, remembering, consideration,
 22     II,  I     | impressions; and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are
 23     II,  II    |       than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas;
 24     II,  VI    |           things. ~2. The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we
 25     II,  VI    |          himself, are these two:— Perception, or Thinking; and Volition,
 26     II,  VII   |          and several sensations a perception of delight. If this were
 27     II,  VIII  |          our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby
 28     II,  VIII  |      natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as
 29     II,  VIII  |           the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding,
 30     II,  VIII  |          are apt to think it is a perception and resemblance of such
 31     II,  IX    |                     Chapter IX~Of Perception ~1. Perception the first
 32     II,  IX    |      Chapter IX~Of Perception ~1. Perception the first simple idea of
 33     II,  IX    |        simple idea of reflection. PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty
 34     II,  IX    |       anything. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most
 35     II,  IX    |          give us the idea of what perception is. What perception is,
 36     II,  IX    |          what perception is. What perception is, every one will know
 37     II,  IX    |     notice of within, there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies
 38     II,  IX    |           wherein consists actual perception.~4. Impulse on the organ
 39     II,  IX    |        the mind, there follows no perception: and though the motion that
 40     II,  IX    |        wherever there is sense or perception, there some idea is actually
 41     II,  IX    |    further to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive
 42     II,  IX    |          and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an
 43     II,  IX    |         to be mistaken for direct perception. But this is not, I think,
 44     II,  IX    |         that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is
 45     II,  IX    |          taking notice of it.~11. Perception puts the difference between
 46     II,  IX    |       vegetables. This faculty of perception seems to me to be, that
 47     II,  IX    |          receiving any ideas.~12. Perception in all animals. Perception,
 48     II,  IX    |        Perception in all animals. Perception, I believe, is, in some
 49     II,  IX    |    sensations are so few, and the perception they are received with so
 50     II,  IX    |          come to it?~14. Decay of perception in old age. But yet I cannot
 51     II,  IX    |          there is some small dull perception, whereby they are distinguished
 52     II,  IX    |     lowest degree of animals.~15. Perception the inlet of all materials
 53     II,  IX    |           materials of knowledge. Perception then being the first step
 54     II,  IX    |          have remarked here,—that perception is the first operation of
 55     II,  IX    |        too to imagine, that it is perception, in the lowest degree of
 56     II,  X     |         anything when there is no perception of them; this laying up
 57     II,  X     |         had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it
 58     II,  X     |         active. In this secondary perception, as I may so call it, or
 59     II,  X     |   necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great moment,
 60     II,  X     |           with me, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their
 61     II,  XI    |         enough to have a confused perception of something in general.
 62     II,  XI    |           the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and
 63     II,  XIV   |         to me, in that we have no perception of duration but by considering
 64     II,  XIV   |   succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with
 65     II,  XIV   |          or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite
 66     II,  XIV   |    therefore, though a man has no perception of the length of duration
 67     II,  XIV   |          in our minds, we have no perception of motion; which consisting
 68     II,  XIV   |         no otherwise gives us any perception than as it causes in our
 69     II,  XVIII |          remote from any sensible perception, yet at last hath nothing
 70     II,  XIX   |          distinct ideas. Thus the perception or thought which actually
 71     II,  XX    |       pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so,
 72     II,  XXI   |        bodies, in relation to our perception, &c.? And, if considered
 73     II,  XXI   |         involuntary. The power of perception is that which we call the
 74     II,  XXI   |           call the Understanding. Perception, which we make the act of
 75     II,  XXI   |         is of three sorts:—1. The perception of ideas in our minds. 2.
 76     II,  XXI   |        ideas in our minds. 2. The perception of the signification of
 77     II,  XXI   |    signification of signs. 3. The perception of the connexion or repugnancy,
 78     II,  XXI   |     Perceptivity, or the power of perception, or thinking; Motivity,
 79     II,  XXIII | themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to suit them to their
 80     II,  XXIII |      fancy concerning the ways of perception of beings above us; but
 81     II,  XXIII |        things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial
 82     II,  XXVII |           without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how
 83     II,  XXVIII|     another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion. Secondly,
 84     II,  XXVIII|          whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all
 85     II,  XXIX  |           explained by sight. The perception of the mind being most aptly
 86     II,  XXIX  |         well-ordered sensation or perception, present them. Whilst the
 87     II,  XXIX  |           organs, or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened
 88     II,  XXIX  |           such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from
 89     II,  XXIX  |           it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes
 90     II,  XXIX  |      smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses; and
 91     II,  XXX   |        all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined
 92     II,  XXXI  |         which having any distinct perception at all can I have any idea
 93     II,  XXXII |          knowledge, and make each perception more comprehensive, the
 94    III,  IV    |           it is such a particular perception in us, than the idea of
 95    III,  IV    |      standing only for one simple perception, men for the most part easily
 96    III,  VI    |          one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself.
 97    III,  IX    |         being each but one single perception, are much easier got, and
 98    III,  IX    |          essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify:
 99    III,  XI    |      ideas limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to
100     IV,  I     |         them.~2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement
101     IV,  I     |          me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion of and
102     IV,  I     |           it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge,
103     IV,  I     |           by its natural power of perception and distinction. And though
104     IV,  I     |            and is nothing but the perception of the relation between
105     IV,  I     |           in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed
106     IV,  I     |          foregoing clear and full perception, whereof the mind is assured
107     IV,  I     |      which at first produced that perception. He remembers, i.e. he knows (
108     IV,  I     |    general knowledge. If then the perception, that the same ideas will
109     IV,  I     |          when the very discovery, perception, and laying together that
110     IV,  I     |         always so clear as actual perception, and does in all men more
111     IV,  II    |           in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement
112     IV,  II    |           that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable
113     IV,  II    |           the faculty of distinct perception, it will perceive the agreement
114     IV,  II    |           in one, or clearness of perception in the other.~6. Not so
115     IV,  II    |        knowledge. It is true, the perception produced by demonstration
116     IV,  II    |          proof; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement,
117     IV,  II    |          is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement
118     IV,  II    |        two ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement
119     IV,  II    |         There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about
120     IV,  II    |         to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun
121     IV,  II    |         external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have
122     IV,  II    |       knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement
123     IV,  II    |    clearness or obscurity of that perception, and not in the clearness
124     IV,  II    |           have but a very obscure perception of their agreement, and
125     IV,  III   |           been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement
126     IV,  III   |          further than we can have perception of that agreement or disagreement.
127     IV,  III   |  agreement or disagreement. Which perception being: 1. Either by intuition,
128     IV,  III   |           not very acute, ways of perception, such as are our senses;
129     IV,  III   |            some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as
130     IV,  III   |    Omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to a substance
131     IV,  III   |      whereof the mind has a clear perception: yet, without setting down
132     IV,  III   |          any sort of body and any perception of a colour or smell which
133     IV,  IV    |   Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement
134     IV,  IV    |        knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement
135     IV,  IV    |           certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement
136     IV,  IV    |     demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the
137     IV,  IV    |       everlasting state of sense, perception, and knowledge, only because
138     IV,  V     |          words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement
139     IV,  VII   |       been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement
140     IV,  VII   |         For, First, The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement
141     IV,  VII   |           any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being,
142     IV,  VII   |         the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them.
143     IV,  VII   |        being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement
144     IV,  VII   |  conversant about.~10. Because on perception of them the other parts
145     IV,  VII   |           but the clear, distinct perception he hath of his own simple
146     IV,  IX    |         evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as
147     IV,  IX    |          doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the
148     IV,  IX    |        and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act
149     IV,  X     |     witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot
150     IV,  X     |            a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then
151     IV,  X     |          blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing
152     IV,  X     |     should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is
153     IV,  X     |          material, without sense, perception, or thought, as the clippings
154     IV,  X     |           and from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident
155     IV,  X     |           hence, that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be
156     IV,  XI    |        upon it: of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few
157     IV,  XII   |     truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement
158     IV,  XVII  |         been shown, consists in a perception of the agreement or disagreement
159     IV,  XVII  |          outward sense and inward perception? What need it there of reason?
160     IV,  XVII  |       consists in nothing but the perception of the connexion there is
161     IV,  XVII  |     particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement or disagreement
162     IV,  XVII  |           represented by. But the perception of the agreement or disagreement
163     IV,  XVII  |        Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement
164     IV,  XVII  |         Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement
165     IV,  XVIII |       from the clear and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement
166     IV,  XVIII |           is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement
167     IV,  XVIII |         the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that
168     IV,  XVIII |   therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement
169     IV,  XIX   |            This seeing, is it the perception of the truth of the proposition,
170     IV,  XIX   |        God? This feeling, is it a perception of an inclination or fancy
171     IV,  XIX   |          I know not how, is not a perception that it is from God. Much
172     IV,  XIX   |     persuasion that it is true, a perception that it is from God, or
173     IV,  XX    |         is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assent is