Book,  Chapter

 1    Int        |          demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which
 2      I,  III  |  principles, it may with as much probability be said, that a man hath
 3     II,  XXI  |     anything of the certainty or probability of a future state, designing
 4     IV        |         BOOK IV~Of Knowledge and Probability~
 5     IV,  II   |         which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly
 6     IV,  III  |          am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge; and I think
 7     IV,  III  |         ourselves with faith and probability: and in the present question,
 8     IV,  III  |          be; because the highest probability amounts not to certainty,
 9     IV,  III  |       find man to be; who in all probability is one of the lowest of
10     IV,  VI   |       certainty.~13. Judgment of probability concerning substances may
11     IV,  VI   |      must content ourselves with probability in the rest: but can have
12     IV,  XI   |       the world: but this is but probability, not knowledge.~10. Folly
13     IV,  XI   |       the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed
14     IV,  XIV  |    twilight, as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to
15     IV,  XIV  |           Judgment, or assent to probability, supplies our want of knowledge.
16     IV,  XV   |                    Chapter XV~Of Probability ~1. Probability is the appearance
17     IV,  XV   |    Chapter XV~Of Probability ~1. Probability is the appearance of agreement
18     IV,  XV   |   connexion one with another; so probability is nothing but the appearance
19     IV,  XV   |  foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing; the proof
20     IV,  XV   |   several degrees and grounds of probability, and assent or faith.~3.
21     IV,  XV   |    before we know them to be so. Probability is likeliness to be true,
22     IV,  XV   |      lies the difference between probability and certainty, faith, and
23     IV,  XV   | consideration.~4. The grounds of probability are two: conformity with
24     IV,  XV   | testimony of others’ experience. Probability then, being to supply the
25     IV,  XV   |    before we come to a judgment. Probability wanting that intuitive evidence
26     IV,  XV   |       examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more
27     IV,  XV   |        of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other.
28     IV,  XV   |      walk on the ice, it is past probability; it is knowledge. But if
29     IV,  XV   |          before, there the whole probability relies on testimony: and
30     IV,  XV   |        these grounds depends the probability of any proposition: and
31     IV,  XV   |          it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of
32     IV,  XVI  |      regulated by the grounds of probability. The grounds of probability
33     IV,  XVI  |      probability. The grounds of probability we have laid down in the
34     IV,  XVI  |        that, whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate
35     IV,  XVI  |          found on which side the probability appeared to them, after
36     IV,  XVI  |        doubt. But, in matters of probability, it is not in every case
37     IV,  XVI  |       unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh
38     IV,  XVI  |         weighed the arguments of probability, on which they should receive
39     IV,  XVI  |      less imposing on others.~5. Probability is either of sensible matter
40     IV,  XVI  |      receive upon inducements of probability are of two sorts: either
41     IV,  XVI  | therefore, and highest degree of probability, is, when the general consent
42     IV,  XVI  |   confidence. The next degree of probability is, when I find by my own
43     IV,  XVI  |   infinitely vary the degrees of probability. Thus far the matter goes
44     IV,  XVI  |         matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries
45     IV,  XVI  |       the different evidence and probability of the thing: which rises
46     IV,  XVI  |           by an inverted rule of probability, to pass for authentic truths;
47     IV,  XVI  |        forces me to say, That no probability can rise higher than its
48     IV,  XVI  |     analogy is the great rule of probability. [Secondly], The probabilities
49     IV,  XVI  |          draw all our grounds of probability. Thus, observing that the
50     IV,  XVI  |         next to it. This sort of probability, which is the best conduct
51     IV,  XVI  |        the more or less apparent probability of the proofs. But of faith,
52     IV,  XVII |     compare the grounds of their probability. In both these cases, the
53     IV,  XVII |        certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is that which
54     IV,  XVII |    clearer without them: and the probability which she easily perceives
55     IV,  XVII |        in demonstration, less in probability. But however it be in knowledge,
56     IV,  XVII |    running away with one assumed probability, or one topical argument,
57     IV,  XVII |       considered, is the greater probability.~6. Serves not to increase
58     IV,  XVII |         firmly together, and the probability is so clear and strong,
59     IV,  XVII |         force and weight of each probability; and then casting them up
60     IV,  XVII |      foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum
61     IV,  XVII |      propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive
62     IV,  XVII |       either as signifying above probability, or above certainty: and
63     IV,  XVII |     clearer evidence and greater probability. But since reason and faith
64     IV,  XVIII|  specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in
65     IV,  XVIII|    discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or
66     IV,  XVIII|         but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound
67     IV,  XVIII|         our assent, even against probability. For where the principles
68     IV,  XVIII|          to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination
69     IV,  XVIII|        nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge
70     IV,  XIX  |         vouchers and gage of its probability to us; and we can receive
71     IV,  XX   |          give assent contrary to probability. Knowledge being to be had
72     IV,  XX   |          motive of our assent be probability, and that probability consists
73     IV,  XX   |         be probability, and that probability consists in what is laid
74     IV,  XX   |        their assents contrary to probability. For there is nothing more
75     IV,  XX   |      them. IV. Wrong measures of probability.~2. First cause of error,
76     IV,  XX   |          are to be had for their probability: but hitherto we have considered
77     IV,  XX   |         error, wrong measures of Probability. Fourthly, There remains
78     IV,  XX   |       taken up wrong measures of probability, which are: I. Propositions
79     IV,  XX   |      first and firmest ground of probability is the conformity anything
80     IV,  XX   |      judge of truth, and measure probability; to that degree, that what
81     IV,  XX   |    swallow, not only against all probability, but even the clear evidence
82     IV,  XX   |      same fate. Let ever so much probability hang on one side of a covetous
83     IV,  XX   |          into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his
84     IV,  XX   |        matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs
85     IV,  XX   |        side on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable
86     IV,  XX   |      that side on which the less probability appears to him, seems to
87     IV,  XX   |        nor our assent, where the probability manifestly appears upon
88     IV,  XX   |          inquire and examine the probability: there I think it is not
89     IV,  XX   |    appear on either. The greater probability, I think, in that case will
90     IV,  XX   |         he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid knowing
91     IV,  XX   |         lie in wrong measures of probability; as the foundation of vice
92     IV,  XX   |        and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of,
93     IV,  XX   |      arguments and appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick