Book,  Chapter

  1   Read         |         was there not laying down moral rules, but showing the original
  2   Read         |        the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the
  3   Read         |          rules men make use of in moral relations, whether these
  4   Read         |          a ground or measure of a moral relation is—that esteem
  5   Read         |        they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and gravity of
  6      I,  II    |       Practical Principles ~1. No moral principles so clear and
  7      I,  II    |          hard to instance any one moral rule which can pretend to
  8      I,  II    |         is stronger against those moral principles than the other.
  9      I,  II    |           evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning
 10      I,  II    |         It may suffice that these moral rules are capable of demonstration:
 11      I,  II    |         Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all
 12      I,  II    |         strongly impelling us.~4. Moral rules need a proof, ergo
 13      I,  II    |        think there cannot any one moral rule be proposed whereof
 14      I,  II    |       that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon
 15      I,  II    |    variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to be found
 16      I,  II    |           be allowed that several moral rules may receive from mankind
 17      I,  II    |         it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation which
 18      I,  II    |       teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would
 19      I,  II    | Conscience no proof of any innate moral rule. To which I answer,
 20      I,  II    |         come to assent to several moral rules, and be convinced
 21      I,  II    |        opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of
 22      I,  II    |      should ever transgress those moral rules, with confidence and
 23      I,  II    |           observation or sense of moral principles, or what touch
 24      I,  II    |      Whole nations reject several moral rules. Here perhaps it will
 25      I,  II    |          so far from being innate moral principles, that if they
 26      I,  II    |      overturning of all morality. Moral laws are set as a curb and
 27      I,  II    |     impossible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general
 28      I,  II    |           finding any such innate moral principles in themselves,
 29      I,  II    |          not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave
 30      I,  II    |          commands,” for an innate moral principle written on the
 31      I,  II    |        consent (were there any in moral principles) to truths, the
 32      I,  III   |        how there should be innate moral principles, without an innate
 33     II,  XXVIII|        whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation
 34     II,  XXVIII|          to his army.~4. Ideas of moral relations. Fourthly, There
 35     II,  XXVIII|            I think, may be called moral relation, as being that
 36     II,  XXVIII|        that which denominates our moral actions, and deserves well
 37     II,  XXVIII|           morally good or bad.~5. Moral good and evil. Good and
 38     II,  XXVIII|           pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is
 39     II,  XXVIII|         reward and punishment.~6. Moral rules. Of these moral rules
 40     II,  XXVIII|          6. Moral rules. Of these moral rules or laws, to which
 41     II,  XXVIII|           only true touchstone of moral rectitude; and, by comparing
 42     II,  XXVIII|          of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions;
 43     II,  XXVIII|           three laws the rules of moral good and evil. These three
 44     II,  XXVIII|         they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate
 45     II,  XXVIII|           and so hath a notion of moral goodness or evil, which
 46     II,  XXVIII|         therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being
 47     II,  XXVIII|     requires. And thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded
 48     II,  XXVIII|  whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions; or by what standard
 49     II,  XXVIII|       prescribed by some law.~15. Moral actions may be regarded
 50     II,  XXVIII|            To conceive rightly of moral actions, we must take notice
 51     II,  XXVIII|       idea of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended
 52     II,  XXVIII|           mode or action, and its moral rectitude or obliquity:
 53     II,  XXVIII|    understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action, and
 54     II,  XXVIII|          which, therefore, I call moral relations.~It would make
 55     II,  XXVIII|         at all. And thus also all moral words terminate at last,
 56     II,  XXVIII|     Thirdly, That in these I call moral relations, I have a true
 57     II,  XXVIII|     brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude; because I have
 58     II,  XXXIII|           in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings,
 59    III,  V     |       part of those which make up moral discourses: whose names,
 60    III,  V     |          parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the
 61    III,  IX    |          as for the most part are moral words, have seldom in two
 62    III,  IX    |        the most material of them, moral words, the sounds are usually
 63    III,  IX    |           meaning of names, these moral words are in most men’s
 64    III,  IX    |        the signification of these moral words there is no end. These
 65    III,  X     |         the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter
 66    III,  X     |         and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words
 67    III,  XI    |        would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can
 68    III,  XI    |          of modes, and especially moral words; which, having no
 69    III,  XI    |        especially in the names of moral words. The proper signification
 70    III,  XI    |        not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct.
 71    III,  XI    |      perverseness to discourse of moral things with uncertainty
 72    III,  XI    |        real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly
 73    III,  XI    |     substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers
 74    III,  XI    |           concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him,
 75    III,  XI    |       should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical
 76    III,  XI    |          17. Definitions can make moral discourses clear. This I
 77    III,  XI    |         consequently in all their moral discourses, to define their
 78    III,  XI    |           occasion: since thereby moral knowledge may be brought
 79    III,  XI    |    whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known; and
 80    III,  XI    |          necessary, especially of moral words, is what I mentioned
 81     IV,  III   |          19. Two things have made moral ideas to be thought incapable
 82     IV,  III   |       This cannot be thus done in moral ideas: we have no sensible
 83     IV,  III   |     difficulty in ethics is, That moral ideas are commonly more
 84     IV,  III   |         avoidable in very complex moral ideas, where the same name
 85     IV,  III   |        the complexedness of these moral ideas there follows another
 86     IV,  III   |      dealing demonstratively with moral ideas. One part of these
 87     IV,  III   |         of these disadvantages in moral ideas which has made them
 88     IV,  III   |        indifferency, search after moral as they do mathematical
 89     IV,  III   |           can be hoped for in the moral sciences? The subject part
 90     IV,  IV    |     however they exist.~7. And of moral. And hence it follows that
 91     IV,  IV    |         And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable
 92     IV,  IV    |       other ideas or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical,
 93     IV,  IV    |        the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from
 94     IV,  IV    |          true or certain, because moral ideas are of our own making
 95     IV,  IV    |        will here be said, that if moral knowledge be placed in the
 96     IV,  IV    |          contemplation of our own moral ideas, and those, as other
 97     IV,  IV    |            Just the same is it in moral knowledge: let a man have
 98     IV,  IV    |            Indeed, wrong names in moral discourses breed usually
 99     IV,  IV    |       present and in view? But in moral names, that cannot be so
100     IV,  IV    |       law-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made
101     IV,  V     |         our way to knowledge.~11. Moral and metaphysical truth.
102     IV,  V     |           sorts of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking
103     IV,  XII   |       will have other measures of moral rectitude and pravity, than
104     IV,  XII   |    advance.~11. We are fitted for moral science, but only for probable