Book,  Chapter

  1   Read         |            elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with
  2   Read         |      circumstances in order to the soul’s exerting them,” all that
  3   Read         |     propositions which, though the soul from the beginning, or when
  4   Read         |        Book. For I suppose by the “soul’s exerting them,” he means
  5   Read         |          to know them; or else the soul’s “exerting of notions”
  6   Read         |            in the mind before the “soul exerts them,” i.e. before
  7   Read         |         necessary “in order to the soul’s exerting them,” brings
  8   Read         |          not so imprinted upon the soul as that they naturally and
  9   Read         |    themselves, as p. 78, that the “soul exerts them.” When he has
 10   Read         |       others what he means by “the soul’s exerting innate notions,”
 11      I,  I     |         the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first
 12      I,  I     |            truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands
 13      I,  I     |         stamped immediately on the soul, (as these men suppose,)
 14      I,  II    |         reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly,
 15      I,  III   |           a creature consisting of soul and body, be the same man
 16      I,  III   |    Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though
 17      I,  III   |            too, which had the same soul, were not the same with
 18     II,  I     |         which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and
 19     II,  I     |         scarce ever at all.~9. The soul begins to have ideas when
 20     II,  I     |            is an opinion, that the soul always thinks, and that
 21     II,  I     |            as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from
 22     II,  I     |         after the beginning of his soul. For, by this account, soul
 23     II,  I     |        soul. For, by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and
 24     II,  I     |          at the same time.~10. The soul thinks not always; for this
 25     II,  I     |            proofs. But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent
 26     II,  I     |         any more necessary for the soul always to think, than for
 27     II,  I     |       being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body;
 28     II,  I     |           the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary
 29     II,  I     |         being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly,
 30     II,  I     |       thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it,
 31     II,  I     |            whether this, “That the soul always thinks,” be a self-evident
 32     II,  I     |           I do not say there is no soul in a man, because he is
 33     II,  I     |            of it. I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never
 34     II,  I     |            conscious of it. If the soul doth think in a sleeping
 35     II,  I     |            it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is
 36     II,  I     |           the same person; but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates
 37     II,  I     |             consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are
 38     II,  I     |         happiness or misery of his soul, which it enjoys alone by
 39     II,  I     |           man are two persons. The soul, during sound sleep, thinks,
 40     II,  I     |          Let us suppose, then, the soul of Castor, while he is sleeping,
 41     II,  I     |           life, without a thinking soul, to all other animals. These
 42     II,  I     |            should live without the soul; nor that the soul should
 43     II,  I     |     without the soul; nor that the soul should subsist and think,
 44     II,  I     |           then, I say, suppose the soul of Castor separated during
 45     II,  I     |          who is sleeping without a soul. For, if Castor’s soul can
 46     II,  I     |           a soul. For, if Castor’s soul can think, whilst Castor
 47     II,  I     |           of two men with only one soul between them, which we will
 48     II,  I     |         and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking in the waking
 49     II,  I     |         Pollux, thus with only one soul between them, which thinks
 50     II,  I     |         same reason, they make the soul and the man two persons,
 51     II,  I     |          two persons, who make the soul think apart what the man
 52     II,  I     |          persons to consist in the soul’s being united to the very
 53     II,  I     |       doctrine, who teach that the soul is always thinking. Those,
 54     II,  I     |          perhaps be said,—That the soul thinks even in the soundest
 55     II,  I     |           retains it not. That the soul in a sleeping man should
 56     II,  I     |          sort of thinking; and the soul, in such a state of thinking,
 57     II,  I     |            for such ideas, nor the soul for such thoughts. Perhaps
 58     II,  I     |        that in the thinking of the soul, which is not perceived
 59     II,  I     |            sleeping man, there the soul thinks apart, and making
 60     II,  I     |          the body too; or else the soul, or any separate spirit,
 61     II,  I     |           think? They who make the soul a thinking thing, at this
 62     II,  I     |        noble, as the thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking;
 63     II,  I     |            On this hypothesis, the soul must have ideas not derived
 64     II,  I     |          satisfied in,—whether the soul, when it thinks thus apart,
 65     II,  I     |       these men must say, that the soul owes the perfection of rational
 66     II,  I     |           irrational; and that the soul should retain none of its
 67     II,  I     |       confidently tell us that the soul always actually thinks,
 68     II,  I     |          ideas are that are in the soul of a child, before or just
 69     II,  I     |    together. It is strange, if the soul has ideas of its own that
 70     II,  I     |            find it reason that the soul should, in its retirement
 71     II,  I     |          spirit? It is strange the soul should never once in a man’
 72     II,  I     |           conclude either that the soul remembers something that
 73     II,  I     |         How knows any one that the soul always thinks? For if it
 74     II,  I     |           pronounce that the human soul, or, which is all one, that
 75     II,  I     |            that it is possible the soul may always think, but not
 76     II,  I     |            is as possible that the soul may not always think; and
 77     II,  I     |         improbable. To suppose the soul to think, and the man not
 78     II,  I     |          they who tell us that the soul always thinks, do never,
 79     II,  I     |         man always thinks. Can the soul think, and not the man?
 80     II,  I     |         But it is but defining the soul to be “a substance that
 81     II,  I     |     therefore, to believe that the soul thinks before the senses
 82     II,  I     |           will find few signs of a soul accustomed to much thinking
 83     II,  I     |          imagine that the rational soul should think so much, and
 84     II,  X     |          as it were the eye of the soul upon it; though sometimes
 85     II,  XIII  |    substance; for another when the soul is called substance; and
 86     II,  XIX   |             not the essence of the soul. This difference of intention,
 87     II,  XIX   |         and not the essence of the soul? Since the operations of
 88     II,  XXI   |            some real beings in the soul that performed those actions
 89     II,  XXI   |            superior faculty of the soul; that it is or is not free;
 90     II,  XXI   |       eternal life; but unto every soul that doth evil, indignation
 91     II,  XXI   |    exquisite misery of an immortal soul hereafter, actions in his
 92     II,  XXIII |            speak not here). For my soul, being a real being as well
 93     II,  XXIII |          finds in himself that his soul can think, will, and operate
 94     II,  XXIII |        Nobody can imagine that his soul can think or move a body
 95     II,  XXIII |           impulse: and our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit,
 96     II,  XXIII |           are our complex ideas of soul and body, as contradistinguished;
 97     II,  XXIII |         conceived as thinking in a soul. If any one says he knows
 98     II,  XXIII |          have a clear idea how the soul thinks as how body is extended.
 99     II,  XXVII |             For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man;
100     II,  XXVII |          could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in
101     II,  XXVII |         mind; since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness
102     II,  XXVII |         the seventh day, think his soul hath existed ever since;
103     II,  XXVII |         persuaded his had been the soul of Socrates (how reasonably
104     II,  XXVII |          suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nestor or Thersites,
105     II,  XXVII |           as well as it is now the soul of any other man: but he
106     II,  XXVII |         either of them than if the soul or immaterial spirit that
107     II,  XXVII |           The body, as well as the soul, goes to the making of a
108     II,  XXVII | consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet
109     II,  XXVII |           inhabits it. But yet the soul alone, in the change of
110     II,  XXVII |          but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make
111     II,  XXVII |           same man. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with
112     II,  XXVII |        soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would
113     II,  XXVII |          in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts
114     II,  XXVII |            immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever
115     II,  XXVII |          short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.~Secondly,
116     II,  XXVII |            regard to an immaterial soul.~Thirdly, or the same immaterial
117     II,  XXVII |     concerning these matters), the soul of a man for an immaterial
118     II,  XXVII |           to suppose that the same soul may at different times be
119     II,  XXXIII|      mother’s eyes, and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the
120    III,  VI    |          being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident,
121    III,  VI    |         little altered, a rational soul could not have been lodged
122    III,  VI    |            ill figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him,
123    III,  X     |          The Platonists have their soul of the world, and the Epicureans
124    III,  XI    |       whether they have a rational soul or no; which can be no more
125    III,  XI    |        informed us that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement,
126     IV,  III   |           lessen the belief of the soul’s immateriality: I am not
127     IV,  III   |           the Immateriality of the Soul, if our faculties cannot
128     IV,  III   |        philosophical proofs of the soul’s immateriality; since it
129     IV,  III   |           the immateriality of the soul, have been forward to make
130     IV,  III   |         certainly knowing what his soul is. It is a point which
131     IV,  III   |         fixedly for or against the soul’s materiality. Since, on
132     IV,  IV    |         doors all consideration of soul or spirit; upon whose account
133     IV,  IV    |        internal perfections of his soul: which is but little better
134     IV,  IV    |          is the sign of a rational soul within, which is immortal.
135     IV,  IV    |          yet nevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape;
136     IV,  IV    |           that there is a rational soul in a changeling, because
137     IV,  IV    |       concluded to have a rational soul. I know not by what logic
138     IV,  IV    |           is a man, has a rational soul, though it appear not: this
139     IV,  IV    |           that it hath no rational soul, and must be destroyed.
140     IV,  IV    |         carries with it a rational soul? For, since there have been
141     IV,  IV    |          not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. What
142     IV,  VII   |      demonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man
143     IV,  VIII  |           thereby; v.g. “what is a soul, is a soul,”; or, “a soul
144     IV,  VIII  |         v.g. “what is a soul, is a soul,”; or, “a soul is a soul”; “
145     IV,  VIII  |          soul, is a soul,”; or, “a soul is a soul”; “a spirit is
146     IV,  VIII  |           soul,”; or, “a soul is a soul”; “a spirit is a spirit”; “
147     IV,  VIII  |          existence; or, who hath a soul, hath a soul. What is this
148     IV,  VIII  |            who hath a soul, hath a soul. What is this more than
149     IV,  VIII  |      substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive,
150     IV,  VIII  |   undoubted propositions about the soul, without knowing at all
151     IV,  VIII  |            knowing at all what the soul really is: and of this sort,
152     IV,  XX    |        time at all to think of his soul, and inform himself in matters