Book,  Chapter

 1    III,  VIII |         other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their
 2     IV,  I    |            truths whereof we have an intuitive knowledge; where the ideas
 3     IV,  I    |             much more imperfect than intuitive, as we shall see in the
 4     IV,  II   |      clearness, of our knowledge: 1. Intuitive. All our knowledge consisting,
 5     IV,  II   |             this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the
 6     IV,  II   |            mind has no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case
 7     IV,  II   |             not so easy and ready as intuitive knowledge. This knowledge,
 8     IV,  II   |           the assent so ready, as in intuitive knowledge. For, though in
 9     IV,  II   |           Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge
10     IV,  II   |          there was a doubt; which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen
11     IV,  II   |             those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have
12     IV,  II   |            other.~6. Not so clear as intuitive knowledge. It is true, the
13     IV,  II   |          accompany that which I call intuitive: like a face reflected by
14     IV,  II   |     demonstrated knowledge must have intuitive evidence. Now, in every
15     IV,  II   | demonstrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement
16     IV,  II   |           perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge: if it cannot
17     IV,  II   |              produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty; which when the
18     IV,  II   |              account) is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement
19     IV,  II   |          this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men embrace
20     IV,  II   | praeconcessis. The necessity of this intuitive knowledge, in each step
21     IV,  II   |         there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge; and where it
22     IV,  II   |              of any two ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement
23     IV,  II   |             is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there
24     IV,  II   |           degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive:
25     IV,  III  |            hence it also follows:~3. Intuitive knowledge extends itself
26     IV,  III  |               That we cannot have an intuitive knowledge that shall extend
27     IV,  III  |         between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the
28     IV,  III  |       connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts
29     IV,  III  |       disagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended
30     IV,  III  |           does not, presently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be
31     IV,  III  |             man may know how far his intuitive knowledge in surveying several
32     IV,  III  |      existence of things, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence,
33     IV,  VII  |             respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far
34     IV,  VII  |              we have but very little intuitive knowledge: nor are there
35     IV,  VII  |          Upon this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires
36     IV,  IX   |              of our own existence is intuitive. As for our own existence,
37     IV,  IX   |        convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence,
38     IV,  X    |             it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall
39     IV,  X    |              place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing
40     IV,  XI   |         altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions
41     IV,  XII  |            of them, that they had an intuitive knowledge, and by that a
42     IV,  XV   |            right ones; and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement
43     IV,  XV   |             Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly
44     IV,  XVII |       highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning. Some
45     IV,  XVII |             as has been said, I call intuitive knowledge; which is certain,
46     IV,  XVII |           nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge. Because in that
47     IV,  XVII |           knowledge, as the other is intuitive.~16. To supply the narrowness
48     IV,  XVII |      narrowness of demonstrative and intuitive knowledge we have nothing
49     IV,  XVII |             has the overbalance.~17. Intuitive knowledge is the perception
50     IV,  XVIII|          equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never
51     IV,  XVIII|              the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern
52     IV,  XVIII|           contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this